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This thesis explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to the
period of seminal change, 1914-18. The first two chapters examine the impact of the pre-
war emphasis on world-wide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's
defence on the mindset of the Anny's leadership and its lack of preparedness for a
continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and materiel. British
Generals, busy managing the army's expansion and inexperienced in continental war,
were slow to reform. Tardiness in learning from mistakes and improving performance
resulted not from the social background of senior officers, although resistance to change
was a factor, but from the small size and inexperience of the military elite which had to
learn how to run a continental war. The subsequent three chapters analyse this poor
performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British
Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', and careerism within the high
command; the development of a younger, more professional leadership; and the tendency
of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate
prior to 1916. The next three chapters explore the rapid learning curve undergone by the
high command in 1916-18, an especially formative period resulting in the first truly
modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since. During 19 16-18 the
Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a
doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate which bedevilled Allied
offensives in 1915-17 and an operational style of attack employing limited-objective set-
pieces to overcome the German defence in depth. A final chapter concludes that,
although there were problems of adjustment in the war's early years, the developments of
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Records from numerous archive sources are referred to in the
text, and they are given the acronyms below:
CCC:	 Churchill College, Cambridge
IWN:	 Imperial War Museum, Lambeth, London
LHCMA: Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's
College, Strand, London
NAN: National Army Museum, Chelsea, London
NLS: National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh




RAF: Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, London
RAI:	 Royal Artillery Institute, Woolwich, London
SRO:	 Scottish Record Office, Edinburgh:
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GLOSSARY
The following abbreviations are employed:
A.A.G.	 Assistant Adjutant-General
A.A. & Q.M.G.	 Assistant-Adjutant and Quartermaster-
General
A.D.C.	 Aide-de-Camp
A.D.G.A.M.S.	 Assistant Director-General, Army Medical
Services
A.D.M.S.	 Assistant Director of Medical Services
A.D.O.S.	 Assistant Director of Ordnance Services
A.F.A. Bde	 Army Field Artillery Brigade
A.G.	 Adjutant-General
A.I.F.	 Australian Imperial Force
A.M.O.	 Army Medical Officer
A.M.S.	 Assistant Military Secretary, or
Army Medical Service
A.N.Z.A.C.	 Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
A.O.C.	 Air Officer Commanding
A.O.C.-in-C.	 Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief
A.P.M.	 Assistant Provost Marshal
A.Q.M.G.	 Assistant Quartermaster-General
A.S.C.	 Army Service Corps
B.E.F.	 British Expeditionary Force




B. G.0.	 Brigadier-General, Operations






B.G.R.A.	 Brigadier-General, Commanding Royal
Horse Artillery















Chief of the Air Staff
Companion of the Bath
Central Flying School
Chief of the General Staff
Chief General Staff Officer
Committee of Imperial Defence
Chief of the Imperial General Staff
Commander- in-Chief
Companion of St. Michael and St. George
Commander Royal Artillery
Commander Royal Engineers









































Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster-General
Deputy Assistant Adjutant &
Quartermaster-General
Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General
Deputy Chief of the General Staff
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry
Deputy Assistant Director-General
Deputy Director-General
Deputy Director-General Medical Services
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Director of Military Operations
Director of Miltary Operations and
Intelligence
Director of Medical Services
Director of Military Training
Deputy Quartermaster-General
Director of Ordnance Services
Director of Staff Duties
Distinguished Service Order
Egyptian Expeditionary Force
Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society
Groupe des Armees du Nord
Groupe des Armees de Reserve
Great Britain
Knight Grand Cross of the Bath





Grand Quartier General des Armees
Francais
General Staff Officer (1st Grade)
General Staff Officer (2nd Grade)
General Staff Officer (3rd Grade)
H.A.G.	 Heavy Artillery Group
H.A.R.	 Heavy Artillery Reserve
H.L.I.	 Highland Light Infantry





l.a.	 Intelligence Section A
I.b.	 Intelligence Section B
i/c	 in charge
I.C.S.	 Indian Civil Service
I . G.	 Inspector-General
I.M.S.	 Indian Medical Service
I.R.A.	 Irish Republican Army
J.P.	 Justice of the Peace
K.C.B.	 Knight Commander of the Bath
K.C.I.E.	 Knight Commander of the Indian Empire
K.C.M.G.	 Knight Commander of St. Michael and St.
George
K.C.S.I.	 Knight Commander of the Star of India
K.I.A.	 Killed In Action
K.O.S.B.	 King's Own Scottish Borderers
K.O.Y.L.I.	 King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
K.R.R.C.	 King's Royal Rifle Corps
K.S.L.I.	 King's Shropshire Light Infantry
L. of C.	 Line of Communications
M.C.	 Military Cross
M.C.C.	 Marlebone Cricket Club
M.E.F.	 Mediterranean Expeditionary Force
M.F.H.	 Master of Fox Hounds
M.G.C.	 Machine-Gun Corps
M.G.G.S.	 Major-General General Staff
M.G.O.	 Master-General of Ordnance
M.G.R.A.	 Major-General Royal Artillery
M.P.	 Member of Parliament
M.T.	 Mechanical Transport
N.S.W.	 New South Wales
N.Z. & A.	 New Zealand and Australian
0.	 Operations
O.a.	 Operations Section A
O.b.	 Operations Section B
O.B.E.	 Officer, Order of the British Empire
O.C.	 Officer Commanding
O.T.C.	 Officer Training Corps
P.C.	 Privy Councillor
P.M.O.	 Principal Medical Officer
p.s.c.	 Past Staff College
Q.M.G.	 Quarter-Master-General
Queens	 Queen's (Royal West Surrey Regiment)
R.A.	 Royal Artillery
R.A.F.	 Royal Air Force
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We are too near the events of the Great War to see
them as our descendants will see them, without
prejudice and with fuller knowledge of the facts
as a whole.'
Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Birch, 1920.
History has given the British high command during the
First World War a bad reputation and the public has a deep-
seated belief that many of the British offensives made
between 1914 and 1918 led to needlessly heavy casualties for
negligible military gain. Since the guns stopped firing
over eight decades ago, the Great War has resulted in a
large volume of literature of varied quality and
objectivity. The conventional image of that war is one of a
senseless bloodbath - a stark war of attrition conducted by
unimaginative and incompetent generals and lacking any
tactical innovation. There is an almost indelible image of
futility produced by the heavy losses sustained on the Somrne
and at Passchendaele in 1916 and 1917.
This popular perception of the First World War was an
image based largely on the vivid impressions of popular
writers like Edmund Blunden, Erich Maria Remarque, Robert
Graves, and Siegfried Sassoon. 2 These and other works all
I Lieutenant-General Sir Noel Birch, Artillery Development in the Great War, The Anny Quarterly,
October 1920.
2 Edmund Blunden, Undertones of War (1928), Erich Maria Remarque, All Quiet on the Western Front
(1929), Robert Graves, Good-bye to All That (1929), and Siegfried Sassoon, Memoirs of a Fox Hunting
Man (1928) and Memoirs of an Infantry Officer (1930).
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emphasised the appalling conditions faced by the front-line
soldier and criticised commanders for their bloody-
mindedness and distance from those conditions. Such an
approach found a public highly receptive to anti-war
messages and strongly disinclined to view war in any sort of
positive light. These eminently readable works combined
with the moving war poetry of Binyon, Graves, McRae, Owen,
Sassoon, and others established a mind set that viewed the
Great War with great revulsion and laid the foundations for
a "mud-and-blood" view of the war which put the blame for
the slaughter of British soldiers on the Western Front
directly at the feet of the B.E.F.'s commanders. British
generals were caricatured as being incompetent, mistake-
prone and callous Victorians who did nothing to rectify
their colossal errors. The true story of the First World
War and its tactics is not quite so mindless or simplistic
as these critics would have us believe.
Two major British Schools of thought had developed in
an attempt to address the controversies surrounding British
generalship on the Western Front. The critical school,
which has included both Lloyd George and Liddell Hart, has
tended to stress internal factors, usually the incompetence
of Haig, G.H.Q., and senior military commanders. The second
major school of thought, which has included both Brigadier-
General Edmonds and John Terraine, has stressed external
factors, including the pre-war British inexperience and lack
of preparation, the problem of adapting to new technology,
10
the fighting power of the German Army, restraints imposed by
coalition warfare, and political interference.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart and C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, who
provided the first realistic depictions of the war, were
both extremely able and influential historians who had
served as infantry officers on the Western Front. Although
Liddell Hart claimed objectivity, and Cruttwell more nearly
achieved it, each could not avoid subjectivity in treating
the fundamental experience of his life. Liddell Hart was
increasingly critical of the whole Western Front campaign
while Cruttwell was more understanding of the problems faced
by the generals. Liddell Hart came to exert a dominant
influence on First World War historiography through his own
prodigious output in the l920s and 1930s. Although his work
was not scholarly by modern standards, Liddell Hart listed
an impressive range of published sources and enjoyed
significant 'inside' contacts with Edmonds and many senior
officers. Liddell Hart was mainly concerned to inculcate
broad strategic views in a polemical style and was always a
staunch supporter of the 'indirect approach' as a far more
attractive alternative to Western Front attrition.
In the 1920s and l930s, 3 Liddell Hart turned from his
excessive adulation as a junior officer during the war to
extreme criticism, convinced that the grand strategy of the
war had proved an exercise in futility. For Liddell Hart,
the purpose of military history was didactic, instructing
Captain B.H. Liddell Hart, Reputations (1928); The Real War (1930), later revised as A History of the
World War, 1914-1918 (1934); and Through the Fog of War(1938).
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for the future. He therefore devoted far more attention to
the failures of 1915-17, notably the Somme and
Passchendaele, than to the successes of 1917-18. The
fighting on the Western Front of the Last Hundred Days in
1918, culminating with the German request for an armistice,
the period on which his claim to greatness must rest, was
almost completely ignored. By the standards to which
military historians now aspire, The Real War is a very
partial and selective look at the Western Front.
Liddell Hart completely failed to understand that the
skills demanded in the leadership of mass armies in an
industrialized age were more managerial than the heroic
generalship of the 'Great Captains'. Although the quality
of much of what was written on operations was excellent and
remains of analytical value to this day, he could not begin
to unravel the processes by which the German Army was
defeated and one of the fundamental dilemmas of the First
World War, the need to integrate new technology and to shape
doctrine in the light of technological capabilities, was
solved by 1918. Both Fuller and Liddell Hart drew the false
deduction that because the massive bombardments preceding
the Battles of the Somme and Third Ypres had not achieved
their aims, artillery would have little influence on future
conflict.
The observations of a group of influential military
theorists who wrote during the 1920s and 1930s were
particularly critical. Yet for all the significance of
12
their writings, the views of the First World War advanced by
Sir Basil Liddell Hart and others, such as Major-General
J.F.C. Fuller, who savagely satirized his fellow off iecrs as
'Colonel Blimps', 4 are far from objective. Most of them
served in the war and personally suffered through the years
of mud, blood, barbed wire, and gas. Many, too, were deeply
involved in the partisan and often bitter internal debates
among the post-war armies over the proper roles of
mechanisation, air-power, and fire-power on the emerging
modern battlefield. Like their ideological opponents, their
interpretations of the lessons of the Great War were
sometimes coloured by their view of what the future should
look like.
Cruttwell was an infinitely greater historian than
Liddell Hart and his magnum opus is more objective and
balanced. He comments on the industrialization of the war
while reflecting the contempt of the infantry for the staff.
Above all, Haig receives remarkably fair, even generous,
treatment. Although critical of his weakness, Cruttwell
concludes that 'Haig grew with disappointment and disaster,
until he stood out in the last months of the war as a very
great general' and notes the impact made at G.H.Q. in 1918
by Lawrence, Haig's C.G.S., which is often ignored.6
J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure (1933); The Army in My Time (1935); and
Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier (1936).
C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War, (1934; Second Edition, 1936).
6 C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War, pp.169. and 554.
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Sir James Edmonds was the chief editor and principal
compiler of the multi volume Official History, 7 written not
as a popular layman's history but as textbooks, which could
be employed in military academies to teach lessons to future
generals. Hampered by the need to skate carefully around
mistakes made by senior officers and worries that criticisms
of the high command's conduct would damage the army's
prestige and Britain's international reputation, Edmonds
confined his text to a bald narrative of events, omitting
criticisms or placing awkward evidence in footnotes or
appendices. The result was that the books were written in a
dry style, which did not give much encouragement to read
them, obscured some important lessons, glossed over the
professional defects of senior officers, and failed to
educate the lay public in the realities of the war.
Nevertheless, careful reading sheds much light on British
operations, the lack of preparation for a continental war,
and the massive expansion of the army, which occurred during
1914-16. Edmonds' industry also left a huge mountain of
material, notably the official records and the oral and
written reminiscences of survivors, which remains a very
valuable source for historians to this day.8
The memoirs of the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George,9
and Winston Churchill, 1° outstanding polemics in defence of
Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Military Operations. France and Belgium, 1914-1918
(H.M.S.O., 1922-1948).
8 See C.A.B.44 and 45, P.R.O.
9 David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, (six volumes, 1933-1936).
Wmston Churchill, The World Crisis (six volumes, 1923-1929).
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their own reputations, which sold in large numbers and
shaped the popular historical memory of the Great War, had a
long-term impact on popular perceptions of the Somme and
Passchendaele as bloody and futile campaigns and did most
damage to the reputations of the generals. Lloyd George in
particular was highly selective in his choice of evidence
and emotive, defending his reputation and political
judgement during the war, whilst attacking and denigrating
the reputation and military judgement of the generals,
notably Haig and Robertson.
The popular image of the war was perpetuated after the
Second World War by the work of historians who were still
being inspired by the 1930's revulsion against war. It was
given fresh impetus and new directions by the mood of the
sixties, which was anti-establishment, socially sensitive
and was expressed by people who had fought in neither war.
Despite the saturation coverage of the First World War in
the 1960s, little was produced of lasting scholarly value
because there was so little attempt in the polemical books
of Leon Wolff and Alan Clark " to place the war in
historical perspective. Both authors emphasised the
failures of 1915, 1916, and 1917 and ignored the successes
of 1918.
In 1960 Falls produced a balanced and unjustly
neglected masterpiece. 12 In direct contrast to Liddell Hart
in the l920s and 1930s and to the prevailing trend of the
"Leon Wolff, In Flanders Fields (1959) and Alan Clark The Donkeys (1961).
12 Cyril Falls, The First World War (1960).
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l960s, Falls was anxious to demonstrate that 'the military
art' had not 'stood still in the greatest war to date' and
that 'skill and intelligence' were applied find solutions to
the stalemate of the early years of the war.' 3 Anticipating
the more strident revisionism of John Terraine, Falls argued
that technology and mechanization, which led to improved
tactics and strategy, had unlocked the German defences and
that from August 1918 the British Armies had triumphed. Ten
years later E.K.G. Sixsmith, using some archival sources,
which were becoming available, came to the same
conclusion.' 4 Such conclusions opened the way for later,
more academic research but did little to change the
prevailing, popular image.
From the l960s John Terraine defended the generals
against their critics, maintaining that the generals were
not 'donkeys' and that, despite his mistakes during the
attritional battles of 1916-17, Haig had won the war by
exploiting new technology. Haig had been the first allied
leader to perceive that the Germans were cracking in 1918
and had then led his armies to a series of great victories
the second half of 1918.15 Although critical of Haig's
strategy in 1917, Correlli Barnett supported Terraine's
13 Cyril Falls, The First World War, p.xvi-xvii.
" Major-General E.K.G. Sixsmith, British generalship in the Twentieth Century (1970).
' John Terrame, Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier (1963; reissued 1990); Impacts of War 1914 and
1918 (Hutchinson, 1970); The Road To Passchendaele. The Flanders Offensive of 1917, A Study in
Inevitability (1977); To Win A War. 1918, The Year of Victory (1978); The Smoke and the Fire: Myths
and Anti-Myths of War, 1861-1945 (1980) and White Heat: The New Warfare, 1914-18 (1982).
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interpretation of the conduct of operations on the Western
Front 16
In recent years there has been a renewed interest in
both academic and more populist circles in the First World
War reflecting the considerable impact that the war has had
on British History in the Twentieth Century. An increased
awareness of the Great War has led many to develop an
interest in learning about the Western Front. This growing
awareness of events between 1914 and 1918 amongst the
general public has been reflected in the publication
recently of a wide variety of books on the war, notably
fiction,' 7 and popular books,' 8 which try to make sense of
and lay the blame for the huge slaughter and sacrifices of
many ordinary men and women which took place during 'the war
to end all wars'. In terms of the historiography of the
First World War, the 1970s and l980s saw the emergence of a
post-Second World War generation of professional military
historians from Britain and the Commonwealth who began the
transformation of our understanding of the conduct of the
war on the Western Front. Scholars, such as Brian Bond,
Martin van Creveld, Tony Ashworth, Richard Holmes, and
16 Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command in the First World War (1966).
17 Such as Pat Barker Regeneration (1991), The Eye In The Door (1993), The Ghost Road (1995); and
Sebastian Fau11, Birdsong (1993).ig.	 .Such as Laffm, John, British Butchers and Bunglers of World War One (1988); Denis Wmter, Haig s
Command: A Reassessmen (1991); and J.H. Johnston, Stalemate!: The Great Trench Warfare Battles of
1915-1917 (1995).
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Timothy Lupfer, began to make the first assault on the
popular image of the war.'9
With the advantage of being at a distance from both
world wars and having virtually unlimited access to a wide
range of source material, our understanding of British
command had been transformed during the 1980s. The
publication of Shelford Bidwell and Dominic Graham's
pioneering work Firepower in 1982,20 one of the few studies
to take a balanced view between the internal and external
arguments, moved the discussion from the decisions of a
small group of leaders, such as Haig, to a study of the
British Army, a huge organisation by 1918, as a bureaucracy
which reacted to and implemented change. They examined the
technology involved in the Allied victory, maintaining that
the British achievement had been ignored. It increased
attention to the importance of artillery and led to new
studies of the First World War.
Exploiting the full range of sources now available to
throw new light on the Western Front, scholars, such as
David Woodward, Ian Beckett, Keith Simpson, David French,
Peter Simkins, John Bourne, and Bruce Gudmundsson produced
first-class scholarly analyses of the British Army as a
social institution, its attempts to absorb new technology
' 9 Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854-1914 (1972) and Liddell Hart: A Study of
his Military Thought (1977); Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
(1977); Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare, 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System (1980); Richard
Holmes, The Little Field Marshal. Sir John French (1981); Captain Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of
Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War (1981).
20 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-
1945 (1982).
18
and doctrine, the practical difficulties of military
operations, and a more subtle interpretation of the
personalities and issues. 2' The publications of
contemporary historians display a refreshing detachment from
the emotional hang-ups and petty vendettas, which have
characterised so much of the historiography of the First
World War. At the same time this new wave of scholarship
has revealed serious gaps as well as the need for a
reassessment of well-worn subjects.
Study of the performance of the British High Command on
the Western Front was invigorated by the Canadian military
historian, Tim Travers, in a series of articles and two
major books, which addressed the British Army's weaknesses
during the Great War in managerial terms. 22 In The Killing
Ground Travers argued that he had attempted to take a
balanced judgement, but with greater emphasis on internal
factors and with his analysis commencing well before the war
and based upon a wide range of sources, including official
and private papers. He concluded that the 'ethos' of the
pre-war officer corps was hierarchical and riven with
favouritism, whereby the officer corps influenced by
21 David R. Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (1983); I.F.W. Beckett and K. Simpson. A Nation
in Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War (1985); David French, British
Strategy and WarAims, 1914-1916 (1986); Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War(1986); Peter
Simkins, Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16 (1988); J.M. Bourne, Britain and
the Great War, 1914-1918 (1989); and Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the
German Army, 1914-1918 (1989).
22 .	 	 .	 ,Tim Travers, A Particular Style of Command: Haig and GHQ, 1916-1918 , Journal of Strategic Studies,
10 (1987). pp.363-3'76; 'The Evolution of British Strategy and Tactics on the Western Front in 1918:
GHQ, Manpower and Technology', Journal of Militaiy History, 54 (1990), pp.173-200; The Killing
Ground: The British Army, the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918
(1987); and How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army on the Western
Front, 1917- 1918 (1992).
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hierarchy and personality proved inflexible in meeting the
challenges of the war.
Travers believed that there was not a revolution in
military thinking before the war and that pre-war ideas and
a particular pre-war image of warfare persisted throughout
the war. There was an enduring legacy of the Napoleonic
experience and the cult of the offensive spirit so that
senior commanders, especially Haig, pursued tactics which
were often inappropriate and beyond the capabilities of the
weapons systems employed. Travers also identified the
penchant of senior commanders to regard battle as an ordered
and regular activity, notably Haig, who saw his role as that
of 'master planner' issuing generalized instructions.
Travers' account does not explain the reasons for the
successes of 1918. Given the severity of his strictures,
the pre-war Regular Army ought not to have been able to
adapt at all, even slowly and inadequately, to the challenge
of defeating the German Army on the Western Front. In
particular, it is difficult to square his account of the
pre-war army, based largely on personal papers and 'court
gossip', with the army as a practical instrument of empire.
The army's role as a colonial police force has often been
regarded as a source of institutional weakness. It produced
an army, which fought in 'penny packets', lacked operational
doctrine, was weak in staff work and under-gunned in heavy
artillery.
20
But the wars of empire also produced an officer corps
with vast combat and active service experience. The
intensity and range of professional opportunity offered by
the pre-war British Army was enormous. It is difficult to
reconcile the fit, adaptable, energetic, resourceful men who
served as battalion, battery, brigade and divisional
commanders in 1918 with the dogma-ridden and unprofessional
commanders depicted by Professor Travers. He also gives far
too little attention in his work to the second half of 1918,
when the B.E.F. finally succeeded in integrating infantry,
artillery, armour and aircraft, something it could hardly
have achieved had it been as 'traditional' and hostile to
'technological solutions' as he claims. What Travers never
explains is what an "unstructured" battle might be like, and
in what important aspects it would differ from a
catastrophe. Neither does he explain what the generals and
staffs are for, if it is not to try to bring some degree of
order out of chaos.
In the l990s, reflecting the renewed interest in the
war, a number of books by Bill Rawling, Robin Prior, Trevor
Wilson, Martin Samuels, Paddy Griffith, Paul Harris, David
T. Zabecki, Paul Ha ris, David French, Andy Simpson, Shane
Schreiber, Ian Malcolm Brown, and Niall Ferguson have
successfully challenged the dominant view of trench warfare
and have sought to paint a clearer picture of the evolution
of strategy, tactics and training by both British and German
21
armies. 23 These authors argue that the last two years of
the war saw many innovative efforts to break the stalemate
of trench warfare and restore manoeuvre to the battlefield.
Those efforts did not bear fruit completely in 1917 and
1918, but the ideas behind them were taken up and improved
forming the basis for tactics in the Second World War. A
growing number of historians acknowledge impressive
developments in fighting efficiency and that the British
Army climbed a steep 'learning curve'. Refuting the
assumptions of authors such as Martin Samuels and Martin van
Creveld 24 and arguing that in doctrine, training and
tactics the British had achieved parity with the Germans by
251918, Paddy Griffith has produced one of the few British
contributions to the understanding of operational matters
and the technical problem of how the British Army achieved
the breakthrough. Neither Tim Travers, explaining British
failures in managerial terms, nor Dominick Graham, Rof
Prior and Trevor Wilson, focusing on the technical problems
of achieving and converting a break-in into a breakthrough,
have provided altogether convincing explanations for the
23 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare. Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 (1992);
Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry
Rawlinson, 1914-18 (1992); David T. Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and the Birth of
Modern Artillery (1994); Andy Simpson, The Evolution of Victory: British Battles on the Western Front,
1914-1918(1995); J.P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British Military Thought andArmoured Forces,
1903-1939 (1995); David French, The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918 (1995);
Prior and Wilson, Passchendaele: The untold story (1996); Shane B. Schreiber, The Shock Army of the
British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War (1997); Ian Malcolm Brown,
Logistics on the Western Front (1998); J.P. Harris (and Niall Barr), Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in
the Hundred Days' Campaign, 8 August - 11 November 1918 (1998); Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War
(1998).
24 Main Sarnuels, Doctrine and Dogma: German and British Infantry Tactics in the First World War
(1992) and Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Ar,nies,
1888-1918 (1995); Martin van Creveld, Command in War (1985).
25	 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front (1994).
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transformation of British fortunes in 1917-18. It is
operational rather than social studies which will alone
correct the myths still current.
For the most part the commanders of the British Army
have remained faceless, devoid of personality or character.
The British military leadership is characterised as being
led by unthinking automatons, part of a "monolithic" war
machine. This faceless and colourless portrayal of British
commanders gives little recognition to individual military
prowess, and, in the end, extends oversimplified caricatures
of generals as Colonel Blimps. The results are a grossly
stereotyped image of British commanders. A more balanced
assessment of these men both as personalities and leaders is
long overdue. Undoubtedly the war saw the emergence of a
tougher and younger group of leaders during the war.
Haig had good reason to be proud of his triumph in
November 1918 but British victories and defeats were
fundamentally the accomplishments of a specific group of
men. In many ways, Haig's subordinates are the forgotten
men of the Twentieth Century. Haig's subordinates are far
less well known than, say, Montgomery's lieutenants, because
of Haig's dominating personality. While the battlefield
commanders of the Second World War such as Montgomery and
Slim became familiar names to the British people, Birdwood,
Byng, Home, Plumer and Rawlinson remain relatively unknown.
Increasingly, as the war progressed Haig's subordinates,
resisting interference, played a major, and largely
23
positive, role in winning the war on the Western Front but
they have received little recognition or serious study.
The debate continues as to whether the British
successes of summer 1918 were due to improved strategy,
tactics, weapons, technology, leadership, staff efficiency
or merely mass. Every institution has a culture. The much
discussed, yet never properly and comprehensively researched
regimental system can still be placed at the heart of
British military culture and its diversity of sub-cultures.
Much cultural behaviour can be positive, functional and
cohesive but the British Army cannot be absolved from the
negative aspects of its cultural behaviour. It is the
intention of this study to examine the mind set of the high
command and its efforts to analyse early mistakes and to
improve tactical and operational efficiency on the Western
Front.
In particular, this study looks at the development of
British operational thought during the war, a subject that
has been comparatively neglected. The concept of the
operational level of war is employed here in the sense of
the 'area between strategy and tactics which denoted the
fighting of battles in a given theatre of operations in
pursuit of the political objective of the waI26 and as the
'grey zone once called Grand Tactics, the tactics of large
formations', such as army groups, armies and corps. 27 One
26 JGG MacKenzie and Brian Holden Reid (editors), The British Army and the Operational Level of War,
English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, p.xiii.
area of much debate during the war was over the employment
of breakthrough or siege operations against the German
defences.
This work is based on a wider range of sources than
those available to earlier polemical writers such as Fuller
and Liddell Hart. Since the late 1960s a vast array of
sources have become available, not only official documents,
such as operational records and War Diaries of formations,
in the Public Record Office but a vast array of private
papers, such as contemporary letters and diaries and post-
war memoirs written by participants in the war. Most
official records relating to the Great War were not open to
historians until the mid-l960s and collections of private
papers also began to be deposited in repositories from the
late 1960s onwards. These enable the historian to produce a
detailed and balanced picture of the British Army and its
operations on the Western Front.
Contemporary scholarship has begun to correct flaws in
the prevailing, populist perception of the war and to
provided a more balanced view, which does not shy away from
apportioning blame where blame is due or giving praise when
merited. This author aims to provide a synthesis of older
ideas with a more balanced approach to the problem,
unencumbered by the emotional baggage of having lived
through, or grown up in the immediate shadow of, the Great
War. The transformation of the B.E.F. from a small,
colonial army of some 220,000 soldiers in 1914 to a large,
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continental army of over two million men in 1918 capable of
defeating the best army in the world, so often ignored by
critics, was a unique British military achievement, which
requires some explanation.
Above all, it is hoped to provide a more balanced
understanding of the war, replacing the cherished stereotype
of a futile and blundering B.E.F. with the perception that
the British Army was tactically innovative during the second
half of the Great War and able to learn from past mistakes
as was clearly shown by its performance in 1917 and in 1918.
How impressive developments in tactics, staff work,
training, operational planning and all-arms co-operation
were introduced, codified, and implemented and at what
levels the British Army progressed along the 'learning
curve' are some of the important questions which have to be
considered and answered. By examining how strategic and
technical innovation, effective co-ordination and planning
were handled, it is possible to evaluate the performance of
the British Armies in France.
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CHAPTER ONE
The Army's Ethos and Culture
To understand the British Army in 1914, one must
comprehend something of the character and mentality of the
officer corps, which was shaped by the ethos and culture of
the Army's hierarchy. In this opening chapter the British
military leadership on the Western Front is examined as a
group and "social institution". Every institution has a
culture, the integrated pattern of behaviour that transmits
knowledge and learning to succeeding generations, which can
be observed in its distinctive behaviour. The Regular Army,
largely cut off from British civilian society by the demands
of foreign service and the distaste often displayed for army
life by the middle and working classes alike, had its own
unique style and identity. Who were the Army's leaders and
what were their backgrounds, ethos and culture?
In an attempt to evaluate the breadth of background,
education and experience of the men who formed the High
Command of the British Army biographical data has been
collected on a sample of 700 senior commanders and staff
officers, who served on the Western Front at divisional
level and above between 1914 and 1918.' The overwhelming
majority (89%) were British Army officers, mostly serving
officers (82%) but also including a small number of retired
'See Appendix 1.
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officers (7%), with the rest (11%) being made up of a motley
mixture of officers from the Indian Army, the Territorials,
the Dominions, civilian life and even the Royal Navy 2
These war managers were born between 1854 and 1894,
with 311 (44.5%) being born in the 1870s; 3 drawn from an
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, upper class or professional
background. 4 The British Army's elite shared an
Establishment and Victorian upbringing, which provided a
common social background and elaborate family ties. The
leadership of the B.E.F. were members of a privileged class
enjoying social prestige based on family origin and service
to the state, which supplied a strong group and cohesive
morale. They were a cohesive group recruited from either an
aristocratic and landed-gentry background (34.5%) or
respectable middle-class service families (35%) and a
significant minority (8.5%), such as Field-Marshals Lord
Byng and Lord Cavan, Brigadier-General Hon. A.M. Henley, and
Major-General Hon. W. Lambton, were members of the nobility.
Others had aristocratic wives or family connections. A
number of generals were close to the Royal Family, notably
Lieutenant-General Sir William Pulteney (III Corps), who was
'a personal friend' of the King, 6 and Field-Marshal Earl
Haig, whose marriage to the Queen's lady-in-




6 Field Marshal Lord Kitchener to Field Marshal Sir John French, 11 July [1915], French Papers 75/46/11,
IWM.
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waiting took place in the private chapel of Buckingham
Palace.7
The landed influence on the officer corps was still
strong, with the gentry representing over a quarter (26%) of
the sample. The typical officer had the conventional
upbringing of an upper-class Victorian gentleman. General
Sir Walter Kirke, a staff officer throughout the war, had a
typical background being the second son of Colonel St.G.M.
Kirke. The Kirkes had been the squires of Mirfield Hall,
East Markham, Nottinghamshire, for several centuries. He
went to Haileybury, leaving at sixteen to attend a crammer
to pass into Woolwich where he won the riding prize. He
took up polo and racing when in the Army. 8
 Unfortunately,
despite such an illustrious background, the wealth
associated with the lineage had, as for many other gentry
families, almost entirely evaporated by the time Walter
Kirke was born.9
All the available biographical and autobiographical
evidence underlines the continuing influence of old
established families with a tradition of military service.
This elite was traditionally drawn from gentry with a
military tradition and such families continued to serve King
and Country as officers in the armed services.' 0 Major-
General Sir Hereward Wake was one of the Wakes of
The Countess Haig, The Man I Knew, pp.36-37.
8 'General Sir Walter M.St.G. Kirke, G.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.L., J.P.', undated, pp.1-4, Kirke Papers,
IWM.
Brian St. George Kirke, General Sir Walter Kirke, Part I. Subaltern to Major - 1896 to 1914, The Army
Quarterly and Defence Journal, Volume.1 15, No.4, p.442.
'° See Appendix 7.
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Northamptonshire, who when they were not defending the
Empire, resided at the family seat, Courteenhall." General
Sir Walter Congreve came from an old Staffordshire family
with a tradition of service in the army and a notable
ancestor in the inventor of the rocket.' 2 The County
families of Tyrone and Fermanagh in Ulster produced six
Field-Marshals 13
It was a narrow, almost feudal world whose ethos and
values remained those of the landed gentlemen, who moved in
'county' circles. Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds noted
that 'in 1914 the army was still very feudal in its status,
and great personages, even great ladies, exercised the
higher patronage' 14 Personality and connections, rather
than professional expertise, continued to exert a big
influence in the Army. Many officers believed, as a result,
that 'influential backing is more important than the
possession of brains and professional ability' •5 For
example, Haig was accused of flaunting his royal
connections,' 6 and his rapid rise attributed partly by
contemporaries to his links with the Royal family.' 7 A
number of generals, including Allenby, Hunter-Weston,
"See Professor Peter Gordon, The Wakes ofNorthamptonshire, pp.174-197.
12 See Commander Sir Geoffrey Congreve, The Con greve Family, p.1, and Lieutenant-Colonel L.B.
Thornton and Pamela Fraser, The Congreves: Father and Son, pp.3-il.
' Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massmgberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, Journal of the
RoyalArtillery, Volume LXXIII, No.4, p.292.
1 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Brigadier C.N. Barclay, 7 April 1950, Edmonds Papers
I/2B 5a, LHCMA.
Edmonds, Remarks on the Staff College, undated, Edmonds Papers L/2B 6, LHCMA.
16 Lieutenant-Colonel William Vaughan to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 21 February 1939, Liddell Hart Papers
11/1933/108, LHCMA; Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XIV, Edmonds Papers 11112/10, LHCMA.
I Brigadier-General Sir James Edrnonds, Diary Note, Liddell Hart, 1 February 1928, Liddell Hart Papers
111928 ib; Lord Geddes, Unworthy Apolgia, National Review, February 1953, p.1 09, Liddell Hart
Papers 15 2/23, LHCMA; Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XIV, Edmonds Papers ff12 10, LHCMA.
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Rawlinson, Robertson, and Smith-Dorrien, kept up a long
correspondence from France with the King through his Private
Secretaries. At lower levels, aristocratic officers such as
Major-Generals Lord Loch and Hon. W. Lambton also had
contacts with the King and were reporting on operations.
The Army's values still espoused the traditional and
leisurely lifestyle of the gentry and an officer was still
expected to be a 'Gentleman', in an era when it was de
rigueur for a 'Gentleman' to always carry a walking stick,
which had replaced the sword as the symbol of belonging to
the gentry. 18 Service served to confirm one's social
status. Allenby, who looked like 'a typical young English
fox-hunting squire',' 9 joined the Army because 'other
openings were limited, for commercial business was not in
those days considered a suitable occupation for a
gentleman' •20 In Scottish society of the mid-nineteenth
century, Douglas Haig's mother was regarded as having
married beneath her class by marrying into trade (his father
owned the Whisk, 'y Distillers) and as a result he went to
school in England and into an English cavalry regiment, the
7th Hussars, rather than into the Scots Greys, 2' and was
referred to disparagingly as 'the opulent whiskey
22distiller'.
18 Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoirs, p.38, Archibald Papers, IWM.
Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XIV, Edmonds Papers 11112 13-14, LHCMA.
20 General Sir Archibald Wavell, Allen by: A Study in Greatness, p.35.
21 See Duff Cooper, Haig, p.166; Lord Geddes, Unworthy Apolgia, National Review, February 1953,
p.109, Liddell Hart Papers 15 2 23, LHCMA; and Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart to Victor Bonham-
Carter, 2 March 1964, Liddell Hart Papers 1/90 36, LHCMA.
Annotation by Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, 2 September 1918, on a letter from Major E.J.
Thompson, Haig's A.D.C. at G.H.Q., to Pinney, 1 September 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
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General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, from the landed gentry
in Scotland, 23 was 'an awful snob' at Staff College, who
allegedly socialised only with officers of the Rifle Brigade
and Guardsmen. 24 If a person had the proper background as a
gentleman, it could be assumed that he would have the proper
abilities as an officer. Major-General Sir Robert Rice, 'a
fine type of a loyal and determined English gentleman, ready
to do his duty whatever required and regardless of his
rank', 25 was the ideal officer. In 1914 Major-General Sir
Frederic Glubb reminded his son 'that you are also a
gentleman, a simple honest English gentleman - you cannot be
anything better whatever you aret 26
Officers were 'expected to have more sense of chivalry
and honour' 27 and conduct themselves in accordance with a
code of behaviour based upon 'standards of morality,
manners, and honesty, qualities we have been taught to
regard as sacrosanct, and a peculiar heritage of our
race' 
28 The Army's code was largely implicit and
unwritten. A gentleman knew when he had broken the code.
If caught transgressing the manners and morals which were
stressed by the culture of the Army resignation was
expected. For example, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Repington
General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter I, p.2, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
24 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with General [Sir Henry] Karslake, 20 November 1936, Liddell Hart Papers
11/1936/107, LHCMA.
25 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 8 November 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/6 PRO.
26	 Sir John Glubb, The Changing Scenes of Lfe: An Autobiography, p.26.
27	 Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massmgberd to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 15
May 1918, Maurice Papers 4 4 2/1, LHCMA.
28 General Sir Kenneth Wigram to Major-General G.P. Dawnay, 8 December 1946, Dawnay Papers
69/2 1 3, IWM.
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was forced to resign from the Army not for being either
named as co-respondent in a divorce case in 1901 or
incompetence but because he had 'broken a solemn written
promise to a brother officer' and 'not behaved like a
gentleman' 29
To be a gentleman was to fulfil the expectations of
one's peers and often had little to do with professional
competence. For example, when discussing the possibility of
his removal from command of Second Army Haig decided that
'Plumer is himself such an honest straightforward gentleman
that I feel one ought to retain him if possible'.3°
Criticisms of senior officers reflected the prevailing
ethos. Those such as Brigadier-General John Charteris, who
'behaved in anything but a gentlemanly manner', 31 were
disapproved of and compared ill-favourably with those, such
as Field-Marshal Viscount Byng, who was 'a perfect old
courtier & gentleman in every way', 32 or General Sir Charles
Fergusson, 'a perfect sahib'
Senior officers who had served in the ranks were rare
but there were a few, notably General Sir Gerald Boyd,
Major-General Lord Dugan, and General Sir William Peyton.
Boyd was forced to obtain his commission through the ranks
because he had failed to get into Sandhurst 	 while in
29 Introduction by A.J.A. Morris to The Letters of Lieutenant-Colonel Charles a Court Repington CMG,
Military Correspondent of The Times, 1903-1918, pp.6-10.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 18 February 1916, Robertson Papers
1/22 24, LHCMA.
' General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 8 March 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
32 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 15 August 1915, Howell Papers IV/C/3/208, LHCMA.
General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 23 August 1914, Milward Papers 6510-143-1, NAM.
Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.35, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
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Peyton's case he joined the ranks and was commissioned in
the regiment of which his father was a colonel. 35 The most
famous ex-ranker, who made it to the very top of the Army
despite his working class origins, was of course 'Wully'
(later Field Marshal Sir William) Robertson and there was
some disgust during the war at his lack of a gentleman's
social graces. 36 Haig commented that it was 'much easier
to work with a gent1emanJ.37
The officer corps, educationally and socially
exclusive, was dominated by the values of the gentry, whose
family and social life was based very largely on horses and
hunting. As Major-General J.F.C. Fuller noted, 'it was a
delightful life, mostly duck-shooting and hunting in winter,
and tennis and cricket in the summer' 38 Sport was a
central activity of officers, who had ample leisure time to
indulge their passion for field sports and team games so
characteristic of the public schools from which they came
and were great enthusiasts for hunting, shooting, riding,
and other outdoor sports. Most officers enjoyed playing
sport of some kind, either individually or for regimental
teams. 19 (2.7%) of the sample particularly distinguished
themselves at first-class sport. One staff officer noted
that 'every senior officer with the forehead of an ape who
Obituary of General Sir William Peyton, in Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee's Memoirs, p. 134a, Lee
Papers, IWM.
36 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 10 April 1915, Howell Papers IV/C/3 135, LHCMA; Major-
General Sir John Davidson to Major-General Sir Louis Spears, 19 March 1933, Spears Papers 2 3 8,
LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 13 February 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.25618, PRO.
38 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, The Army in My Time, p.62.
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can afford a horse thinks he is first a huntsman & then a
soldier'	 Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh was
highly unusual in being no good at games, an indifferent
horseman, and looking 'the embodiment of the Staff College
"owl" , 40
General Sir Alexander Godley was typical in his all-
round sporting interests: captaining the school Cricket XI;
marrying a member of a famous Irish hunting family; being
keen on all forms of sport; a noted rider, polo player and
judge of horses; and Master, successively, of two garrison
packs of hounds. 41 The obsession of Regular officers with
sport also manifested itself in Divisional Race meetings and
Horse Shows during the war. In 1917 the 33rd Divisional
Race Meeting, consisting of 'seven events including two mule
Races', was a miniature Epsom 'within 8 miles of 7th Div.
fighting hard at Bullecourt' 42 while the sports meeting of
the 15th Division 'was very like an Agricultural Show, with
jumping and musical riding and races on foot and mounted'.43
The Cavalry Horse Show, besides being attended by 'a great
gathering', produced 'an excellent lunch' with salmon and
44grouse.
The Army's officer corps had been undergoing a social
transformation since the mid-nineteenth century in which the
C.M. Page to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 25 August 1934, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
4° Obituaiy of Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh by Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, no
date, Edmonds Papers V/2fFile 2, LHCMA.
" Foreward by the Hon. Evelme Godley, Letters ofArthur, Lord Kilbracken, G. C.B., and General Sir
Alexander Godley, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., 1898-1932, pp.5-6.
42	 Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 7 May 1917, Prnney Papers, IWM.
Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, p.129, Lee Papers, IWM.
General Sir Sidney Muspratt, Diary, 1 September 1917, Muspratt Papers 86/22/1, IWM.
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"landed class", in slow decline, was gradually being
replaced by the middle class, which by 1930 held an absolute
majority both in the officer corps as a whole and in its
senior ranks. By 1912 the aristocracy and landed gentry
constituted only 41% of the entire officer corps and 64% of
the officers holding the rank of Major-General and above.45
Men like Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, Major-General Sir
Charles Gwynn, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, General Sir
David Henderson, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, General Sir
Charles Monro, and General Sir Cecil Romer, belonging
respectively to distinguished families of ministers,
academics, distillers, shipbuilders, merchant bankers,
physicians, and judges, 46 came from a professional or
commercial rather than a gentry background. Nearly a
quarter (24%) of the sample were from the professional
classes. 47 The broadening of the officer corps social
background was gradual although to some extent accelerated
by the Boer War and Great War.
A significant proportion of officers were either sons
of serving officers or had relatives in the services. This
self-recruitment from among the sons of professional
officers was extremely widespread among the British military
elite. No less than 228 (32.8%), nearly a third, of the
sample were the sons of Army Off icers. 48 Jacob was one of
45 P.E. Razzell, Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British Home Army, p.353.




twenty-eight male members of his family who served in the
East India Company's Army or the Indian Army, l8l7-l926,
while Colonel B.C. Battye came from 'one of the well known
family who served India for generations' 50 Many other
senior officers also had brothers and relatives serving,
notably Birdwood who was one of five sons to serve with the
army in India. 5' This resulted in a narrowing of the base
of the British officer corps and the danger of officers
becoming a self-perpetuating clique but had the advantage of
an increase in the officer corps' professional identity.
In addition 79 (10%) were sons of generals, implying an
even tighter circle of recruitment. For example, General
Sir Hubert Gough, coming from an Anglo-Irish family, which
had abandoned the Church for the profession of arms in the
eighteenth century and included a Field-Marshal, had a
father and an uncle who were generals and had won the V.C.52
Thus, kinship provided a complex network of relationships
within the Army's elite. The daughter of General Sir
Francis Treherne married the son of Field-Marshal Sir Claud
Jacob (respectively the S.M.O. and G.O.C., Meerut Division),
the two families having known each other well in India pre-
war, with the son of Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson as
the best man. 53
 Marriage to the daughter of a high-ranking
General Sir Charles Richardson, From Churchill's Secret Circle: The Biography ofLieutenant General
Sir Ian Jacob, p.1.
5° General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.!, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
Field.Marshal Lord Birdwood, Khaki and Gown: An Autobiography, pp.25-26.
52	 Farrar-Hockley, Goughie: The Lfe of General Sir Hubert Gough, pp.3 and 383.
General Sir Charles Richardson, From Churchill's Secret Circle: The Biography of Lieutenant General
Sir Ian Jacob, p.1 6.
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officer was often a useful step in building a career
cementing professional ties with marriage. For instance,
General Sir Eric de Burgh married the daughter of
Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Fanshawe, 54 while Brigadier-
General Sir John Gough, V.C., wed the daughter of General
Sir Charles Keyes, becoming the brother-in-law of Admiral of
the Fleet Lord Keyes and Brigadier-General Sir Terence
Keyes. 55 Similarly, Cavan and Byng and General Sir Noel
Birch and Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode were brothers-in-law.
Such relationships maintained the social exclusiveness of
the Army's leadership.
Wealth was not necessarily synonymous with social
status and, although some officers, such as Haig, were
personally well off, many lacked financial largesse. Far
from emulating the relaxed amateurism of the officers of the
nineteenth-century gentry, these officers - often from a
lower income group than their predecessors - were forced by
their relative poverty to work hard and to take their
careers as military professionals seriously. Burnett-
Stuart, who won a scholarship to Repton, was aware that 'the
state of the family finances made this rather important' 56
while Kirke had to leave Haileybury at the age of sixteen
because of his failure to gain a scholarship. 57 Once in the
Army, Kirke had to rely on his ability to buy and train
General Sir Eric de Burgh, Memoir, p.21, de Burgh Papers 7306-67, NAM.
Ian F.W. Beckett, Johnnie Gough, V.C.: A Biography of Brigadier-General Sir John Edmond Gough,
V.C,, KC.B., pp. xiii-xiv.
56 General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter I, p3, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
' General Sir Walter Kirke, Memoirs, p.1, Kirke Papers, IWM.
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horses for racing and polo, selling them at a profit, to
finance his life style. 58 Brigadier-General Sir Ormonde
Winter resorted to the shroff, or local native money-lender,
to finance his sport in India. 59 Field-Marshal Viscount
Montgomery, as a bachelor with few expenses, helped his
parents to pay the school fees of his younger brother.6°
Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart was
forced to seek active service abroad in Somaliland when his
father crashed financially 61 and like Major-General Sir
Frederick Maurice, 'a poor man' 62 with no allowance, had to
live off his salary. Maurice and Brigadier-General E.G.
Wace, both sons of Major-Generals, had to live off their own
earnings and like Brigadier-General P. Howell, 'a poor man
and keen', 63 were driven by economic necessity to take their
profession seriously. Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot
Kiggell 'had practically no private resources and during his
whole career was always undertaking extra work to support
his family' with the result that as C.G.S., G.H.Q. he 'was
an exhausted man' 64 Whatever the sociological reasons
behind the phenomenon, military professionalism developed
gradually, slowly eclipsing the patrician-gentleman model.
Brian St. George Kirke, General Sir Walter Kirke, Part I. Subaltern to Major - 1896 to 1914, The Army
Quarterly and Defence Journal, Volume. 115, No.4, p.447.
" Brigadier-General Sir Ormonde Winter, Winter's Tales, pp.28-30.
60 Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Notes on his letters and a letter to his Mother, 10
April 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM1 57, IWM.
61 Lieutenant-General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey, pp.45-46.
62 General Sir Charles Grant to Lord Rosebery, 20 May [1918], Grant Papers C4 1 24, LHCMA.
63 Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Home, Diary, 15 March 1915, Home Papers, 1WM.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with [Brigadier-General Sir] J.E. Edmonds, 7 June 1934, Liddell Hart
Papers 11/1934 41, LHCMA.
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Social change and the growing professionalisation of
the officer corps, who increasingly saw the Army as a career
rather than a pleasant hobby, had implications for the
Army's performance during the war. It was easier for those
with independent means to show the moral courage to risk
professional ruin. In the First World War Guardsmen and
Cavalrymen with private means, such as Lord Cavan who was
quite happy to retire to hunt with the Hertfordshire Hounds,
were much more willing to criticise superiors and to resist
orders whereas impecunious officers, such as Field-Marshal
Sir Cyril Deverell, who could not afford to lose their jobs,
were not. 65 General Sir Herbert Lawrence had tone very
strong asset', namely 'the independence of a civilian and
the training of a soldier' having 'a very big job in civil
life to go back to' 66 As a successful banker outside the
Army in peacetime, Lawrence could afford to be more
independent than his predecessor, Kiggell, declaring that
'for myself, I care nothing and am quite ready to make room
67for a better man & take other employment'.
Charteris noted that it was 'difficult for any regular
professional soldier not to be influenced to some extent by
considerations of his own future prospects' 68 For example,
when Major-General Sir Frederic Glubb, an officer with a
65 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with [Major-}General [L.H.R.] Pope-Hennessey, 14 October 1933, Liddell
Hart Papers 111933/23 and Talk with [General] Sir H. Karslake, 26 November 1936, Liddell Hart
Papers 111936 111, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General John Charteris, At G.H. Q
. , 
p.286.
67 General Sir Herbert Lawrence to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 9 April 1918, Maurice Papers
4 5 12, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General John Charteris, At G.H.Q., p.286.
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wife, two children, and no private means, was placed on
half-pay before the war it 'was no slight matter' 69 and
Wace, who was 'very poor with a considerable family', was
removed as G.S.O.1, 32nd Division during the war 'the loss
of the comparatively high pay' was 'a bitter blow'
Similarly, professionally Major-General Sir Archibald Paris
(Royal Naval Division), did not want to go back to being a
Colonel and routine duties.7'
A strong desire by some officers to take advantage of a
small window of opportunity in wartime to enhance their
careers meant that careerism became a major problem during
the war. Colonel C.J.L. Allanson remarked 'on the
depressing extent to which soldiers, especially the
ambitious Staff College type, cold-bloodedly regarded war as
a professional opportunity' noting that when the war ended
General Sir William Bartholomew commented that 'it's ended a
year too soon for me', thinking only of his lost chance of
further promotion while Burnett-Stuart, who was a
Brigadier-General on the staff of VII Corps and G.H.Q., was
always talking about people being 'in his way' for
promotion. 73 Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-
Massingberd, as a rising staff officer during the war, was
alleged to be eager to rise and determined to do so by
69 Lieutenant-General Sir Joim Glubb, The Changing Scenes of L(fe: An Autobiography, p.1 8.
70 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Philip Game to his wife, 6 December 1917, Game Papers PWG 16, IWM.
Major-General Sir Archibald Paris to Mrs Christine Pilkington, 30 March and 6 May 1916, Paris Papers,
IWM.
72 Sir Basil Sir Liddell Hart, Talk with Colonel C. [J.L.] Allanson, 19 August 1937, Liddell Hart Papers
111929 15, LHCMA.
" Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with General H. Karslake, 20 November 1936, Liddell Hart Papers
111936 107,LHCMA.
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agreeing with G.H.Q. 74 Such behaviour ate into the ethos of
officers.
Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson claimed that
subordinates tended to cover up mistakes or inconvenient
data and falsified reports in order to give a good
impression and tell superiors what they wanted to hear,
rather than the truth, in an attempt to appease the high
command. 75 It is alleged that Field-Marshal Sir Henry
Wilson ordered the destruction of operation orders issued by
G.H.Q. during the retreat from Mons in order to hide the
panic, which had occurred during that campaign, 76 while
Major-General Sir Hugh Bruce-Williams (37th Division)
predated orders he had given and made untrue statements of
events. 77 Similarly the Staff of the Fourth Army destroyed
the War Diary of Fourth Army General Staff for 1 July 1916,
and substituted a Narrative of Events in order to cover up
the failure to exploit the success at Montauban by XIII
Corps 78
One staff officer remarked that 'a feeling was created
amongst those in the front line that to tell unpalatable
truths' was 'unpopular with those above, and led to one
being considered not to have the right amount of "The
Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with [Brigadier-General Sir James] Edmonds, 23 September 1929, Liddell
Hart Papers 111929/15, LHCMA.
Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 April 1936,
C.A.B.451132, PRO.
76 Major-General Sir L. Pope-Hennessey to Liddell Hart, 28 May 1937, Liddell Hart Papers 1/579 3-4,
LHCMA.
Liddell Hart, Talk with M. Cuthbertson, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1933/25, LHCMA.
Liddell Hart, Talk with Edmonds, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1931/3, LHCMA; Liddell Hart, 'Some Odd
Notes for History', Liddell Hart Papers 11/1933/5, LHCMA.
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fighting spirit"' which 'undoubtedly led people to hesitate
to tell the whole truth'	 Shoddy practices, such as
falsification of reports and 'the whitewashing habit',
prevented the high command from recognizing 'the most
valuable lessons' from the Somrne in 1916 'which might have
saved us from many of the futilities of Passchendaele in
1917. Post-battle narratives by commanders, which 'did not
always paint a true picture', failing 'to bring out some of
the big lessons' were one reason for the failure 'to learn
from our mistakes' .° On the Ancre in November 1916 one
commander refused 'several times' to send on the reports by
his Brigade-Major about the very poor conditions on the
grounds that he would lose his job 81 while another Brigade
Major 'had to alter considerably a draft narrative, not
because it was in any way inaccurate' but because his
commander 'wanted certain incidents to appear in a more
favourable light than they perhaps should have done'.82
Fear of dismissal when 'it was common talk that no
divisional commander dared say his infantry were unfit to
attack for fear of being sent home' ,83 led to even more
nefarious practices. One battalion commander admitted
frankly after the war that he 'only renewed the attack' on
Guedecourt in Septethber 1916 '"to save my reputation"' and
because he 'was more frightened of my superiors than even of
Major-General G.M. Lindsay to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 28 June 1937, C.A.B.45/135,
PRO.
80 Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
81 Major L.W. Kentish to Edmonds, 19 November 1936, CAB 45 135, PRO.
82 Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
83 [Major-General] F.A. Wilson to Edmonds, 26 November 1936, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
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the Germans' •84 When unable to persuade 14th Division of
the impracticality of an attack on Delville Wood in August
1916, Brigadier-General P.C.B. Skinner (41st Brigade),
hatched a plan with the commander of the 8/K.R.R.C. to
launch a feint attack and then reported the position
occupied. 85 When in April 1918 a battalion commander
'flatly refused to carry out' a 'futile' attack his brigade
merely reported that the counter-attack had failed.86
Nevertheless, many officers remained in less glamorous
posts because the they saw it as 'the right course for the
general show' and regarded such 'days of grave crisis' as
'not time to think of one's own career' 87 although they
fully realised that such action might be 'suicidal' and 'bad
professionally' 88 because it meant being left behind in
promotion by friends and colleagues. The G.S.O.1, 30th
Division was proud that his report on the operations of July
1916 was 'strictly accurate and not patched up as an
"apologia pro sua vita"' •89
The careerism of a minority of officers was counter-
balanced by the social and cultural homogeneity of the
officer corps which shared a close sense of community.
Everyone knew each other either personally or by repute.
84	 .	 .Brigadier-General H.H.S. Morant to Bngadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 2 April [?1930],
C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
85 Laton Fraven to Edmonds, 13 April 1934, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
86 Lieutenant-Colonel M.C. Clayton to Edinonds, 3 March 1934, C.A.B.45 122, PRO.
Lieutenant-Colonel F.H. Lister, Addenda to My Diary of 1St French Army Operations from 2nd April -
12 August 1918, p.2, Lister Papers, LHCMA.
88 General Sir Walter Kirke, Diary, 21 December 1915 and 10 January 1916, Kirke Papers, IWM.
89 Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Edmonds, 18 March 1930, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
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Above all, 'the old Army was a small family affair' 90 in
which an individual officer, Brigadier-General Philip
Howell, could write to his wife that 'I seem to know
everybody & everyone me', attend a conference with 'all the
generals & staffs of the whole bally show' meeting 'hundreds
of old friends', and be taken to have tea with Sir John
French, the Commander-in-Chief, who explained 'the whole
situation on the map' 91
From attending a particular school; Sandhurst or
Woolwich; belonging to a particular regiment, or having
participated in certain campaigns together; or Staff
College, each officer had a small circle of acquaintances
with whom he remained on intimate terms throughout his
entire career. Friendships were particularly strong at
regimental level. Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke,
Lieutenant-General E.F. Norton, and Major-General E.O.
Lewin, artillery staff officers during the war became
friends while serving together in 30th Battery, R.F.A.92
Colonel A. Crookenden (G.S.O.l, 11th Division) named his son
after a friend in the same Regiment who was killed in
1915.	 These ties continued to be a strong influence on
senior officers, such as Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney,
who whenever visiting G.H.Q. stayed or dined with
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Dunnington-Jefferson, who had
° Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, p.60.
I Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 30 June 1916, 20 and 28 September 1914, Howell Papers
IV C/3 308 & 66-67, LHCMA.
92 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes for My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 2 1/55, LHCMA.
Mrs Mary Napier to Major A. Crookenden, 24 October 1915, Crookenden Papers, IWM.
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also joined the Royal Fusiliers. 94 This group cohesion was
extended from regiments to divisions during the war. For
example, the 51st Division was 'almost a family concern'
The Staff Colleges, the passport to high rank, provided
a very important method of meeting fellow high-flyers and
making life-long friendships. 96 Edmonds stated that the
friends made at Camberley 'remained my closest friends for
the rest of my life, eclipsing those of my school, Woolwich
cadet and young officer at Chatham periods'	 The Staff
College also widened an officer's contacts. Field-Marshal
Sir Archibald Montgomery noted that 'two of the happiest
years of my service were spent at the Staff College, where I
made many friends in other branches of the Army' 98 The
closeness of the links between officers and their families
can be seen in the friendship of Lieutenant-General Sir
Basil Burnett-Hitchcock and Edmonds who served together for
three years on the peace staff of the 4th Division, whose
wives shared the same house when the war came, and whose
children were at Oxford together and 'were almost one
family'
An example of the friendships and networks made by
officers can be seen by the careers of two officers.
Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 31 May 1917, 20 January 1918, and 18 December 1918,
Pinney Papers, IWM.
Brigadier-General Sir Standish Craufurd to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 3 August 1944, CAB
45 118 PRO.
% Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Karsiake to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 22 October 1936, Liddell Hart Papers
1/414, LHCMA.
Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XW, Edmonds Papers 11112/26, LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.9,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159 1, LHCMA.
Edmonds to Liddell Hart, 25 November 1938, Liddell Hart Papers, 1/733 16, LHCMA.
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General Sir Sidney Clive, a staff officer at G.H.Q. during
the war, was 'curious how many people one knows' while
lunching at XI Corps in September 1915 with five friends;
who he had met during service with his regiment (Grenadier
Guards), at Staff College, the manoeuvres of 1913, during
the war, and at G.H.Q. 10° Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor was
at "The Shop" with Major-General C.E.D. Budworth; a
subaltern in India with Winston Churchill and General Sir
Hubert Gough; in "G" Battery with General Sir Percy
Radcliffe, and with Field-Marshal Earl Haig on the Staff of
Sir John French during the Doer War.'°' As the war
progressed the small numbers of the old Regular Army tended
to be swamped by the more numerous territorials and New Army
officers. For example, going on the leave boat to the U.K.,
Edmonds discovered that 'as time passed I found that I knew
fewer and fewer of the officers on board; from knowing every
one in 1914, I was glad in 1918 if I saw the face of a
single old hand' 102
With the close-knit Regular Army sustaining many deaths
especially during 1914 and 1915, no senior officer was
unaffected by the loss of colleagues.'° 3 In early 1915 Sir
John French haunted by the high casualties imagined that 'my
room is becoming thick with the spirits of my friends'.104
'°° General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 11 September 1915, Clive Papers 1112 47, LHCMA.
'°' Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1915, pp.19, 23, 31 and 32, and -1916, p.2, Tudor
Papers, RAI.
102 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXVII, Edmonds Papers 111/1114, LHCMA.
103 Frank Davies and Graham Maddocks, Bloody Red Tabs: General Officer Casualties of the Great War,
1914-1918, pp.xii, note that 232 generals were killed or wounded during the war.
'° Sir John French to Mrs Bennett, 25 February 1915, French Papers 75 46 1, IWM.
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'Wully' Robertson 'felt deeply' the death of Colonel Freddy
Kerr, a close friend killed by a shell while G.S.O.1, 1st
Division on 31 October l9l4.'° Increasingly officers, such
as Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen felt 'awful losing all
one's friends one after another' and saw each casualty list
'with a feeling of horror for the loss of another friend' 106
while Howell felt 'anger at losing my friends & anxiety to
preserve the few who are left' •b07 Many officers also
suffered the loss of close relatives: John Capper and Hubert
Gough had brothers killed in 1915; Major-General Sir Robert
Montgomery, Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, General Sir Walter
Braithwaite, and Capper lost their only Sons; while Herbert
Lawrence lost both sons.
One outsider noted that the three pillars of General
Lord Jeffreys' beliefs and loyalty were Eton, the Brigade of
Guards and the Conservative Party.'° 8 These pillars
contributed to the homogeneity of the British Army. The
majority of the sample were in school during the last years
of Queen Victoria's age.'° 9 The officer corps was not only
dominated by public school educated men but also came from a
very narrow band of schools. For example, the bulk of the
officers trained at Woolwich for the Royal Artillery and the
Royal Engineers came from Wellington, Cheltenham, Clifton,
Marlborough and Malvern while the Guards, Cavalry and
105 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 31 October 1914, Clive Papers 1111/50, LHCMA.
106 Colonel R. Meinertzhagen to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Dunnington-Jefferson, 28 May 1915,
Dunnington-Jefferson Papers, IWM.
107 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 28 September 1915, Howell Papers N/C 3 229, LHCMA.
108 Oliver Lyttelton, Viscount Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, p.50.
See Appendices 4, 5, 16 and 17.
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Infantry officers at Sandhurst were supplied from Eton,
Harrow and Winchester." 0 In 1913 nearly half the cadets at
Woolwich in 1913 came from five schools."
This trend was also reflected in the Army's elite. Of
the sample, over a seventh (96) had attended Eton while over
a third (223) had been educated at one of five public
schools 112 and over half (334) had attended one of ten
public schools.'13 Five public schools founded to provide
soldiers and civil servants for the Empire alone provided
nearly a quarter (154) of the officers in the sample." 4 Sir
Frank Fox even compared service at G.H.Q. to 'such a life as
studious boys might live at a Public School, if there can be
imagined a Public School in which sport was reduced to the
minimum essential to keep one fit for hard "swotting"' h15
At School important links could be forged which would
be useful in the Army both for senior commanders, such as
Hubert Gough, who had been a contemporary at Eton of Field-
Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Major-Generals Sir Neill
Malcolm, and Sir Percy Hambro," 6 and junior officers, such
as General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, who was a
contemporary at Rugby of Generals Sir Desmond Anderson, Sir
Harold Franklyn, George Giffard, Arthur Percival and Sir
lb Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Morgan, Peace and War, A Soldier's Lfe, p.17.
Wellington, Cheltenham, Clifton, Marlborough, and Winchester; Alan Shepperd, Sandhurst, p.11 5.
112 Eton, Wellington, Harrow. Marlborough, and Charterhouse.
113 Eton, Wellington, Harrow. Marlborough, Charterhouse, Winchester, Clifton, Cheltenham, Rugby and
Haileybuiy.
"4 Cheltenham, Clifton, Haileybury, Marlborough, and Wellington; see Appendix 4.
" "G.S.O." [Sir Frank Fox], G.H.Q., p.3 of the Foreword.
116 Obituary, The Times, 20 March 1963, Liddell Hart Papers 1/323/42, LHCMA.
Henry Pownall." 7 For others acquaintance began even
earlier. Colonel T.T. Grove was at Preparatory School with
General Sir Charles Deedes, General Lord Jeffreys and Major-
General O.H.L. Nicholson." 8 The 'Old School Tie' could also
provide a point of contact between the Regular and Non-
regular Officers. One temporary artillery officer following
a visit from the Second Army commander (Plumer) was
admonished for not being 'obsequious enough' and talking 'to
the old man as if he had been a friend' by his Colonel who
was unaware that they were both Old EtOfliafls."9
Some officers, such as Major-General Sir Hugh Bruce-
Williams, proclaiming Winchester the 'best school in the
world', were aggressively proud of their school.' 2° General
Sir Sidney Clive, like his father an Old Harrovian, having
heard in France that his wife had sent his son to Eton,
returned to take him to Harrow.' 2' Field-Marshal Lord
Alanbrooke, who had gone to a private school in France
rather than public school, was made to feel at Woolwich
'that I was quite out of the herd, I had missed something
122that they all had'.	 Air Commodore L.E.O. Charlton 'was
fully conscious that the Brighton College of his day was
neither an Eton, a Harrow nor a Winchester; it was not even
a Clifton, a Charterhouse nor a Tonbridge' and 'it was many
a long year before he could bring himself to admit without a
117 General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars, p.4.
118 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.4, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
" Major R.P. Schweder MC to his wife, 19 December 1916, p.1 10, Schweder Papers, IWM.
° Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality, p.163.
1 Obituary of Brigadier Archer Clive, The Times, 17 April 1995, p.17.
122 Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes for My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 2/1/4, LHCMA.
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certain embarrassment the precise locality of his Alma
Mata'.' 23	 While some 73 (10%) of the sample had been to
University with Oxford and Cambridge by far the most popular
Universities,'24 often, as in Haig's case, officers did not
bother to take a degree, although Congreve (Pembroke,
Oxford) was sent down for shooting the Junior Proctor in the
head with an air gun.' 25 Many officers resembled Haig who
'read few books and never a single novel' 126 and had 'few,
if any, interests outside soldiering' other than polo and
his family.'27
The modern regimental system was at the heart of
British military culture and its diversity of sub-cultures.
Alanbrooke believed that his regimental service were 'some
of the happiest and certainly the most carefree days of my
life'.'28 Military dynasties were common as families became
associated with regiments. For example, Major-General Sir
Guy Dawnay served with the Coldstream Guards as did his
father, his brother, and, eventually, his two sons 129 while
his brother-in-law, General Sir Sidney Clive, joined the
Grenadier Guards as did his father, his brother, and his
son.'30 Officers were bound to their regiments by strong
family ties, which owed little to grandiose ideas of nation
123 Air Commodore L.E.O. Chariton, Charlton, p.29.
124 See Appendix 6.
' Commander Sir Geoffrey Congreve Bart., The Congreve Family, p.129.
'26 Bngadier..General John Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig, pp.68-69.
127 General Sir Noel Birch to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, 15 December, 1936, Allenby Papers 6/V1J24,
LHCMA.
128 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes for My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 2/1 9, LHCMA.
129 Major-General G.P. Dawnay, Personal Correspondence, 1919-50, Dawnay Papers 69 21 3, IWM.
130 General E.H. Clive (father), Who's Who, 1913, p.396; General Sir Sidney Clive, Who's Who, 1951,
p.554; Lieutenant H.A. Clive (brother) and Brigadier A.F.L. Clive (son), Kelly's, 1951, pp.500-501.
51
or empire, but much to tradition, homogeneity and regimental
pride. General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, a rifleman, stated
in his memoirs that his proudest day came when he became
Colonel Commandant of his Regiment's 1st Battalion.' 3' Staff
Officers at G.H.Q., such as Generals Sir Sidney dive 132 and
Sir Walter Kirke,' 33 tried to get back to their regiments
without success.
In an Army which was permanently fragmented and thinly
spread over a large Empire a soldier's loyalty was to the
concrete reality of the "Regiment", not to the more abstract
concept of the "Army", the regimental system, while
promoting unit esprit de corps and cohesion, encouraged
inter-arm rivalry and friction. When one Brigadier-General
reported after the Battle of Cambrai that some drunken,
artillery officers had looted his headquarters, 'it raised
an awful storm' and he and his Divisional Commander were put
under pressure by the Corps and Army to withdraw the report,
134
which he refused to do.
With the advent of modern weapons the cavalry in
particular felt itself to be under threat. The transfer of
de Lisle from the infantry to a cavalry regiment, in an
attempt by Lord Roberts to reform the cavalry after the Boer
War, generated much opposition within the cavalry.' 35 Prior
General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter I, p.6, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
132 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 1 June 1915, Clive Papers 1111/140, LHCMA.
" General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 2 February, 17 and 25 August, and 16 November 1915, Kirke
Papers, IWM.
' Brigadier-General Sir Standish Crauford to Brigadier-General Sir James Ednionds, 3 and 25 August
1944, C.A.B.45/118, PRO.
135 General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle, Reminiscences of Sport and War, pp.121-124.
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to the war Haig and French had been allies in their defence
of the Cavalry arm.' 36 During the war, Beddington was
accused by a senior officer, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles
Kavanagh, of being '"a traitor"' to his arm, the cavalry,
for advocating the abolition of the Cavalry Corps in 1916.'
Allenby (Cavalry Corps) and his B.G.G.S. (Howell) were
reported to Haig by Major-General H.J.M. Macandrew
(B.G.G.S., Indian Cavalry Corps) as being 'despondent'
regarding the possibilities of cavalry action in future' 138
Such attitudes hindered any objective assessment of
progress and fostered an extreme parochialism, which,
according to Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, hampered the
promotion of good officers, by replacing intelligence and
professional knowledge with regimental favouritism.' 39 It
was the perception of many officers that belonging to an
elite regiment could enhance an officer's prospects within
the Army. It was claimed that Major-General Sir John
Davidson had 'the additional advantage' of being in the
K.R.R.C. 140 while General Sir Francis Davies, as a
Guardsman with 'a lot of influence', was thought capable of
avoiding removal as a Divisional Commander after Neuve
Chapelle.' 41 The subsequent promotion of Davies to be
136 See Richard Holmes, The Little Field-Marshal, pp.156-157; General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle,
Reminiscences of Sport and War, pp.121-122; and Gerard J DeGroot, Ambition, Duty and Doctrine:
Haig 's Rise to High Command, in Bond and Cave, Haig: A Reappraisal 70 Years On, pp.42-48.
' 37 Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoirs, pp.95-96, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
'j Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 11 April 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 4, PRO.
' Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, The Army in My Time, pp.37-38.
'° General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 6 February 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
'' Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Keary to his brother, Captain F.W. Keary, R.N., 23 April 1915, Keary
Papers, IWM.
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Military Secretary at the War Office reinforced this
perception. The rapid promotion of Bethell, the youngest
divisional commander on the Western Front, was attributed to
his belonging to Haig's old regiment, 7th Hussars,'42
although, in fact, Haig appears to have shown greater
loyalty to his second regiment, the 17th Lancers, which
formed the Guard of Honour at G.H.Q. throughout his tenure
as Commander-in-Chief.
The Army was a small professional force designed
primarily for a particular task: the defence of the Empire.
Few of the officers in the sample were without imperial
experience as only 123 (18%) of 700 were not veterans and
most had much more battle experience than their Continental
counterparts. Of the sample 485 (69%) had fought in South
Africa (1899-1902), 73 (10%) on the North-West Frontier
(1897-98), and 64 (9%) on the Nile (1897-99)	 Most of the
senior officers in the sample had obtained positions of
influence as a result of their pre-war, colonial service.
For example, of the four Inspectors-General of the King's
African Rifles before the war, three, Major-Generals J.E.
Gough, G.H. Thesiger, and A.R. Hoskins, served on the
Western Front.' 44 Other officers, such as General Sir
William Heneker, General Sir Thomas Morland, and Marshal of
the Royal Air Force Viscount Trenchard, had also served with
distinction in West Africa.
142 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 11 October 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
143 See Appendix 9.
Lieutenant Colonel H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p.700.
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It is debatable whether colonial experience was of much
use on the Western Front and General Sir Horace Smith-
Dorrien bluntly complained that 'one could never become an
up-to-date soldier in the prehistoric warfare to be met with
against the Dervishes'	 At the turn of the century the
British in Africa were still employing the square, notably
against Fulani horsemen during the Kano-Sokoto Expedition in
Northern Nigeria in March 1903,146 and against the Dervishes
of the Mad Mullah in Somaliland in April 1903.'	 A
large number of British Generals whose experience was bush
orientated had only a rudimentary knowledge of modern war.
Typical were Major-General Sir Henry Lukin, who had fought
in the Zulu War (1879), being severely wounded at Ulundi, in
Basutoland (1881), in Bechuanaland (1896-97), and in the
Boer War (1899-1902) ,148 and General Sir William Heneker, who
had served in Benin and Nigeria (1899-1903), published a
book on 'Bush Warfare' (1906) ,149 and was said to be 'more at
home in a rough house than in civilised discussion or
speculation' •150 Although not "educated" soldiers, men like
Lukin, who was 'an experienced soldier' having 'commanded
the Cape Mounted Rifles' during 'the last year of the South
145 General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Memories of Forty Eight Years Service, p.67.
' Colonel A Haywood, The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force, pp.46 and 96.147.	 •1Lieutenant-Colonel H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kings African Rifles, p.181.
I48 John Buchan, The South African Forces in France, p.19.
General Sir William Heneker, Who Was Who, Volume ifi, 1929 - 1940, p.624.
'o Major-General H Essame to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 27 January 1962, Liddell Hart Papers 1/269/1 07,
LHCMA.
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African War', 15' possessed 'an abundance of sound common
sense' and tactical flexibility.'52
Physical robustness, and initiative was required by
officers on campaign against savage foes, especially those
who found themselves in command of small forces in remote
areas. Many officers became self-sufficient because of
their experiences, notably Major-General S.S. Butler who
'had travelled from Baghdad through Arabia to Damascus
disguised in native Arab costume' ' and Meinertzhagen who,
as a junior officer in Kenya, was one of 'three white men in
the heart of Africa, with 20 nigger soldiers and 50 nigger
police, 68 miles from doctors and reinforcements,
administering and policing a district inhabited by half a
million well-armed savages'.' 54 Brigadier-General W.D.
Wright won the V.C. at Rawia in March 1903 defeating the
determined charges of the Emir of Kano's 1,000 horse and
2,000 foot with a small troop of Mounted Infantry,
consisting of one officer and forty-four men. Major-General
C.H. Foulkes thought nothing of journeying 175 miles with an
escort of six Hausa soldiers, riding almost non-stop for
three days and two nights, in order to capture the fleeing
Emir of Kano despite a display of military might by at least
15510,000 warriors.
'' Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 29 April 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9 PRO.
Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1918, p.3, Tudor Papers, RAI.
' Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 9 June 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 32 PRO.
Richard Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary, 1902-1906, pp.5 1-52.
' Colonel A Haywood, The History of the Royal West African Frontier Force, p.45-46.
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In defending the Empire the combined world-wide
experience of the older officers and N.C.O.s was formidable.
While at Staff College 'there was hardly a corner of the
British Empire but you could hear about it from someone who
had been there, and hardly a small war of the past fifteen
years but someone had taken part in it' •156 General Sir
James Marshall-Cornwall remembered that in his artillery
brigade before the war in 1914 all the senior officers and
even some of the subalterns had war experience and that, as
a result, the field training was practical and taken very
seriously.' 57 Field-Marshal Lord Mime first came to the
attention of Kitchener when serving at Omdurman,' 58 while
Lieutenant-General G.H. Fowke first came to prominence
during the Siege of Ladysmith.' 59 The Regular Army was
especially successful in producing at battalion and brigade
level the drive, inspiring leadership and bravery of men
such as Brigadier-General J.V. Campbell, who won the V.C. on
the Somme in 1916 by rallying his men with his hunting
6Ohorn,	 Field-Marshal Lord Gort, who won the M.C., three
D.S.O.s and the V.C. commanding battalions of the Grenadier
Guards,' 6' Brigadier-General Frank Maxwell, V.C., who led his
troops from the front,' 62 and Brigadier-General (later Major-
General Sir Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter IV, p.45, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
I57 General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars, p.6.
158 Obituary of Field-Marshal Lord Milne, n.d., Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hutton Papers, LHCMA.
159 Obituary of Lieutenant-General Sir George Fowke in Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee's Memoirs, p.21 6a,
Lee Papers, IWM.
'60 Obituary of Brigadier J.V. Campbell, V.C., 23 May 1944, in Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee's Memoirs,
p.lOOa, Lee Papers, IWM.
161 [Bngadier] Sir John Smyth, V.C., Milestones. A Memoir, p.128.
162 Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Croft, Three Years with the 9th (Scottish) Division, pp.86 and 9 1-92, and Sir
William Darling, So It Looks To Me, pp.170-171.
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General) A.L. Ransome, who 'was quite willing and able to
163take a rifle and do a bit of the stabbing himself'.
In many ways the Army's own "culture" reinforced the
Colonel Blimp stereotype, which still prevails. Senior
officers were often difficult and arbitrary in their
behaviour towards subordinate officers, notably General Sir
Richard Haking, who was 'a vindictive bully'; 164 Lieutenant-
General Sir Aylrner Hunter-Weston, who spoke to subordinate
generals 'as if he was teaching a class of N.C.O.s';'65
Major-General Sir Hugh Bruce-Williams, whose entrance caused
'a minor stampede' amongst his staff;' 66 and General Sir
Peter Strickland, a feared autocrat whose arrival caused his
staff to exit in panic via the nearest window. 167 Senior
officers, such as General Sir Bertram Sergison-Brooke and
the Major-General Hon. W. Lambton, were distinctly "livery"
in the morning and could not be approached until after
luncheon 168 while others were notorious for their temper,
notably Allenby, nicknamed 'the Bull';' 69 General Sir Horace
163 R. Cude, Memoirs, p.156, Cude Papers, IWM.
164 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 8 and 20 December 1915 and 18 Apnl 1916, Game
Papers PWG 9 & 11, IWM.
165 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 24 December 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
' Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality, pp.152-153.
167 C.P. Clayton, The Hungaiy One, pp.168-169. See also Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoirs,
p.127, Archibald Papers PPIMCRJI 1, IWM; Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.'76, Grove Papers 6308-14,
NAM.
168 Oliver Lyttelton, Viscount Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, p.52; Lieutenant-General Sir
Adrian Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey, p.79.
169 General Sir George Barrow to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, 3 June 1938, Allenby Papers 6/VJJ1 6;
General Sir Charles Grant to Wavell, 21 November 1936, Allenby Papers 6/V11126; General Spencer E.
Hollond to Wavell, 4 December [c. 1936-38], Allenby Papers 6/Vll/3 1, LHCMA.
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Smith-Dorrien;' 7° Bruce-Williams, 'a blustering bounder';17'
Major-General Sir Oliver Nugent;' 72 and Major-General H.L.
173Reed.
One non-regular officer noted how 'the English
professional officers of 1914' formed an 'isolated and self-
contained body' which amazed him 'by their narrow
professionalism and the extent to which they had preserved
the outlook of the least intelligent and most snobbish type
of late Victorian public-school boy' 	 Senior commanders
of the Great War 'retained an almost schoolboyish way of
talking', using exaggerated terms about each other such as
'cads and bounders, rotters or stinkers' which did not
represent a considered judgement but rather reflected 'the
persistent adolescence characteristic of many regimental
messes'.'75 For example, one officer called a fellow Brigade
Commander 'a bounder and a cad, a bombastic fat
176buckstick'.
Numerous stories illustrate the remoteness and Blimp-
like qualities of the Generals at different levels of the
hierarchy and the 'professional exclusiveness' of the old
regular Army 'made it impossible for them to establish any
Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.10,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159/1, LHCMA; The Earl of Camavon, No Regrets, pp.100-101;
General Sir Archibald Murray to Jasper, 28 December 1933, Murray Papers 77 48 4, IWM.
171 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 18 May 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS; Guy Chapman, A
Passionate Prodigality, p.173; Major-General P.G. Whitefoord, Diary, 15 and 16 May 1918,
Whitefoord Papers 77/2 1, IWM.
' 72 Captain Cyril Falls to Liddell Hart, 22 August 1964, Liddell Hart Papers 1/276/60, LHCMA.
Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Holland to Field-Marshal Lord Home, 12 October 1918, Home Papers
73 60 2, IWM; General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 14 January 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
174 Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, pp.98-99.
175 Lord Geddes, Unworthy Apolgia, National Review, February 1953, pp.109-110, Liddell Hart Papers
15 2 23, LHCMA.
'76 General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 24 April 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.
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contact with the civilians who formed the overwhelming
majority of the officers in the line'	 Regular soldiers
were often unable to unbend and found it difficult to
establish relations of mutual trust with their own citizen
soldiers, increasing the gulf between them and the New
Armies. General Sir William Thwaites (46th Division), a
Gunner with his eyeglass, ruddy complexion and fierce white
moustache, could appear even to a regular staff officer as
'the very model of a modern Major-General' portrayed in The
Pirates of Penzance.' 78 Major-General Sir John Capper with
'a fanatical temperament' and 'holding the most archaic
views on soldiering, government, and the conduct of life'
epitomised the stereotype of Colonel Blimp being an
'extremely dogmatic' soldier who 'in arguing seemed rather
to bark than talk', 'repressed rather than invited opinions,
and would not tolerate argument'
The Army disliked and distrusted showmanship of the
type which generals such as Montgomery would indulge in
during the Second World War. It was seen by officers as
"bad form" to court the press by having one's photograph in
the newspapers.'°° Soldiers had an 'extreme reticence and
horror of all forms of publicity',' 81 boastfulness, and
appearing conspicuous. In marked contrast to the Second
World War most of the senior officers, such as Haig, Allenby
' Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, p.107.
178 General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Wars And Rumours Of Wars, p.40.
179 Extracts from H.Q. Tanks, 191 7-1918 by Captain the Hon. Sir Evan Charteris, Liddell Hart Papers
15/2 6, LHCMA.
'jo General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 11 February 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
' Notes by General Sir Ivor Maxse, [January 1918], Maxse Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
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and Plumer, were loath to address the troops. 182 Haig, in
particular, was notorious for his inability to make a
coherent speech.' 83 Many generals, such as Major-General
H.I.W. Hamilton (3rd Division) or Major-General W. Douglas
Smith (20th Division), appeared taciturn, dour, and austere
to their own staff officers 184 let alone the troops they
commanded.
Regular officers were slow to appreciate that the New
Army made greater demands on their powers of leadership than
the Old Army and tensions between the professionals and
amateurs (like R.N. and R.N.V.R. in the Royal Navy)
continued well into the war. Senior officers proved
unsympathetic in their professionalism to the New Armies and
attempted to inculcate Regular discipline, ill-suited to
'the type of war we were then fighting' 185 Major-General
Sir George Forestier-Walker (2 1st Division), 'very
unpopular' and 'positively inhuman' to his troops, admitted
that he had been impatient and had misjudged the differences
in dealing with Regular and New Army troops.'86 	 Many
officers agreed with the sentiment that France was 'no place
for amateur soldiers, of whom we have more than enough
182 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Autobiography, Volume H, p.366, Haldane Papers Acc.20254, NLS.
183 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to anon, 8 August 1918, Dawnay Papers 69/21/3, IWM; Air Vice Marshal
Philip Game to his wife, 21 March 1918, Game Papers PWG 21, IWM; General Sir Charles Bonham-
Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, pp.37-38, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC; Brigadier-General J.
Charteris, Field-Marshal Earl Haig, p.65-66; General Sir Noel Birch to Field-Marshal Lord Wavell, 15
December 1936, Allenby Papers 6/VJ/24, LHCMA; Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 22 August
1916, Howell Papers N/C 3/336, LHCMA.
's General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 22 September and 16 October 1914, 28 June and 6 September 1916,
Milward Papers 6510-143-1 and 65 10-143-5, NAM.
185 Colonel R. Macleod, Memoirs, pp.235-246 and 380-38 1, Macleod Papers 1/1, LHcMA.
186	 K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.178-179, Henderson Papers DSfMISC/2, IWM.
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already' 187 and 'it became a joke that very simple language
had to be used in instructing the officers and men of the
New Army' 188 One Divisional Commander complained about the
'sarcastic' and 'disparaging remarks' made in 1917 by Maxse
(XVIII Corps) about the London Territorials of 58th
Division, 'constantly comparing them with "teachers at a
girls' school"'.' 89
 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson believed
that Kitchener's 'ridiculous and preposterous' New Armies
were 'the laughing-stock of every soldier in Europe',' 9° and
were 'a roughish lot with hardly a gentleman amongst the
off icers'.'9' Regular soldiers were particularly
unfavourable towards the lax discipline of Colonial troops.
For example, General Sir Archibald Murray noted that,
although 'from a physical point of view a magnificent body
of men', the Australians had 'no idea of ordinary decency or
self control'.' 92
 Even Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, an
innovative soldier, believed that the Canadians in 1914 were
193
'not an army but a mob, much worse than Kitchener's army'.
Commanders at all levels were obsessed with saluting
and regulations relating to uniforms and equipment. For
example, Haig spoke to the Army and Corps Commander (Gough
and Jacob) about 'the lack of smartness, and the slackness
187 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 20 October 1914, Kirke Papers, IWM.
188 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXVI, Edmonds Papers 111110 8, LHCMA.
Major-General H.D. Fanshawe to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 58th Division A/35163 12, 29
September 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53 II, IWM.
°	 Sir C.E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Volume I, p.178.
191 Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 21 November 1915, Game Papers PWG 9, IWM.
192 General Sir Archibald Archibald Murray to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 18 March 1916,
Robertson Papers 1/32/13/1, LHCMA.
193 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his Father, 15 August 1914, Fuller Papers IV 3/141B, LHCMA.
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of one of its Batt[alionlns in the matter of saluting when I
was motoring through the village' where the 49th Division
was billetted,' 94 while Haig's staff complained to the
commanders of the 16th and 33rd Divisions because troops
failed to salute the Commander-in-Chief.' 95 Lieutenant-
General Sir Charles Fergusson took Cavan, his fellow
Grenadier, to task for being improperly dressed, wearing the
gold spurs of a guardsman when he was no longer a regimental
196
officer.
The Army firmly believed that 'discipline increases the
self-respect of the individual and is shown by a smart and
soldierly bearing, scrupulous cleanliness, good saluting,
punctilious care of arms and the habit of unhesitating
obedience to command'	 Obsessive behaviour gained
intelligent Commanders reputations as martinets. Allenby
(Third Army) was notorious for haranguing a dead body for
not wearing a helmet;' 98 Gough (Fifth Army) went round the
trenches spotting dirty rifles;' 99 and Hunter-Weston (VIII
200Corps) inspected the latrines whenever he visited a unit.
Haking (XI Corps) when inspecting a unit which had just come
out of the trenches complained about the 'dirt on their
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 4 September 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/13 PRO.
Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Major-General W.B. Hickie, 5 March 1916, Kiggell Papers
V112, LHCMA; Major E.G. Thompson to Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, 1 September 1918,
Pinney Papers, IWM.
196 Oliver Lyttleton, Viscount Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, p.46.
'' S.S.143, The Training and Employment of Platoons, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B. 1919T, February 1918, Maxse
Papers 69 53 11, TVJM.
' Major-General Cecil A. Heydeman to Field-Marshal Lord Wavell, 22 March 1939, Allenby Papers
6/V/32, LHCMA; Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Wavell, 23 June 1938, Allenby Papers
6/VI/33, LHCMA; Major-General Sir Lothian Nicholson, Diary, 5 March 1917, Nicholson Papers,
IWM.
' Sir Basil Liddeil Hart, Talk with Broad, 12 February 1947, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1947/2, LHCMA.
200 [Major-General] Eric Harrison, Gunners, Game & Gardeners: An Autobiography, p.51.
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clothes from hard work' 201 and inspected the 26th Brigade
for 2 hours in August 1916,202 while General Sir Cameron
Shute (V Corps) ordered troops to wear 'two head chains &
203burnished metal' for a parade.	 In Septenther 1917 the 37th
Division insisted that 'a very high standard of smartness
and cleanliness must be insisted upon throughout the
training period' 204
In the eyes of one senior officer 'to concentrate on
such trifles while neglecting serious matters showed a lack
of a sense of proportion' 205 This elaborate protocol, and
ceremony, which governed military life far more than that of
civilians, formed a barrier between the Army leadership and
the New Army troops. A non-regular, regimental officer
noted that 'the Old Army could not grasp that the New Army
cared nothing for soldiering as a trade; thought of it only
as a job to be done, and the more expeditiously the
206better'.
Nevertheless, the social isolation of the Army officer
can be overdrawn. The more thoughtful officers were able to
temper their professionalism with a more sympathetic
approach. Haig, more flexible than many senior officers,
preferred to stress the fighting spirit and keen
201 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 11 May 1916, Pinney Papers, IWM; see also General C.A.
Milward, War Diary, 9 May 1916, Milward Papers 65 10-143-5, NAM.
202 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 3 August 1916, Wilson Papers, 1WM.
203 Pinney, Diary, 31 October 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
204 Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Dill, Notes on Training to be carried out in the Reserve Area, 37 Division
No.G.3 116, p.2, 11 September 1917, Dill Papers 1/3/2, LHCMA.
205 Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles quoted by Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Diary, 2 February
1939, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1939 6, LHCMA.
206 Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality, pp.141 -142.
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determination of the Australians rather than their poor
disciplinary record. 207 Generals such as Field-Marshal Lord
Birdwood and Field-Marshal Lord Plumer with experience of
Dominion troops were able to accept colonial ideas of
discipline. 208 There are, moreover, many examples of the
high regard held for senior officers at all levels of the
high command. General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was an
example of an officer who could speak with great eloquence
to the troops and was greatly admired by regimental
officers. 209 Plumer was someone who 'the men all love &
admire', 21° taking the trouble to get to know even his
battalion commanders individually and gaining the confidence
211
of the troops.
Jacob (II Corps) 'made a great impression on the [8th]
Division by finding time to see all the officers of each
Brigade at Brigade H.Q. and to talk to each of them
individually' in June 1917.212 One N.C.O. awaiting 'with no
little trepidation' an interview with General Sir David
Campbell (21st Division) for a commission was put at his
ease 'with a kindly word' and emerged proud of his service
with his battalion on the Somme. 213 Lieutenant-General Sir
207 The Memoirs of Major-General S.S. Butler, p.5, Butler Papers PPIMCR/107, IWM; Field Marshal Lord
Birdwood, Khaki and Gown, p.309.
208 Colonel R. Macleod, Memoir, pp.245 and 256, Macleod Papers, LHCMA.
209 Lieutenant-Colonel T.S. Wollocombe, M.C., Diary of the Great War, pp.38 and 69, Wollocombe
Papers, IWM; Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Floyer-Acland, Memoirs, p.29, Floyer-Acland Papers,
IWM.
210 Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Morland to his daughter, 20 June 1917, Morland Papers, IWM.
211 Rowland Feildmg, War Letters to a Wife, France and Flanders, 1915-19, p.163.
212 Brigadier Sir Edward Beddmgton, Memoir, p.1 13, Beddmgton Papers, LHCMA.
213 I.L. Read, Of Those We Loved, p.268.
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George Harper (51st Division), 'the most charming of men',214
won 'the genuine affection of all ranks' by being 'in
constant touch with his troops, both in and out of the line'
and was 'known personally to many of them' •215 Lieutenant-
General Sir Harold Walker (1st Australian Division), 'a
waspish little bloke with a very quick turn of wit',
maintained close contact with his troops and 'spent a lot of
time chatting to them' wishing 'to know exactly what the men
were thinking' 216 Brigadier-General R. McDouall (141st
Brigade) calling his troops 'a lot of lazy Buggers for not
digging fast enough', removed his tunic and began digging
beside them.217
Most of the top officers of the B.E.F. were part of a
homogeneous and tightly-knit group with its own sense of
identity, ethics and standards. The interpretation that the
social background of the officer corps was responsible for
the failings of the Army in the First World War, while
providing a possible answer for the shortcomings of some
officers, remains dubious and conveys the impression of
monolithic stupidity among the officer corps which is not
convincing. Indeed, the fact that the army leadership of
the First World War and the successful commanders of the
Second World War came from the same social background makes
untenable the interpretation that the social background of
214 NG Barron to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 January 1939, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
215 Major F.W. Bewsher, The History of the 51st (Highland) Division, p.273.
216 Major H.V. Howe to Captain E.W. Bush, I February 1972, Bush Papers 75/65 2, IWM.
217 Corporal H.W. Smith, Diary, 15 September 1916, Smith Papers, IWM.
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an officer corps dominated by the "landed classes" explains
the army's failures to meet the challenges of trench warfare
or the suggestion that senior officers were incapable of
adjusting to changing conditions.
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CHAPTER TWO
The Decline and Fall of an Army
The British Army, like the other Armies involved from
1914, was unready for an unexpected trench war quite
distinct from a "traditional'1 war of movement. Unlike other
European armies, the British Army was employed in world-wide
garrison and policing duties for the Empire and, while
excellent for colonial warfare, its small, professional
organisation was ill-prepared for continental warfare, with
its clashes between mass citizen armies. Birch noted that
'our army was to a great extent an amateur facing a
professional army, and that those in command, in fact in all
ranks from general to lance-corporal, had to train their men
and fight at the same time'.'
In a repeat of the Crimean and Boer Wars the British
Army, small by Continental standards, lacked the
organisation for rapid expansion. The Army leadership,
trained in small isolated wars and with little experience of
continental warfare, as a result of its pre-war role as an
imperial police force, was severely handicapped when pitted
against the well-trained and highly organised German Army.
Kiggell remarked after the war that 'putting "new armies" up
against highly trained ones, of such good stuff as Germans,
is somewhat like putting up a village XI against the
'General Sir Noel Birch to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 June 1938, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
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Australians' 2	 was not until 1917-18 that all ranks,
including the generals, could compete on equal terms.
Unlike the other major armies in 1914, which could
concentrate their efforts on trying to absorb the lessons of
modern warfare, the British coped with a rapid expansion of
their professional army from a very small base. They faced
the daunting task of raising and training a large and
powerful army while deeply engaged in a major war, a task
that other armies with their larger, conscript armies
largely avoided. In August 1914 Haig proposed that the
B.E.F. should not 'go over for 2 or 3 months' during which
time 'the immense resources of the Empire' could be
developed.
For political reasons, this good advice was ignored
and, as a result, the first years of the war were a harsh
and costly experience for the British Army. In 1915 and
1916 generals and staffs had to improvise formations from
corps upwards. Looking back on the poor performance of the
British commanders in 1914 General Sir Thomas Snow noted
that 'we were one as bad, or I should say as ignorant, as
the other' since 'we had none of us had the practice in
handling such large bodies of troops, and the restrictions
placed on the manoeuvre of troops in England had taught me
many false lessons' .
2 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Brigadier-General Sir James Edinonds, 16 June 1938,
C.A.B.45 135, PRO.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 5 August 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
General Sir Thomas Snow, The Account of the Retreat of 1914, undated, p.!, C.A.B.45/129, PRO.
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The largest force put into the field during the
lifetime of any serving officers had been the relatively
small number, a peak of 45,000, raised for the Boer War.5
The B.E.F. was not organised as the 'sole strategic reserve
for use as required in the Empire' until 1906; previously
the Home Army 'had no real war organisation and was just a
number of draft-finding units'. 6 In 1914, the British
Regular Army at home consisted of only one cavalry and six
infantry divisions and lacked even provisional planning for
raising troops on anything approaching the Continental
scale. Despite this the B.E.F. expanded from 4 infantry
divisions and 1 cavalry division in August 1914 to 11
infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions in January 1915;
the cavalry remained static but the infantry divisions
continued to expand in number to 22 in July 1915; 38 in
January 1916; 55 in July 1916; 57 in January 1917; to a peak
of 62 in July 19l7.
This ten-fold expansion in a time of war cannot be
dismissed as an insignificant accomplishment. Nevertheless
this was only achieved at great cost as the Army was plunged
into a spiral of decline from which it only recovered in
1917-18. As Macdonogh noted, 'the old British Army was
destroyed at 1st Ypres' 8 and in these first months of the
C. Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p.347.
6 Major-General F.H.N. Davidson, Lecture to the Swiss Officers' Society, 1935, on the War Effort of the
British Empire in the World War, 1914-1918, The War Office, February 1935, Davidson papers,
LHCMA.
R.M. Luckock, Growth of British Troops in France, 1914-1918, Staff College,
Camberley, April 1920, Field-Marshal Sir John Dill Papers 3 2, LHCMA; see Appendix 16.
8 Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 July 1938,
C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
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war the Regular Army lost a large percentage of its trained
peacetime strength. The heavy casualties of 1914 and 1915
left the British with the Herculean task of revitalising the
Army at all levels, reconstructing the Army at formation and
unit level and creating the weaponry necessary to win the
war.
In marked contrast to the Canadian and A.N.Z.A.C.
Corps, which with permanently allocated divisions and
supporting arms possessed the inestimable advantage of
homogeneity, enabling them to develop a cohesion in their
training, the division remained the basic fighting formation
in the British Army and the composition of corps was
constantly altered as the operational situation demanded.9
Moreover, it was 'not the policy of G.H.Q. to keep divisions
in [the same] Corps' in 1916 and Corps Commanders such as
General Sir Walter Congreve who wished to retain divisions
were not allowed to do so.'° In 1916 XIII Corps thought
that the Army 'has grown too big to think in Divisions' and
that it was 'desirable that the Corps should be more
generally recognised as the real "unit of attack"' and
'should exercise very close supervision and command over the
plans and methods of divisional Commanders in order to
ensure continuity and to avoid the repetition of methods
which have been found to be erroneous' ." As early as
October 1916 Kiggell had suggested the 'regrouping of Divns.
Colonel J.A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, p.16.
'° General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 9 October 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
Xffl Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.9, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
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in Corps and keeping [the] same Divns. in Corps' 12 but the
idea was not developed.
As a result, in contrast to the Canadian and Australian
experience, British formations were constantly broken up.
Henry Wilson (IV Corps) listed 12 divisions which had been
under him in 1916 on a relatively quiet front 13 while Maxse
(XVII Corps) "hosted" 'no less than 30 British Divisions in
141917'.	 General Byng (Third Army) complained to G.H.Q. in
August 1917 that 'the Divisions in a Corps are constantly
changing'	 Rawlinson (Fourth Army) noted the difficulties
of supervising training schools efficiently 'owing to Corps
constantly changing their Divisions and areas'. 16 As late
as October 1918 Major-General G.P. Dawnay (M.G.G.S., Staff
Duties, G.H.Q.) was 'constantly being told by divisions
moving from corps to corps and army to army that they are
being taught differently - different doctrine and different
methods - as they move from one command to another' 17 and
Fergusson (XVII Corps) complained of the detrimental effect
of 'this constant shuffling of divisions from one Corps to
another' 18 Experience showed that 'to work up poor
divisions is impossible while they keep on shifting from
Corps to Corps' whereas 'if Divisions were left in a Corps
12 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 24 July 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
13 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, Memoranda at beginning of January 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
and Hints on Training, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 659, 10 February 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53/8A,
IWM.
' Field-Marshal Viscount Byng to Advanced G.H.Q., 20 August 1917, W.O.95 365, PRO.
16 General Sir Henry Rawlinson to G.H.Q. (Training), Fourth Army G.T.107, 28 October 1918,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
' Major-General G.P. Dawnay to Major-General Sir A.A. Montgomery, G.H.Q., 31 October 1918,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
' General Sir Charles Fergusson to General Lord Home, 10 October 1918, Home Papers 73/60 2, IWM.
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for a good long time one could work up Corps esprit de
19
corps'.
The system of rotating divisions through corps during
1915-17 gave Corps Commanders, who could further their own
ambitions by proclaiming that the situation was more
favourable than the more experienced divisional commanders
judged it to be, little incentive to husband the divisions,
which came and went with great rapidity. For example,
Haking's disastrous attack (XI Corps) at Fromelles, which
was 'a botch job' 20 and 'as good an illustration as there
was of the reckless extrava gance in exiDenditure of life
which ruled the minds of some of the subordinate commanders,
like Gen. Haking, at this stage of the war', showed that
t the weakness of G.H.Q. lay in not seeing that a Corps
commander, left to himself, would also be tempted to win
glory for his Corps by spectacular success, and would be
prodigal in using the Divisions that passed through his
hands for this purpose'. 21 Similarly the attack at Beaumont
Hamel by the Fifth Army on 13 November 1916, was allowed
against the protests of various Corps and Divisional
commanders and staff who pointed out the appalling
conditions and the exhaustion and disorganisation of his
troops, 22 because Gough was 'so keen and confident' that the
General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 11 April 1918, Haldane Papers Acc.20250, NLS.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 30 July 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
21 Captain Philip Landon to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 2 April 1937, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 23 October 1936, CAB 45/135, PRO; Major-General G.M. Lindsay
to Edmonds, 28 June 1937, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
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Commander-in-Chief decided to permit the attack. 23 The lack
of cohesion and co-ordination at corps level exacerbated the
weaknesses of an inexperienced army in controlling the
battle at the operational level.
As General Noel Birch remarked, 'we had to learn our
lesson in the pitiless school of war' 24 Brigadier-General
John Charteris noted 'we were learning our job by hard
experience, and progress was on the whole rapid though
costly', believing that battles such as Loos 'though
unsuccessful, tactically or strategically' were justified by
'the lessons learnt and subsequently applied' 25 As one
battalion commander remarked on the Battle of Loos,
'everyone has to learn, staffs and troops alike, when faced
with conditions so new as those of 1915' 26 Marshal Foch
thought that Haig's 'tremendous losses' on the Somme in 1916
were 'partly owing to having an untrained Army &
Generals' 27
The British Army had to undergo a steep "learning
curve" which 'during 1917 and 1918 led step by step to
eliminating the omissions of 1916,.28 With inexperienced
commanders, staff, and troops the plans of the British
during the period 1915-17 were with hindsight very ambitious
and very difficult to achieve. Inexperienced in the
Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 4 June 1938, CAB
45/135, PRO; see also Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 12 November 1916, W.O.256/l3, PRO; General
Sir Hubert Gough, The Fifth Army, p.156.
24 General Sir Noel Birch to Edmonds, 8 July, 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
25 Brigadier-General John Chartens to Edmonds, 24 February 1927, C.A.B.45/120, PRO.
26	 R.E. Martin to Edmonds, 8 September 1926, C.A.B.45/120, PRO.
27 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 12 November 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
28 Major-General R.M. Luckock to Edinonds, 8 August 1930, C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
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operational art the British from 1915 launched a series of
small-scale battles and costly, attritional attacks on
unsuitable terrain 'with heavy losses and no decisive
success'. 29
 Poor or unrealistic planning and ineffective
control of operations meant that too often the troops went
into battle without adequate preparation, fire-support,
logistic support and effective co-ordination that might have
allowed the difficult task of expanding the initial break-in
into a breakthrough to be achieved.
The best plans were doomed to failure unless the
commanders at lower levels were thoroughly conversant with
the ground, the men were fully briefed and were properly
launched into battle. As early as December 1914 General Sir
Archibald Murray, C.G.S. at G.H.Q., warned that 'it is
important' that 'orders be issued in sufficient time to
enable subordinate commanders to become thoroughly
acquainted with the situation and to make all necessary
arrangements' and that 'should this not be possible it will
usually be better to postpone the attack' 	 With the
expansion of the Army and the largely "amateur" status of
the New Armies, this lesson had to be relearnt. One
Brigadier-General noted that 'bad Staff work and want of co-
ordination between Corps & Divisions' resulted 'in the many
isolated efforts' failing because 'no attack could be
successful if orders reach attacking troops too late for
29 Fjeld..Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.20,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159 1, LHCMA.
30 General Sir Archibald Murray to First and Second Armies, 28 December 1914, Loch Papers 7112 1,
IWM.
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careful explanations to be given to subordinate commanders
and plans to be carefully thought out'
Another lesson was the importance of preparation. One
junior staff officer commented that the staff 'cannot say
that their orders were always framed on sound tactics based
on F.S.R. Part I' and they 'could not expect the gallant and
brave men to do what was impossible and to give them no
sporting chance of a fight' wasting good officers and men in
offensives which were ill-prepared and showed 'a total
disregard of the opinion of Officers, N.C.O.'s and men who
had to do it' 32 After the war, Field-Marshal Viscount
Montgomery noted that the more tired the soldier was 'the
more it is necessary to ensure that he is given a good "kick
off", and is launched on his task with a reasonable and
sporting chance of success'
British operations in the Second Battle of Ypres were
typical of the problems the "amateur" British Army had to
face while adapting to operations on a continental scale.
The Staff work of the Second Army in the Ypres Salient,
exemplary in 1917, 'was very bad' in 1915 and divisions,
notably the 50th, were thrown in without adequate orders or
brief ings. 34
 Haig received reports from subordinates that
'the state of the British troops around Ypres is not
satisfactory' with reinforcements being 'ordered into the
31 Brigadier-General R. FitzMaurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 7 November 1936,
C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
32 MC Ferrers-Guy to Edmonds, 29 June 1937, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 October 1938, C.A.B.45/l16, PRO.
Major-General A.I. MacDougall, Diary, 4-13 May 1915, MacDougall Papers DS/MISC 92, IWM; see
also Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 27 May 1915, Howell Papers W/C 3/167, LHCMA.
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fight without any preliminary reconnaissance or method' and
counter-attacks being 'ordered over open ground, in
daylight, which could not possibly succeed and only
unnecessary losses resulted'
General Sir Aylmer Haldane (3rd Division) complained
that he was forced to undertake three attacks in 1915, which
failed because they had 'at best been gambles, and none of
them had the odds in their favour which Napoleon insisted on
as indispensable', and was highly critical of the '"holding"
attacks' ordered by G.H.Q., 'silly shows' which asked 'men
to sacrifice their lives uselessly' in attempting to pin
down German reserves and frittered away men 'in absolute
opposition to the principle of economy of force'.36
The poor management of operations continued at the
Battle of Loos in September 1915 when no proper staff
arrangements were made to clear the roads for the advance of
XI Corps to exploit the initial success of the assaulting
divisions. 37 Although Haig maintained that there was 'no
avoidable delay' to the movement of the divisions of XI
Corps 'through the administrative areas' of I and IV
Corps, 38 there is little doubt that poor staff work did
indeed make the advance of the 21st and 24th Divisions on 25
September 1915 much more difficult than it should have been.
The 21st and 24th Divisions were 'brought to the fight in an
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 June and 4 July 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 4, PRO.
36 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 14 June 1915, 12 March 1915, and 25 April 1915, Haldane
Papers, NLS.
' Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, pp.1 62-164, Henderson Papers DS/MISC 2, IWM.
38 Haig to G.H.Q., First Army No.194 15(a), 21 October 1915, Butler Papers 69 10 1, IWM.
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exhausted condition, due to bad Staff work' both behind the
line where this fatigue was 'due in large measure to the
lack of any efficient traffic control' and in the front
lines by 'the utterly constant changes in orders'
The 64th Brigade (21st Division) was held up for over
one and a half hours at Bruay Railway crossing by a train
accident and uncontrolled traffic. 4° The Guards Division
had to wait at Manes les Mines for six hours because of the
crowded condition of the road due to shocking staff work.4'
Forestier-Walker (21st Division), witnessing successive
delays notably at the level crossing at Marles Les Mines,
felt that even Regular Divisions 'would have had to do
extraordinarily well' to cope with 'not only the enemy in
front, but with the bad staff work of Higher Commands, the
frequent counter-orders and the disgraceful lack of
organised control in the district behind the Front line' •42
According to Jeffreys, who witnessed 'the appalling
confusion and congestion of the traffic' between La Bussiere
and Noeux les Mines, 'the afterwards excellent system of
traffic control of the army was evolved as a result of the
lessons of that day'
Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice (B.G.O., G.H.Q.)
later admitted that 'for the night march of the 2 divisions
which was through a congested area and crossed several lines
Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 24 January 1927,
C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
° Major J. Buckley to Edmonds, 1 January 1927, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
Harold Macmillan, Winds Of Change, 1914-1939, p.72.
42 Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker to Edmonds, 24 January 1927, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 21 August 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
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of railway in which there was much traffic, G.H.Q. should
have made arrangements for assisting the march of newly
formed divisions' and that 'this was a bad oversight on my
part'	 and as 'there was so much friction and discussion
about the employment of the general reserve I ought either
to have insisted on the First Army making arrangements for
clearing the roads or seen to it myself' 	 General Sir
Robert Whigham (Sub Chief at G.I-I.Q.) noted that there were
also 'faults in the exercise of command and Staff work' by
the inexperienced XI Corps H.Q. Before the battle First
Army had been warned to help the new Army Divisions by the
C.G.S. (Robertson) because 'in nearly every case the march
discipline of the New Divisions when proceeding to the front
to join Armies has been noticed to be very indifferent' so
there was no excuse for First Army to neglect traffic
control 46
There were also complaints concerning the way in which
the 28th Division was made to march to the Loos battlefield
instead of being allowed to travel by bus and rail. 47 In a
later attack on the Hohenzollern Redoubt on 13 October 1915,
Major-General Hon. E.J. Montague-Stuart-Wortley (46th
Division) noted that the troops were hurried into the
trenches to relieve the Guards Division and launched into
the assault when 'the division had barely time to become
" Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 January 1926,
C.A.B.45/120, PRO.
' Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to Edmonds, 12 January 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
General Sir Robert Whigham to Edmonds, 9 July 1926, CAB 45/121, PRO; see also G.H.Q. Instruction
O.A.M.799 to First Army, 8 September 1915, W.O.95 158, PRO.
47 Bngadier-General Philip Howell Diary, 11 October 1915, Howell Papers IVID/1 2, LHCMA.
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acquainted with the actual position' and that 'the division
suffered very heavy losses by an attack which was ordered to
be made, contrary to appreciation of the situation' by the
local commanders •48
One Brigadier-General noted that 'there can be little
doubt that during the early days of trench fighting, and
even later, we were too prone to make isolated attacks'
In his post-operations report Major-General Sir John Capper,
concluded that the 24th Division 'was split up and in fact
did not exist as a division during the fighting', losing
control of its artillery, and that its attack 'seems to have
been unsupported by any special artillery fire, and to have
been isolated'	 During 1916-17 the problem of poor staf f-
work, the result of the inexperience of commanders and staff
officers, continued to dog the British, extending the time-
lag between the planning and execution, making them slow to
react to events, and hindering the translation of their
planning into reality.
In March 1916 the recapture of the Bluff in the Ypres
Salient emphasised that the 'preparation must be most
careful and minute' with the troops selected to carry out
the attack 'prepared and practised beforehand'	 The
experiences on the Somme in 1916 and at Ypres in 1917
reinforced this lesson and commanders of divisions began to
48 Major-General Hon. E. J. Montague-Stuart-Wortley to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 June
1926, C.A.B.45/121, PRO.
Brigadier-General G.C. Kemp to Edmonds, 26 June 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
Major-General J.E. Capper to V Corps, 25 October 1915, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
Major-General Sir John Davidson to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 4 March 1916, Maurice
Papers 3 5 25, LHCMA.
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stress the necessity of giving subordinate units time to
prepare their assaults noting that 'without it the bravest
troops fail and their heroism is wasted' whereas 'with
sufficient time to prepare an assault on a definite and
limited objective' a well trained division could 'capture
almost any "impregnable" stronghold' •52 Much anxiety and
resentment stemmed from the mismanagement of troops, which
reinforced the perception of uncaring generals. Once
established this reputation was very difficult to shake off.
Many failures in attack on the Somme were caused by a
combination of 'bad staff work - want of co-ordination -
Infantry launched hurriedly into action - with insufficient
knowledge of what was expected of them' and ignorance of the
situation by the Higher Commands. 53 The failed attack by
the 24th Brigade on Contalmaison on 7 July showed all the
failings which so blighted the British performance in both
1916 and 1917, namely: 'insufficient preliminary
reconnaissance'; 'lack of co-ordination between neighbouring
units'; 'no proper liaison between units'; too many isolated
bombing attacks along trenches instead of a 'well mounted,
well gunned, simultaneous attack in strength and numbers
across the open'; a 'lack of properly regulated and well
timed Artillery support'; 'false reports of the situation';
52 Major-General F.I. Maxse toll Corps, 18th Division in the Battle of Ancre, 1916, 18 Division No.
G.274, 14 January 1917, paragraph 6, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8, IWM.
Brigadier-General R. FitzMaurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 7 November 1936,
C.A.B.45/133, PRO.
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poor tactics; and 'Brigade Headquarters too far back, out of
touch with the immediate situation'.54
The tendency amongst higher commanders 'to allow too
short a time between the issue of their orders for an
operation and the time at which that operation is to take
place' continued resulting 'in futile loss of life'.55
Complaints of inadequate time to prepare and execute attacks
during the Somme Campaign in 1916 to the B.G.G.S. of II
Corps alone were numerous. 56 One Brigadier-General
complained 'how most of the attacks made in those days were
very hurried & without proper artillery preparation' and
that attacks 'owing to the lack of time in getting orders
given' were 'delivered piecemeal & for this reason
failed'. 57 One regimental officer noted that the attack on
Delville Wood on the 20th July 'was one of many instances of
a hurriedly arranged, piecemeal attack going wrong' with
orders being 'only received verbally at 1030 p.m. on the
19th' forcing the battalion to deploy 'in the dark' and 'on
totally unfamiliar ground without having a chance to see
their objectives or lines of advance' •58
Brigadier-General H.C. Potter (9th Brigade) complained
of many instances on the Somme 'of delay in transmission of
orders failing to give subordinate commanders a fair chance
54	 .	 .Brigadier-General G.W.St.G. Grogan, V.C., to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 April 1930,
C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
Major-General W.T. Furse to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, 9th Division, 26 July 1916,
Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General P. Howell, Diary, 17 July, 8 August, 31 August, and 2 October 1916, Howell Papers
IVID 13, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General F.G.M. Rowley to Edmonds, 22 October 1934, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
58 Captain V.C. Runcer to Edmonds, 11 December 1933, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
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of carrying out their orders', giving as an example the late
arrival of orders on the afternoon of 22 July 1916 for an
attack on Longueval early the following morning which
resulted in a failure	 because the attacking troops 'were
rushed into the attack at short notice with very little time
to examine the ground' 60 In another instance neither the
2/D.L.I. nor the 11/Essex had any time to carry out a
reconnaissance and 'could only just get their troops into a
suitable position to attack by Zero hour' and although
Brigadier-General R.J. Bridgford (18th Brigade) 'protested
most strongly against this ill advised scheme owing to the
lack of time' he was ordered to continue. 6' At one extreme,
the 41st Division sent out an impossible order for an attack
in September 1916, which allowed no time for the assault to
be prepared. 62 Pinney's 33rd Division was asked to attack
Transloy at '48 hours notice' with the result that 'a soaked
tired Div. ' was expected 'to do what wants 4 days
preparation and fresh troops' 63
Claims that it was 'the slowness of the New Armies
which was the cause of the impasse in various parts of the
battle field in the days following the main assaults' were
refuted and the blame for failed attacks put squarely on
'the failure to give time to local commanders to organise
their attacks' and the tendency to employ tired troops in
Brigadier-General H.C. Potter to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 January 1934, C.A.B.45 136,
PRO.
60 Humphrey H. Prideaux to Edmonds, 5 December 1933, C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
61 H.P. Pickering to Edmonds, 17 June 1935, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
62 Major-General A.!. MacDougall, Diary, 16 September 1916, MacDougall Papers DS/MISC/92, IWM.
63 Major-General Sir Reginald Prnney, Diary, 3 November 1916, Pinney Papers, IWM.
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attacks so that 'very heavy losses have been suffered and
lives have been sacrificed to no purpose'." The relatively
untrained battalion and company commanders of the New Armies
required '"nursing" into battle' and considerable time to
reconnoitre the ground before attacking. Unlike the well-
trained 'Old Army', they could 'not be hustled on and told
to attack at an impossible hour' 65 One Brigadier-General
in July 1916 noted that 'the present staffs, from want of
experience' did not know 'how long it takes for an infantry
unit to carry out an order and get into position' 66 and
'the Corps apparently had no notion how long orders take to
percolate through from the higher command to the Company
Commanders' 67 One battalion commander on the Somme noted
that 'orders were often received by the battns. after the
time they were supposed to have been carried out' and that
'it never seemed to be realised by the higher authorities
that after orders were received by the battn. Comdr., that
Company Comdrs. had to be collected, who again had to see
their platoon Comdrs. often widely scattered & difficult to
get at'.68
Bridges (19th Division) warned that 'the new army wants
lots of time & warning to do anything' and attributed the
64 Bngadier-General R.J. Kentish to 3rd Division, 76th Bngade No. B 175, 3 August 1916, Montgomery-
65 Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
Major General F.!. Maxse to Major General A.A. Montgomery, 31 July 1916, Maxse Papers, 69 53 7,
IWM.
66 Brigadier-General T.H. Shoubndge to Major-General F.!. Maxse, 30 July 1916, Maxse Papers, 69 53/7,
IWM.
67	 -Brigadier-General F.G.M. Rowley to Bngadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 22 October 1934,
C.A.B.451137, PRO.
66 Lieutenant-Colonel C. Connell to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 26 November 1929,
C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
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failure of his division at Bazentin-le-Petit to the lack of
'more time to prepare'. 69 One major lesson from the Battle
of the Somrne was that 'the officers of the New Army take
more time to digest orders and to pass them on' especially
during the 'necessary preparations prior to an attack' and
the better commanders, realising that there was no
substitute for careful preparation and that 'when ample time
was not given, attacks failed', 7° allowed time for
reconnaissance by the divisional commander and his staff,
liaison with other artillery and divisional commanders, to
issue orders to sub-commanders, and to brief the battalions
involved.
To 'issue their orders in sufficient time to enable
Battalion and Company Commanders to reconnoitre the ground
to be attacked, make their preparations in detail and issue
their orders' six hours was 'a minimum time for orders to
pass from Corps to the Company Commanders and if less than
that time is allowed adequate preparation cannot be made'.72
But this minimum of 6 hours recommended by G.H.Q. for orders
to pass from Corps to Company H.Q. was considered by some
divisions and corps to be 'greatly underestimated' given the
69 Lieutenant-General Sir Tom Bridges to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 15 August 1916, French Papers
75/46/li IWM.
0 G.T.M. Bridges, Some Further Notes on the Recent Operations, by the Divisional
71 Commander, 19th Division, 9 September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
Major-General J.S.M. Shea to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, 30th Division, 2 August 1916,
Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
72 LXth Corps, Notes on Information collected from various Sources including troops who have been
engaged in the Recent Fighting, 31 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
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conditions on the Somme.73
One division even suggested that 'operations orders
should be issued 12 hours previously to all concerned',74
while XIII Corps required that 'on average a period of at
least 24 hours from the time Divisional Operation Orders are
issued before the Platoon Commander in the front line is in
a position to carry out his part in the attack'. 75 The
Brigade Major of the 36th Brigade (12th Division) commented
that 'it might take as much as six hours to go up from
Brigade Headquarters, round two forward battalions and
return' and that 'when the higher staffs issued these
orders, often very lengthy and complicated, they did not
ensure there was time for them to be digested below, and for
orders to reach the troops who were actually to attack'
giving the troops no chance of success.76
Inexperienced staff and troops ensured that the British
Army was unable to react quickly to events and that any
attempt to "force the issue" by speeding things up resulted
in disaster. During the later stages of the Battle of Loos
General Sir Edward Buif in (28th Division) was informed 'late
on the night before the attack, which started at dawn' that
Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Deedes, Notes on Experience gamed during the Recent Operations, 2nd
Division No. G.S. 1001/1/51, 16 August 1916, and Major-General W.G. Walker, 2nd Division No. GS.
1001/1/52, 16 August 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA; see also Brigadier-General
A.R. Cameron, Questions relating to an initial attack after lengthy preparation, X Corps, 16 August 1916,
7 
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
Major J.McD. Haskard, Notes on the Recent Operations, 19th Division No. G. 48 27, 19 July 1916,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA; See also Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Johnson, Notes on the
Recent Operations - 2nd Phase: 20th - 30th July 1916, 19th Division, September 1916, Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
Xffl Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.10, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
76 Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 April 1936,
C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
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'the guns which had registered and been given their targets
were to come out, and I had to put a new lot of artillery
who knew nothing of the targets and had not registered' with
the result that 'the whole show was hopeless' .'
One staff officer noted on the Somme in November 1916
that 'it cannot be too well realised that you cannot change
plans at the last moment, it takes hours for orders to reach
front line, as wires [are] invariably cut by shell fire'.78
Colonel W.H.F. Weber (G.S.O.l 30th Division) complained that
in the planning to capture Falfemant and Guillemont 'between
20 and 30 July the plan was changed or postponed no less
than ten times' which involved 'one wild rush of visiting
Corps & Divisions' while 'a request for a Barrage Map
invariably accompanied each fresh change of plan' .
In a lecture on the lessons of the Battle of Loos,
Montgomery (B.G.G.S. IV Corps) noted that once the planning
process had been completed 'the less interference with
subordinates the better' since 'mistrust and nagging at
subordinates on matters of detail does an infinity of
harm' 80 Unfortunately, this lesson was not learnt. One
artillery commander complained that during the Battle of the
Somme 'one was being harassed by Staffs from the rear a good
deal', which 'added to the nightmare'. 81 There was a
" General Sir Edward Bulfm to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 11 December 1927, CAB 45/120,
PRO.
H. Spender Clay, Diary, 17 November 1916, quoted by H. Spender Clay to Edmonds, 28 September
1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Edmonds, 19 October 1933, Extracts from Diary, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
SO [Brigadier-General A.A. Montgomery], Lecture given at Head-Quarters, 3rd Anny, on 14th December,
1915 on action of IV Corps at Loos, ,25 September 1915, W.O.95 711 PRO.
' Colonel J.H. Bateson to Edmonds, 26 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
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tendency within the high command of 'issuing orders without
an accurate knowledge of the local situation and against the
strong representations of commanders on the spot who had
that knowledge' 82
Some sections of the high command were resistant to
demands for more preparation. When in September 1916
Morland asked for a postponement, which was reluctantly
given, to allow time for the XV Corps to take Guillemont
there was talk of his B.G.G.S. (later General Hon Sir
Francis Gathorne Hardy) 'being replaced by someone else as a
consequence of this protest' 83 Similarly, General Gough
reported that the B.G.G.S. of Canadian Corps (later General
Sir Percy Radcliffe) 'made unnecessary difficulties with bad
results on the whole corps and also on neighbouring
division' •84 In such an atmosphere lessons were not learnt.
A number of generals at all levels of the hierarchy
were quite prepared to browbeat and bully doubtful generals
into carrying out their wishes and making sure that
subordinates at lower levels of the command structure obeyed
and implemented the approved policy. Examples of such
commanders were Haking (XI Corps), who constantly bullied
and interfered with the planning of his subordinates, such
as Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game, the G.S.O.1 of the 46th
Division in late 1915 85 and reported Lieutenant-General
82 NN Menzies to Edmonds, 19 April 1934, C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
83 General Hon Sir Francis Gathorne Hardy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 28 August 1934,
C.A.B.45/134, PRO.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 12 October 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
85 Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 10, 11 and 24 November 1915 and 8, 10, and 20
December 1915, Game Papers, PWG 9, IWM.
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R.G. Broadwood, 57th Division, for 'lack of fighting
spirit', 86 when they tried to prevent the loss of lives in
unprofitable attacks by their troops; Hunter-Weston (VIII
Corps), who unjustifiably removed Major-General P.S.
Wilkinson (50th Division) 87 and Major-General P.R. Wood
(33rd Division), 88 who was 'a victim to this bullying'; 89 and
Lieutenant-General Sir Cameron Shute (V Corps), 'a great
thruster' with 'a rather ruthless nature', 90 who in late
1918 continually harried his divisional commanders such as
Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney (33rd Division) 91 and
General Sir David Campbell (21st Division), who complained
that 'the fortnight's bosh [sic] hunting to which he had
looked forward all his Service had been absolutely miserable
owing to Shute's fussing'.92
But during the Battles of the Somme and Third Ypres
Gough (Fifth Army) in particular was notorious for harassing
subordinates into over-ambitious action, often breaking the
chain of command by speaking direct to Divisional
commanders, and demanding that they implement unworkable
orders. 'Very impetuous and difficult to get on with' 	 as
well as being 'excitable & thoughtless & impatient', Gough
86 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Colonel C. [J.C.] Allanson, 19 August 1937, Liddell Hart Papers,
11/1937/69, LHCMA.
Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 23 February 1918, Pinney Papers, J.WM; General Sir William
Heneker, Diary, 24 February 1918, IWM.
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Pinney, Diary, 28 November 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
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was 'like a cat on hot bricks' 	 lacking respect for senior
officers who did not come up to his standards and developing
a tendency 'to fight with everyone above him as well as with
the Boches'. 95
 The death of his brother, Brigadier-General
J.E. Gough, V.C. in early 1915, exacerbated Gough's almost
irrational and unrealistic demands for speedy progress from
his subordinates. One subordinate thought that Gough's
'temperament did not suit/ him for command' and when serving
under him in France 'found him full of nerves & hunting his
subordinates' •96
General Sir Edward Buif in (28th Division) recalled
serving under Gough at I Corps at the Battle of Loos as 'a
sort of horrid nightmare' and did not 'want to serve under
him again'	 On the Somme Major-General W.H. Rycroft (32nd
Division) was said by his G.S.O.l (Wace) to be terrified of
Gough and on receiving orders to return in October 1916
remarked 'wryly that it would be his undoing unless we went
to Rawly's Army!' Lacking 'the kick in him to stand up to
Gough, when all initiative was taken out of his hands',
Rycroft was duly removed when his division failed in an
attack on 18 November 1916.98 Other senior officers, such
as Jacob (II Corps), Malcolm (his M.G.G.S.) and Percival
(49th Division) were also alleged to be 'terrified' of
Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 14 October 1914, Howell Papers IVIC/3/75, LHCMA.
Howell to his wife, 19 March 1915, Howell Papers N C/3 129, LHCMA; see also Brigadier Sir Edward
Beddington, Memoir, p.54, LHCMA.
Major-General Sir Richard Bannatine-Allason to Brigadier-General Sir James Edinonds, 19 November
1931, Edmonds Papers 1112 257, LHCMA.
General Sir E.S. Bulfm to Edmonds, 11 December 1927, CAB 45/120, PRO.
Brigadier-General E.G. Wace to Edmonds, 30 November 1936, CAB 45/138, PRO.
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him. 99
 By early 1917 Gough had gained the reputation of a
commander who 'terrorises those under him to the extent that
they are afraid to express their opinions for fear of being
degomme • 100
Unlike good officers, such as Allenby and Plumer, Gough
does not seem to have learned from the experiences of 1915-
16. By early 1917 commanders such as Birdwood, who was
'very sick at going to the V Army', 101 Haldane 102 and
Lambton were 'not at all keen' to go to Gough's Army.'° 3 By
March 1917 junior officers felt that 'heavy losses &
complete failure' were 'very typical [of] Gen. Gough, who
apparently does not care a button about the lives of his
men' 
104 By mid-1917 there was 'little confidence' in
105	 .	 .	 106Gough,	 notorious for his 'encounters' with subordinates
and 'looked on as a bit of a freak' 107 By late 1917 there
was 'intense feeling against Goughy', who had made 'many
enemies', with 'the formation of a sect of officers called
the G.M.G. which interpreted means "Gough must go"'.'° 8 By
late 1917 'no division wanted to go' to the Fifth Army 109
Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 29 August 1916, Howell Papers IVIC/3/339, LHCMA.
'°° General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 31 March 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
'o General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 26 January 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
102 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
103 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 10 September 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
' °4 Brigadier A.E. Hodgkin, Diary (Volume III), 14 March 1917, Hodgkin Papers P.399, IWM.
LOS Brian Bond and Simon Robbins, Staff Officer: The Diaries of Walter Guinness (First Lord Moyne).
1914-1918, 23 July [1917], p.162.
' °6 Major-General J.W. Sandilands to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 August 1923,
C.A.B.45/l 92, PRO.
107 Brigadier-General C. Yatman to Edmonds, 23 May 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
108 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 14 October and 1 November 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1 9, CCC.
'° Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with [General Sir Charles] Broad, 12 February 1947, Liddell Hart Papers
1119472, LHCMA.
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and most units hailed with relief a transfer to Plumer's
Second Army."°
In October 1917 Kiggell recommended to Haig that the
Canadian Corps 'should be sent to General Plumer and not to
Gough because the Canadians do not work kindly with the
latter' who 'drove them too much in the Somme fighting last
year' and again in November 1917 'of the strong wish of
divisions not to be sent to Gough's Army'." General Sir
William Peyton (the Military Secretary) 'had told Haig three
times that he was not only injuring himself but injuring
also the cause by keeping Gough in command' but Haig was
'perfectly infatuated with him' •h12
The Brigade Major of the 36th Brigade had 'the most
bitter memories' of the Somme in 1916, commenting that it
'merely resulted in a useless loss of life and lowering of
morale in the formations which took part in it' since 'the
conditions, weather and in particular mud' made 'any real
success out of the question'. 113 One sapper noted that 'the
end of the SOMME battle, as seen by the regimental officer,
appeared to be a pointless and depressing affair - a stale
remnant of what had once been quite exciting'	 One
I0 See General Sir Charles Harrngton to Liddell Hart, Diary Notes, 31 March 1927, Liddell Hart Papers
111927/lb., LHCMA; Liddell Hart, Talk with General Pope-Hennessy, 14 October 1933, Liddell Hart
Papers 11/1933 33, LHCMA; Liddell Hart, Talk with Broad, 12 February 1947, Liddell Hart Papers
111947 2; Major-General R. Bannatine-Allason to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 November
1931, Edmonds Papers 11/2 257; Brigadier-General P. Howell, Pocket Diary, 2, 18, 20, and 25 August
and 1 October 1916, Howell Papers IVID/l 3, LHCMA; C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War,
1914-1918, p.502.
' Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 5 October and 8 November 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 24, PRO.
112 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoir, Chapter XXVIII, Edmonds Papers 111112 17, LHCMA.
' Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
Major-General C.G. Woolner to Edmonds, 2 April 1934, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
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Company Officer, later a battalion and Brigade commander,
complained of the 'failure of the Higher Command to cancel
hopeless attacks which eventually made the troops feel that
they were not being given a sporting chance'
The Somme was the nadir of the British Army and things
began to improve thereafter but nevertheless problems
continued into 1917, partly because new, inexperienced
commanders came out to the front repeating old mistakes and
partly because 'the High Authorities never seem to learn
lessons which are obvious to those who have to carry out
their plans'.' 16
 At Brigade level it was 'felt, perhaps
quite wrongly, that the Staffs of the higher formations were
not taking sufficient trouble to find out the true
situation' and, although 'admittedly it was difficult for
them in the limited time available, as even a Brigade
Headquarters probably necessitated a long walk in the mud',
they seemed 'time and again to ignore our reports and not to
care that they were so ignorant, and to issue orders and
instructions quite inapplicable to the real situation' •h17
Too often the orders of the Higher Command were 'only a
summary of the decisions taken at numerous conferences'
which prescribed 'the choice of methods selected by (even)
Battalion Commanders'. For staff officers 'it was literally
not possible both to effect the necessary personal touch
Brigadier-General S.V.P. Weston to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 17 March 1937,
C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
116 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 26 July 1916, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
h17 Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Anderson to Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
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with Formations to the flanks and to observe first-hand what
one's troops were doing in front' since 'it was one constant
stream of long motor rides over bad roads to conferences at
which each new plan had to be examined and acted upon as it
came along' 118 During the planning for the operations on
the Ancre in November 1916 by the 32nd Division, Wace (the
G.S.O.1) 'was furious at the time that the whole of these
arrangements, even including the selection of Advanced Bde
H.Q., were definitely laid down to us by Corps H.Q. as the
Army Commander's decision' or 'in other words Rycroft did
not in effect command the 32nd Division' but 'was told what
orders he was to issue, and he hadn't the spirit to say he
would command his own Division' •h19
Colonel E.M. Birch noted that during the German
withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line the Fifth Army advanced
'without real cooperation of formations or time given to
them (as was the case in the early days on the Somme, when
my experience as G.S.O. 1 [25th] Divn. was similar) to
function properly' •120 One reason for the failure to
complete a very ambitious programme at Arras 'was the lack
of co-operation between units, and a lack of co-ordination
from the higher command' which resulted in there being 'no
guiding hand from above to co-ordinate attacks' and in 'one
futile attack after another, with appalling waste of human
118 Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 October 1933, Extracts from
Diaiy, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
119 Brigadier-General E.G. Wace to Edmonds, 30 October 1936, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
120 Colonel E.M. Birch to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 September 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
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121life'.	 Birch also remembered, as G.S.O.l Fifth Army
during the Battle of Arras in April 1917, 'how disgruntled I
was at the sketchy & hurried way plans were made, giving
recipients of orders no time to digest & act upon them',
which 'was a repetition of the early days of the Somme
fighting, resulting as then in much loss & little to show
122for it'.
The attack by the 27th and South African Brigades of
the 9th Division at Arras on 12th April 'was completely
wiped out' because 'no doubt the Attack looked alright on
the map, but viewed from the actual ground it was hopeless'
with 'something like 1500 yds of absolutely open ground to
be advanced over in the face of an enemy well entrenched &
well supplied with Machine Guns & Artillery' 123 For 34th
Division's assault at Arras on 29 April 'the orders for the
attack were not issued from the Corps until early on the
27th April' and as a result 'the detailed orders did not
reach battalions in time to enable adequate instruction to
be given to the junior officers' most of whom 'were
inexperienced' 124 One junior staff officer also noted that
'attacks were constantly being put in with insufficient time
to organise them' when 'the wire about the Hindenburg Line
was so strong that nothing short of a carefully prepared
attack had any hope' 125
121 Brigadier-General R.A.C. Wellesley to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 August 1937,
C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
122 Colonel E.M. Birch to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 September 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
123 Colonel Sir George W. Abercromby, April 12th 1917, undated, C.A.B.45/l 16, PRO.
124 Lieutenant-Colonel W.A. Vignolles to Falls, 10 February 1939, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
125 Major Hon D.G. Fortescue to Falls, 6 February 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
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Another example of formations not being given enough
time to prepare for an attack occurred during operations of
the 7th Division at Bullecourt when the 22nd Brigade 'was
put into a night attack at very short notice' on 3 May and
the 20th Brigade only received their orders late in the
afternoon of 6 May when the troops 'had some miles to march,
all arrangements for guiding onto the forming up tapes had
to be made & the tapes themselves laid out' and 'the notice
was too short to allow of any reconnaissance of the ground'
for an assault on 7 May.' 26
 One staff officer at Third Army
during the Battle of Cambral noted that 'all these attacks
without proper preparation were pretty dreadful' especially
as 'we did exactly the same at Loos' •127 But the lesson was
gradually learnt. As a result of experiences at Ypres in
1917, the Second Army stressed that prior preparation,
reconnaissance and close liaison by staffs were 'vital to
128the success of any operation'.	 G.H.Q. emphasised in early
1918 that each stage of the offensive had to be thought out,
planned and rehearsed in every detail beforehand 129 while
commanders such as Harper (IV Corps) reiterated in late 1918
that 'success in battle' was 'largely dependent on the care
and forethought exercised by Commanders in laying their
126 Lieutenant-General A.N. Floyer-Acland to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 January 1939,
C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
Major-General E.C. Gepp to Edmonds, 14 July 1944, C.A.B.45/1 18, PRO.
Notes on Recent Operations, Second Army No. G.S.52 2, [November 1917], Montgomery-Massingberd
1291peis 93, LHCMA.
S.S. 135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B. 1635, January 1918,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
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initial plans' and that most battles were 'won or lost
before zero hour' 130
Other recurring faults emerged during the war. At some
considerable additional cost in life and materiel, the
British armies always fought for ground as much as to defeat
the enemy. General Sir John Burnett-Stuart commented that
'ground came to have an exaggerated value, and that much
fighting took place either merely to advance the line a
fraction of an inch on the map without any tactical
advantage, or to retain a bit of ground which was so
commanded and exposed as to be worse than valueless, when
often a much better position existed close behind it'.
'Clinging for months to bad and valueless positions became a
fetish which it was worth no commander his place to
disregard' 131 and those who surrendered ground voluntarily
were likely to face severe disapproval. For example, when a
withdrawal to a shorter line at Ypres rather than hold onto
'an impossible position' was ordered in May 1915 by the
G.S.O.1 on his own initiative, both General Allenby (V
Corps) and General Plumer (Second Army) 'showed their
disapproval by recommending, without any enquiry of the
circumstances' the removal of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
Wilson (4th Division), causing much anxiety.'32
130 Lieutenant-General Sir George Harper, Guiding Principles Affecting the Attack, IV Corps, 23 October
1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IVTM.
General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter VIII, pp.85-86, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massmgberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, pp.16-18,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159/1, LHCMA.
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'Heavy losses and ill success',' 33
 especially in 1915
and 1916, were invariably 'the general result of this policy
of "hanging on at all costs" in unfavourable ground',
resulting in an 'unduly large' casualty bill with the
British 'losing heavily in life, fighting strengths,
fighting efficiency, ammunition, equipment and, above all,
moral' with the troops 'losing faith in the judgement and
skill of those above them' and 'without sufficient
corresponding gain'
	 Typical examples of this policy was
the failure of Sir John French to abandon the Ypres Salient,
a policy advocated by Smith-Dorrien in 1915, which would
have saved 100,000 casualties.' 35
 The British in early 1918
hung 'onto every yard of ground, whether it be to their
advantage or not' ' and the failure to abandon the
Flesquieres and Passchendaele Salients before the German
Spring Offensive prevented subordinate commanders from being
able 'to economize men and make the Germans attack us in
conditions as favourable to ourselves as possible, that is
to say on ground of our own choosing' •i:	 The British in the
end were forced by circumstances to abandon both salients.
Edmonds believed that 'G.H.Q. or Third Army hung on too long
to the Flesquieres Salient so when the garrison did at last
clear out it was forced N.W. away from the Fifth Army and a
'3 Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, pp.1 6-18, Montgomery-Massingberd
1 Papers 159 1, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General P. Howell, Note on our position round Ypres, 28 May 1915, Howell Papers IIJC/7,
LHCMA.
135	 .General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 4 December 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
136 Haldane, War Diary, 17 April 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
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gap between the Armies was created'. 138 Haig was considered
to be much more flexible than many of his generals in
refusing to hold onto useless ground or retaking lost ground
if it was not worth the casualties.'39
Another tendency was to commit troops in piecemeal
assaults on narrow fronts. The more experienced British
commanders were critical of the tendency to carry out a
"nibbling" attack on a narrow front 'after a large attack in
order to "straighten the line"' when the front could 'easily
be straightened when the next big attack is carried out'.'4°
The result was that the attacker lost 'far more men in the
drawn-out original attack' than if he 'broke it off, and
prepared for another'
	 As early as December 1914, the
British were taught the lesson that it was better to wait
for a major offensive rather than trying to save casualties
by gaining ground with 'small isolated attacks' which 'lost
too many lives' to 'the subsequent most costly counter-
attacks'.'42 Generals remained wedded to 'minor and
premature attacks' which 'when launched without adequate
art [iller]y support or when sufficient time for preparation
has not been possible, only result in useless waste of life
and energy without inflicting on the enemy greater losses
than we suffer ourselves'.'43
' Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to General Sir Hubert Gough, 21 November 1932, C.A.B.45/192,
PRO.
139 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Autobiography, Volume II, p.430, Haldane Papers, NLS.
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Early in 1915 Haldane, a witness of the Russo-Japanese
War, was highly critical of these '"holding" attacks'
ordered by G.H.Q., 'silly shows' which asked 'men to
sacrifice their lives uselessly' in attempting to pin down
German reserves,'44 frittering away men 'in absolute
opposition to the principle of economy of force'.' 45 After
the Battle of Loos one staff officer reported that 'events
have proved the costliness or futility of attacks made by
small formations such as brigades or even divisions, owing
to the subsequent punishment by concentrated hostile
artillery fire' and, noting that 'the troops hate these
small efforts and go for them with small enthusiasm',
recommended that any 'offensive should therefore be on a
comparatively large scale - say with 6 to 9 divisions on a
front of 5,000 to 10,000 yards' 146
Yet on the Somme, as before at Neuve Chapelle and Loos,
'the minor, but very costly piecemeal attacks' continued to
be 'a feature of operations' •147 During the period of late
July 1916 'piecemeal attacks were being made on small
fronts' against 'the LONGUEVAL and DELVILLE WOOD salient' 148
The isolated attack on Delville Wood by the 3rd Division in
July 1916 'was a very great mistake and was 'foredoomed to
failure'	 One staff officer noted that, although
144 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 12 March 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
'' Haldane, War Diary, 25 April 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
' Major J.M. Elles, Notes on a further offensive, p.2, 10 October 1915, W.O.158 17, PRO.
14 Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish to 3rd Division, 76th Brigade No. B175, 3 August 1916, p.14,
Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
' D.K. McLeod to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 24 January 1935, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
' 49 Brigadier-General S.G. Craufurd to Edmonds, 19 November 1933, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
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'constant isolated attacks' on Guillemont in August 1916,
which ignored G.H.Q. instructions, were 'extremely
demoralizing to the Germans', better good results 'might
have been obtained by the Artillery leaving the front line
to be held by a few outposts and thereby avoiding the
terrible casualties these minor operations caused'
Instead the infantry had no rest and 'it was impossible
to consolidate or make the necessary preparation for any
larger operation'. Experienced commanders were critical of
'the folly of such tactics' which were 'quite unsound and
very costly',' 5° noting that the attritional nibbling tactics
employed by G.H.Q. and the Fourth Army on the Somme in 1916
were very costly and 'hanging on and scratching forward from
Bazentin was expensive work & we got well hammered'
These numerous small, isolated attacks 'to straighten line
prior to a big attack' were 'unnecessary' and 'very costly
in valuable lives, munitions, and morale' •152
As one regimental officer noted, 'the most noticeable
feature in the operations during this period was the almost
invariable failure of small attacks' which led to the
realisation that 'attacks on a large scale were as a rule
much less costly in proportion and the ground gained was
easier to hold owing to dispersion of enemy's artillery
fire' •153 Infantry Brigade Commanders 'very much resented
General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 26 July 1916, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
Lieutenant-General Sir Tom Bridges to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 15 August 1916, French Papers
75/46 11,IWM.
' 52 Laton Fraven to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 13 April 1934, C.A.B.45/1 33, PRO.
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the irritation of these minor attacks, after a series of big
operations had come to an end' because 'in nine cases out of
ten this "nibbling" was carried out by tired officers and
men in (consequently) a very half-hearted fashion, and
almost invariably meant heavy loss of life, and ended in
disappointment & failure'
	 The G.S.O.1, 17th Division,
felt that 'there was something very seriously wrong with our
tactics, and methods, of attack' on the Somme in which the
British 'squandered men' in the opening phase 'without
inflicting commensurate loss on the enemy'
The Germans too were critical of British tactics on the
Somme employing a series of 'almost continual attacks on a
smaller scale to attain more limited objectives', 156 which
relied heavily on stereotyped attacks preceded by a heavy
bombardment with little attempt at surprise, failed to
exploit any initial success.' 57 Haldane maintained that
instead of applying a policy of attrition employing 'piece-
meal attacks',' 58 once the initial assault had taken place
'it would be much less costly to let things settle down' and
instead 'of nibbling a small bit' to wait until 'the next
general attack' as the attacker lost 'far more men in the
drawn-out original attack' than if he 'broke it off, and
prepared for another'	 One Corps noted that the Somme
'Bngadier.General Rudolf Jell to Edmonds, 27 November 1934, C.A.B.45/1 35, PRO.
'"Major-General R.J. Collins to Edmonds, 7 February 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
' 56 Field..Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massmgberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.22,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159/1, LHCMA.
' 57 S.S.478 (Translation of a German Document), Experiences of the IV German Corps in the Battle of the
Somme During July 1916, G.H.Q. Ia/20245, 30 September 1916, Montgomery .Massingberd Papers 49,
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operations 'have proved once again that small isolated
attacks are usually doomed to failure' and noted that 'the
French on our right attributed much of their success to the
fact that the Commander of the VI French Army sternly set
his face against any attempt at small isolated operations
and hardly ever attacked on a narrower front than that of 2
Corps' 160 Haig told Gough that it 'was better to wait than
to start a series of small operations which could not have
decisive results' 161
The problem, however, remained at Arras in 1917.
Fergusson (XVII Corps) threw away 'a lot of lives' on
'useless narrow front enterprises' at Roeux on the Scarpe 162
as part of a series of 'numerous & isolated attacks on
Roeux, the Chemical works and Greenland Hill' which made
'very sorry reading'.' 63 Charles (B.G.G.S., XVII Corps)
maintained that 'the policy of tying the enemy down' to
prevent him from moving his reserves elsewhere 'could
equally well have been achieved by maintaining a strong and
active force of artillery on our front' allowing 'the
divisions who had taken part in the original victorious
attack' to regroup and embark on a second stage of the
Battle of Arras which 'would have achieved equally striking
successes as they did on 9th April at a very much smaller
cost in human life' 164
°XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, p.1 3, [August 1916], Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
161 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 November 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 14, PRO.
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Major-General C.G. Fuller (G.S.O.1, 29th Division)
agreed on 'the futility of piecemeal attacks, beloved of the
Higher Command, and abhorred by the Divisions and still more
so by the Bdes & Bns.' whereas the adherence to general
attacks would have ensured success at much lower cost in
casualties.' 65 The lesson was belatedly learnt in September
1917 when worried about 'the wisdom of making small attacks
on farms and isolated strong points', Haig decided 'to stop
Gough from going on with these little attacks' although
Gough was resistant to this pressure.'" In the victorious
advance of 1918 very different tactics were employed. For
example, Haldane (VI Corps) was warned by his Army
Commander, in October 1918 to attack only on a broad front
or with small raids and to avoid attacks on a narrow
.67front.
A common complaint during the war was a propensity to
repeat assaults, which had failed, rather than finding
alternative avenues of attack. One major reason for 'our
painfully slow progress and heavy losses throughout the
Somme battle' was 'the failure on the part of higher
commanders to apply boldly the principles of "reinforce when
successful"'.' 68 Unlike the Germans who in Spring 1918
'exploited any small breakthrough that they made and spread
out behind such of our troops as had held their positions',
165 Major-General C.G. Fuller to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 July 1938, C.A.B.45/1 16, PRO.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 September 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 22, PRO.
167 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 21 October 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Nosworthy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 July 1935,
C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
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the British 'generally had been accustomed to hammering away
at the points which we had been unable to take at first' •169
Unfortunately, this attritional form of operations was
persisted in throughout the campaigns of 1915-17.
At Loos in 1915 attacks were continued into November
when they should have been abandoned at the end of
September;' 7° on the Somme in 1916 Haig was 'bent on
continuing the battle' until 'forced to stop by the weather'
and indeed wanted 'to go on all through the winter';' 7 ' at
Arras repeated attacks were made along the Scarpe in May
1917; and at Ypres in 1917 the offensive was allowed to
continue into November, despite the protests in early
October 1917 of Gough and Plumer who made it clear that they
did not expect to see any further great strategic results
from operations,'72 making 'rather doubtful victories' such
as the capture of Passchendaele 'extremely costly' .'
There was no coherent, co-ordinated tactic other than
battering on in the hope that the Germans would collapse and
as a result each battle seemed to have developed a momentum
of its own with Haig determined to continue with it whatever
the circumstances. 'In the opinion of the intelligent man in
the trench the prolongation of the battle, and the final
autumn attacks, were a mistake, and a waste' because of the
169 Brigadier-General A.P. Benson to Captain Cyril Falls, undated, C.A.B.45/1 16, PRO.
170 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 14 November 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
171 Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.23,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159 1, LHCMA; General Lord Rawlinson, Diary, 6 October 1916,
Rawlinson Papers 1 7 CCC.
172 Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm, Filth Army S.G.657 502, 1 October 1917, and Field-Marshal Lord
Plumer, Second Army G.924, 30 September 1917, W.O.158 250, PRO.
173 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 19 September and 6 October 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1 7, CCC.
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poor ground conditions.' 74
 One staff officer later concluded
that 'the Somme battle 'proved conclusively' that 'it is
useless to attempt to maintain the momentum of the original
attack if halts occur anywhere, unless ample time is given
to the artillery to prepare for the next phase' .'
The Battle of Arras in April 1917 'was another example
of the same disastrous policy, of continuing the effort
after all possible hope of success has gone' ' and 'the
many regrettable failures on the part of the British troops
engaged' which were 'in strong contrast' to 'the fine
successes achieved by the Canadians' at Vimy Ridge were
mainly due to 'the use of tired troops' 	 Lieutenant-
General Sir Ronald Charles (then B.G.G.S. XVII Corps) noted
that continuing the offensive proved futile as 'we had
nothing but tired divisions who had lost pretty heavily in
the initial attacks of the 9th, 10th & 11th of April, & it
was quite evident, on the XVIIth Corps front, at any rate,
that we were up against fresh German divisions who had no
intention of retreating' and 'to hurl these depleted, & to
some extent disorganised, formations against good troops who
had had 3 or 4 days in which to place & dig in their machine
guns was to ask for failure' •178 Similarly, after the
initial success at Cambrai on 20 November 1917, the 2nd
Guards Brigade was pushed into a hopeless and 'criminal'
Pearson Choate to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 26 March 1926, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
' Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Karslake to Edmonds, 28 January 1936, C.A.B.45 135, PRO.
176 Major-General G.M. Lindsay to Captain Cyril Falls, 16 January 1939, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
W.L.O. Twiss to Edmonds, 18 September 1938, C.A.B.45/1 16, PRO.
Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles to Edmonds, 14 July 1937, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
106
attack on Les Tone Wood and La Fontaine on 27 November
despite the protests of its commander and Feuding (Guards
Division), who 'got little backing from the Corps Cdr' 179
Commanders also showed an unimaginative obsession for
frontal attacks rather than by-passing strongpoints, which
invariably resulted in heavy casualties. Haig felt that at
Neuve Chapelle 'there is no doubt' that Wilicocks and Joey
Davies 'were impregnated with the old tactical idea that if
during an attack any part of the line is held up, it is
dangerous for the others (who are not held up) to press on'
and 'hence no steps were taken to reinforce our trps.
[which] had met with success, and press forward and round
180the flanks of the points still holding out'.
	
When the
question whether the VIII Corps should in July 1916 'attack
BEAUMONT HNVIEL by direct assault or envelopment' was
discussed by G.H.Q. 'it was decided to attack it direct'
because of the 'complication of [the] artillery programme'
and the 'danger to our own troops from our own artillery or
enemy' rifle fire' •181 Similarly, the plans of the 64th
Brigade to bypass the Cojeul Valley - 'a death trap' - by
capturing the neighbouring dominant features was ruined by
the insistence of General Sir John Shea (30th Division) 'on
"a continuous line of attack"' and as a result the
179 Lieutenant-General Sir Bertram Sergison-Brooke to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 December
1944, C.A.B.4511 18, PRO.
180 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Edmonds, 6 August 1925, Edmonds Papers 1114 39a, LHCMA.
' General Staff, Precis of tasks allotted to Corps of Fourth Army, p.7, undated [1916], W.O.158/19, PRO.
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9/K.O.Y.L.I. were faced 'with an impossible task forced on
them by Gen. Shea's pigheadedness' 182
One Divisional Commander (Pinney) during the Battle of
Arras in May 1917 found that his Corps Commander (Snow) was
reluctant to abandon the concept of frontal assaults despite
the opposition of the battalion, Brigade and Divisional
commanders who favoured a flank attack.' 83 Haig complained
in August 1918 that the 32nd Division had lost 1,700 men in
three days fighting 'due to having attacked the enemy in a
prepared position without first reconnoitring to find out
the best lines of approach, weak spots, in fact how best to
attack it' so that 'our men came across uncut wire and were
mown down by machine-gun fire' 184 In September 1918 Haldane
(VI Corps) was annoyed to find that the 62nd Division had
taken a town 'by direct attack, and not by working round the
rear as I wished, which would have been more effective and
would have gained more ground.' 185 Perhaps the explanation
was that the Division's commander, Major-General (later
General Sir Robert) Whigham, had only just taken command
having spent most of the war as a Staff Officer at G.H.Q.
and the War Office.
The Army had to travel along a series of learning
curves before victory was achieved in 1918. The nadir came
on the Somme in 1916 but thereafter lessons were learnt and
182 Brigadier-General H.R. Headlam to Captain Cyril Falls, 9 June [1938], C.A.B.45/116, PRO.
183 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 22-25 May 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 16 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/35, PRO.
185 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 1 September 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
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the Army gradually improved. That process was both painful
and rather slow given the relative inexperience and small
size of the British Army and its officer corps. The
regeneration of an army, the development of a competent
officer corps to command that army, and the articulation of
an advanced military theory to govern all levels of war
occurred in a short period of three years, but at a
tremendous cost to the British nation. It is how the Army




The Brain of an Army
One of the biggest problems faced by the Army was to
produce enough staff officers capable of running the
bureaucracy, producing the efficient command and staff
methods at which the German Army excelled, and manning the
staffs of the large formations required in continental
warfare. By the end of 1915, on top of the divisional
commanders and staffs required to man the forty divisional
H.Q.s, commanders and staff officers had to be provided for
three Army and nineteen Corps H.Q.s, in France alone.
Clearly 'the difficulties and desire for change that have
arisen during the war' were 'due chiefly to the rapid rise
of both Commanders and Staff Officers with absolutely no
Staff experience' and while 'brains, ability and personal
gallantry' were useful they could 'not compensate for lack
of military knowledge, far less for lack of good staff
training' .
While it was one thing to theorise about the
achievement of good command and staff procedures, it was
quite another to develop enough staff officers with the
talent f or such large-scale operations. Major-General
J.F.C. Fuller noted during the war that 'our weak point is
I [Lieutenant-General] Sir Richard Butler, Memorandum on 'Headquarters Units with a Division', 12
December 1918, Butler Papers 69 10 1, IWM.
110
our Staffs not the men' 	 It was impossible to 'expect a
General Staff only inaugurated 9 years ago, if so long, on a
basis of 6 Divisions, and insufficient for that, to provide
adequate staff officers for 60 Divisions'	 and 'to talk of
25 Corps is to talk like a madman or a fool' because it had
'taken our German friends 40 years to make 25 Corps' . The
tendency to concentrate on the mistakes made while the Army
was adapting to terra incognita during the period 1915-17
has meant that the process by which the Army developed a
war-winning staff in 1917-18 has been neglected.
A relatively small group of graduates of the Staff
Colleges at Camberley and Quetta held most of the key
positions in the B.E.F. Pre-war neglect led to a shortage
of well-trained and educated officers capable of undertaking
the task of managing a hugely expanded army. Early in the
war it quickly became apparent that the B.E.F. lacked an
adequate supply of well-trained staff officers to equip the
staffs of the new Divisions. 211 of the sample or just over
a third (34%) lacked any staff experience whatsoever prior
to August 1914. Similarly only 92 (just under 15%) had held
the post of G.S.O.]. or higher whereas 273 (nearly 74%) had
held lower staff posts such as G.S.O.2 and G.S.O.3. In
peacetime, this assured a healthy competition for places but
relegated to regimental soldiering the unlucky majority who
2 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his mother, 27 March 1918, Fuller Papers IV/3 228, LHCMA.
Lord Esher to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 26 June 1915, French Papers 75 46 1, IWM.
Sir Henry Wilson to General Lord Rawlinson, 16 September 1914, Maurice Papers 3 4 3,
LHMCA.
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tended to resent ambitious colleagues who attended Staff
College and ensured a severe shortage of qualified staff
officers during wartime.
The few "educated" officers who had attended Staff
College prior to the war were thinly spread as the "brains
of the army" during the war. Only thirty-two candidates
were admitted to Camberley each year during the 1890s
compared to a "year" consisting of 60 students in 1930 6 and
90 in 1952 ' respectively, nearly double and three times the
number which passed through pre-1914. This meant that
graduates were the elite of the Army and certainly the year
of 1913 was a vintage one, including as it did two future
Field-Marshals, Ironside and Dill, 8 who were to rise to the
rank of Brigadier-General by the end of the war.
Reforms at Camberley after the Boer War 'made the Staff
College one of the most efficient places of military
education in the world' and one student, who qualified in
1913, concluded that 'as a result of what I had learnt at
Camberley I was well equipped to deal with any situation
that arose when I was a Staff Officer' .'° The task of the
students 'was to learn the arts of lubrication' as they were
'to be greasers of the army machine, normal functionaries'
Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XIV, Edmonds Papers 11112/3, LHCMA;
Regulations Respecting The Staff College, War Office, 1894, Edmonds Papers 112A/1, LHCMA;
Edmonds, Four Generations of Staff College Students, Part I. 1896, The Army Quarterly, Volume LXV,
October 1952, p.42.
6 Brigadier C.N. Barclay, Four Generations of Staff College Students, Part III: 1930, The Army Quarterly,
Volume LXV, October 1952, p.49.
D.M.A. Wedderbum, Four Generations of Staff College Students, Part IV: 1952, The Army
Quarterly, Volume LXV, October 1952, p.52.
Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.29, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VI, pp.4-6, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
'°	 Edward Beddington, Memoirs, p.52, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
112
and not 'as disciples of war and of wisdom' 	 Field-
Marshal Sir William Robertson, as Commandant, bluntly
informed his students that they 'were at the Staff College
to learn staff duties and to qualify for Staff Captain, not
to talk irresponsible trash' on 'subjects of policy or
strategy' 12
A major flaw was the British Army's neglect of the
operational aspects of modern war; namely the planning and
staff work required for operations on a continental scale.
Staff officers had little opportunity to hone their skills
during peacetime. Neither army nor corps staff existed in
peacetime, a condition imposed by the small colonial army,
so that many duties had to be learned "on the job". The
peacetime staff of a Division consisted of a General Staff
Officer, a D.A.A.G., a C.R.A. and a C.R.E. with other staff
only joining on mobilization or for manoeuvres and training
during every summer.' 3 Since peacetime divisions were only
allowed one G.S.O.l 14 and as a result relied on the
allocation of additional personnel before they were able to
go to war. For example, 'the four additional staff officers
who were, on mobilization, appointed to the 4th Division
were strangers to it' and having little experience or
training were unable even to write operational orders.'5
Colonel Sir Thomas Montgomery-Cunmghame, Dusty Measure, p.50.
12 Brigadier-General A.F.U. Green, Evening Tattoo, pp.32-33.
13 General Sir Thomas Snow, The Account of the Retreat of 1914, undated, pp.2-3, C.A.B.45/129, PRO.
' 4 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXII, Edmonds Papers 11117/4, LHCMA.
15 Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXffl, Edmonds Papers 11118 5, LHCMA.
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Edmonds noted that 'in 1914 there were very few trained
staff officers, that is men who had served on the staff of a
command, a division, or a brigade with troops; and of these
few more than half (including the best George Morris, Adrian
Grant-Duff and "Gussie" Geddes, who fell in action in 1914)
were either killed or disabled in the early days' 16 At
first, the British Army was very inexperienced at the staff
work required in warfare on a continental scale. One
battalion commander noted that 'in the early stages of the
war the Germans were better practised than were our staffs
in the handling of large unitsf.17 During the Somme in 1916
'staff work (Divisional, Brigade, & Battalion) in the
earlier stages of the battle was poor' as even 'the most
competent officers were working on a scale and in conditions
of which they had no experience, and they had to learn their
job', but in the later stages 'the Staff, having had an
opportunity to learn, were just beginning to take hold of
18their job'.
One of the most able of the trained staff officers,
General Sir Charles Harington (M.G.G.S. Second Army),
admitted that he had not been prepared to 'think in
"Armies"', having 'never even in theory' contemplated the
problems of commanding a force larger than the original
B.E.F. Yet within less than two years of the outbreak of
Bngadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Bngadier C.N. Barclay, 7 April 1950, Edmonds Papers
112B 5a, LHCMA.
17 Lieutenant-Colonel R.R. Gibson to Edmonds, 10 August 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
Pearson Choate to Edmonds, 6 April 1936 and 26 March 1926, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
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the war he found himself responsible for the staff work of
an Army which 'two or three times in tenure exceeded thirty
divisions' •19 Harington blamed the British Army's many
problems on the failure to develop 'a General Staff
"doctrine"' in parallel to the big formations that had
developed from nothing during the war and to standardise
doctrine at Army, Corps and Divisional level. The methods
employed 'varied considerably' so that 'very divergent views
are held and entirely different methods exist in the various
Armies, Corps & Divisions'.20
Camberley and Quetta together could barely accommodate
a minority of officers producing only 447 Staff College
graduates in the 1914 Army List 21 so that, while pre-war
reform established the increasing dominance of Staff College
graduates within the Army, a shortage of Staff graduates
meant that entrance into the top military elite remained
open to non-graduates, who were given posts of
responsibility as a result of "hands-on" experience and the
army's rapid expansion during the war. Certainly as the
B.E.F. grew, the Staff College graduates (376 or 61% of the
sample) tended to dominate the Army's hierarchy.
Nevertheless, there was a significant minority in the sample
of commanders and staff officers (239 or 39%) who had not
gone to Staff College. An analysis of commanders in the
First World War highlights the fact that Staff graduates
19	 •1General Sir Charles Harmgton, Tim Harington Looks Back, p.53.
20 D.C.I.G.S. [Major-General C.H. Hariugton] to C.I.G.S. [Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson], 11 July 1918,
Maxse Papers 69 57/11, IWM.
21 Brian Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1854 - 1914, p.324.
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held a majority the highest posts, but their numbers were
too few to establish an exclusive monopoly.
Of the eleven senior officers who held the posts of
Commanders-in-Chief and Army Commander eight (73%) had
attended Staff College whereas at Corps and Divisional level
things were much more even. Progressing down the hierarchy
the dominance of the Staff College diminished as the supply
of graduates began to run out and only 27 (56%) out of 48
Corps Commanders and 99 (51%) out of 195 divisional
commanders had graduated from the Staff Colleges. 22
 Staff
College training was not a prerequisite for success. For
example, successful brigade, division and corps commanders,
such as Cavan, Jacob and Maxse, were not graduates. As the
war progressed the proportion of divisional commanders who
were staff college graduates steadily dropped. During 1914
84% of divisional commanders had p.s.c. In 1916 the figure
fell to 78% and in the final year to 73%•23 By the latter
stages of the war a number of officers who had not been to
Staff College had received sufficient on-the-job training to
make them efficient divisional commanders.
It was the older and younger officers who tended not to
have been to Staff College. The senior officers, divisional
and corps commanders such as Lieutenant-Generals Sir Charles
Anderson, R.G. Broadwood, Sir John Keir, Sir Herbert Watts
and Sir Charles Woollcornbe; General Sir James Wilicocks; and
See Appendix 10.
23 See Appendix 15.
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Field-Marshal Lord Cavan, had been able to make a career in
the less professional era before the Boer War without
attending Staff College while the junior ones, such as
Field-Marshals Lord Montgomery and Lord Wilson; Lieutenant-
Generals Sir Philip Neame, Sir Francis Nosworthy, and E.A.
Osborne, who served as G.S.O.1 of Divisions towards the end
of the war, had not had a chance to attend before war broke
out. Of the 293 (47%) of the sample who were born in the
l870s only 83 (28%) had not been to Staff College whereas of
the 218 (35%) born in the 1850s and 1860s and the 103 (16%)
born in the 1880s and 1890s 102 (46%) and 56 (54%)
respectively had not attended Staff College.24
In its exclusivity the Army was compared to the College
of Cardinals 25 and 'the Vatican Board of Cardinals'.26
Regular officers dominated and only 22 (3%) of the sample
were not regular British or Indian Army officers, 15 of whom
were Commonwealth officers (2%)and 3 were Royal Navy
officers! 27 Major-General G.P. Dawnay, himself a "dug-
out", concluded that 'such rot' was talked about non-regular
soldiers not getting 'enough high appointments & that the
Staff runs the war in its own interests, & doesn't want it
to stop'. 28 An investigation by G.H.Q. for the War Office
in July 1918 showed that 'well over 50% of the divisional
commanders had never been on the staff during this war'
24 See Appendices 10-12.
25 Oliver Lyttleton, Viscount Chandos, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, p.45.
26 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 22 September 1926, Liddell Hart Papers
1 302 100, LHCMA.
27 See Appendix 2.
28 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 26 July 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21 3, IWM.
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while 30% had 'never been on the Staff at all'. 29 Visited
by the Minister of Education, who 'had recently expressed
the opinion that officers of the New Army had not been
promoted to high positions which they merit', Haig
maintained that 'the truth is that we have more vacant
appointments than qualified officers to fill them' .o
More important for the functioning of the army's
operations was a growing shortage of Staff Officers as the
war progressed 31 and Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler
reported in 1918 that 'most of the higher staffs are double'
the size of those of 1915 32 necessitating the employment of
unqualified, non-regular officers on the staff as the
Regular Army could not , rovide the numbers of trained staff
officers required. By 1918 the total number of Staff
positions throughout the army had risen to some ten
thousand. 33 The General Staff at G.H.Q. in November 1917
concluded that 'the supply of trained Staff Officers is
falling short of the demand'	 In May 1918, G.H.Q.
stressed that 'it must also be realised by all Commanders of
formations that the supply of trained Staff Officers is
getting very low and that Officers appointed to first grade
appointments in future will not have had the same staff
29	 G.P. Dawnay to Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, 27 July 1918, Dawnay Papers
69 21/3, IWM.
30 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 11 February 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.15 1, Henderson Papers DS/MISC 2, IWM.
32 Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, Answers to Questions Issued with Fifth Army No.G.A.402 10,
29 January 1919, Butler Papers 69 10 1, IWM.
B John Terraine, Smoke and Fire, p.178.
G.H.Q., G.S. Note on Infantry Organisation, 28 November 1917, W.O.158/20, PRO.
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training, or experience on the Staff, as the Officers whom
they replace.35
These problems were exacerbated by the high casualties
sustained by the small pool of qualified staff officers
during the first years of the war. Out of the 447 staff
college graduates in the Army List of August 1914 219
(49.2%) were killed or died of wounds during the war
including 180 Camberley Staff Graduates. 36
 Among the many
staff officers lost early in the war were Captain J.B.
Jenkinson (Brigade Major, 3rd Brigade) and Captain R.W.M.
Stevens (Brigade Major, 9th Brigade) killed in August 1914;
Colonel F.W. Kerr, Major G. Paley, and Captain R. Ommanney
(G.S.O.1, G.S.O.2, and G.S.O.3 of the 1st Division
respectively) and Lieutenant-Colonel A.J-B. Percival
(G.S.O.1, 2nd Division) all killed by a shell landing on
their Headquarters on 31 October 1914; and Captain G.M.
James (Brigade Major, 22nd Brigade), killed in November
1914.
G.H.Q. was forced in late 1914 to start 'making a list
of all p.s.c. people not serving on the Staff'. 37
 The
shortages of staff meant that officers at G.H.Q. spent much
of the war trying to leave but were told that owing to the
shortage of staff officers their services were too valuable
for them to be allowed to depart. When Clive requested a
Sir Herbert Lawrence, O.B. 1329, 7 May 1918, W.O.95/370, PRO.
Camberley Staff College Graduates who lost their lives during the Great War, Edmonds Papers I/2B 4a,
LHCMA.
Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 14 December 1914, Howell Papers IV C/3/95, LHCMA.
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transfer from the staff to command of troops in June 1915,
Sir John French refused remarking that 'he had let two go, &
both had been killed within a week' 38 Kirke's attempts to
get out of the Intelligence Section in 1915 and 1916 were
foiled because he could not be spared. 39 G.H.Q. refused to
sanction the offer of command of a Battalion to General Sir
Eric de Burgh because as p.s.c. his '"services could not be
spared for regimental duty"'.4°
Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell (C.G.S.,
G.H.Q.) maintained that 'the needs of the Army and the
Empire' made it 'impossible to let highly trained staff
officers take up commands' as it was 'indispensable that
staff work should be efficient and it will become still more
so when we get the Germans into the open' •41 When in 1917
Robertson (C.I.G.S.) wished to promote Marshal of the R.A.F.
Sir Edward Ellington to command of a Brigade, Kiggell
insisted on his appointment as B.G.G.S., VIII Corps because
he was 'a trained staff officer and the number of these is
running low' and G.H.Q. had 'three B.G.G.S.s to find at
present' whereas there were 'a large number of officers who
have been through all the recent fighting who are well
qualified to command Brigades and deserving of selection for
such command' •42
38 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 1 June 1915, Clive Papers 1111/140, LHCMA.
'General Sir Walter M.St.G. Kirke, G.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.L., J.P.', undated, p.4, Kirke Papers,
IWM.
40	 .General Sir Enc de Burgh, Memoir, p.10, de Burgh Papers 7306-67, NAM.
' Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Lieutenant-General Sir Tom Bridges, 22 November 1916,
Kiggell Papers V/61, LHMCA.
42 Kiggell to General Sir Robert Whigham, 4 January 1917, Kiggell Papers V/72, LHMCA.
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By late 1916 Kiggell was worried that staff officers
'holding the appointment of B.G./G.S. I
 G.S.O.1, and
equivalent appointments in the administrative branch of the
staff, whom it has been necessary to keep on the staff for
the good of the Service' should be given brevet promotion to
compensate for the likelihood that 'the majority, if not
all, of them would have been selected to command a Brigade'
but for the fact that they 'possessed the necessary
qualifications for staff employment' . 	 Moreover, it 'was
much quicker and easier to reach the rank of B[rigadie]r-
General by getting command of a Brigade, than by waiting to
become the chief staff officer of an Army Corps, which is
the lowest staff appointment carrying the [same] rank'
It was also easier for a Brigade Commander than a B.G.G.S.
to obtain command of a Division as the Staff Officer had to
command a Brigade first in order to become familiar with
modern conditions
Most staff officers during the war stayed in staff
appointments throughout the war and few of the senior ones
had any actual experience of front-line service during the
war. There was certainly no policy of interspersing staff
posts with tours of front-line duty as was the case in the
Second World War. The few exceptions included General Hon.
Sir Herbert Lawrence who had the advantage of having
Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to the Army Commanders, 11 November 1916, Kiggell
Papers V/59 1-2, LHMCA; see also Kiggell to General Sir Robert Whigham, 11 November 1916, Kiggell
Papers V 58, LHMCA.
44 Major-General Sir Fredenck Maunce to his wife, 24 June 1915, Maunce Papers 3/1 4 196, LHCMA.
Major-General G.P. Dawnay to Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, 27 July 1918, Dawnay Papers
6921/3, IWM.
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commanded the 66th Division in 1917 before becoming C.G.S.
in December 1917; Lieutenant-General Sir Louis Bols, who had
commanded a Battalion and a Brigade, 1914-15, before being
appointed B.G.G.S. XII Corps and then M.G.G.S. Third Army in
1915; Major-General Sir Reginald Hoskins who was 'a first
rate' Brigade commander before becoming B.G.G.S. V Corps in
1915;46 and Colonel E.R. Clayton who commanded a battalion
for a year, 1916-17, before becoming G.S.O.l, 2nd Division
in 1918. A number of officers, such as Field-Marshal Lord
Montgomery, Lieutenant-Generals Sir Philip Neame, and E.A.
Osborne, who were relatively junior at the beginning of the
war, rose to hold the post of G.S.O.1 in 1918 having given
gallant service in the front-line in 1914 as regimental
officers and thus gained first-hand experience of the
conditions but once they were appointed to the Staff they
did not return to front-line service again.
The problem of the shortage of qualified personnel was
undoubtedly exacerbated by the number of the staff officers
who proved incapable of standing the pace during the early
period of the war. Both General Sir Archibald Murray in
l915, who fainted in 1914 when he was told some bad news,48
and General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, who 'was an exhausted
man' by December l9l7, were relieved as C.G.S. at G.H.Q.
General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diaiy, 27 September 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Field-Marshal Sir John French to Lord Kitchener, 25 January 1915, and to General Sir Archibald
Murray, 25 January 1915, Murray Papers 79 48 3; Sir John French, Diary, 24 and 25 January 1915,
French Papers 75 46 2; Major-General Lord Loch, Diary, 31 January 1915, Loch Papers 7 1/12 1, IWM;
General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 9 February 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 30 October and 6 December 1914, Rawlinson Papers 11, CCC.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, p.5, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC; see also
Rawlinson, Diary, 3 January 1918, Rawlmson Papers 1 9, CCC.
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on the grounds of ill-health. At a more junior level,
Colonel F.R.F. Boileau (G.S.O.1, 3rd Division), 'an
exceptionally fine soldier and tactician', was announced to
have died of wounds during the Retreat from Mons ° when in
fact he had gone 'quite off his head with strain & finally
shot himself' 51 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds
(G.S.O.l, 4th Division) broke down and 'threatened to shoot'
the 4th Division transport drivers if they did not obey an
order from G.H.Q. to throw off all kit and baggage from the
wagons to make room for tired men 52 and had to be replaced.
One disillusioned battalion commander believed that
'all the shell-shocked idiots of the British Empire were put
to do staff work'	 There were a number of reasons for
such perceptions. In contrast to the large Staff Officer
Corps in the German Army, which allowed all division and
most regimental staff positions to be held by highly trained
members of this "corps", the rapid expansion of the army
meant that there was a severe shortage of trained staff.
Many new staff officers were seconded from front-line units,
due either to wounds or meritorious service. Prior to the
Battle of Loos the 24th Division had 'no staff officer, who
had acted in that capacity with troops in the field during
the war' and although 'the G.S.O.s I and II were serving
regular officers, who entered on the war as regimental
50 Lieutenant-Colonel T.S. Wollocombe, M.C., Diary of the Great War, p.52, Wollocombe Papers, IWM.
' Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to his wife, 28 August 1914, Maurice Papers 3/1 4 10 LHCMA;
See also Loch, Diary, 28 August 1914, Loch Papers 7 1/12/1, IWM.
52 General Sir Aylnier Haldane, War Diary, 28 August 1914, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Richardson to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 24 May 1930,
C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
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officers, both had been badly wounded in the first two
months in France, and had spent months in hospital or
convalescing' and neither 'had had any opportunity of
appreciating to what extent everything connected with staff
work before and during battle had developed in France, since
the commencement of the war'. 54 Brigadier-General C.G.
55Stewart, the G.S.O.l, 'was not well' 	 and both having
'been wounded in still open warfare on the Aisne and 1st
Battle of Ypres' were in hindsight 'not well acquainted with
what trench warfare attacks entailed' •56 Undoubtedly a
shortage of competent staff officers lowered standards.
At a lower level, some staff officers achieved rapid
promotion in the early years of the war. Brigadier-General
John Charteris, who went from the rank of Captain in August
571914 to that of Brigadier-General in December 1915,
General Sir Richard Butler, who was promoted from being a
Major on Smith-Dorrien's staff at Aldershot pre-war to be
Chief of Staff of an Army, 58 and Brigadier-General Philip
Howell, who rose from Captain to Brigadier-General in two
years, 59 all attained the rank of B.G.G.S. very rapidly.
General Sir John Coleridge was able to rise from G.S.O.3 to
G.S.O.1 very rapidly while serving with the 11th Division in
just over a year owing to tthe death or wounding or illness
Brigadier-General C.G. Stewart to Bngadier .General Sir James Edmonds, 30 November 1927,
C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
Brigadier-General B.R. Mitford to Edmonds, 23 January 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
56 Brigadier..General C.G. Stewart to Major A.F. Becke, 3 August 1925, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
57 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.1 85, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.58 Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Home, Diary, 15 March 1915, Home Papers 82/18 1, IWM.
C.R. Woodroffe, Diary, 22 February 1915, Woodroffe Papers, IWM.
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of his superiors'. 60 As a result in the early years of the
war there was a rapid turnover of staff. For example in
1916, Henry Wilson (IV Corps) 'lost my Br. Gen. G.S., my 2nd
Grade G.S., my C.R.A., & my C.E. & my Camp Commt' in 1916.61
Many officers who had attended Staff College prior to
the reforms after the Boer War were not able to perform
adequately as Staff Officers during the war. Brigadier-
General F.A. Buzzard became G.S.O.1, 9th Division 'although
he had been a failure as G.S.O.2 with 2nd Division' and,
proving to be 'indifferent', had to be replaced 62 after
only two months in the post. Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel
L. Hume-Spry (G.S.O.l, 50th Division in 1914-15) was
described as 'the most completely brainless man' 63 and was
soon sacked. Brigadier-General P.D. FitzGerald (G.S.O.1,
2nd Cavalry Division) was 'completely idle and
irresponsible' disappearing from his headquarters to go
courting whenever the division was out of the line much to
the consternation of his staff. 64 One Brigadier-General
'was amazed' by the 'monstrous appointment' of Brigadier-
General A.G.A. Hore-Ruthven (B.G.G.S., VII Corps) regarding
him 'as a thorough good sporting hard riding man with a
minimum of intellect' who, although 'quite cool and
collected', had 'not slightest idea as to what was going on
60 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.1 52, Henderson Papers DSIMISC/2, IWM.61 Field-Marshal Sir Hemy Wilson, Diary, 24 March 1916 Wilson Papers, IWM.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 29 August and 2 September 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 5, PRO.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.20, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1,
CCC.
General Sir Sydney Muspratt, Memoirs, pp.59-60, Muspratt Papers, IWM 86 22/1.
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or what he was going to do next' 65 One regimental officer
could not imagine how Major-General H.D. de Pree, who as
B.G.G.S., IV Corps was the 'bete-noir' of 'Uncle' Harper
(51st Division), 'got such a responsible job'. 66 One
possible reason was that he was Haig's cousin!
Inevitably staff work suffered, notably in 1915 and
1916. For example, General Sir Ivor Maxse (18th Division)
complained in 1915 that 'the Brigade Majors are
inexperienced in staff work' and about one in particular
'who cannot write any sort of operation order and apparently
cannot learn any routine work' 67 An attack on Monchy by
29th Division on 14 April 1917 'was another example of the
dangers of inexperienced Staff Officers' in which 'the Bde
Major, who drew up the orders for the attack of the 88th Bde
was an excellent fellow, but very young' and 'in making out
the orders, he omitted to detail troops to occupy the
trenches vacated by the attacking troops a matter of
routine' and 'as a result, when the Germans counter
attacked, there was practically nobody in our front line at
Monchy' and disaster nearly ensued.68
By 1916 there was a determined effort to train more
staff officers and slowly a corps of experienced and able
staff officers emerged. In December 1915 G.H.Q. had
'started a small staff College' under Burnett Stuart whose
65 Major-General J.W. Sandilands to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 August 1923,
C.A.B.45/192, PRO.
Major-General D.N. Wirnberley, Memoir, p.1 07, Wimberley Papers, IWM.
67 General Sir Ivor Maxse to Brigadier-General H.C. Lowther, 18 November 1915, Maxse Papers
69 53 6, IWM.
Major-General C.G. Fuller to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 July 1938, C.A.B.45 116 PRO.
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aim was 'to train junior staff officers' 69 Bonham-Carter,
commanded the Senior Staff School at Hesdin from October
1916 to April 1917, set up to help 'promising second grade
staff officers to fit themselves to fill first grade
appointments in divisions by courses lasting six to seven
weeks'. 7° The officers trained by Bonham-Carter on the
three courses held that winter, included an impressive array
of talent who not only held the appointment of G.S.O.l of a
Division or Army, providing a pool of useful staff officers
to back up the staff officers educated at the Staff College
at divisional level during the war, 7' but many of whom would
have very successful careers after the war, notably Field-
Marshals Viscount Montgomery, Lord Wilson; Lieutenant-
Generals E.A. Osborne, Sir Philip Neame, V.C., Sir Francis
Nosworthy, Sir Arthur Smith; Major-Generals Sir Kenneth
Buchanan, R.J. Collins, Sir Cyril Gepp, F.S.G. Piggott, and
Hon. P.G. Scarlett. Attending the Staff Course in 1917,
Montgomery described how the students 'all helped each other
and acquired knowledge from each other' •72
By December 1916 the training of junior Staff Officers
was carried out either by attachment to formations within
divisions or at the Senior and Junior Staff Colleges run by
G.H.Q. 73 The Senior Staff School under Lieutenant-Colonel
69 Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to his wife, 30 November 1915, Maurice Papers 3/1/4/264,
70 LHCMA; General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 28 November 1915, Clive Papers 11/2 97, LHCMA.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, pp.24-28, Bonham-Carter Papers
92, CCC.
71 Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, pp.24-28, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
72 Viscount Montgomery to his father, 13 April 1917, Montgomery Papers BLM 1/58, IWM.
G.H.Q., Record of Army Commanders' Conference held at Rollencourt Chateau on Saturday, December
9th, 1916, at I a.m., O.A.D.291 20, 12 December 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
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Bonham-Carter at Hesdin held a course for 20 officers
training for senior staff appointments while the Junior
Staff College under Lieutenant-Colonel R.A.M. Currie held
two courses lasting six weeks for 50 officers training for
junior staff appointments. 74 Having shut down during the
operations of 1917, the two G.H.Q. Staff Schools were re-
opened on 1 October 1917 in Cambridge to train staff
officers during the autumn and winter of l9l7.
	 Field-
Marshal Lord Alanbrooke believed that the Cambridge Staff
Course in March 1918 was 'the most excellent value' 76
From 1916 there was a growing meritocracy on the staff
with a large number of talented, and often young, non-
regular officers who served on the Staff, filling the posts
of Brigade Major, G.S.O.2 and G.S.O.3. 77 With such talent
it is difficult to sustain the argument that by the end of
the war the Army had failed to employ the brains available
to it outside the Regular Army. Although it is perhaps also
noteworthy that most of these men, like the regulars, were
public school educated holding similar interests and in the
case of the Military Director of Kinemategraph Operations at
G.H.Q. a great athlete specialising in horse-racing, pig-
' G.H.Q., Summary of Schools of Training for the British Expeditionary Force during Winter 1916-1917,
undated [c. December 1916], Haig Papers, W.O.256/15, PRO.
Brigadier-General K. Wigram to Third Army, G.H.Q. O.B./1329, 28 July 1917, W.O.95/365, PRO; and
Major-General R.H.K. Butler to Third Army, G.H.Q. O.BJ1329 2, 7 September 1917, W.O.95 365, PRO.
76 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke to his mother, 13 January 1918, Alanbrooke Papers 1 1/1 1/1, LHCMA.
77 Notably Robin Barrington-Ward, Anthony Eden (later the Earl of Avon), J.C. Faunthorpe, Stephen Foot,
K.D.B. (later Major-General) Gattie, Wilfred (later Lord) Greene, Edward Gngg (later Lord Altrincham),
Walter Guinness (later Lord Moyne), H.W. Holland, H.R. (later Major-General Sir Ralph) Hone, F.E.
(later Major-General) Hotblack, Lord Howick, Oliver Lyttelton (later Lord Chandos), Hon. Edmund Pery
(later the Earl of Limerick), Basil Sanderson (later Lord Sanderson), the Earl of Stanhope, A.J.
Thompson (father of Major-General Julian Thompson), R.M. (later Lieutenant-General Lord) Weeks,
and C.S. (later Sir Charles) Wright.
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sticking, polo, and big-game shooting. 78
 Some liked the
Army so much that they obtained regular commissions. 79 In
March 1918 the Brigade Major of the 88th Brigade (29th
Division), Captain J.K. McConnel, was only 23 while the
Staff Captain, Gerald Pilleau, was 'a boy of 20,.80 Anthony
Eden was Adjutant of a battalion at 18 and Brigade Major of
the 198th Brigade at 20.81
A promotional ladder, from G.S.O.3 to G.S.O.1, was
developed and climbed by officers such as Montgomery, Neame,
and Grigg, who became G.S.O.1 of Divisions in 1917-18 by
dint of experience rather than by qualifications. Of the
275 men who held the position of G.S.O.1 of a Division 57
82(21%) did not have p.s.c. after their name.	 Until 1917
the post of G.S.O.l (Intelligence) at Army level continued
to be held by staff graduates. By 1918 there were
exceptions like Lieutenant-Colonels S.S. Butler, F.S.G.
Piggott (Fifth Army), and R.S. Ryan (First Army), which
suggests the monopoly was breaking down but all these
officers were still regular officers. C.H. Mitchell (Second
Army), a Canadian Militia Officer, was the only non-regular
to be G.S.O.1 (I) with an Army. Edward Grigg was the only
civilian to become G.S.O.l of a division during the war.
Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee and Colonel H.W. Holland 'were
the only two Territorial officers to attain the rank of
78 Obituary of Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Faunthorpe, in Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee's Memoirs, p.! 29a,
Lee Papers, IWM.
Notably Major-Generals K.D.B. Gattie and F.E. Hotblack.
° Bernard Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter VIII, pp.4-5, C.A.B.45 208, PRO.
' Brian Bond and Simon Robbins, Staff Officer, pp.11 and 16.
82 See Appendix 11.
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G.S.O. first grade at G.H.Q.' but as Territorials were given
O.B.E.s instead of the C.M.G. given to the Regular
G.S.Os.l. 83 The highest-ranking civilian was Sir Eric
Geddes, formerly Manager of the N.E. Railways, appointed as
Director-General of Transportation with the rank of Major-
General in October 1916 to organise 'the working of the
railways, the upkeep of the roads' 84 Geddes was 'a most
capable man' 85 and 'a great success' 86 but did not challenge
the military at their own competency.
The dominance of the Staff College elite was much more
pronounced on the staff as only graduates could be expected
to perform to the required standards. All twenty-three
(100%) of the C.G.S. at G.H.Q. and the M.G.G.S. at G.H.Q.
and with the Armies in the field were graduates. Of the
B.G.G.S. at G.H.Q. and with the Corps 95% and 93%
respectively were graduates while of the G.S.Os.1 at G.H.Q
and with the Divisions at the front 75% and 79% respectively
were also graduates. 87 Of the 76 men who held the posts of
C.G.S., M.G.G.S., B.G.G.S., and G.S.O.1 at G.H.Q. only 13
(27%) were not graduates and apart from one (a B.G.G.S.) all
of these held the post of G.S.O.1. Only 4 (6%) of the 67
men who held the post of B.G.G.S. of a Corps had not been to
Staff College while only 57 (21%) who served as G.S.O.1 of
83	 .Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, pp.219, 224 and 235, Lee Papers, IWM.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 24 August, 12 and 24 September, 7 and 27 October, 9 November
1916, W.O.256112 and 13, PRO.
85 Haig, Diary, 24 August 1916, W.O.256 12, PRO.
Haig, Diary, 7 May 1917, W.O.256 18, PRO.
87 See Appendices 11 and 12.
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Divisions lacked the magic letters p.s.c. after their
88
name.
Staff College graduates formed the spine of the B.E.F.
in the war years. For example, Brind (G.S.O.l, 56th
Division) 'was very much one of those who ... made the
Division what it was' 89 while MacMamara (G.S.O.l, 32nd
Division) was one reason 'why the Division did so
brilliantly' •90 Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. ap Rhys Pryce
(G.S.O.l, 38th Division) 'was a thoroughly capable officer
in every way', who 'in reality commanded the Division'.91
Although gradually at divisional and army level staff posts
were filled by officers who had not attended Staff College,
the higher staff posts remained the preserve of the Regular
soldiers and there were certainly no civilian high flyers
the equivalent of men such as Toby Low (later Lord
Allington), Sir Enoch Powell and Sir Edgar Williams who
attained the rank of Brigadier General Staff during the
Second World War. Early in the war Regular officers who had
not been to Staff College saw 'little hope of advancement'
on the General Staff, although administrative staff jobs
with 'Q' were available. 92 Major-General Sir John Headlam
echoed the resentment of many who were not part of the magic
"'inner ring'"	 formed by those who had passed staff
college (p.s.c.) when he wrote that 'to the Staff fanatic
88 See Appendices 10-12.
89 R Shoollred to Bngadier-Genera Sir James Edmonds, 11 June 1929, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
9°Brigadier A.C. Girdwoocl to Edmonds, 30 June 1930, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
' Major G.P.L. Drake-Brockman to Edmonds, 7 February 1930, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
92 Lieutenant-Colonel P.F. FitzGerald, Memoirs, p.21, FitzGerald papers 79 35 1, IWM.
Lieutenant-General Sir Tom Bridges, Alarms and Excursions, p.55.
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nothing counts in comparison with those magic letters' and
that 'ten years of the most splendid service in war are as
nothing when weighed in the balance against a week at
Camberley' .
Much of the operational effectiveness of the Australian
and Canadian Corps sprang from the skill of their high-
quality British staff officers. All seven B.G.G.S. of the
Canadian Corps, the two ANZAC Corps and the Australian Corps
between 1915 and 1918 were Regular officers who had been to
Staff College. 95 General Sir Brudenell White and Field-
Marshal Sir Thomas Blarney, the two Australians who served as
B.G.G.S. with the ANZAC or Australian Corps, were both
regular soldiers and products of the Staff College. In the
Canadian Corps, General Sir Arthur Currie insisted upon
retaining British officers in the three senior staff
appointments and singled out Brigadier-General N.W. Webber,
his B.G.G.S., for particular praise. Lacking a large pool
of their own staff officers the Canadians employed the best
British staff officers, three of whom (Field-Marshals Lord
Alanbrooke, Sir John Dill and Lord Ironside) later rose to
become C.I.G.S. and Field-Marshals. The first Canadian
G.S.O.1 was not appointed until November 1917, and by the
Armistice, one of the four Canadian divisions still had a
British G.S.O.1 96 while two of the six Australian and New
Major-General Sir Joim Headlam to Major-General A.W. Bartholomew, 19 May 1919, Brigadier E.C.
Anstey Papers 1159 2, RAI.
The seven officers were Field-Marshal Sir Thomas Blarney; Generals Sir Charles Harmgton, Sir Percy
Radcliffe, and Sir Brudenell White; Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn; Brigadier-General N.W. Webber;
and Brigadier R.F.J. Hayter.
Colonel J.A. English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, pp.15-16.
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Zealand divisions still had a British G.S.O.l. The Canadian
and Australian Corps could scarcely have become operational
without British assistance and the existence of its small
caste of pre-war staff-trained officers such as Harington,
Radcliffe, or Webber.
Early in the war the principle of the Staff as servant
of the troops had to be re-learnt and some staff officers
were too brusque or too domineering. Although able and
hard-working, Bruce-Williams (M.G.G. S. Second Army)
'developed a rather objectionable manner to those under him
in rank'	 and was removed by Haig because he 'had caused
much friction' and 'was not a good enough staff officer' •98
There was much criticism of other senior Staff Officers in
1915, notably Major-General Sir George Forestier-Walker
(Second Army), 99 Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Jeudwine (V
Corps), and Major-General Sir Alistair Dallas (IV Corps) •100
Forestier-Walker was 'difficult both with superiors and
inferiors and quite out of touch with his Corps' being
'always in the office' 10]. while Jeudwine was 'often rude'
and hated in his corps.'° 2 In dealing with peers and
juniors, courtesy, consideration and good manners were
equally essential.
At a lower level arrogance exacerbated problems.
Lieutenant-General Sir George Cory (G.S.O.l, 51st Division),
' General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 22 May 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 27 May 1916, Haig Papers , W.O.256 10, PRO.
General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 8 February 1915, Clive Papers 1111 95, LHCMA.
'°° Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 17 April 1915, Howell Papers N C/3 139, LHCMA.
'° Clive, Diary, 8 February 1915, Clive Papers 11/1/95, LHCMA.
102 Howell to his wife, 7 August 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3 203, LHCMA.
133
who seemed to suffer from a swollen head' and 'hardly spoke'
to his commander, 103 was duly replaced. Major-General Sir
Reginald Pinney had to calm down one of his Brigadier-
Generals who 'was crying with rage at imaginary slights' by
G.S.O.1, 33rd Division.' 04 Lieutenant-Colonel F.H. Moore
(G.S.O.1, 29th Division) in November 1917 was 'an unpleasant
person' and 'one of those persons who think that in order to
be efficient one must be rude'.'° 5 In 1918 Pinney commented
on his new G.S.O.l, Lieutenant-Colonel M.O. Clarke, that
'his talents are A.l, his manner is B4 & many resent it'.'°6
It is significant that both Clarke and Moore lasted only a
few months before being replaced as G.S.O.1. Colonel
Karslake (G.S.O.1, 4th Division) was 'a capable officer, and
impresses men with right ideas, but he has not got on as
well as he should because of a sarcastic manner' •b07 It was
known that the '"G" and "Q" branches [were] not on speaking
terms in one Corps' 108 and Pinney had to warn his Staff that
'they were to help everyone & NOT get up rows between
different branches' 109
The work-load sustained by the few experienced staff
officers was considerably increased. One Brigadier-General
noted that 'the first principles of war were overwhelmed by
a mass of detail which dispensed with individual initiative
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 5 June 1915, Haig Papers , W.O.256 4, PRO.
'° Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 13 April 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
105 Brigadier A.E. Hodgkin, Diary (Volume IV), 5 [November 1917], Hodgkin Papers P.399, IWM.
106 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 21 July 1918, Pinney Papers, 1WM.
107 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 20 May 1918 Haig Papers , W.O.256 31 PRO.
log Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, XVIII Corps Staff Conference Agenda, 1 February 1917, Maxse
Papers 69/53 8A, IWM.
'® Pinney, Diary, 24 December 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
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& any elasticity' and giving as an example the orders issued
by VIII Corps prior to 1 July 1916 a 'terrible document' of
76 pages which 'had been endeavouring to legislate for
everything' and issued with 365 Supplementary Instructions
and it took three days 'to reduce this enormous mass of
instructions to some B pages & 5 maps of brigade orders'.'1°
Of the October battles on the Some the G.S.O.l, 30th
Division noted that 'there was never time during this period
to manage anything'	 One solution for individual Corps,
such as the II Corps in 1916, was to attempt to reduce the
pressure of work on staff officers and to 'draft
instructions for reducing staff work in our staffs: fewer
reports & returns; more liaison; less reduplication' h12
A persistent theme was the long hours required to keep
that bureaucracy turning over. Life as a Staff Officer was
not easy as critics and regimental officers imagined.
General Sir Walter Kirke (G.S.O.1, 4th Division) found the
paper work to be intense and was up until 12.30 a.m." 3 while
the G.S.O.1, 17th Division complained that during the Somme
'the pace was terrific, averaging 16 to 18 hours work a day
for the G.I of a Division & I personally was tied terribly
to my office'	 The senior staff of 20th Division during
the attack on Guillemont on the Somme in 1916 remained in a
'dark office dug-out, lit by electric light' for 36 hours
fl° Brigadier-General H.C. Rees to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 November 1929,
C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
' Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Edmonds, 20 April 1936, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
112 Brigadier-General P. Howell, Diary, 4 October 1916, Howell Papers IV/D/ 13, LHCMA.
113 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 3 April 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
' Major-General R.J. Collins to Edmonds, 7 February 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
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'talking incessantly through the telephone sending messages
and orders'	 During the advance in September 1918
Lieutenant-General Laurence Carr (G.S.O.1, 51st Division)
'had only averaged 2 hrs. sleep' during 'the previous five
116
nights'.
Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (Brigade
Major, 104th Brigade) with a routine of being woken at 5
a.m. and working until 11 p.m. became 'very tired' 117 and by
1917 he 'was beginning to feel the strain a bit' •h18 Kiggell
as C.G.S. sent a circular round the sections of G.H.Q. in
early 1917 stressing 'the great importance' that staff
officers and clerks employed in all the offices 'should
normally finish their work by 10 p.m.' in order to remain
fit for offensive operations. 119 In January 1917 Haig 'urged
the desirability of organising work in offices so as to
allow Sunday to become as much as possible a rest day' as
'many excellent clerks and officers also are suffering from
the continuous daily work.' 2° During the German Spring
Offensive of March 1918, the B.G.G.S. of the III Corps
became so exhausted that his duties had to be taken over for
the night by the G.S.O.1, 2nd Cavalry Division 121 while
early in April 1918 Major G.M. Lee (Brigade Major, 41st
115 General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 3 September 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.
116 Lieutenant-General Laurence Carr to his wife, 5 September 1918, Can Papers, LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his father, 11 March 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM 1 39,
IWM.
118 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his father, July 1917, Montgomery Papers BLM 1 61, IWM.
hI Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to the Branches of G.H.Q., 19 January 1917, Kiggell Papers
V/983/2, LHMCA.
120 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 3 January 1917, Haig Papers , W.O.256/15, PRO.
121 General Sir Eric de Burgh, Memoir, pp.14 and 16, de Burgh Papers 7306-67, NAM.
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Brigade) 'broke down under the strain' and was invalided
home. 122
 Colonel T.T. Grove (G.S.O.1, 6th Division), having
lost a lot of weight, was feeling the strain so much towards
the end of the war that he asked for post at home but then
withdrew his application as he could not bear to leave.123
The scarcity of trained staff officers not only
diminished significantly the efficiency of the staff in the
B.E.F. but also added to the pressure on commanders. As a
result, there was a tendency for army commanders, such as
Birdwood, 'to do the work which his subordinate Generals
should perform' 124 while General Lord Rawlinson did 'a great
deal himself' so that 'the proper staff are at somewhat of a
discount'.'25 Edmonds noted that 'several divisional
commanders' in 1918 'had to do their own staff work, and
then go round the infantry brigadiers to tell them what to
do' 126 Haldane felt that he had 'to think of everything now
that my staff is very different from what it was' 127
Hunter-Weston (VIII Corps) 'devoted much of his time to the
small details of administration that he should have left to
Staff Officers and junior ones at that'.' 28 While serving as
G.S.O.2, Indian Corps Beddington discovered that the
B.G.G.S. (Macandrew) had decreed that no orders were to be
122 Major-General Sir Cyriac Skinner to Brigadier-General Sir ifaines Edmonds, 20 December 1926,
C.A.B.45 193, PRO.
123 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, pp.40-41, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
'24 FieldM&shal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 September 1916, Haig Papers , W.O.256 13, PRO.
125 Air Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 3 December 1914, Game Papers PWG 4, IWM.
126 Edmonds to Brigadier C.N. Barclay, 7 April 1950, Edmonds Papers 112B 5a, LHCMA.
127 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 13 September 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
128 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, pp.26-27, Bonham-Carter Papers,
CCC.
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sent out without his prior approval and that as a
consequence in his absence the other members of the staff
were reluctant to send out draft orders warning of a pending
move to subordinate units.'29
More difficult to solve than the lack of staff officers
was the decline in good relations between the Staff and the
front-line troops. It would appear that the main cause of
friction were the young, junior staff officers holding the
posts of A.D.C. and G.S.O.3 who despite their lowly rank
wore the Red Tabs of the General Staff. Field-Marshal
Viscount Montgomery noted that 'there was a tremendous gulf
between the staff and the fighting army; the former lived in
large chateaux miles behind the front' •130 During the First
World War all staff officers were entitled to wear the red
tabs and hat-bands of the General Staff but, during the
Second World War, only full colonels and above were allowed
to do so as a result of the hostility engendered amongst
front-line troops by junior staff officers.'3'
One junior staff officer, a non-regular, noted that
when compared with the more experienced French and German
Armies the Regular Army during 1915 and 1916 'tended to lead
a secluded and relatively luxurious life far behind the
firing-line where, immersed in office work, they had no time
for personal contact with the front-line troops' •132 As a
' 29 Brigadier Sir Edward Beddmgton, Memoir, pp.87-88, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
'30 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to Colonel Sir Henry Abel Smith, 7 August 1969, Haig Papers
347 64,NLSAcc.3155.
' Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoir, p.135, Archibald Papers, IWM.
132 Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, p.107.
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result, considerable friction was generated between the
staff and regiments in the front-line during the Great War,
which, by making it very difficult for the high command to
be able to obtain accurate "feed-back" from the front-line,
hindered the successful administration of reform and the
introduction of new ideas. One junior artillery officer
noted that 'the Staff had not the remotest idea of what
conditions were like in the line'.' 33 Usually the staff
'never went further than at the most Brigade H.Q. where in a
way they were not welcomed because of the "approach" which
was often in an "off hand red tab superior manner"'
During the whole time that the Cavalry Corps were in the
Ypres Salient under the Second Army in mid-1915, 'not a
single member of the Army Staff had come round to visit them
and enquire into their needs' •1: 	 In May 1916, Haig noticed
that 'in many divisions, the Staff does not circulate
sufficiently amongst the brigades and battalions when
136
operations are in progress'.
The G.S.O.1, 30th Division on the Somme noted that 'an
effort to keep personal touch between Divi. Hdqtrs. and the
front line troops would take a staff officer some 8 or 9
hours' .'	 The dangers of visiting the front for staff
officers were very real and it is often forgotten that even
staying back in the rear could be dangerous; for example,
G.P. MacClellan to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 15 October 1936, C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
'' Paul Maze to 2nd Earl Haig, undated, Haig Papers 347 12, NLS Acc.3 155.
' Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 June 1915, Haig Papers , W.O.256 4, PRO.
136 Haig, Diary, 14 August 1916, Haig Papers , W.O.256/12, PRO.
' Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Edmonds, 20 April 1936, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
139
Lieutenant-Colonel F.E.Ll. Daniell (G.S.O.1, 21st Division)
was killed by a shell, which landed on his headquarters in
February 1916,138 and Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Longridge
(G.S.O.l, 1st Division) was shot through the head and killed
while visiting the front-line in August 1916.'
The lesson that senior officers must pay frequent
visits to battle areas to be with the forward troops and
commanders in order to make the on-the-spot assessments and
decisions which would guarantee the success of operations
was gradually absorbed. During the first years of the war
'the best use was not made' of liaison officers 'as they
were not sent far enough forward' never going 'further
forward than Brigade H.Q.' 140 The G.S.O.1, 32nd Division
complained of 'the lack of liaison from back to front; we
went back always to Corps H.Q.' having 'no recollection of
Corps G.S. coming up to us to help & see how we were faring,
& never further up i.e. to Bdes or to the men in front!' 141
At Third Army in 1916 there were three G.S.O.3s who 'each
had a Corps to look after and were supposed to know all
about it and everything that went on in it, state of the
trenches etc.' but little notice was taken of their reports
while the units regarded their visitors as spies trying to
find fault rather than attempting 'to find out the real and
actual conditions in the front line and to help as far as
138 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson. Memoirs, p.1 82, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
General Sir Peter Strickland, Diary, 18 August 1916, Strickland Papers P.362, IWM.
' General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VII, p.1 5-17, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
Bngadier-General E.G. Wace to Bngadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 October 1936,
C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
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possible' •142 Liaison Officers were often seen as 'the Army
Commanders' private snoopers' 143 and when a "learner" staff
officer from Army H.Q. was found in his area by G.O.C. 96th
Brigade he 'was furious, & rightly so, that the Army should
send up a sort of spy who never reported to Div. H.Q. or to
Bde H.Q. either going up or coming back!'	 One Regimental
Officer noted how the Staff of the 91st Brigade were
'reduced to a state of perspiring nervousness' by a visit
for tea by two officers from Corps.'45
Good staff officers found techniques to ensure that
they kept in close contact with the front. Prior to the
Battle of Loos the G.S.O.2 of the 21st Division 'had
reconnoitred from the air 3 days before as far back as Pont
a Vendin' •146 General Sir Walter Kirke (G.S.O.l, 4th
Division) frequently went round the trenches with the C.R.E.
and the G.O.C., realising that 'its a good thing for the men
to see the Staff pretty often' to prevent them thinking that
the staff were 'leading a life of ease and luxury behind'
Colonel W.H.F. Weber (G.S.O.1 30th Division) 'three times
went right down to the front line to receive impressions' of
operations to capture Trones Wood.' 48 One Brigade Major did
'not get out enough round the line' because his Brigade
Commander did 'not encourage it much' and it was only when
'42 Bngadier G.R.P. Roupell, V.C., Memoir, September 1916, p.15, Roupell Papers GR3, IWM.
'' General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VII, p.1 5-17, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
'4' Brigadier-General E.G. Wace to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 October 1936,
C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
'4' Major C.C. May, Diary, 30 April 1916, May Papers, IWM.
'4' Comments by Brigadier D. Forster, 12 April [1926J, C.A.B.45/120 PRO.
General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 4 July 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
148 Colonel W.H. Frank Weber to Edmonds, 18 March 1930, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
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his commander was replaced by a younger man that he was able
to 'go out every morning', doing his office work in the
afternoon.' 49 Montgomery, while serving as a Brigade Major
in 1916, had a routine of visiting the trenches in the
morning and doing his office work in the afternoon 150 and
while serving as G.S.O.2, 33rd Division, in 1917 took it in
turns with the G.S.O.l 'to go out and visit the trenches'
every other day.'5' By 1918 a number of staff officers were
employing aircraft in order to be able to travel about much
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more quickly.	 G.H.Q. noted in April 1918 that 'staff
officers cannot satisfactorily retain touch with units
belonging to their own formations or with other units on
their flanks if they allow themselves to be bounded by their
offices' and that 'they should make frequent personal
reconnaissances in order to find out for themselves the
situation both in front and on their flanks'
Another solution was the development of liaison
officers, whose duty it was to keep their superiors informed
about the conditions at the front, and, as 'undoubtedly when
properly used' they 'proved of real value',' 54 their
employment gradually became universal. On the First Army
Staff it was the rule that 'every staff officer had to go
out once every day (or night) and visit some unit' and that
C.A. Milward, War Diary, 4 and 23 April 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.
' 50 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his mother, 7 May 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM 1/43, IWM.
Montgomery to his father, Ju'y 1917, Montgomery Papers BLM1 61, IWM.
152 See for example, Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke to his mother, 27 July 1918, Alanbrooke Papers
1 1/11/26, LHCMA; General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoir, p.81, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
' 53 G.H.Q., T 9, Notes on Recent Fighting No.4, Staff Duties, 13 April 1918, W.O.58 70, PRO.
154	 Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VII, p.1 5-17, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
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'every position of the front held by the Army had to be
visited at least once every week' •155 As a result of
experiences on the Somme in 1916 XIII Corps advocated that
'more use might, perhaps, be made of the French system of
Liaison Officers' whose responsibility was 'keeping the
superior authority informed of the situation and for
verifying the position actually held by the infantry' and
ensuring that 'the spirit of the orders of the superior
authority is carried out by lower formations' .'
The Fourth Army noted that it was 'essential' that
Divisional Commanders should have Liaison Officers at
Brigade Headquarters 'during important periods of
operations' to keep them informed 'of all important events'
and 'thus considerably relieving the work of the Brigade
157Staff'.	 By 1917 the post of "Intelligence Officer" at
Brigade Headquarters had been evolved to keep them in touch
with the front line 158 and Plumer (Second Army) had officers
living in sectors of the front line in order to keep him in
touch with the troops. 159 By mid-1918 the troops of the 13th
Brigade (5th Division) were visited regularly in the line by
staff officers from XI Corps.' 6° In 1918 the 8th Division
had a staff Officer (G.S.O.2), who 'was the principal
155 Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 1 May [?1926], Haig
Papers, W.O.256 7, PRO.
156 XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.9, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
' 57 Appendix 6, Liaison, to unsigned and undated memorandum, possibly draft for Fourth Army G.S. 400,
[December 1916], Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
158 Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, pp.94-96.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Diary Notes, 31 March 1927, Liddeil Hart Papers 111927 ib, LHCMA; General
Sir Charles Harington, Plurner of Messines, pp.316-317.
160 Major W. Wilberforce to Edmonds, 10 July 1933, C.A.B.45 119, PRO.
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liaison officer between the forward units and Divisional
H.Q. I, paying 'frequent visits to the forward troops' • 161
Improving the quality of British staff work at all
levels was essential. At his first conference with his Army
Commanders in January 1916, Haig 'spoke on the importance of
good Staff work and the need for adhering to the principles
of F.S.R. 162
 During 1915-17, the staff work of the B.E.F.
gradually improved as the Army absorbed the new,
inexperienced staff officers. By 1917 a number of
formations had gained a very good reputation for their staff
work and at Army level in particular Staff Officers formed
close working partnerships with their commanders. For
example Rawlinson and A.A. Montgomery formed a close
partnership at Fourth Army, 163
 which was, apart from the
partnership of Plumer and Harington at Second Army, 164 the
best known Commander and staff officer partnership at Army
level in the British army during the war. In contrast to
the Fifth Army the Second Army in 1917 was renowned for
'wonderful organization and devotion to detail' 165 in its
'detailed preparation for the battle, down to battalion and
battery level' 166 Anderson Hastings, 'supreme as a Staff
Officer', formed 'a strong combination' with Home, 'a
first-rate soldier', at XV Corps and then First Army 167
161 Brigadier G.R.P. Roupell, V.C., Memoir, p.2, Roupell Papers GR5, IWM.
162 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 8 August 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 7, PRO.
163 Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massmgberd, The A uto biography of a Gunner, p.18,
Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 159 1, LHCMA.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.29, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
165 Bnan Bond and Simon Robbins, Staff Officer, p.162.
166 Anthony Eden, Another World, p.135.
' 67 BonhamCer Autobiography, Chapter IX, ppZ7-28, Bonl1am-Carter Papers, CCC.
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while Byng at the Third Army also formed effective
partnerships with Bols and Vaughan.
Nevertheless, relationships were sometimes unhappy and
problems could arise when commanders and staff officers were
unable to combine happily. In 1917 General Sir Hubert Gough
and his M.G.G.S., Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm, although
old friends, proved to be a disastrous combination and the
Fifth Army gained an unenviable reputation for poor
organisation.' 68 As things had 'not been running at all
smoothly','69 there was 'much discontent with Neill Malcolm',
who 'accentuated and encouraged Gough's peculiarities,
instead of softening them down',' 7° and failed to control his
restless Army Commander.'7' As a result as early as mid-
1916, the combination of Gough and Malcolm had 'managed to
put everybody's back up'.' 72 In November 1916 Gough and his
staff 'had simply no conception of the conditions in the
forward area'
	
By September 1917 even Haig was 'inclined
to think that the Fifth Army staff work is not so
satisfactory as last year'	 and Malcolm left to command
66th Division.'75 In 1918 Plumer held 'no high opinion' of
Harington's replacement, Major-General Sir Jocelyn Percy, at
6 feet 3 inches 'a personality to be remembered', 176 who 'was
Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, pp.3-4, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
169 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 11 and 13 October 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1 9, CCC.
170 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXVIII, Edmonds Papers 111/12 16, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 17 April 1916, Howell Papers N C/3 139, LHCMA.
172 Howell to his wife, 24 July 1916, Howell Papers N C/3 325, LHCMA.
' General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 23 October 1936, CAB 45 135, PRO.
'' Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 18 September 1917 Haig Papers , W.O.256 22 PRO.
' Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, p.12 1-122, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
176 Edmonds, Obituary of Major-General Sir Jocelyn Percy, The Times, 25 August 1952, Edmonds Papers
V/2, LHCMA.
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not given the standing that was his due, and he had as a
result on more than one occasion great difficulty in
obtaining an essential service'.'77
An 'outstanding' feature of XV Corps staff, which was a
'"very happy family"', was the 'intensive training for the
issue of operation orders' by the B.G.G.S. (Hastings
Anderson) who realized that 'it was all important in major
operations that orders to units - smallest units - must
reach them in plenty of time and that there must not be a
second's delay to passing orders from Corps to Division &
division to Brigade etc' •178 As a result 'the staff work
went like clock work' and the commander 'could get his
orders carried out'	 Furthermore, as soon as 'a Division
was ordered to join the Corps, one of the Corps Staff went
at once to the Div.'s H.Q. - even before it came into Corps
area - to give maps, photographs, areas, traffic routes and
in fact every scrap of useful information which could be
circulated and digested during the move up' •180
The greatly increased mobility of their forces in 1917
and especially 1918 suggests that there had been a great
improvement in the level of staff work. By early 1917 Corps
Commanders, such as Du Cane, XV Corps, and Maxse, XVIII
Corps, emphasised the necessity for a closer understanding
between Regimental and Staff off icers,' 8' stressing that the
177 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, pp.29-30, Bonham-Carter Papers,
CCC.
178 Major P.J.R. Currie to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 April 1930, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
179 C.M. Page to Edmonds, 25 August 1934, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
'o Currie to Edmonds, 23 April 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
181	 .	 .Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 10 March 1917, Pmney Papers, IWM.
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Staff were 'the servants of the troops' . The Staff were to
'avoid blaming subordinate Staffs unless their fault is
grave' and above all to make sure that 'the troops have the
earliest notice of matters affecting them'. It was also made
clear that in order to help the troops the Staff 'must be a
happy family and that there was to be 'no quarrelling
between branches of the Staff'. 182
By 1917-18 all British headquarters had gained greatly
in the ability to exercise command; and had gained self-
confidence too from their recent successes. Lord Cavan in
October 1917 agreed with Haig that 'now the divisions
understand the manner of making an attack, long delays for
special preparations are no longer necessary' •183 British
staffs by late 1917 were able to assemble and deploy large
numbers of men and equipment in a way which had not been
possible in 1916. For the Battle of Cambrai seven
assaulting divisions, five of whom 'had been concentrated in
the back areas for training and were brought up to the front
of attack by night moves', were supported by 1009 guns, of
which 667 guns had to be moved in from other areas, and
three Tank Brigades, which were moved to the front on 36
trains.' 84 Staff procedures were appropriately flexible and
unbureaucratic.
182 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, XVIII Corps Staff Conference, Agenda, 1 February 1917, Maxse
Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
183 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 1 October 1917 Haig Papers , W.O.256 23 PRO.
IM	 C.A.L. Brownlow, Notes on the Battle of Cambrai, Now. 1917, undated, pp.4, 6, 7, and 9,
C.A.B.45/1 18, PRO.
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G.H.Q. warned in April 1918 that 'in warfare of
movement it is neither possible nor desirable for Commands
and Staffs, especially those of Divisions and Brigades, to
carry out their functions with the facilities and the
deliberation which have come to be looked on as normal in
trench warfare' . Furthermore, 'it must be realized that it
is necessary for headquarters to be prepared to dispense
with heavy paraphernalia, to send away such officers and
personal as are not immediately necessary to the conduct of
the battle, and to work as far as possible with a message
book only'.' 85 By the autumn of 1918, the staff work of the
B.E.F. had improved immensely and had become a smooth
routine, based on much hard staff work, which was one of the
factors in the victories of that year. Montgomery (G.S.O.1,
47th Division) had 'to work out plans in detail for the
operations' and to supervise 'all the branches of the Staff,
and administrative arrangements' to ensure that:
The day generally commences with an organised attack at
dawn, after which we continue to work all day; then
another organised attack is arranged for the next
morning to carry us forward again, and so on. It means
little sleep and continuous work, at night guns have to
be moved forward, communications arranged, food and
ammunition got up etc. etc.'8'
It would, however, be a mistake to think that an
outdated minority of incompetents represented the Old Army's
G.H.Q., T 9, Notes on Recent Fighting No.4, Staff Duties, 13 April 1918, W.O.58 70, PRO.
6 Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to his mother, 3 September 1918, Montgomery Papers BLM 1 65,
IWM.
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best officers. Many officers took their profession very
seriously. The training at the Staff College had a great
deal to do with producing a group of British generals and
staff officers capable of successfully leading armies
against very proficient German forces. Those officers who
attended Staff College in the late 1890s prior to the Boer
War, such as Field-Marshals Lord Allenby, Lord Byng, Earl
Haig, Sir William Robertson, and Sir Henry Wilson; Generals
Sir Hubert Gough, Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, Sir George
Macdonogh, and Sir Henry Rawlinson; and Lieutenant-General
Sir Launcelot Kiggell,' 87 went on to hold senior posts at
G.H.Q. and Army level during the First World War.
Others such as Generals Sir George Barrow, Sir John Du
Cane, Sir William Furse, Sir Richard Haking, and Sir Stanley
Maude; and Major-Generals Sir Thompson Capper, H.N.C. Heath,
O.S.W. Nugent, E.M. Perceval, H.G. Ruggles-Brise, and A.E.
Sandbach held posts as divisional and corps commanders at
home and abroad. Staff College graduates such as Field-
Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery, Generals Sir Hastings
Anderson, Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Sir John Burnett-
Stuart, Sir Lewis Halliday, V.C., and Sir Charles
Har ington, General Sir William Thwaites; Lieutenant-
Generals Sir Louis Bols, Sir Basil Burnett-Hitchcock,
Burnett-Stuart, Sir Sidney Clive and Sir Louis Vaughan;
Major-Generals Hugo de Pree, Sir Charles Gwynn, and Hubert
Isacke, held most of the Staff posts at Divisional, Corps,
187 E.K.G. Sixsmith, Douglas Haig, pp.194-196.
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and Army level. Later batches at the Staff College produced
the men who held staff appointments at Corps and Divisional
level, such as Field-Marshals Sir Thomas Blarney, Sir John
Dill and Lord Ironside; Generals Sir John Brind, Sir Harry
Knox, Sir Norman Macmullen, and Sir Percy Radcliffe;
Brigadier-Generals Sir Archibald Home, R.H. Kearsley, and
Sir Samuel Wilson.
The men, who left Staff College after the Boer War,
were 'well-educated soldiers' and formed a new breed of
professional staff officers, who held most of the Staff
posts at Divisional, Corps, and Army level during the war.
Their standard of ability was 'high' and their Staff College
education gave them 'an enormously increased power of using
our wits logically and with knowledge'.' 88 These men were
the backbone of the B.E.F. in the war years and enabled the
war to be fought. Their contribution to the winning of the
war has been much neglected and ignored when British
generalship during the war is roundly condemned as
incompetent.




Developing a Professional Leadership
The Army was in transition during the period 1915-17 as
both the commanders and their troops embarked on a learning
curve, which would only be fulfilled with victory in 1918.
During this transitional period there was a fundamental
weakness at the top since the commanders at all levels were
inexperienced or unfit for command. In the long term, far
more important was the search for competent officers,
regardless of arm. The Army hierarchy was dominated by
officers (280) from the infantry who formed 43% of the
sample. Indeed 337 officers (55%) had served with the
infantry at some point in their career. The Artillery (112)
were the next most dominant arm forming 17% of the sample
while officers who originated from the Cavalry (65),
Engineers (64) and Guards (33) formed respectively only 10%,
10% and 5% of the sample.' The Indian Army (46) and
Dominion (32) officers provided respectively 7% and 5% of
the sample. When the war began a small group of 25 officers
(4%) were retired and served as "dugouts".2
Non-regular officers (19) formed only some 3% of the
sample of whom 15 were Dominion officers (2%) while the
British non-regulars were very poorly represented with only
See Appendix 3.
2 See Appendix 2.
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4 officers forming less than 1% of the sample. Nevertheless
the image that all senior Dominion officers were non-
regulars is misleading as over half (17 or 55%) were serving
officers with their own Regular Forces. 3 Some, like
Gellibrand and Russell, had served in the British Army while
others, like Heneker and Hayter, were still serving in the
British Army.
The cavalry held a prestige within the Army's hierarchy
which was proportionately much greater than the numbers of
cavalry officers in senior posts. Although the cavalry in
France played little active part in the war and represented
only 10% of the sample, a large number of commanders in the
highest echelons were cavalrymen. Both Commanders-in-Chief
(Haig and French) and five of the ten Army Commanders
(Allenby, Birdwood, Byng, Gough, and Haig) were cavalrymen.
Only 4 (40%) of the Army Commanders (Monro, Plumer,
Rawlinson, and Smith-Dorrien) were infantrymen. 4 The other
Army Commander (Home) was a gunner (10%)
The dominance of cavalrymen at the top of the B.E.F.'s
power structure is striking but at a lower level the picture
was very different. At corps and divisional level, the
infantry (including Guardsmen) were dominant forming the
largest group with 40% (including Guardsmen, 62%) of Corps




commanders appointed. The Cavalry forming the next largest
group with 21% of Corps commanders and 14% of Divisional
commanders appointed at the expense of the Gunners (15%
Corps commanders, 11% Divisional commanders), Guards (12%
Corps commanders, 8% Divisional commanders), and Sappers (4%
Corps commanders, 4.5% Divisional commanders) . The
conclusions to be drawn from this evidence are clear: during
the war years the British Army believed that service with
the cavalry was second in importance only to service with
the infantry when it came to training officers for command
but the infantry predominated overall. The artillery came
6third.
There was a drastic shortage of adequate officers for
higher command at operational level compared with the French
and German Armies during 1915-1916, which meant that 'owing
to the smallness of the old regular Army our divisions, army
corps and armies were commanded by men of whom only a few
had even handled a division' . Of the sample of 700
officers who served on the Western Front during the war only
63 (9%) had commanded a brigade, 28 (4%) a division, and 9
(2%) a corps prior to the war. General Sir Horace Dorrien-
Smith, a veteran of the Boer War, was the only British
general officer on the western front with personal
experience of commanding a division in action before the war
See Appendix 10.
6 See Appendix 10.
Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, p.107.
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and only 34 (5%) had commanded a formation of Divisional or
larger size prior to August 1914.8
On returning to the UK to take command of the 18th
Division, Maxse noted in November 1914 that none of his
Brigade commanders had 'ever handled more than one
battalion'. 9 Of the 23 divisional commanders on the Somme
on 1 July 1916, only 3 had commanded even a brigade before
the war, while of the 18 corps commanders, only 2 had
commanded a division.' 0 Their inexperience and that of
their subordinates was inevitable and, as a result, mistakes
were frequent and costly. In part because of their colonial
background, corps and division commanders lacked experience
when fighting at an operational level because 'their
training had been in frontier wars and South Africa' 	 One
such commander was Major-General Sir Henry Lukin (9th
Division), a South African, who had done well in bush-
wacking expeditions in Africa, but whose knowledge of modern
warfare was rudimentary.'2
Other commanders, like Hamilton-Gordon, Pulteney and
Woolicombe, were brought into Divisional and Corps commands
from Britain because of their seniority. At a lower level
General Sir Tom Bridges' hair had 'gone grey with his quick
rise from Sq[uadron] Leader in 4 D[ragoon] G[uardsJ on the
8 See Appendix 9.
General Sir Ivor Maxse to Brigadier-General H.C. Lowther, 18 November 1915, Maxse Papers 69/53 6,
IWM.
'°John Terrame, Smoke and Fire, pp.114-115.
"'General Sir Walter M.St.G. Kirke, G.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.L., J.P.', undated, p.5, Kirke Papers,
IWM.
12 Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, p.107.
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Mons Retreat' to command of the 19th Division in December
1915.13 Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell rose from
substantive Major to Major-General in about a year 14 while
General Sir Peter Strickland obtained command of the 1st
Division 'just 10 days over 2 years since I got Lieut.
15 Haig promoted Jacob from Colonel to Lieutenant-
General 'in about 18 months' 16 The rapid expansion of the
Army meant that majors were 'getting commands of Brigades as
a matter of course'. 17 Such rapid expansion left formations
without experienced leaders.
For many the war represented a new impetus for careers
providing opportunities for advancement, which had
previously seemed unattainable. Field-Marshal Earl of Cavan
had actually retired in 1913 and had to be hastily recalled
on the outbreak of war. Major-General P.R. Robertson, 'an
able divisional commander', would not have attained the rank
of Lieutenant-Colonel and command of a Battalion 'but for
the opportune outbreak of the war' 18 while Jacob,
commanding a battalion prior to the war, had been
'officially informed that there was no further employment
for him and that he would be retired' in September l9l4.'
Until the end of 1916 it cannot be said that there was
a proper system of promotion based on professional expertise
Brigadier-General F.A. Maxwell, Diary, 20 May 1916, Maxwell Papers 7402-25-17, NAM.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, p.4, Bonhani-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC;
Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.1 98, Henderson Papers DSIMISC/2, IWM.
General Sir Peter Strickland, Diary, 1 June 1916, Strickland Papers P.362, IWM.
'6 Bngadier..General P. Howell to Sir Montague Turner, 7 July 1916, Howell Papers IV/C/2 233, LHCMA.
General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 25 September 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
18 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.42, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
' Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, pp.92-93, LHCMA.
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because there was no sustained reservoir of experience of
continental warfare. During the period 1914-16 promotion to
the high command and staff positions went mainly by
seniority in the absence of any operational experience to
influence decisions. Of the thirty Divisional commanders in
the B.E.F. in 1914 no less than nineteen (63%) became Corps
commanders, and six (20%) were killed or invalided while
only five (17%) failed to become corps commanders, all of
whom were rather elderly. Furthermore, five (17%) became
Army commanders. Of the twenty-five Brigade commanders in
August 1914, only four (16%), did not become divisional
commanders while twenty-one (84%) did so in the rapid
expansion of 1914, 1915 and 1916. In August 1914 the three
Brigadiers of the 4th Division, Haldane (lath Brigade),
Hunter-Weston (11th Brigade), and F.M. Wilson (12th Brigade)
'were far and away better than the Brigadiers of other
Divisions and all became Corps Commanders' •20 Others were
less lucky. General Sir Edward Buif in (2nd Brigade) proved
'with his fine soldierly qualities' to be 'one of Haig's
'stoutest hearted Brigadiers' and a tower of strength at all
times' 21 but was wounded and thus was removed from the
promotion race at a vital time and did not get a corps until
1917.
Of the remaining 165 British and Dominion officers who
obtained command of a Division on the Western Front between
20 General Sir Thomas Snow, The Account of the Retreat of 1914, undated, p.4, C.A.B.45/129, PRO.
21 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 20 and 27 September 1914, and 1 November! 914, Haig Papers,
W.O.256 1, PRO.
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1915 and 1918 only a very few, 20 (or 12%), became Corps
commanders. 22 145 (88%) failed to progress to Corps level.
In other words, those who commanded a division at the
beginning of the war were particularly well placed for rapid
promotion during the expansion of the army whereas those who
attained this post later in the war were unlikely to
progress further. Five (56%) of the nine corps commanders
in 1914 were promoted to command of armies, and one (Haig)
became Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1915. This first
group of corps commanders who went on to command armies must
be seen as constituting a particularly privileged but
rapidly upwardly-mobile elite within the B.E.F.
Of the 34 corps commanders who served between 1915 and
1918 only five (17%) rose subsequently to army command.23
Even though few of this second generation of corps
commanders managed to rise any higher than that level, they
nevertheless perpetuated a relatively unchanging chain of
command throughout the war. Those Officers, who were in the
right place and rank in 1914 and 1915 and had good
reputations, were able to move furthest up the ladder at a
time when the Army needed commanders to step into the vacuum
created by expansion. Once the initial expansion was
beginning to slacken off in 1916 and ended in early 1917





The rise by seniority meant that men often moved up in
rank in spite of their personal qualities or competence
because of the urgent need for "educated" soldiers. Like
Wellington in the Peninsula, Haig had doubts about his
senior officers' abilities commenting in June 1917 that he
had at last got five Army commanders 'who knew their
business' whereas in 1916 only one did. 24 Lacking a pool of
experienced officers during the early days of the war, Haig
could not show ruthlessness in replacing senior subordinates
until there were officers to replace them. The overall
average competence and inexperience of the officer corps did
not allow him to make wholesale changes. Prior to the war
in 1911, Haig was aware that 'there are a great many useless
officers' who 'are just able to scrape along in peace time,
but are quite unfit for the responsibilities which will come
upon them in the event of war' 25
As early as 1914 when Haldane removed three out of the
four Battalion Commanders of the 10th Brigade, two of whom
were arrested and cashiered for cowardice, 26 while Major-
General E.C. Ingouville-Williams had sent home three of the
four battalion commanders of the 16th Brigade, within three
months of arrival in France, the fourth going on to command
a Division. 27 Corkran (5th Brigade) reported in October
1915 that 'two of the C.O.s in the brigade were tired and
24 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 14 June 1917, Rawimson Papers 1 7, CCC.
25 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 31 August 1911, Haig Papers
328e, NLS.
26 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 4, 5 and 15 September 1914, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
27 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.33, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
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not very good' 28 Henry Wilson complained in March 1916
that the 68th Brigade had '3 bad C.O.s out of
	
Others
had to be sent home to command Divisions of the New Army
because they could not stand the pace, notably General Sir
Ivor Maxse (4th (Guards) Brigade), who 'seemed to have lost
his fighting spirit which used to be so noticeable at
Aldershot in peacetime' and 'had not done well', 30 and
Major-General R.H. Davies (6th Brigade), who 'seemed much
changed, full of nerves', and 'very jumpy' •31
Many of the older divisional commanders, such as Major-
General Hon. E.J. Montagu-Stuart-Wortley (46th Division),
who could not provide 'the necessary thinking' and took
'life very easily', failed to provide the leadership and
energy required of front-line commanders. 32
 At Gomrnecourt
in 1916 Stuart Wortley was 'a worn out man who never visited
his front line and was incapable of inspiring any kind of
enthusiasm'	 Progress in getting new blood into the high
command proved difficult because of the relative shortage of
experienced or capable men. There were many more positions
available for senior commanders and staff officers in France
than there were competent officers. Major-General J.F.C.
Fuller noted that 'our regular army was an army of
dilettantes & our new armies, armies of amateurs'
	 The
28 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 23 October 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 6, PRO.
29	 Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 2 March 1916, Wilson Papers, 1WM.
° Haig, Diary, 6, 14, and 17 September 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 1, PRO.
' Haig, Diary, 27 August, 18, 22, and 24 September 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 1, PRO.
32 Afr Vice Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 19 and 20 November 1915, Game Papers PWG 9, IWM.
" Brigadier-General Frank Lyon to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 June 1929, C.A.B.45/135,
PRO.
' Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his mother, 27 March 1918, Fuller Papers IV/3 228, LHCMA.
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work ethic of some senior officers is characterised by the
C.R.A. of the 2nd Indian Cavalry Division, who 'looked upon
his profession as a means of providing him with an easy
going life connected with horses, hunting and good
friends'
This shortage of officers necessitated the use of
'dugouts', such as Lieutenant-General R.G. Broadwood and
Major-Generals C.G.M. Fasken, Sir John Ramsay and C. Ross,
as commanders at divisional level in 1915 and 1916. For
example, Major-General Charles Ross (an instructor at the
Staff College before retiring in 1912 to become a writer of
military history) rejoined as a Brigade commander and,
despite having 'very little experience of regimental
soldiering or command', was promoted to command 6th Division
in November 1915. He failed 'to exercise any command over
his division, leaving his brigadiers a free hand to go their
own way', 36
 but managed to survive until August 1917 before
being given a division at home. It was indicative of the
rapid expansion of the Army that officers of modest
accomplishment, such as Ross and Ramsay, could be appointed
to command of Divisions during 1915-16.
Many middle-ranking officers agreed in 1915 that 'all
our commanders were too old' 	 The presence of commanders
at Brigade, Divisional and even Corps level who were 'old-
Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes for My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 2/1/70, LHCMA.
Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.47, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Spencer Wilkinson, 15 March 1916, Edmonds Papers 1112/133,
LHCMA.
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fashioned and out of date in most things' 38 created
friction and inertia within the Army's machinery which
prevented its smooth operation. It was not surprising that
'the new divisions under their old "dug out" generals'
conducted attacks which 'just throw men's lives away'
because the 'old gentlemen' were 'with no imagination, or no
first hand knowledge, & with minds far too "set" ever to
learn new things'.39
In 1915 Haig noted that the brigadiers, such as H.R.
Davies, Lawford, Strickland, and Lieutenant-General Sir
Herbert Watts, who were being promoted to command divisions
were respectively 'a hard practical soldier', 'a hard
fighting plucky soldier', 'a capable hard-featured officer',
and 'a plucky hard little man' but also that Lawford and
Watts were respectively 'endowed with no great ability' and
'no great brains' 40 In particular Watts (later XX Corps),
although 'a fine leader and a delightful chief to serve' 41
and 'a hard fighter, a leader of men', was 'a distinctly
stupid man and lacks imagination!'
	 Both Cavan and Watts,
as Divisional and Corps Commanders, had to rely heavily on
their trained General Staff. 43
 Lieutenant-General Sir
William Pulteney 'was the most ignorant general' that his
staff officer had served under during the war and could not
38 Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery to his Mother, 10 April 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM 1 41, IWM.
Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 21 June 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3 183, LHCMA.
4° Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 26 February, 22 April, and 5 May 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/3-4,
PRO.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VIII, p.3, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
42 Haig, Diary, 9 May 1916, W.O.256 10, PRO.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.24, and Chapter VIII, p.2, Bonham-
Carter Papers 9 1 and 9 2, CCC.
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be let out of his B.G.G.S.'s sight as he could not be
trusted to be left to his own resources.44
At a lower level many younger, middle-ranking staff
officers, who were 'accustomed to taking soldiering very
seriously even in peacetime', 45 had to "carry'1 their
seniors. Major-General Sir Cecil Bingham (4th Cavalry
Brigade) 'was a charming rather elderly gentleman who was
content to leave nearly everything' to Beddington, his
Brigade Major, who 'was in fact commanding the Brigade' •46
Bingham later commanded a cavalry division and the Cavalry
Corps. Field-Marshal Lord Montgomery (Brigade-Major, 104th
Brigade) found that his Brigadier 'was an old retired
officer' who was 'a very nice person but quite useless and
it would be true to say that I really ran the Brigade, and
they all knew it'. 47 In the 15th Division, where the
commander, Major-General Reed, V.C., was hot-tempered and
his competency was in question, Lieutenant-Colonel W.N.
Diggle, the G.S.O.1, was 'exceptionally loyal' and kept
'things working very smoothly'. 48 The Army's rapid
expansion had removed too many experienced officers and
while bringing many others too rapid advancement.
Undoubtedly some senior officers were unfit both
physically and mentally for the strenuous demands of war in
August 1914. For example, one officer, who 'gloried in hock
" General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.1, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
45 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.1 52, Henderson Papers DSfMISC/2, IWM.
Brigadier Edward Beddmgton, Memoirs, pp.&3-84, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomeiy of Alamein, Notes on his letters, Montgomery Papers BLM1 1,
IWM; see also Montgomery to his Mother, 10 April 1916, Montgomery Papers BLM 1 41, IWM.
48 General Sir Arthur Holland to General Lord Home, 12 October 1918, Home Papers 73 60 2, IWM.
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for breakfast & high living generally', had to refuse
command of a Division in l914, while Lieutenant-General
Sir James Grierson (II Corps), who left Southampton looking
'like a beef extract advertisement', 50 promptly died of a
heart attack in August 1914 before he could see action.51
Men of much sterner material were needed to perform under
the 'tremendous strain' that senior commanders were enduring
during the war. 52 Sir John French complained in 1915 that
the strain and anxiety were 'most terribly wearing' and
'very trying' admitting that he 'had really begun to feel it
horribly'
Many were unable to stand the pace. In July 1916
Brigadier-General H.F. Jenkins (75th Brigade) 'found the
strain of command too much for his age & asked to be allowed
to resign his command & to return to England' 	 On the
Somme in October 1916 Brigadier-General J.F. Edwards (71st
Brigade) 'had to apply to be relieved of his command because
he found it beyond his physical powers to go round his front
line'	 while Brigadier-General F.C. Carter (24th Brigade)
resigned because 'his health is not too good and he feels
too old for the hard work of a Brigr'. 56 Brigadier-General
Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 13 July 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
J.F.C. Fuller to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 6 May 1937, Liddell Hart Papers 1/302 246,
LHCMA.
' Major-General Lord Loch, Diary, 19 August 1914, Loch Papers 71/12/1, IWM; General C.A. Milward,
War Diary, 17 August 1914, Milward Papers 6510-143-1, NAM.
Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 7 September 1937, Liddell Hart
Papers 1/466 1, LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Sir John French to Mrs Bennett, 18 February 1915, French Papers 75/46/1, IWM.
Lieutenant-Colonel E.N. Snapp to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 July 1930, C.A.B.45/1 37,
PRO.
55 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.44, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.
56 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 13 March 1915, Rawlinson Papers 11, CCC.
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L.F. Philips (189th Brigade) 'had a complete nervous
breakdown just before zero hour' at Beaumont Hamel in
November l916.	 Lieutenant-Colonel George Powell
commanding a battalion in the 18th Division on the Somme in
July 1916 cracked up and had to be quietly sent home when in
line for command of a brigade.58
Gradually as the war progressed the older commanders
unfit for the strenuous life of trench warfare at Battalion,
Brigade, and Divisional level were ruthlessly replaced by
battle-hardened veterans. Brigather-General F.J. Kempster
(91st Brigade), an 'old boy [who] was useless and had
received the boot in no uncertain manner', was replaced by
Brigadier-General J.R.M. Minshull-Ford, 'a topping chap, a
soldier both in appearance and being'	 During the Battle
of Canthrai Brigadier-General H. Nelson (88th Brigade) 'fell
senseless to the ground during a German attack in early
December 1917 60 and was replaced by the much younger
Brigadier-General B.C. Freyberg, V.C. A "dug-out" having
retired in 1909, Brigadier-General F.S. Derham (69th
Brigade, 23rd Division) was replaced by the comparatively
youthful Major-General T.S. Lambert who was over ten years
younger and commanded the brigade for two years until May
1918 when he was given command of 32nd Division. Lambert
'was a first class soldier, who left nothing to chance and
Brigadier Harold M. Sandlilands to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 20 November 1936,
C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
58	 .Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 29 and 31 July 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
Major C.C. May, Diary, 24 February and 11 March 1916, May Papers, IWM; see also General Sir
Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, p.5, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/2, CCC.
60 Brigadier-General H. Biddulph to Edmonds, 22 September 1944, C.A.B.45/1 18, PRO.
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never hurried prematurely', and 'was close up to the scene
of action, from whence he could watch the attack, and
control by timely action its course'
Commenting on 'the strain of commanding a battalion in
this kind of warfare', Haig believed that 'only young and
strong men can stand it' 62 Command of Brigades and
Battalions was by the end of the war seen as a job for only
fit, young men. One battalion commander in 1915 noted that
it was 'a young man's war' and that 'no man over 50 should
be further forward than the Division - a Brigadier should be
under 50 - over that they are no use' . 	 Born in 1858
Derham was 'as too old' at sixty." General Sir David
Campbell, on being appointed to command of the 21st
Division, 'on hearing the first time they met that
Brigadier-General G.M. Gloster (64th Brigade) was 52 years
of age, without further enquiry expressed the opinion that
that was too old for a brigade command and had him sent
home' 65 One Brigade commander, who had been out in France
as a Brigade commander since July 1915, wounded for the
second time in March 1918, and evacuated home, 66 was not
recommended to return to resume command of a brigade in the
Field' 'in view of his age' (56 years old) by the Military
61 Brigadier-General G.W.St.G. Grogan, V.C., to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 April 1930,
C.A.B.45/134, PRO.
62 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 13 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 31, PRO.
63 Brigadier-General E.M. Morris to Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, 21 July [1915], Lee Papers, IWM.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 3 March 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
65 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.1 85, Henderson Papers DSIMISC/2, IWM.
Brigadier-General Hon. R. White, late commanding 184th Brigade (61St Division) to Lieutenant-
General Sir Ivor Maxse, 30 September 1918, Maxse Papers 6953 11, IWM.
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Secretary at G.H.Q. 67 on the advice of his Divisional,
Corps, and Army Commanders. 68 Lieutenant-General Sir John
Keir (VI Corps) was sacked because he was 'over 60' •69
Major-General Sir Edward Montagu1 -Stuart-Wortley (46th
Division) was too old at the age of 58.°
To be effective the British Army had to promote rapidly
those officers with outstanding managerial skills and
technical expertise. In June 1915 Haig felt that 'even if
ample guns and ammunition, etc, be provided, progress will
be disappointing unless young capable commanders are brought
up to the front' and urged that 'some of the present
captains should be chosen to command battalions, Majors
Brigades, etc'. 7' In July 1915, Haig informed the Prime
Minister (Asquith) of the 'necessity for promoting young
officers to high command' and that 'to make room, some of
the old ones must be removed' and, looking through the lists
of Major-Generals in the Army list for 'young, capable
officers', recommended 'in order of seniority' Morland,
Home, Gough and Haking for command of corps believing that
'they should eventually be given command of armies' 72 and
that 'the present circumstances in which the Army was placed
justified the selection of the best and youngest men to fill
67 Major-General Sir Harold Ruggles-Brise to The Secretary, War Office, 23 May 1918, Maxse Papers
6953/11, rWM.
Major-General Sir Cohn MacKenzie to Xl Corps, 61st Division No. Q.88, 11 May 1918; Lieutenant-
General Sir Richard Hakmg to A.M.S. First Army, XI Corps No. A/923 13, no date; General Sir Henry
Home, First Army, to the Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 18 May 1918, Maxse Papers 69/53 11, IWM.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 8 August 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 12, PRO.
70 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 1 August 1915, Game Papers PWG/12, IWM.
' Haig, Diary, 25 June 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 4, PRO.
72 Haig, Diary, 8 July 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 4, PRO.
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the highest commands. 73 Of the four generals mentioned all
were commanding corps by the end of 1915 but only Gough and
Home were promoted to command Armies (in 1916)
By 1917 G.H.Q. was reluctant to give appointments to
senior officers 'when they have not had recent experience'
in France 'as the responsible Commanders are naturally
anxious to get men who are absolutely up to date with the
various peculiarities of this war' .	 Haig was able to take
his pick of 'a large number of brigadiers highly recommended
for advancement, and who have commanded their Brigades in
all the hottest fighting during the past eighteen months'
and doubted whether it was possible 'for even the most
gifted officer to suddenly take command of a Division before
a modern battle and do justice either to himself or his
troops'	 Brigadier-Generals Hon	 Arthur Asquith, the\
son of the Prime Minister, and B.C. Freyberg 'courageous and
capable leaders' who were 'young men of exceptional ability
and great promise' 76 both got Brigades in early 1917. In
1918 Brigadier-General G.H. Gater (62nd Brigade, 21st
Division), a New Army officer and 'very highly recommended'
by his superiors as 'a magnificent brigadier' who was 'quite
exceptional', had 'been strongly recommended for a
division' .
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 26 July 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 5 PRO.
' General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to Brigadier-General H.S. Sloman, 6 March 1917, Kiggell Papers,
LHCMA.
Haig to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 20 August 1917, French Papers 75 46/11, French Papers, IWM.
General Sir Hubert Gough, 'My Story', News Chronicle, 18 November 1936, Liddell Hart Papers
1/323 26, LHCMA.
.'' Brigadier-General S.E. ('Tom') Hollond to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 7 October 1918, Maxse
Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
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From 1915 younger and fitter commanders were gaining
command of Brigades. For example, Brigadier-General Hon.
J.F.H.F.S. Trefusis had commanded the Irish Guards with
'great success' and as a result, although he was only a
substantive Captain, Haig promoted him to command 20th
Brigade' 78 Brigadier-General A.B. Beauman was at the age
of 29 the third youngest officer to be promoted to the
command of a brigade behind two V.C.s, Bernard Freyberg and
Brigadier-General R.B. Bradford. 79 Bradford was 25 80 and
Freyberg was 28 when given command of a Brigade. 81 Asquith
and Gater, both non-regulars, were in their thirties and old
men in comparison! Brigadier-General G.S. Shephard, a model
for Carruthers in Erskine Childers' The Riddle of the Sands,
was only 31 when he was given command of 1st Brigade,
R.F.C., in 1917 while Salmond obtained the rank of Major-
General at the age of 36, becoming commander of the R.F.C.
in France in 1918 at the age of 37. Major-General H.K.
Bethell was the youngest divisional commander on the Western
82Front at the age of 35.
During the years of war the average age of general
officers dropped. The emphasis was shifted to promotion by
merit. The mean age of army commanders fell from 62 in
August 1914 to 54 in July 1917, rising to 56 in November
l918;83 that of corps commander fell from 54.5 in August
78 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 September 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 5, PRO.
Brigadier-General A.B. Beautnan, Then A Soldier, p.57.
80 Colonel W.D.B. Thompson, Biography of Brigadier-General R.B. Bradford VC MC, p.3, IWM.
Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg, VC, p.1 02-103.
82 Brian Bond and Simon Robbins, Staff Officer: The Diaries of Lord Moyne, 1914-1918, p.16.
83 See Appendix 13.
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1914 to 53 in November 1918;84 that of divisional commanders
from 55 in August 1914 to 52 in July 1916, 50 in July 1917,
and 49 in November 1918.85 Not only, as one would expect,
did the commanders became younger and more energetic further
down the hierarchy but also the fall in the age of
commanders became much more dramatic. By 1917-18 a cadre of
officers led divisions with a level of competence that
allowed them to compete with their German counter-parts.
Major-General F.A. Dudgeon when appointed to command the
56th Division in August 1917 had already commanded a
Battalion, April - August 1915, and the 42nd Brigade (14th
Division) for exactly two years from August 1915, serving at
Neuve Chapelle, the Second Battle of Ypres, Hill 60,
Bellevaarde Ridge, the Somme, and Arras. 86
 This new blood
provided a level of competence and professionalism, which
made sure that the British Army with a good balance of
experience and relative youthfulness, was now, at last,
well-run and able to attack with the high level of
performance which Continental warfare required.
By 1916 it was becoming apparent that the performance
of officers like Major-General H.G. Walker (2nd Division),
who was 'a gallant soldier & a gentleman but without much
tactical knowledge', 87 was not successful enough and that
they needed to be replaced by more effective commanders,
See Appendix 14.
85 See Appendix 15.
Major-General F.A. Dudgeon, Mss Notes on his Career, no date, Dudgeon Papers 86 51 1, IWM.
87	 .Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 24 February 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
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such as General Sir Peter Strickland (1st Division from
1916) who had 'a violent temper' and was 'unpleasantly rude'
88 but was 'an ambitious fighting-man with any amount of
energy' •89 By May 1918 the three brigadiers of the 1st
Division, Brigadier-Generals G.C. Kelly, H.H.S. Morant, and
W.B. Thornton, 'were young' but 'they had all proved their
capacity in the field' •90 Major-General H.W. Higginson was
given command of the 12th Division because 'he did very well
as a brigadier in 18th Division'
From the Battle of the Somme onwards some effective
commanders emerged within the B.E.F. who had gained
experience and were active in pursuing new ideas while the
process of the weak and ineffective being weeded out by the
high command continued. Young and experienced Brigadier-
Generals were given command of divisions. Thus, 'most of
the people who come out from home with the new Divisions are
sent away fairly soon', 92 being replaced by younger officers
who had already proved themselves while commanding Brigades.
For example, Major-General Sir William Fry, 'a cherry good-
natured officer, [who] would probably execute orders better
than he can make a plan', 93 brought the 30th Division out to
France but was quickly replaced in command prior to the
Battle of the Somme by a younger man. General Sir John
Shea, who was 'a very smart fellow' with 'plenty of brains
88 Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoir, pp.l2'7-l28, Archibald Papers, IWM.
89 Pearson Choate to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
° Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 15 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 31, PRO.
Haig, Diary, 8 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256131, PRO.
92 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 25 September 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
Haig, Diary, 8 April l9l6Haig Papers, W.O.256 9 PRO.
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and energy'	 was given the 30th Division but was
nevertheless himself sacked in early 1917	 and replaced by
Major-General W. de L. Williams, who had commanded a brigade
since 1915.
A pattern of renewal had been established. For
example, Major-General Sir Ivor Philipps (38th Division),
who 'had no training as a commander in the field', 96 was
removed by General Lord Home (XV Corps) on the Somme
because he was 'ignorant' and lacked the required skills '
and replaced by Major-General C.G. Blackader, commander of a
Battalion between 1912 and 1915, and a Brigade in 1915.
Blackad/er in turn made way for General Sir Thomas Cubitt, a
younger man, who had commanded a Battalion and then a
Brigade between 1916 and 1918.
Originally a regular soldier who had retired from the
Indian Army before the war and was serving with the
Pembrokeshire Yeomanry, Philipps had been promoted to
command the 38th Division in early 1915 'over the heads of
many more senior and meritorious officers' as a friend of
Lloyd George and it was 'hardly surprising that he was
ignorant, lacked experience and failed to inspire
confidence'. Under the command of Blackader and Cubitt the
political atmosphere was eliminated and the division 'did
94	 .	 .General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 25 September 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 23 and 25 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/17, PRO.
Haig, Diary, 17 January 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/7, PRO.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VIII, pp.1 3-14, Bonham-Carter Papers
9/2, CCC.
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extremely well' •98 Haig ascribed the improvement in the
38th Division 'which did so badly at Mametz Wood in July
[1916]' to the appointment of the 'excellent' Blackader as
commander. 99 In August 1918 General Shute (V Corps)
reported that 'Cubitt commanding 38th (Welsh) Division had
done very well' 100 and in October 1918 Haig noted that he
had 'done particularly well as a divisional commander' •101
Similarly, the 50th Division demonstrates the process
by which good men were established in command of Divisions.
Major-General Sir Walter Lindsay, 'a charming man but
physically old and not an efficient commander of a
division', was sacked by Allenby (V Corps) in June 1915 and
replaced by the exceptional Cavan who before being promoted
to command of the Guards Division in August 1915
reinvigorated the Division. 102 His successor, Major-General
P.S. Wilkinson, 'a capable energetic commander' 103 and 'a
sound, not brilliant' man, completed the good work of
turning it into 'a magnificent division' 104 before making
way for General Sir Henry Jackson, a younger commander who
had already commanded a Battalion and a Brigade, in March
1918.
98	 .Major G.P.L. Drake-Brocknian to Bngadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 7 February 1930,
C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 December 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 14, PRO.
'°° Haig, Diary, 25 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 35, PRO.
'°' Haig, Diary, 17 October 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 37, PRO.
102 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, pp.20-22, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1,
CCC.
'° Haig, Diary, 23 March 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
'°4 Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, pp.20-22, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
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As 'an immediate result' of the failure of the 32nd
Division on the Ancre in mid-November 1916, Major-General
Rycroft who 'always gave one a feeling of confidence and
fair-play', the G.S.O.l, and two Brigadiers including the
'very good' Brigadier-General Compton, were removed 105 and
replaced by more efficient and younger men. Rycroft, a
cavalryman, knew nothing 'at all about the P.B.I. or how to
treat them'. 106 Rycroft was replaced 	 first by Major-
General Sir Reginald Barnes (promoted from 116th Brigade),
who fell ill, and then by Major-General C.D. Shute who,
although 'not popular' and 'very talkative and rather a gas
bag', had been recommended for promotion by Lord Cavan from
59th Brigade and when later commanding the 19th Division
107
'did splendidly'.	 Shute worked the 32nd Division 'hard
but sensibly' and 'understood infantry and their funny ways
as none of the others did' and 'that is why the Division did
so brilliantly afterwards'.'° 8 On Shute's promotion to V
Corps the division was commanded briefly by Major-Generals
J. Campbell and R.J Bridgford before Major-General T.S.
Lambert took over command until the end of the war. All had
been brigadiers since 1915.
As 'an experienced fighter' and 'a most likeable
personality', who was 'full of sound common sense' and never
'rattled', but, above all, 'did not cling to steriotyped
105 Lieutenant-Colonel H.J.N. Davies to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 November [1936],
C.A.B.45/133, PRO.
106 Brigadier A.C. Girdwood to Edmonds, 30 June 1930, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
107 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 12 August 1915, 28 April 1916, and June 1917, Haig Papers,
W.O.256 5, 9, and 19, PRO.
108 Girdwood to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 30 June 1930, C.A.B.45/134, PRO.
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[sic] tactics if he saw something better', 109 Major-General
Sir Henry Lukin (9th Division) was a typical divisional
commander in 1916-17. By 1917 and 1918 one of the main
attributes of a commander, whether at battalion, brigade,
divisional, or corps level, was his ability to train his
command and to pick subordinates who were also able to train
their formations. Divisional commanders, such as Major-
General Sir Reginald Pinney (33rd Division) spent much time
interviewing or admonishing subordinate commanders and
regimental officers, constantly looking for better officers
to fill posts in his units, particularly as battalion
where necessary removing battalion commanders
when they proved incompetent,'' recommending those suitable
to command Brigades.' 12 New, younger commanders ruthlessly
weeded out incompetent or unfit subordinates. For example,
on taking command of the 8th Division, Heneker immediately
sacked his C.R.A., two of his three Brigade Commanders, and
the G.S.O.2, who were not up to his standards." 3 He later
also got rid of the third brigade commander and the A.A. &
Q.M.G.!
Fergusson (XVII Corps) noted that the 'constant
shuffling of divisions from one corps to another' meant that
'a mediocre man very often goes on and on, because he is
'° Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1918, pp.3 and 31, Tudor Papers RAT.
"° Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 22 April, 8 May, 1 September, 20 October 1916; 12 and 16
July, 1 September, 17 December 1917; 1,4-5 April, 23 May, 11, 14-15, 21 July, 22 September, 14
October 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
" Pmney, Diary, 8 August 1917, 3 October and 8 November 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
112 Pinney, Diary, 28 November 1916, Pinney Papers, IWM.
h13 General Sir William Heneker, Diary, 27 and 31 December 1916, Heneker Papers, IViM; see also Sir
Edward Beddington, Memoir, pp.106-107, Beddington Papers, LHMCA.
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never long enough in one unit for the Corps Commander to
feel justified in firing him out' 	 For example, when the
2nd Division moved from the I Corps to the IV Corps in early
1916, Gough passed onto Henry Wilson his adverse but
informal views on its commander, Major-General H.G.
Walker,"5 who was later replaced. By 1917, however,
continued assessment of the abilities of commanders had
become more forrnalised replacing arbitrary sackings and
allowing for the removal of mediocre commanders. The Fifth
Army asked its Corps in September 1917 'to furnish a report
on all divisional commanders who have been under your
command from 31st July 1917' commenting on their 'fitness to
command a division during active operations' and 'capacity
for training a division'. 116
Maxse (XVIII Corps) reported favourably on two
commanders but adversely on two others. Major-General Sir
Robert Fanshawe (48th Division) was 'a good average
divisional commander and trainer' while Maxse had 'formed a
high opinion' of General Sir George Harper commanding 51st
Division, which was 'now one of the two or three best
divisions in France' thanks to 'his intimate up-to-date
knowledge of infantry tactics' and 'a masterly manner in
active operations'. On the other hand, Lieutenant-General
Sir Hew Fanshawe, (58th Division) lacked the 'decision of
I Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson to General Lord Home, 10 October 1918, Home Papers
73 60/2, IWM.
" Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 24 February 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
' 16 Major-General Neill Malcolm, M.G.G.S., to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, Fifth Army
G.A.720/39, 22 September 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
175
character' to command during active operations, having
'little influence over his subordinate commanders' while
Major-General G.J. Cuthbert (39th Division) had 'few ideas
regarding the tactical employment of a division in battle'
and, although 'a good disciplinarian of a narrow type', had
'little or no conception of training methods'. Both
Cuthbert and Fanshawe refuted Maxse's adverse reports on
them by complaining of Maxse's interference in the training
of their divisions " but to no avail as both were removed
from command of their divisions. According to Jacob (II
Corps) Cuthbert had been 'inclined to be very obstinate &
mulish' on the Somme in 1916.118
The process was a continuous one and by 1918 it was
difficult to arbitrarily sack a divisional commander. When
General Sir Walter Congreve (VII Corps) 'had reported
unfavourably on him, Brigadier-General F.W. Ramsay in
temporary command of the 16th Division complained in
February 1918 to the visiting Commander-in-Chief, who asked
Congreve 'to go once more into the question, as Ramsay had
done well as a brigadier' •h19 Ramsay was not confirmed in
command of the 16th Division but given the 58th Division in
June 1918.120 In October 1918 Fergusson reported to Home
(First Army) that Major-General H.L. Reed, V.C., was unfit
to command 15th Division while praising the 63rd Division
117 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S.82, 27 September 1917, Maxse
Papers 69 53 1l,IWM.
118 Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 20 December 1936,
C.A.B.45/135, PRO.
" Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 15 February 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
120 Haig, Diary, 17 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256135, PRO.
176
under Major-General C.A. Blacklock as the finest he had ever
seen.'2' Reed was able to survive as his previous Corps
Commander assessed him to be an 'above average Divisional
Commander' 122 By 1917-18 the older or less professional
senior officers had been weeded out and replaced by those
trained by experience at the front and with a greater
commitment to professionalism. By September 1918, Haig felt
that 'we have a surprisingly large number of very capable
Generals' on whom 'are our successes to be chiefly
123
attributed'.
There was a steady flow of changes in the personnel
holding senior commands at Divisional, Corps and Army level
during the period 1915-18 as commanders were either
incapacited, sacked or promoted so that between 20% and 33%
of commanders changed each year.' 24 In the matter of
generalship and professionalism, 1918 clearly demonstrated
that the British had passed the nadir of incompetence and
were at last coming into their own. Out of fifty-three
British Divisions in France in late 1917 and 1918 no less
than 36 (68%) had had at least one change in command. In
August 1917, for example, Major-Generals G.J. Cuthbert, C.
Ross, and H.G. Ruggles-Brise (39th, 6th, and 40th Divisions
respectively) were selected to command Divisions at home.'25
In another case Lukin (9th Division) 'compelled because of
121 Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson to General Lord Home, 10 October 1918, Home Papers
73 60 2, IWM.
122 Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Holland to Home, 12 October 1918, Home Papers 73 60 2, IWM.
123 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 20 September 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 36, PRO.
124 See Appendix 18.
125 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 24 August 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
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the grave illness of his wife to accept the offer of a tour
of duty in England' was replaced by Tudor.' 26 Others such as
Major-General W.H. Greenly, 'who was very exhausted, broke
down and had to hand over command' of the 2nd Cavalry
•	 .	 127Division.
The British Army's particular weakness was at corps
level. Haig complained that 'he had sent home more than a
hundred brigadiers, but that he was ,,fund to leave certain
corps and divisional commanders in their appointments
because he could not be sure of securing better ones' 128
Haig had to allow men like Fergusson (II Corps), 'a smart-
looking pleasant man' who got 'on well with his
subordinates' but had no mental courage and caused 'too many
difficulties',' 29 and Pulteney (III Corps) who, while 'a
plucky leader of a Brigade or even a Division', had 'quite
reached the limits of his capacity as a commander' and had
'not, however, studied his profession sufficiently to be
really a good corps commander',' 3 ° to remain in their posts.
Despite some unfavourable reports 'regarding his military
efficiency' as commander of 15th Division,'3 ' Lieutenant-
General Sir Frederick McCracken managed to be promoted to a
corps. McCracken, who 'was quite pleasant and amiable, but
weak and lazy, and left everything to his staff' with only
126 John Buchan, The South African Forces in France, p.156.
127	 Sir Eric de Burgh, Memoir, pp.14 and 16, de Burgh Papers 7306 .67, NAM.
128 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to Brigadier C.N. Barclay, 7 April 1950, Edinonds Papers
112B 5a, LHCMA.
129 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 December 1915 and 20 February 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 8,
PRO.
130 Haig, Diary, 11 May 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/10 PRO.
' Haig, Diary, 4 August 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 12, PRO.
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'imperturbability in the worst situations' as his strong
point, 'was not found out and sent home' until March 1918.132
Some older corps commanders were indeed replaced but
many were able to linger. Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery
noted 'that the real people who were tired were the
commanders behind; Corps Commanders were getting pretty old
by 1917 and few of them knew what went on up in front',
notably Snow (VII Corps) and Hamilton-Gordon (IX Corps) 133
Snow had failed at Gommecourt on 1 July 1916, having made
little effort to reduce casualties for this subsidiary
attack 134 and proved 'quite useless' at the Battle of Arras
where 'he merely told his Divisions to get on with it' and
provided 'no co-ordinated artillery plan' •135 Hamilton
Gordon (IX Corps) always appeared to be 'in his dotage' 136
and in a state of gloom and depression 137 but was not sent




By early 1918 the need for a clearout of Corps
commanders was apparent and Henry Wilson as C.I.G.S. was
very keen on adopting a scheme for 'turning out some of our
senior Generals & starting a flow of promotion' and make it
possible to promote younger men to command of corps and
132 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.1 88, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
B Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 October 1938, C.A.B.45/1 16, PRO.
'' F.H. Walers to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 9 September 1929, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
' Montgomery to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 October 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
136 General Sir William Heneker, Diary, 23 May and 3 June 1917, Heneker Papers, IVTM.
' General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 31 July 1931, C.A.B.45 123, PRO.
138 Field-Marshal Sir Hemy Wilson, Diary, 8 September 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig to his wife, 5 September 1918, Haig Papers 152, NLS.
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divisions.' 40 Most of the Corps Commanders involved in the
German counter-attack at Cambrai 'retired shortly
afterwards', 14' notably Generals Sir William Pulteney, Sir
Thomas Snow and Sir Charles Woolicombe, who were unable to
rise to the occasion showing little enthusiasm for the
operations 142 and were removed along with Generals Sir
Frederick McCracken and Sir Walter Congreve in a purge of
Corps Commanders which took place in early 1918.' 	 Congreve
(VII Corps) suffered from asthma'	 and 'had not really
recovered from having his arm blown off at the SOMME' or his
son's death.' 45 Woollcombe (IV Corps) was 'a first rate
officer' but 'rather old in mind for an active corps in the
field' P146 By late 1918 unsuccessful corps commanders were
quickly removed if unsuccessful, for example, when Rawlinson
said 'that General Butler's arrangements had not met with
his entire satisfaction' Haig 'directed Lawrence to arrange
to relieve the III Corps complete, and to send General
Morland and staff with three fresh divisions, now in G.H.Q.
Reserve to replace it' 147
Although there is no doubt that bad staff work and poor
leadership contributed to the failures of divisions in the
period 1915-17, the clear-out of senior officers was often
° Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 20 February and 7 March 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
141 Major-General C.G. Fuller to Edmonds, 7 January 1945, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
142 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 8, 10 and 15 November 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
143 Haldane, War Diary, 27 February, 12 March, and 22 May 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
' Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 22 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 31, PRO.
145 Major-General J.W. Sandilands to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 August 1923,
C.A.B.45 192, PRO.
146	 .Haig, Diary, 13 and 27 February 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
Haig, Diary, 22 September 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 36, PRO.
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unfair and drastic. Snow (VII Corps) felt that 'the whole
proceeding was most unjust and to be regretted' and,
although the sacked officers were replaced by more
experienced men who had been through the fighting of 1914-
15, this did 'not remove the injustice to those who
suffered' •148 Perhaps one of the most notorious removals was
that of Smith-Dorrien, 'an exceptionally gifted soldier',
from command of the Second Army in May 1915 because Sir John
French, 'a much less able man', disliked him.' 49 Major-
General Sir George Forestier-Walker (21st Division) was also
removed with 'quite unnecessary peremptoriness and
harshness' by his Corps Commander (Fergusson) on the grounds
of his unpopularity with the troops. This seriously damaged
his career as he 'was relegated to the command of a Home
Service division for about a year' and, a1thogh 'he managed
to retrieve the situation to some extent' when commanding a
division in Salonika, he retired immediately after the war
in 1920 as a Major-General.'5°
Perhaps the most interesting example of the necessary
clear out of the 'obsolete & incompetent officers who are
always such a supreme asset to the enemy' 151 occurred on the
Somme in April 1917 when a battalion commander, Colonel F.
Rayner was '"degummed"' by his Brigadier-General E.W.S.K.
Maconchy, who was promptly '"degummed"' by Major-General
148 Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Snow, Memoir: 27th Division Nov 1914 to June 1915, p.25, Snow
Papers 76/79/1, IWM.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.19, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1,
CCC, see also General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 7 May 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
K. Henderson, Memoirs, pp.1 78-179, Henderson Papers DS/MISC 2, IWM.
'' Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his father, 21 January 1916, Fuller Papers W/3 177, LHCMA.
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A.E. Sandbach (59th Division) who was himself '"booted"',
and they 'all travelled on the same cross Channel boat' back
to EnglandJ They were all considered too old for their jobs
(Sandbach was 60, Maconchy was 58 and Rayner 50) and were
'pushed out at the first chance',' 52 as 'the 59th Division
were out new from Home & somewhat inexperienced' •153
In the cases of Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe and
Lieutenant-General Sir John Keir, who were removed from
command of V and VI Corps respectively, Haldane felt that
there were firm military grounds for removing them but that
the arbitrary way in which their replacement was achieved
caused friction and insecurity within the high command.'54
Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe was 'quite ignorant of
how to set about preparing to carry out an operation' 155 but,
although agreeing that Fanshawe lacked 'enough experience to
command a Corps', when sacked in June 1916, Haldane noted
that 'there are other Corps commanders who are in like case'
and survived in their posts.'56
General Sir Aylmer Haldane noted that 'there are
several Generals in our Army who, the moment anything goes
wrong search for a scapegoat' which inevitably led to 'a
general feeling of insecurity' 	 Snow (2 7th Division)
remembered that in 1915 'there was a great epidemic of
stellanbosching' in which the higher commands were
152 Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, p.125, Lee Papers, IWM.
's ian	 L.W. Lewer to Captain Cyril Falls, 10 January 1939, C.A.B.45/1 16, PRO.
' General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June and 7 August 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 22 and 23 June 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10 PRO.
' 56 Halthne War Diary, 6 April and 25 June 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
' 57 Haldane, War Diary, 24 February and 30 June 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
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determined to whitewash themselves for the unsatisfactory
state of affairs by making scapegoats of subordinates, and
many brigadiers were relieved of their commands' •158 For
example, when Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin Alderson
(Canadian Corps), who 'was at best a mediocre general','59
was replaced by Byng many Canadians, notably Currie (1st
Canadian Division), were suspicious that Alderson had been
removed as a result of his involvement in the controversy
about the Ross rifle.'60
Brigadier-General F.M. Carleton (98th Brigade) felt
that he had been 'sacrificed to the ambitions of an
unscrupulous general' 161 when removed from command on the
Somme by Major-General H.J.S. Landon (33rd Division) who
justified Carleton's replacement on the grounds that he
lacked 'quick, practical methods of command, and a cheerful
outlook which will communicate itself to the troops'.'62
Car]on's recent promotion to replace Strickland (promoted
to 1st Division) was an example of how a 'change in command
owing to promotion or casualties often had a marked effect
on the value of a particular unit, and affected the battle'.
Car4on 'although unmistakably a soldier, was a Cavalry man,
and not exactly bursting with knowledge of infantry tactics,
or experience of infantry in action' and as a result of
'friction between 98th Brigade and 33rd Division Hdqts' was
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Snow, Memoir: 27th Division Nov 1914 to June 1915, p.25, Snow
Papers 76/79/1, 1WM.
Daniel G. Dancocks, Sir Arthur Currie: A Biography, p.68.
A.MJ. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography, pp.55-57.
161 Brigadier-General F.M. Carleton to his wife, 28 August 1916, Carleton Papers, 1WM.
162 Major-General H.J.S. Landon to XV Corps, 33rd Division Ri, 28 August 1916, Carleton Papers, IWM.
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sent home 'but fought his case at the House Guards, and won
his case, and later returned to the Front to command another
163brigade'
While some commanders needed to be removed, the "hire
and fire" syndrome, which affected the high command
undoubtedly, had an adverse effect on both the troops and
subordinate commanders. Whether the rapid turn-over of
commanders was ultimately beneficial is debateable. As
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Snow noted, 'throughout the
war it was difficult to know how one's actions would be
viewed by one's superiors' so that 'one was never sure
whether for some particular action one would be promoted or
stellanbosched' 164 As late as October 1917, General Sir
Charles Grant on getting command of a Brigade noted that
'indeed one rises and falls with great rapidity out here -
uneasy in this respect is the humble slave who wears a
165Brigadier's uniform'.
Early in the war corps and divisional commanders froze
into inaction waiting orders from higher command displaying
little initiative and allowing golden opportunities to slip
by. Gough complained that 'a great deal of time was lost,
and many great opportunities lost also because we were so
slow in preparing to meet a new situation' and that
'throughout the army among the senior officers the spirit of
163 Pearson Choate to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 6 April 1936, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Snow, Memoir: 27th Division Nov 1914 to June 1915, p.25, Snow
Papers 76/79/1, IWM.
165 General Sir Charles Grant to the Earl of Rosebery, 31 October 1917, Grant Papers C4 1 2, LHCMA.
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energy, of resolution, & of initiative, was lamentably
under-developed' and 'the value of time was not
recognised' 166 The oft remarked upon ponderousness of so
many British operations may have owed something to the fact
that boldness required commanders to gamble and the prospect
of being sacked inhibited many from doing so.
One Company Commander complained in December 1915 that
initiative was 'asked for, but woe to the man who displays
it'.' 67 Officers worried about the security of their own
jobs were unlikely to be willing to experiment or innovate
for fear of being removed if anything went wrong. Hence the
care shown by some subordinates 'to avoid giving offence to
superiors by hesitation to launch attacks when desired' •168
An example, of how savagely senior officers could object to
'the departure from an order in the presence of the enemy'
was the reaction on the 1 July of Major-General Sir Oliver
Nugent (36th Division), who 'was "Rigid" in so far as the
obedience to	 orders was concerned' and 'kicked up such a
fuss about "disobedience"' threatening one of his officers,
who had been forced to adapt his orders during the battle,
with court martial for '"rank disobedience of orders"' •169
Nugent was also reluctant to stop the hopeless attack of the
107th Brigade on his own responsibility.' 70 Unsurprisingly,
'	 Sir Hubert Gough to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 18 March 1944, C.A.B.45 140,
PRO.
167 Major C.C. May, Diary, 13 December 1915, May Papers, IWM.
168 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Colonel C. Allanson, 19 August 1937, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1937 69,
LHCMA.
'69 Bngadier .General F.P. Crozier to Edmonds, 23 March 1930, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
170 Captain Cyril Falls to Liddell Hart, 22 August 1964, Liddell Hart Papers 1 276 60, LHCMA.
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a lack of initiative at all levels was a persistent British
weakness.
Under intense pressure to conform many officers while
showing great physical courage demonstrated little moral
courage in the face of bullying by their seniors. Snow (VII
Corps) was accused of being 'more frightened of G.H.Q. than
he was of the enemy'	 One impatient, staff officer
concluded that too many generals were far more 'terrified of
their own rules and regulations' than they were 'of the
Germans; or of losing the war, or getting uselessly killed
many thousand men' •172 General Sir Havelock Hudson, whose
8th Division lost 'more than half his whole force' on 1 July
1916, was 'such a nice little man & very quick & sensible'
but while he was 'quick enough to see what was going to go
wrong' he had 'not quite enough personality to be
insubordinate & refuse' pressure from above.' 73 With quick
decisions and prompt response essential in modern battle for
success time was wasted in deciding the next move at every
step and the resulting failure was inevitable.
Junior commanders were often placed in a cleft stick
when given orders by seniors to make unsuitable assaults.
Having 'no confidence in the plan' to attack the main
Hindenburg Line in June 1917, Freyberg (173rd Brigade) went
to see Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe (58th Division)
171 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with General Edmonds - United Services Club - 22 April 1937, 23 April
1937, Liddell Hart Papers 111937 30, LHCMA.
172 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 18 August 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3/1 88, LHCMA.
' Howell to his wife, 3 July [1916], Howell Papers IV C 3 188, LHCMA.
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'prepared to refuse to do it' aware that, although it was
'the duty of the commander to refuse to commit his men to a
bad plan', if he did refuse, he would be sent home and
another officer would be brought in at the last minute
ignorant of the ground and the men. Freyberg remained at
his post but the attack, as predicted, was 'a complete
failure' with heavy losses.'74 By the period 1917-18 the
learning process was less fraught and the problem of
scapegoating diminished as the incompetent commanders at all
levels were removed and replaced.
By 1918 commanders had learnt to stand up for
themselves. Colonel C.R.C. de Crespigny (1st Guards
Brigade) expressed contempt for any senior officer and
showed little respect for generals and the higher command.'75
'Uncle' Harper (51st Division) was harshly intolerant of
G.H.Q. and of the orders that emanated from there.' 76 Such
officers were quite capable of standing up to bullying
senior officers in 1917 and 1918 and to resisting undue
pressure from above. A mature and experienced commander
knew how to handle the tactical situation himself after
ascertaining the facts on the ground and not to permit
interference from any quarter.
The personality of its commander was immensely
important in the performance of a division. Haig considered
174 Bernard Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter V, pp.16-18, C.A.B.45 208, PRO.
175 Harold Macmillan, Winds of Change, 1914-1939, p.79; Oliver Lyttleton, Viscount Chandos, The
Memoirs of Lord Chandos, p.4!.
176 Philip Gibbs, The Pageant of The Years, pp.190-19!.
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that 'much also depends on the fighting spirit of the G.O.C.
Division' since 'the division is our real battle unit' and
divisional commanders had to be 'able to inspire the unit
with their own personal energy and fighting spirit' •177
Haig believed that Divisional commanders should 'be able to
inspire the unit with their own personal energy and fighting
spirit' 178 Hull was 'full of energy, dash and ambition"79
and 'made the [56th] Division what it was' showing 'the
extent to which the personality of the Divisional Commander
permeates through a division'.' 80 Lord Cavan (XIV Corps)
'spoke in high terms of Major-Gen[eral] Douglas Smith
commanding 20th Division' which had become 'quite a
different force' since his appointment.' 81 Haig felt the
improvement in the 33rd Division after the replacement its
commander of Landon with Pinney proved how the performance
of a Division depended on the qualities and spirit of the
182
commander.
In contrast Haig noted that the 40th Division was 'a
poor division' under Major-General Sir Harold Ruggles-
Brise.' 83 Sir Charles Fergusson (XVII Corps) claimed that
under the 'mediocre' Reed the 15th Division had slipped
'from 1st to 3rd class' whereas, by contrast, Blacklock, 'a
first rate commander', had made the 63rd Division 'one of
177 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 27 October and 7 November 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 6, PRO.
178 Haig, Diary, 7 November 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.25616, PRO.
179 Brigadier-General Frank Lyon to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 June 1929, C.A.B.45/135,
PRO.
'° R Shoollred to Edmonds, 11 June 1929, C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
181 Haig, Diary, 23 June 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10 PRO.
182 Haig, Diary, 27 October 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
183 Haig, Diary, 24 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/17, PRO.
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the finest' •184 According to Haig, Matheson, 'whose company
was judged the best at company training before the war at
Aldershot', had 'made the 4th Division into one of the best
in the army' 185 while Sir Edward Fanshawe considered that
the 3rd Division 'under Deverell was one of the best trained
that ever came into the V Corps' •186 Worn out and performing
poorly on the 1 July 1916, the 8th Division, which had been
commanded 'damned badly' by his predecessor,' 87 'improved
beyond all recognition' under Major-General (later General
Sir William) Heneker,' 88 who 'greatly improved' the division,
which had been 'allowed to become sleepy' 189 and its esprit-
de-corps 'at rather a low ebb owing to a series of
unsuccessful attacks', and 'soon put our tails up' •190
To be effective the British Army had to promote rapidly
those officers with outstanding managerial skills and
technical expertise. Throughout the war but especially in
1917-18 the British Army was able to produce some highly
competent corps commanders, who vied for accolades, notably
the Earl of Cavan (Guards Division and XIV Corps), 'an
exceptionally highly gifted commander' 191 and rated the best
192Corps Commander in France; 	 Jacob (II Corps), a 'first-
Sir Charles Fergusson to General Lord Home, 10 October 1918, Home Papers 73 60/2, IWM.
' Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 20 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 31, PRO.
'Lieutenant-Genera1 Sir Edward Fanshawe to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 November 1936,
C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
' 87 General Sir William Heneker, Diary, 20 August 1917, Heneker Papers, IWM.
A.A. Hanbury-Sparrow to Edmonds, undated, C.A.B.45/134, PRO.
189 Haig, Diary, 4 March 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/16, PRO.
'90 G.F. Richards to Edrnonds, 20 April 1936, C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
'' General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.21, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
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rate' 193 and 'most efficient general'; 194 de Lisle (XV Corps)
'one of the best Corps Comdrs.';' 95 Morland (X and XIII
Corps) 'one of our best'; 196 and Watts (XIX Corps) 'a born
leader of infinite courage and coolness in action', 1" who
'had the name of knowing better than anyone exactly how much
you could ask our infantry to do' •198 One staff officer felt
that 'except for Lord Cavan, Home and Congreve were about
the two best Corps Commanders in France' and that Jacob
inspired 'great confidence in his capacity' •199
At Divisional level the Army also produced energetic
and efficient officers such as Major-General C.A. Blacklock
(63rd Division) who was 'thorough, and quite a first-rate
commander'; 20° Bethell (66th Division) 'a wonderful fighting
soldier'; 201 Major-General Hon. W. Lambton (4th Division) 'a
wonder', 202 who was 'full of brains and energy'; 203 and Major-
General Sir ameThr Nicholson (34th Division) whose
behaviour during the Battle of Lys in April 1918 was
'magnificent' •204 Haldane concluded that Deverell (3rd
Division), Hickie (16th Division), and Shute (32nd Division)
'were the 3 best divisional commanders who served under me
Field-Marshal Earl Haig Haig, Diary, 9 September 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.25615, PRO and Brigadier-
General P. Howell to Sir Montague Turner, 7 July 1916, Howell Papers IVIC/2/233, LHCMA.
' General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.31, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
' Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1918, p.36, RAI.
' Howell to his wife, 20 June 1916, Howell Papers IV/C/3 303, LHCMA.
197 Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VIII, pp.1 -2, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC.
' Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Fanshawe to Edrnonds, 29 June 1935, C.A.B.45/123, PRO.
' Brigadier Sir Edward Beddington, Memoir, p.92, Beddington Papers, LHCMA.
200 Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Fergusson to General Lord Home, 10 October 1918, Home Papers
73/60/2, 1WM.
20t Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Macready, In The Wake of The Great, p.25.
202 General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 4 July 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
203 Kirke to his wife, 10 July 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
204	 Sir Walter Constable-Maxwell-Scott to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14
February 1933, C.A.B.45 124, PRO.
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in the war' 205 while General Sir George Harper made the 51st
Division into 'one of the two or three best divisions in
206France'.
Moreover, a cadre of competent leaders was slowly built
up during the war and by 1917-18 the leadership required to
win victory was developed. By 1918 generals such as Major-
General T.O. Marden (6th Division) 'a man of restless
energy, and a first-class Regimental officer, with an
exceptional knowledge of detail' who left no one 'in any
doubt who commanded the division', 207 and Major-General
Edward Feetham (39th Division), killed in action in March
1918 and described by a fellow officer from the Berkshire
Regiment as 'a very fine Regimental officer of the best
type' who 'had seen much service in the Sudan and S.
Africa', 208 were far more typical of the very best type of
British general than the old-fashioned stereotypes of lazy
aristocrats and unthinking martinets.
205 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 10 April 1918, Haldane Papers Acc.20250, NLS.
Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S.82, 27 September 1917, Maxse
Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
207 Colonel T.T. Grove, Memoir, p.48, Grove Papers 6308-14, NAM.




The Army's Over-ambitious Decision-making
For much of the war the excessive optimism, not just a
British phenomenon, was a psychological barrier to a
realistic vision of the war making it difficult for the
British to assess accurately the German Army and to adjust
to an unfamiliar continental warfare. The British high
command's great strength, its tremendous self-belief in
refusing '"to conclude that by the rules of the game we were
beaten"' 1 was a two-edged sword.	 The hierarchy's ethos
expressed in the motto '"We'll do it. What is it?"',2
demanding 'the necessary enthusiasm, and the relentless
offensive spirit, which pursues its object with dogged
determination till it is achieved', 3 was a powerful asset in
keeping the Army going, when the other armies of 1914 all
succumbed to mutinies.
Most officers agreed with the sentiment that 'no matter
what happens, this war has got to be won for once & for all
even if it takes years to do it'. 4 But this faith in
victory too often degenerated in the early years of the war
into a fatal lack of realism within the hierarchy, termed
'Field Marshal the Earl of Cavan to Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 4 April 1928, Liddell Hart Papers
1155 1, LHCMA.
2 Lieutenant General Sir Tom Bridges, Alarms and Excursions: Reminiscences of a Soldier, p.73.
Brigadier-General J.P. Du Cane, B.G.G.S. III Corps, to 4th Division, III Corps G.340, 13 January 1915,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 38, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General C.R. Woodroffe, Diary, 20 October 1914, Woodroffe Papers, IWM.
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variously as 'the cult of optimism', 5 'the "Cavalry
Spirit"', 6 and the 'offensive spirit'; 7 an unthinking
assumption that the Germans 'must steadily & obviously go
down hill: unless the Allies become very stupid or rash'
which was echoed by many officers.8
More damaging still was the way in which a realistic
review of planning was impeded by over-optimism. Prior to
the Battle of Neuve Chapelle General Sir Horace Smith-
Dorrien thought that the war would be over in March l9l5.
Although understandable in the first year of the war, such
over-optimism was demonstrably unrealistic by 1917. Full of
exhilaration, the British Army rushed headlong into over-
ambitious offensives during the period of 1915-17. The
'undue optimism of the higher command was one of the direct
causes of failure'.'0
The planning process was 'too ambitious' with the
result that 'in nearly every major operation in France the
irrepressible optimism of the Higher Formations carried on
the offensive beyond the point when from a balance sheet
point of view, it had ceased to show a profit' because 'they
never knew when to take their profit and stop' 	 Only an
'unimaginative cult of the "offensive spirit"', which 'led
Comments on Loos Draft by Brigadier-General C.G. Stewart, 19 January 1926, CAB45/1 21, PRO.
6 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 3 March 1915, 24 February 1916, and 13 June 1916, Haldane
Papers Acc.20248 and 20249, NLS; General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 26 August 1914, Milward Papers
65 10-143-1, NAM.
Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, p.107.
8 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his uncle, Sir Montague Turner, 7 July 1916, H.Q. H Corps, Howell
Papers N/C 2 233, and Howell to his wife on 4 July 1916, Howell Papers IV C/3 311, LHCMA.
9 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Diary, 15 March 1915, Haldane Papers, Mss 20248, NLS.
Note by Colonel E.R. Clayton, undated, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
J.L. Weston to Captain C. FaIls, 21 July 1937, C.A.B.45/1 16, PRO.
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to a disregard of the technique of stationary warfare',
could explain 'this delusion about the "War of Attrition"
and the bull-headed persistence in counting territorial
gains of a thousand yards as worth any sacrifice of
lives' 12
In particular, the overconfidence of the high command
manifested itself in an underestimation of the supreme
importance of secrecy and surprise for modern operations.
Attempts to mislead the Germans in 1915-17 failed miserably
given the all too obvious offensive preparations and poor
security. The attack at Loos on 25 September 1915 was
common knowledge not only in London but also to the enemy,'3
while during the St Eloi attack in March 1916 one Divisional
commander found that his operation was 'a general subject of
talk'	 In April 1916 the D.A.A. & Q.M.G, 3rd Division was
sacked for writing home that the British attack would be
from Arras to the Somme.' 5 Surprise prior to 1 July 1916
'was non existent' and the 'lack of secrecy or any effort to
mislead' was one of 'the causes of this disaster' •16 The
British attack at Ypres in 1917 was an open secret ' and one
corps commander complained that a young staff officer at
12 Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, p.107.
Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 27 September 1915, Game Papers PWG 8, IWM, and
Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoir, p.11 8, Archibald Papers, IWM.
' General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 19 March 1916, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 April 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
16 Brigadier-General H.C. Rees to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 14 November 1929,
C.A.B.45 137 PRO.
' Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 27 July 1917,
Kiggell Papers IV/7, LHCMA.
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G.H.Q. had actually informed his A.]J.C. about 'the big push
up north to break the line'
Translations of German battle reports showed that the
massive build up for the 1 July 1916, which gave numerous
'indications of an impending attack' to the enemy,' 9
 was
spotted by German aeroplanes as early as February 1916.20 At
Beaumont Hamel the 'want of surprise' was 'the main cause of
our failure' as 'the Hun must have known for weeks that an
attack was pending' because 'our Artillery had been
endeavouring to cut his wire' •21 On the Somme lengthy
preparations made concealment very difficult as there were
'masses of transport and men moving about in daylight, many
in full view of the enemy' and the mass of guns made
concealment 'out of the question'. 22 Similar lengthy
bombardments prior to the Battles of Loos, Arras, Messines,
and Ypres made sure that the element of surprise was
'completely lost'. 23 In January 1918, Lawrence bluntly
concluded that 'hitherto, with the exception of the CAMBRAI
operations, every intended offensive has become known to the
enemy before it developed owing to changes in the
organization, command, grouping and distribution of the
18 Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Kavanagh to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 11 May 1917,
Kiggell Papers IV 105, LHCMA.
19 S.S. 544, Experiences of the Recent Fighting At Verdun, Berlin, 25 December 1916, G.H.Q., 28 February
p1917, Montgomery-Mass ingberd Papers 95, LHCMA.
2 S.S.553, Experience of the German 1st Army in the Somme Battle, 24 June-26 November 1916, General
von Below, 30 January 1917, G.H.Q., 3 May 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 95, LHCMA.
21 F.A. Wilson to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 17 June 1930, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
22 Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hutton, War Diary: Battle of the Somme, p.6, Hutton Papers, LHCMA.
Major-General S.C.M. Archibald, Memoir, p.1 18, Archibald Papers, IWM.
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forces to be employed' 24
Rawlinson was in no doubt that the 'very large number
of casualties' in 1915 had been the result of 'faulty
tactics and a misconception of the strength and resisting
power of the enemy bred of a persistent optimism at G.H.Q.'
rather than any shortage of shells. 25 For example, before
the Battle of Loos in September 1915, 'everyone was too
optimistic', 2 ' notably Haking (XI Corps) who assured his
troops that once the German line had been broken there would
be no resistance, 27 giving Regimental officers the
'altogether misleading' impression 28 that there would be
'very little opposition' 29 and that the enemy was badly
defeated, which was 'a most regrettable travesty of the real
30facts'
Similarly before the Battle of the Somme the high
command was so 'misled by a faulty optimism' 31 that 'the
whole plan of attack did not allow for any failure' 32
Prior to 1 July 1916 VIII Corps (Hunter-Weston) 'were
24 General Sir Herbert Lawrence, The Influence of Increased Strength on German Intentions during 1918,
1a143614, 1 January 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
General Lord R.awlinson to Lieutenant-Colonel O.A.G. FitzGerald, 24 May 1915, Kitchener Papers
WB 21B, PRO 30 57.
26	 of letter from Colonel G. Crossman, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
27 Lieutenant-Colonel Rowland Feuding to his wife, 16 September 1915, War Letters to a Wife, p37.
28 Colonel C.G. Stewart to Major A.F. Becke, 3 August 1925, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
Copy of letter from Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.G. Rainsford, 14 March 1926, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
3° Comments by Brigadier-General R.M. Ovens, 3 February 1926, C.A.B.45/12l, PRO.
Lieutenant-Colonel C.R. Simonds to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 3 February 1930,
C.A.B.45/1 37, PRO.
32 Lieutenant-Colonel John L. Hartley to Edmonds, 5 November 1929, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
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saturated with optimism over-emphasising the effect of the
preliminary bombardment' .	 Hunter-Weston 'was extremely
optimistic telling everybody that the wire had been blown
away' although they 'could see it standing strong & well'
and that all they 'had to do was to walk into Serre',34
announcing that the enemy's front line trenches would '"be
blown to pieces"'. 35 The subsidiary assault on Gommecourt
by VII Corps 'inspired with unusual optimism' 36 and was
marred 'by the unwarranted optimism of the higher commands
for an attack that never had any possible chance of being a
success'	 General Gough 'became more and more optimistic
as the day of the battle grew near' 38 Haig believed that
'all the Corps Commanders' were 'full of confidence'
Even after the 1 July 1916 commanders such as Gough
(Fifth Army) who was 'ultro optimistic' 40 promoting 'far
reaching' plans, 4 ' and Haking (XI Corps), who 'was most
optimistic' 42 and had no doubts that the Germans on the
Somme being 'very tired, confused & rather demoralized' were
'in a bad way'	 remained unrealistic in their aims. This
'undue optimism was one of the direct causes of failure' for
XI Corps at Fromelles. 44 Similarly, one battalion attack on
Ian Grant to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 October 1929, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
' Charles Howard to Edmonds, 6 November 1929, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
Major J. Collis Browne to Edmonds, 12 November 1929, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
36 Colonel L.A.C. Southam to Edmonds, 3 July 1929, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
E.J. Snalding to Edmonds, 20 July [?1929}, C.A.B.45/137, PRO.
0G. Wynne to Edinonds, 11 July 1930, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 29. 29 and 30 June 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/10, PRO.
° Brigadier-General P. Howell, Pocket Diary, 6 July 1916, Howell Papers IVID 13, LHCMA.
4° Howell, Pocket Diary, 14 September 1916, Howell Papers WID 13, LHCMA.
42 General C.A. Milward, 22 June 1916, War Diary, Vol.111, Milward Papers, 65 10-143-5, NAM.
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the Somme in August 1916 failed with heavy losses 'largely
due to over optimistic reports about German moral' which
lulled the troops, who had 'expected a sitter', into a false
sense of confidence
Despite the bitter experiences of 1916 over-optimism
continued buoyed up by success in early 1917. Before the
Third Battle of Ypres, Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob (II
Corps) addressing the officers of 25th Division 'talked the
most arrant nonsense' concerning the plans of the Fifth Army
'to drive the Germans right out of Belgium'. 46 In late 1917
Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell (3rd Division) was still
'very optimistic' thinking that 'the Germans are beaten and
that the war may finish this year' 	 Failure at Cambrai in
November 1917 was caused by 'too great optimism in the
higher command', 48 which meant that 'the fighting power and
morale of the German Army were higher than expected'
The official spirit was one of optimism. G.H.Q.
stressed 'the great importance of a real spirit of
determination being instilled constantly into regimental
officers and men by all corps, Divisional, and Brigade
Commanders' .o In training officers and N.C.O.s, senior
officers especially valued 'a cheerful countenance' and
emphasised the importance of being optimistic and
Brigadier-General P. Howell, Diary, 28 August 1916, Howell Papers IV/D/1 3, LHCMA.
Brian Bond and Simon Robbins, Staff Officer: The Diaries of Lord Moyne, 1914-1918, 23 July 1917,
p.162.
General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Diary, 8 October 1917, Haldane Papers, Mss 20249, NLS.
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enthusiastic at all times in order to foster the moral and
Esprit de Corps of the Army. 5' Visiting G.H.Q. in late 1916
one officer found that 'it is a relief to hear people speak
optimistically again after the way everyone at home is
convinced that the war will last 5 years and that then we
shall be beaten' •52 One division on the Somme in 1916
emphasised 'the importance of officers maintaining a
cheerful attitude in dealing with their subordinates, even
under distressing circumstances' 	 while one divisional
commander spoke to subordinates 'about keeping cheerful
instead of moaning about bad conditions which were made
worse thereby'	 At a local, regimental level raids were
encouraged by the high command as a means 'of inculcating
the offensive spirit into young troops and of giving them
the moral superiority over the enemy that is so essential
whether in offensive or defensive warfare'	 Corps
commanders such as Birdwood tried 'to inculcate a real
spirit of offensive' among his men.56
Pessimism was frowned upon since it was believed that
'a staff officer who allows a difficult task to depress him
is useless'	 Commanders like Pinney tended also to look
Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish, The Maxims of the late Field-Marshal Viscount Wolseley and the
Addresses on Leadership, Esprit de Corps & Moral, Gale & Polden, 1917, pp.3 1-32.
52 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Game to his wife, 4 December 1916, Game Papers PWG 14, IWM.
" Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Johnson, Notes on the Recent Operations - 2nd Phase: 20th - 30th July 1916,
19th Division, September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 8 November 1916, Pinney Papers, IWM.
Policy on the Anny Front for 1918, Fourth Army No. 161 (G), Section III, 30 January 1918,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 61, LHCMA.
56 Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood to Colonel D. Rintoul, 23 July 1916, Birdwood Papers WRB 1, IWM.
" General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VI, pp.6-7, Bonharn-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
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down on anyone they thought was 'a pessimist' •58 Few were
immune to this ethos and even realistic commanders, like
Haldane, tended to be critical of officers such as Hamilton-
Gordon, XI Corps ('the most melancholy-looking individual I
know'), or Lieutenant-Colonel E.R. Clayton, G.S.O.l, 2nd
Division ('a doeful-looking customer'), who did not project
the image of being 'a great thruster' such as Shute or 'full
of energy and ideas' like de Lisle. 59 In mid-1915 Philip
Howell, 'an exceptionally brilliant officer' who 'had been
largely responsible for the success achieved by the II
Corps' on the Somme in 1916,60 was called 'the most
mischievous pessimist in France' by Major-General Sir
Frederic Glubb (Chief Engineer, Second Army) and warned by
Major-General Sir Robert Montgomery (C.R.A., Third Army)
that 'by being so awfully pessimistic' he was doing himself
'a lot of harm at G.H.Q.' and that to save his career he
'must cheer up' •61
Those officers who did not follow "the party line"
found their career jeopardised, reinforcing the tendency in
other officers to tell their superiors what they wanted to
hear. Haldane was warned by Major-General H.B. Williams
(M.G.G.S., Second Army) 'not to show my disapproval of what
is proposed and not to do otherwise than advocate what is
58 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 21 September 1918, Pinney Papers, IWM.
" General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 21 June 1916, 24 August 1918, 10 April 1918, 2 June 1917,
Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
60 Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Nosworthy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 July 1935,
C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
61 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 18 and 19 July 1915, Howell Papers 1V C 2/195-196, LHCMA.
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proposed! ,62 Allenby (V Corps) moved Lieutenant-Colonel
Cuthbert Evans (G.S.O.1, 3rd Division) back to regimental
duties in 1915 because he was pessimistic and made
difficulties. 63 In 1916 Brigadier-General John Charteris
(B.G.I., G.H.Q.) informed Haig that Sir Henry Wilson (IV
Corps) was pessimistic and should be removed when he
questioned the prevailing optimism, stressing that
subordinates 'in constant touch with the Germans' knew 'very
well what fine soldiers they were'. 64 Divisional commanders
such as General Sir Peter Strickland who had 'not written
very cheerful letters' worried that they would be in
'trouble' if the censor read them. 65 Nearly sent home in
March 1918 when the censor read a despondent letter to his
wife, Brigadier-General C.H. Rankin was saved by the
intervention of Kavanagh (Cavalry Corps) 66
Conversely, commanders were pressurised into attacking
despite unsuitable conditions and 'it was common talk that
no Div[ision] C.O. dared say his infantry were unfit to
attack for [fear of] being sent home' 67 When Furse and
Tudor (G.O.C. and C.R.A. of 9th Division) suggested in July
1916 that 'it was sheer waste of life to advance further,
until a general advance of the whole army was made' this
62 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 22 August 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
63 Brigadier-General Cuthbert Evans to Haldane, 13 August 1915; Haldane, War Diary, 16 and 31 June
1915; 1-3, 8 and 12 August 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
64 Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Belgrave to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 20 February 1929; Major-
General H.D. de Pree to Edinonds, 20 January 1929; and General Sir Charles Deedes to Edmonds, 21
January 1929, CAB45 139, PRO.
65 General Sir Peter Strickland, Diary, 5-11 March 1916, Strickland Papers, IWM.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig to General Sir George Greaves, 12 March 1918, Haig Papers Acc.3 155, No.147,
NLS.
67 F. Wilson to Edmonds, 26 October 1936, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
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advice 'was not well received' 68 In the spring of 1917
Lieutenant-General R.G. Broadwood (57th Division) was
reported for 'lack of fighting spirit' by his Corps
commander (Haking) because he tried to prevent the loss of
lives in unprofitable attacks by his troops.69
In a climate where 'a lack of realism and an excessive
optimism' prevailed Brigadiers, 'naturally anxious about
their own professional careers, were reluctant to challenge'
senior decisions 70 and for many officers, knowing that
'optimism pays in the way of promotion' to declare that 'we
can break through the German line whenever we want to; that
the Boches are absolutely in extremis' and that 'very soon
we'll be in Berlin; that every thing we do is perfect'
There was a tendency for the higher command to be 'sceptical
of reports received from Battalions, Brigades and
Divisions', 72 which contradicted their optimism and for
Divisions to discount the value of much of the information
coming from Battalions and Brigades because of the junior
ranks of their Intelligence Officers.73
Macdonogh complained that the Operations Section at
G.H.Q. 'cooked or suppressed' intelligence to suit their own
'preconceived notions' and 'systematically concealed'
Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 2 December 1933,
C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
69 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Colonel C. Allanson, 19 August 1937, Liddell Hart Papers, 11/1937 69,
LHCMA.
70 Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few, p.107.
71 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 19 July 1915, Howell Papers IV C/2 196, LHCMA.
72 E. Wough Flanagan to Edmonds, 19 December 1934, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
L. Green to Edmonds, 1 August 1936, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
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information from him in 19l4. 	 Cavan (XIV Corps) concluded
that the opinions of Corps Commanders on the Somme in 1916
'should have carried more weight' and that the advances of
October and November should never have been attempted given
the poor ground conditions. 75 Those who prophesied bad
news, such as a German attack on Vimy Ridge in May 1916 or a
German counter-attack at Cambrai in November 1917, were told
by their seniors that they had got 'the "wind up"'.76
The hierarchy's over-confidence created a situation in
which too many senior officers were out of touch both
physically and mentally with their subordinates. From 1916
G.H.Q. were considered 'wholly inaccessible' and 'useless as
guides, philosophers or friends' because of its 'complete
isolation & therefore ignorance of what is going on' .
Although his staff stressed that 'he talked to numerous
Regimental Officers, and saw and discussed affairs regularly
with Battalion commanders and Brigade and Division
commanders', 78 Haig was seen by his critics as being 'quite
out of touch with the whole Army & even with his own
Staff', 79 living 'an isolated life completely out of touch
with his Corps generals and with the feeling of the Army';
Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 22 November
1922, C.A.B.45/141, PRO.
Field-Marshal Earl Cavan to Edmonds, 9 April 1936, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
76 G.C.S. Hodgson to Edmonds, 14 January 1928; General Sir Thomas Snow to General Sir Hugh
Jeudwine, 5 February 1923, Jeudwine Papers 72 82/2, IWM; see also General Sir Ronald Charles to
Edmonds, 14 January 1929, C.A.B.45 139, PRO.
77 .	
78 
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 9 and 13 November 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
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seeing and entertaining nobody. 8° When attending periodical
conferences with Army Commanders, Haig and his personal
staff 'always brought their lunch with them and seldom if
ever lunched at Army Headquarters' 81 limiting the chances
for informal discussion. During the Battle of Ypres in 1917
Haig isolated himself on his private train with Kiggell and
one staff officer and a few A.D.C.s 82
None of Haig's senior staff, including Major-General
Sir John Davidson (B.G.0) and Lieutenant-General Sir
83Launcelot Kiggell (C.G.S.), ever went to the front. 	 Of
Kiggell one Brigadier-General remembered that 'we used to
say on the Somme that he never ventured S. of Amiens: no
doubt a gross libel' 84 Kiggell 'had not the slightest idea
of the local conditions' 85 and when he did finally visit
the front at Passchendaele after the battle he was shocked
by the conditions and burst into tears. 86 Davidson's
Operations Staff tended to remain in their offices instead
of visiting Corps and Divisional H.Q. where they could have
learnt much.87
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Burnett-Stuart felt that 'several of the senior
officers had been there so long that they developed an
inferiority complex vis-à-vis the forward troops, and were
shy of visiting them'. 88 Tandy (G.S.O.l, Operations)
admitted that his knowledge of the front-line 'never
consisted of more than that gleaned from official reports
and telegrams from Armies, plus secondhand word pictures
from Liaison Officers at the time' •89 When General Sir
Charles Bonham-Carter arrived as Director of Training, he
'was horrified by the lack of knowledge at G.H.Q. of the
conditions under which the fighting in the Ypres Salient was
being carried out' • 90
Henry Wilson, not an impartial observer, believed that
Haig and his staff 'are completely out of touch with the
Army' owing 'chiefly to the fact Robertson & Haig abolished
my system of Liaison', 91 which kept G.H.Q. informed of
conditions at the front, when armies were introduced in
early 1915.92 During the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in March
1915 a gap between the Meerut and 8th Divisions was
unreported owing 'to faulty liaison work' between the Corps
and the First Army because experienced officers such as Hugh
Dawnay, Lord Loch, Frank Lyon, 'Mary' Price-Davies, and
Jimmy Shea who had kept G.H.Q. in touch with the front in
General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoir, p.80, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
89 Brigadier-General E.N. Tandy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 4 December 1944,
C.A.B.45 118 PRO.
° General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.5-6, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2,
CCC.
91 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 24 December 1917 Wilson Papers, IWM.
92	 .	 .Major-General Sir Fredenck Maunce to his wife, 19 January 1915, Maunce Papers 3/1 4/70, LHCMA.
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1914 had been 'replaced by quite inferior men, not p.s.c.',
who were 'told nothing & know nothing & therefore are no
use' 93
In 1916 'the importance of getting touch between G.H.Q.
and Corps by means of first class liaison officers' was
ignored by Haig. 94 The Operations Staff under Davidson 'did
not make proper use of the means at their disposal for
keeping in close touch with the formations and units in
front'. 95 Whereas close liaison could have allowed G.H.Q.
'to get first hand information' of the situation at the
front and to 'have heard the opinion of the troops',96
liaison officers tended to visit formations rather than the
front itself	 and, as junior officers, could not override
senior staff off icers. 98	Colonel E.M. Birch (G.S.O.1,
Fifth Army) remarked 'woe betide him who so much as hinted'
to G.H.Q. liaison officers in 1917 that mistakes were
continuing in 'a repetition of the early days of the Somme
fighting'	 At the time of Passchendaele and during the
Battle of Cambrai, G.H.Q. 'had not been sufficiently well
informed of conditions at the front' 100
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 6 and 14 March 1915 Wilson Papers, IWM.
Wilson, Diary, 1 September 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.5-6, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2,
CCC.
Colonel A.C. Jeffcoat to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 3 August 1937, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
Report by Major Gort to B.G.O. re 17 Division, 3 November 1916, W.O.l58 235, PRO; Brigadier-
General P. Howell, Diary, 19, 23 and 25 September 1916, Howell Papers IV/D 12, LHCMA.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, 12 December 1935, Liddell Hart
Papers 111935 114; Talk with Major-General C.C. Armitage, 15 May 1936, Liddell Hart Papers
111936 62; Talk with Sir Edward Gngg, 15 May 1936, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1936 63, LHCMA.
Colonel E.M. Birch to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 September 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
'°°	 E.G. Miles to 2nd Earl Haig, 28 November 1957, Haig Papers 347/1, NLS.
206
Effective liaison between G.H.Q. and 'the sharp-end'
was re-introduced by Dill at the end of 1917 when staff
officers with first-hand experience of the front and
conditions at the front were appointed to the Operations
Branch of G.H.Q. 101 '"to maintain a closer liaison between
G.H.Q. and the troops in the line"'. 102 At last G.H.Q. was
able to link planning with first-hand information of the
actual situation.'°3 The liaison officers in 1918 'were
carefully chosen and exceptionally able young officers' who
visited 'the most forward troops' and returned 'to G.H.Q.
quickly with valuable information which would not have
reached the C-in-C through ordinary channels for some
time','°4 bringing G.H.Q. 'in much closer touch with forward
formations' during 1918.105
Haldane commented in March 1918 that VI Corps were
'visited much more frequently by S.O's from G.H.Q. than
formerly' 106 One liaison officer travelled by aeroplane to
IX Corps on the Aisne and reported back to Haig. 107 Liaison
officers "short circuited" the long chain of command from
brigade to G.H.Q. by visiting the front 'to get the
101 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with [Major-General] J.F.C. Fuller, 1 October 1929, Liddell Hart Papers
11/1929/16, LHCMA.
Major-General E.G. Miles to 2nd Earl Haig, 28 November 1957, Haig Papers 347/1, NLS Acc.3 155.
Colonel B.C.T. Paget to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 15 November 1936, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1936 105;
Sir Edward Gngg to Liddell Hart, 15 May 1936, Liddell Hart Papers 111936 63; Major-General C.C.
Annitage to Liddell Hart, 15 May 1936, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1936 62; Field-Marshal Lord Gort to
Liddell Hart, 14 May 1936, Liddell Hart Papers 111936 61; Brigadier [D.F.] Anderson to Liddell Hart,
13 and 14 May 1936, Liddell Hart Papers 111936 60 and 152 6; Liddell Hart, Talk with General Sir
Charles Bonham-Carter, 12 December 1935, Liddell Hart Papers 111935 114; Talk with J.F.C. Fuller on
1 October 1929, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1929 Ib; General Su Ivor Maxse to Liddell Hart, Diary Notes, 10
February 1928, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1928 ib, LHCMA.
'° General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter VII, p.1 7-18, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1, CCC.
105 Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter IX, p.13, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
lo6 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 11 March 1918, Haldane Papers Acc.20250, NLS.
107 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 28 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
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"atmosphere" of the fighting troops' and 'to "feel the
pulse" of the whole great machine' taking 'the latest
information' and 'a general view of the whole trend of the
battle back to the C.-in-C. the same evening'.'08
A common complaint after the war was that senior
commanders did not visit the front. In 1916 Fifth Army
staff 'had simply no conception of the conditions in the
forward area' and were 'blissfully unconscious, living as
they did, in a substantial chateau several miles behind the
line' •b09 One regimental officer remarked that 'the Army or
anyhow the Corps Commander at whatever risk ought
occasionally to have come right up into the front line and
seen the conditions for himself' and 'many of us felt that
those responsible for the issuing of operation orders were
out of touch with the real conditions under which the troops
were to attack' 110
Another noted that 'I don't think the higher command
quite realized the conditions under which the front line
troops were existing'	 As a result the 'higher leadership
was sadly lacking in ability to cope with the changing
conditions of the campaign' and that 'the instructions
issued by higher authority hardly met the arduous conditions
under which the troops were ordered to endure or to
attack' h12 Haldane (VI Corps) concluded that 'half the
los Lieutenant-General A.N. Floyer-Acland, The Journal of Arthur Nugent Floyer, p.95, Floyer-Acland
Papers, IWM.
'° General Lord Jefferies to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 October 1936, C.A.B.45 135, PRO.
° E. Wough Flanagan to Edmonds, 19 December 1934, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
Major K.B. Godsell to Edmonds, 13 October 1936, C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
Brigadier-General W. Robertson to Edmonds, 15 July [?1930], C.A.B.45 137, PRO.
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trouble during the war arose from senior commanders knowing
nothing of the conditions at the front'.113
The custom of not leaving headquarters during
operations was common at divisional and even Brigade
level."4 One officer who commanded a Company, Battalion and
Brigade, complained that 'many C.O.'s buried themselves in a
Deep Dug-out & proceeded to write endless orders without
keeping personal touch with their Batt.' although there were
brigade commanders, such as Bernard Freyberg, who 'was a
brilliant exception'," 5 and Frank Maxwell, who was often
'personally in no-man's-land seeing the alignment of troops
for attack' 116 One reason why senior officers did not visit
the front from 1915 was a wish to preserve the lives of the
limited numbers of trained commanders that were available.
In October 1915 after three divisional commanders,
Major-Generals T. Capper, G.H. Thesiger and F.D.V. Wing, had
been killed during the Battle of Loos, Robertson (C.G.S..,
G.H.Q.) warned of 'the necessity of guarding against a
tendency by senior officers such as Corps and Divisional
Commanders to take up positions too far forward when
fighting is in progress'." 7 This order was interpreted by
many commanders to mean that 'owing to the scarcity of
regular trained officers of the higher ranks, senior
officers should be chary of exposing themselves unduly in
113 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Note on War Diary, 15 December 1914, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
"j' E. Wough Flanagan to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 December 1934, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
hI Brigadier-General S.V.P. Weston to Edmonds, 29 March 1937, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
116 Sir William Darling, So It Looks To Me, p.170.
I Lieutenant-General W.R. Robertson, G.H.Q Confidential Letter O.B./888 to the First, Second, and Third
Armies, Cavalry and Indian Cavalry Corps, 3 October 1915, W.O.95/2, PRO.
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the forward dangerous zone'. 118 To minimise casualties
Nugent (36th Division) 'had laid down that no C.O. should go
further than his battle H.Q.' on 1 July 1916.119
Haldane noted in 1915 that 'few divisional generals go
to their front trenches'.' 2° One divisional commander in the
Ypres Salient in May 1915 'had never been outside his dugout
for three weeks'.' 21 Montagu-Stuart-Wortley (46th Division)
was notorious for rarely visiting his front line,' 22 and
'there was always a feeling' against him 'for not going into
123the trenches'.	 In July 1916 Furse (9th Division) had his
H.Q. at Bruay some 7 miles from the front and seemed quite
out of touch with the battle at Longueval.'24 While on the
Somme the commander of the 123rd Brigade had no idea of the
conditions at the front or the positions of their men.'25
Even in 1917 the 'difficulty was to get commanders of
divisions to go forward and take control of the operations'
since 'they had been accustomed to sit behind trenches and
command by the aid of the telegraph' and once the wires got
broken 'they lost communication with their brigades who were
advancing and fighting'.'26
Commanders at Brigade and Divisional level were
expected to be accessible to the high command and it was
118 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 5 October 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS; Major-General Sir
Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1917, p.38, Tudor Papers, RAI.
"9 Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 March 1930, C.A.B.45 132,
PRO.
120 Haldane, War Diary, 15 August 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
121 Major-General A.!. MacDougall. Diary, 4-13 May 1915, MacDougall Papers DSIMISC 92, IWM.
122 Charles A.S. Page to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 1 June 1929, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
123 Air Vice-Marshal Sr Philip Game to his wife, 1 August 1915, Game Papers PWG 12, IWM.
124 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 July 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 11, PRO.
125 MacDougall, Diary, 16 September 1916, MacDougall Papers DS/MTSC 92, IWM.
126 Haig, Diary, 11 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/17, PRO.
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'anathema' for Brigadiers to move away from the telephone'
ensuring that 'they become nothing better than ciphers
perfectly unable to command their Brigades' as it was
'unpopular with higher authority' for Brigade commanders to
visit the front because they were supposed 'to send them
pretty messages of victory all the time' •127 By going
forward commanders often cut themselves off from their
communications for a long time, as happened to one Brigade
commander at Loos when he was lost with his Brigade-Major
for four hours.128
One of 'the difficulties of commanders from divs.
upwards' was 'getting to know the actual situation in time
to take action' and 'of even the front line formations
(divs. & bdes) finding out the situation' 129 Haldane (3rd
Division) visiting Delville Wood in July 1916 after 'a very
risky' journey found a 'state of confusion, which he could
not rectify' and had to return having achieved nothing.'3°
Effective commanders, such as Haldane, concluded that,
despite the difficulties, they had to visit the front
'before ordering an attack, as the map does not show the
difficulties of the ground and that makes all the
difference'.' 3' Haig noted that 'no one who has not visited
' 27 Brigadier..General F.A. Maxwell to his wife, 16 April and 20 September 1917, Maxwell Papers
7402-31-24 31,NAM.
128 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, pp.1 68-169, Henderson Papers DS/MISC 2, IWM.129 Major-General R.M. Luckock to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 25 January 1931,
C.A.B.45 135, PRO.
' 30 Bngadier-General S.G. Craufurd to Ednionds, 19 November 1933, C.A.B.45/1 32, PRO.
131 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 15 August 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
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the front trenches can really know the state of the
exhaustion to which the men are now reduced' •132
Wishful interpretations of German intentions and
capabilities percolated down from the highest levels of the
hierarchy, reinforcing the tendency for British offensives
to be over-ambitious. Both Commanders-in-Chief set the
trend with their unrealistic optimism. 'Obstinate and
unreasonable', 133 Sir John French 'believed what he wished to
believe' 134 and 'never could believe that the Germans were
not at the last gasp', 135 being always reluctant to pass on
information which did not fit in with his plans during the
campaign of 1914.136 During the First Battle of Ypres,
convinced that 'everything was going splendidly' and that
'the Germans were exhausted', Sir John 'got very angry,
banged the table with his fist' when Macdonogh informed him
that some fresh German corps were arriving, shouting '"How
do you expect me to carry out my campaign if you keep
bringing up these blasted divisions"' 137 Sir John remained
'ridiculously optimistic about German state of collapse' and
in mid-1915 was 'convinced that the Boches are coming near
the end of their reserves'. 138 Robertson (C.G.S., G.H.Q.)
struggled to get him 'in a better frame of mind & not so
'32 FieldM&shal Earl Haig, Diary, 4 November 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 14, PRO.
' General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
' General Sir Percy Radcliffe to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 23 November 1923,
C.A.B.45/141, PRO.
' General Sir George Macdonogh to Edmonds, 14 November 1922, C.A.B.45 141, PRO.
' 36 Macdonogh to Edmonds, 11 October 1922, and Notes and Suggestions by General [Sir George]
Macdonogh, undated, C.A.B.45/141, PRO.
Sir Percy Radcliffe to Edmonds, 21 January 1924, C.A.B.45 141, PRO.
' Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 28 June 1915, Wilson Papers, IWM.
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ridiculously optimistic about German state of collapse' yet
informed a conference that he and Sir John French 'looked
out above all things for optimists'.'39
French's replacement as Commander-in-Chief brought no
new realism because Haig was equally optimistic in his
forecasts, convinced that German powers of resistance were
diminishing and that a decisive victory was imminent. In
the campaigns of 1916-17, being 'a strong man' and 'very
determined', Haig did 'not always realise the limitations of
his men' and his optimism 'obscured his judgement and led to
heavy casualties in attempts to advance and decisively
defeat the German Army, with insufficient means'	 For
example, in June 1916 he informed the King that there were
signs that 'the Germans might bargain for peace before the
following winter','41 believing that he could 'smash up the
whole Bosh Army' on the Somme.' 42 Despite the disaster of 1
July Haig concluded that 'Germany is beaten' 143 and remained
confident that the enemy was increasingly demoralised and
'not fighting so well'.'44 After the war Haig continued to
claim that Germany was in a critical position in the summer
of 1916 owing to the simultaneous Allied attacks on all
fronts
Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 19 July 1915, Howell Papers IV C 2/196, LHCMA.
'° General Sir Hubert Gough to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 12 July 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
'' Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 7 June 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10, PRO.
142 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 31 August 1916 and 5 June 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
' Haig, Diary, 28 July 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/l 1, PRO.
'Haig, Diary, 27 September and 2 October 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 13, PRO.
Haig, Operations on the Western Front, 1916-1918, 30 December 1920, p.24, Haig Papers, W.O.256/38,
PRO.
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The belief that 'the prospects of success' in 1917 were
'distinctly good' 146 was confirmed in Haig's eyes by
successes at Arras and Messines which 'undoubtedly produced
a considerable moral effect on the German forces' which
appeared 'much rattled' 147 and showing 'unmistakable signs
of deterioration' 148 Indeed, Haig informed his Army and
Corps commanders in mid-1917 that 'the power of endurance of
the German people is being strained to such a degree as to
make it possible that the breaking point may be reached this
year' and that 'one more great victory' would culminate in
'the collapse of Germany before next winter' •149 Haig
stressed that 'the present moment is very favourable for
150
ending the war'
Haig believed that 'Germany was within six months of
the total exhaustion of her available manpower' 151 and that
'further defeats in the field may have unexpectedly great
results'.' 52 In response to the '"grave misgivings"' of
Lloyd George (the Prime Minister) Haig stressed that his
optimistic view of 'the very changed condition of the German
Army since the commencement of the Somme battle last July'
was 'justified by the present condition of our opponents'
troops' and based on the German shortage of manpower,
''Fie1d-Marsha1 Earl Haig to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 19 April 1917, Haig Papers,
W.O.256 17, PRO.
'' Haig to Lord Mimer, 11 June 1917, C.A.B.21 22, PRO.
' Haig, G.H.Q. Letter O.A.D.478, Present Situation and Future Plans, 12 June 1917, Haig Papers,
W.O.256 19, PRO.
Haig to Army and Corps Commanders, O.A. 799, 5 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
'° Haig to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 22 August 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 21, PRO.
'' Haig, Diary, 19 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
' 52 Haig G.H.Q. Letter O.A.D.478, Present Situation and Future Plans, 12 June 1917, Haig Papers,
W.O.256 19, PRO.
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economic problems, and 'a marked and unmistakeable fall in
morale of the German troops', which 'almost every week gives
us fresh indications of the decisive effect of the Somme
Battle on the German Army' and its 'very changed
condition'	 By September 1917 he believed that 'the enemy
is tottering and that a good vigorous blow might lead to
decisive results' •154 Such prophesies of doom were to come
true only in 1918 and proved premature in both 1916 and
1917.
Haig tried to persuade Robertson (C.I.G.S.) that 'the
German was now nearly at his last resources' 155 and that
156
'the German Army was in reduced circumstances'. 	 Indeed,
he complained that Robertson 'was most gloomy & pessimistic
& talked d- nonsense', 157 believing that the 'pessimistic
estimates' issued by Macdonogh (a catholic) at the War
Office were 'tainted (i.e. catholic) sources' 158 and did
'much harm and cause many in Authority to take a pessimistic
outlook, when a contrary view, based on equally good
information, would go far to help the Nation on to
Victory'	 In October 1917 Haig protested to Robertson at
the War Office's failure to point out evidence of poor
German morale to the War Cabinet.160
' Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 22 June 1917, Haig Papers,
W.O.256 19, PRO.
' 54 Haig Diary, 23 and 28 September 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 22, PRO.
' Haig, Diary, 9 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
156 Haig, Diary, 10 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 11 June 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
158 Haig, Diary, 15 October 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 23, PRO.
Haig to Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, 13 August 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 21, PRO.
'60 Haig to Robertson, O.A.D.652, 16 October 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 23, PRO.
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The War Office more adept at evaluating German
intentions than G.H.Q. and both Robertson (C.I.G.S.) and
Macdonogh (D.M.I) refuted the over-optimism of Haig and
Charteris. Disagreeing with G.H.Q.'s calculations of the
'extent of depletion of enemy reserves' 161 and observing
that 'the diminution of German morale has been greatly
overdone at General Headquarters', 162
 Robertson did not
expect 'a great and definite victory involving the collapse
of the German Army' in 1917.163 Dismissing Charteris' claims
that Germany was on the point of collapse, Macdonogh
concluded that 'the morale of the German troops has not been
affected by their reverses or by the adoption of a purely
defensive role to such an extent as to make a decisive
success for the Entente probable in the near future',
emphasising that he could 'see no hope of exhausting the
German reserves of personnel' 164 and that 'the morale of the
German people is as yet far from being broken'.'65
Robertson implored Haig not to argue that 'you can
finish the war this year, or that the German is already
beaten' 166 Macdonogh in particular noted that to publicise
'a low state of morale in the German Army' would lead the
public to 'expect immediate great results, in which they
161 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Telegram R. 142, 13 June 1917, Haig
Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
162 Robertson to Field.Marshal Lord Plumer, 10 December 1917, Robertson Papers 1/34 41, LHCMA.
163 Robertson to Haig, 28 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 17, PRO.
164 General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General J. Charteris, 8 August 1916, Macdonogh Papers,
W.O.158 897 PRO.
165 Note by the Director of Military Intelligence, Cabinet Committee on War Policy Memo. No. W.P.49,
The Man-Power and Internal Conditions of The Central Powers, 1 October 1917, Haig Papers,
W.O.256 23, PRO.
166 Robertson to Haig, 13 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
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will probably be disappointed' allowing the politicians 'to
criticise our operations, run down the tactical handling of
the troops' in 'a sudden revulsion of public feeling' away
from 'undue optimism'. Macdonogh noted that 'the better the
German morale, the finer the exploit of the British Army in
167defeating it'
As early as February 1917 the Earl of Derby (Secretary
of State for War) urged that Charteris should be sacked 168
blaming him for rash and optimistic promises of a
breakthrough made in the British and French Press. 169 Haig
ignored this good advice, presenting an over-rosy view of
the war which raised unfulfilled expectations and encouraged
Lloyd George (the Prime Minister) to sneer at Haig's
'optimistic views' P170 Eventually, as Robertson and
Macdonogh predicted, Haig's over-optimism rebounded as Lloyd
George and the War Cabinet demanded an explanation for the
successful German counter-attack which was launched at
Cambrai on 30 November 1917 despite G.H.Q.'s reports that
'German morale was low and many German divisions of inferior
fighting quality' 171 and Haig's assurances that 'the Germans
are well on the down-grade in morale and numbers' •172
167 General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General J. Charteris, 24 October 1916, 23 and 25 July
1916, Macdonogh Papers, W.O.158 897, PRO.
' Earl of Derby to Field-Marshal Earl Haig, 20 February 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 15, PRO.
169 Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, pp.11 8-119, Lee Papers, IWM; General Sir Aylmer Haldane,
War Diary, 8 March 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS; General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall,
Wars and Rumours of Wars, p.27.
170 Haig, Diary, 21 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Haig, Telegram No.47259, 5 December 1917, Haig Papers,
W.O.256 25, PRO.
172 Robertson to Haig, 6 December 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256125, PRO.
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It was clear that G.H.Q. had miscalculated the effect
of the collapse of the Eastern Front would have on the
Western Front. In June 1917 Charteris argued that there was
'no reason to anticipate that Russia will make a separate
peace' and concluded that 'Germany may well be forced to
conclude peace on our terms before the end of the year' •173
Charteris 'failed to appreciate the profound affect which
the disappearance of the Eastern Front was bound to have on
our position in the West, and he continued to encourage Haig
by the prospects of an early victory, which had previously
appeared to be within the bounds of possibility' •174 G.H.Q.
underestimated the importance of keeping Italy and Russia in
the war, 175 ignoring the warnings of the War Office.176
As late as October 1917 Haig was refusing to admit that
Russia would collapse and contended that any German
divisions transferred from the Eastern Front were likely to
be of poor quality and unfit to take the offensive. 177 In
short 'the highly optimistic estimates formed at G.H.Q. in
'16 and '17 of the waning strength of the Germans were
proved to be all wrong' for, although intelligence showed
that 'the Germans were undoubtedly very near the end of
their tether up to the moment when the Russian Revolution
Brigadier-General John Charteris, Ia/35273, 'Note on the Strategical Situation with Special Reference to
the Present Condition of German resources and Probable German Operations, 11 June 1917, Haig
Papers W.O.256/19, PRO.
"' General Sir Walter Kirke, Obituary of Lieut-General Sir George M. W. Macdonogh, G.B.E., K.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., p.9, Kirke Papers WMK1O, IWM.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 30 November, 3 December 1916, 19 April 1917, and 26, 30, 31
May 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
176	 Sir William Robertson to Field-Marshal Earl Haig, 20 April and 15 and 27 September
1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 17 and 22, PRO.
Haig to Robertson, 8 October 1917, and Haig, Diary, 18 October1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 23, PRO.
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upset all calculations', the biggest mistake made by G.H.Q.
'was in not recognising the enormous effect caused by the
Russian Revolution'.' 78 Haig's forecasts 'had entirely
miscalculated' the strength of German resistance.'79
Blinded by optimism Haig failed to grasp the fact that,
although suffering much distress, the Germans were far from
collapsing during 1916 and 1917 but rather were
strategically on the defensive in the west while pursuing
victory on the Eastern Front. In these calculations Haig
'placed the greatest reliance' on his B.G.I. but Charteris
'regarded it as one of his duties to maintain Haig's morale
by gilding the intelligence lily, a self imposed duty which
eventually led to his downfall' 180 Charteris was happy to
distort facts,' 8' notably removing all the more able-bodied
Germans from a prisoner-of-war camp in order to impress his
chief with the deterioration of the German troops.'82
Increasingly under the B.G.I.'s influence Kiggell's opinions
began to 'reek of Charteris' 183 Reputed to be 'such a
confirmed optimist that he was unable to weigh evidence
objectively' and jumped to conclusions ahead of the
information available,' 84 Charteris was judged to be out of
178 General Sir Walter Kirke, 'Lecture on Secret Service', 27 November 1925, Kirke Papers, Intelligence
Corps Museum; quoted in M. Occleshaw, Armour Against Fate, p.366.
'79 i 	 Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 16 October and 3 September 917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
180 Kirke, Lieut.-General Sir George M.W. Macdonogh, G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.,
pp.8-9, Kirke Papers, IWM.
181 Macdonogh to Brigadier-General E.L. Spears, 1 February 1933, Spears Papers 2 3 70, LHCMA.
182 General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and Rumours of Wars, p.26.
General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 1 and 4 October 1917, Clive Papers 1114 61, LHCMA.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.14, and Chapter IX, p.5, Bonham-
Carter Papers 9 1 and 9 2, CCC; Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Sir Charles Bonham-Carter,
12 December, 1935, Liddell Hart Papers 111935 114, LHCMA; Major-General JF.C. Fuller, Memoirs
ofAn Unconventional Soldier, p.14!; General Sir Henry Rawlmson, Diary, 29 August 1917, Rawlinson
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touch with events 185 and to have an 'harmful' influence on
Haig. 186 A turning point came when in December 1917 Kiggell
reported that Charteris 'was much disliked in Corps and
Armies' and Haig finally agreed to sack Charteris although
insisting that 'no one had done or could do the Intelligence
work better' 187 and that Lloyd George had plotted to remove
Charteris because of his influence with the Press.'88
As the war progressed the hierarchy's over-optimistic
perceptions were increasingly challenged as front-line
commanders became more realistic in their assessment of
German durability. Birdwood (II ANZAC Corps) gave a typical
opinion in early 1917 that 'things are certainly going well
out here at present, but I still do not delude myself with
any belief that the Germans are yet beaten, and that the war
is over, for I am sure we have still very much before us
both in time and fighting'.' 89 Plumer thought German morale
'very much better than Haig & Kigg[ell) think' and that 'our
men have no illusions on this point' 	 In late 1917, the
Second and Fifth Armies in Flanders expressed the
predominant view when they informed Haig that a general
demoralization of the enemy producing great strategic
results could not be expected.'9'
185 Field.Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 3 September 1916, Wilson, IWM.
186 Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.14, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/1, CCC; see also Major-
General J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs ofAn Unconventional Soldier, p.14!.
187 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 9 December 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 25, PRO.
188 Haig to his wife, 23 November 1917, Haig Papers No.148, NLS.
Lord Birdwood to Colonel D. Rintoul, 13 April 1917, Birdwood Papers WRB/1, IWM.
° Wilson, Diary, 12 June 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm. Fifth Army 5.G.657 502, 1 October 1917; General Sir Herbert
Plumer, Second Army G.924, 30 September 1917, W.O.158 250, P.R.O.; and General Sir Charles
Hanngton to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 9 November 1934, Maurice Papers 3 2/7, LHCMA.
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Suspicion of 'exaggerated optimism in high quarters' 192
and the belief that 'the German defence is going to crack
tomorrow, that his troops are demoralised' grew as bitter
experience taught that 'we have not got the Germans beat yet
and so it is useless talking of breaking their line and
hunting them with Cavalry!!' 193 Senior officers came to
'always mistrust this kind of tonic from behind' believing
that it was 'better to tell the men that they have a tough
job' 194 and that prophesies of easy success were 'invariably
195	 .	 196
wrong and do harm'	 because 'over optimism rebounds'
By 1917 pronouncements of impending victory had lost
credibility with many commanders, who preferred to believe
that 'pigs may fly!' 197 According to Gough, Army and Corps
Staffs became more and more disillusioned with the tendency
to indulge in wishful thinking and began to discount much
that emanated from G.H.Q.' 98 Germans offensives at Cambrai
in November 1917 and in the Spring of 1918 had a further
sobering effect on the British high command.
A greater realism went hand-in-hand with increased
efforts to make contact with the troops. It should be
remembered that good commanders and staff officers at all
levels kept in close touch with the troops in the front
line. Smith-Dorrien (Second Army) regularly made personal
' 
Brigadier-General P. Howell, Pocket Diary, 17 July 1916, Howell Papers W/D 13, LHCMA.
General Lord Rawimson to Lieutenant-Colonel O.A.G. Fitzgerald, 24 April 1915, Kitchener Papers,
PRO 30 57 5IIWB 19B.
General Sir Ayhner Haldane, Diary, 10 July 1916, Haldane Papers, Mss 20249, NLS.
Haldane, Diary, 11 July 1916, Haldane Papers, Mss 20249, NLS.
' Howell, Pocket Diary, 16 July 1916, Howell Papers IVID/13, LHCMA.
Haldane, War Diary, 5 June 1917, Haldane Papers Acc.20249, NLS.
General Sir Hubert Gough to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 12 July 1926, C.A.B.45/121, PRO.
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reconnaissances of the ground in 1915,199 while Major-General
Sir George Forestier-Walker (21st Division) at the Battle of
Loos came up to the front-line 'to investigate personally'
and walked 'along calmly with shells bursting literally all
round him' 200 In the last years of the war such visits to
the front became the norm.
At Army level Rawlinson (Fourth Army) visited the front
'one very early morning' in November 1916 and with Feilding
(Guards Division) and Cavan (XIV Corps) 'walked about 40 or
50 yards in front of our own wire' 201 while Gough (Fifth
Army) liked 'to see things for himself' •202 Home (First
Army) visited Divisional H.Q.s every day and cheered his
subordinates up creating an atmosphere of confidence.203
Allenby (Third Army) 'was constantly out in his car
inspecting parts of the Army Area, visiting trenches,
Divisional Headquarters, Hospitals, Ammunition dumps,
etc'. 204 Byng (Third Army) was always in close contact with
the front 205 and Plumer (Second Army) travelled about his
206front.
At Corps level, Jacob (II Corps) 'kept himself fully
informed of all that was passing and in close touch with his
199 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Autobiography, Volume II, p.42!, Haldane Papers Acc.20254, NLS.
200 Lieutenant-Colonel K. Henderson, Memoirs, p.1 67, Henderson Papers DS/MISC/2, IWM.
201 Field-Marshal Earl Cavan to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 9 April 1936, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor, Diary of the War, 1917, p.38, Tudor Papers RAI.
203 General Lord Jeffreys to Edmonds, 31 July 1931, C.A.B.45 123, PRO.
204 R.H. Andrew to Field-Marshal Lord Wavell, 13 August 1937, Allenby Papers 6,V1I/6, LHCMA.
205 Haldane, War Diary, 7 June 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS; Haldane, Autobiography, Volume II, p.327,
Haldane Papers, NLS; Captain Rt. Hon. Sir Basil Brooke, Bail., to Edmonds, 15 May 1945, A.B.45 118,
PRO.
206 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Diary Notes, 31 March 1927, Liddell Hart Papers 1 1/1927/ib, LHCMA; General
Sir Charles Harington, Plumer of Messines, pp.316-317.
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subordinate commanders, so he always knew the situation of
everyone and the condition of his troops' 207 while Birdwood
made 'almost daily visits round the trenches' 208 At
Divisional level, Major-General Sir Amyatt Hull (56th
Division) 'fully enjoyed' creeping round the new front line
at Gommecourt 209 and Major-General W. Douglas Smith (20th
Division) was quite happy to crawl round trenches to see
things for himself. 21° At Arras de Lisle (29th Division)
went upto the front 'most days' regardless of the
shelling, 21' while General Sir Herbert Lawrence (66th
Division) went round the trenches 'quite often' P212
At Brigade level, Major-General Lord Dugan (73rd
Brigade) and Major-General Sir John Capper (24th Division)
narrowly avoided capture by a German patrol while out
visiting front-line posts unarmed. 213 Brigadier-General P.R.
Wood (43rd Brigade) was right in the front line sheltering
in a shallow trench from heavy, enfilade machine gun fire 214
while Brigadier-General W.H.L. Aligood (45th Brigade), 'used
to go round his line every morning during operations either
just before or just after dawn' 215 Commanders were also
more willing to consult front-line subordinates. Tudor (9th
Division) noted that 'later in the war a Divisional
207 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.3 1, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
208 Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood to Colonel D. Rintoul, 23 July 1916, Birdwood Papers WRB 1, IWM.
209 Colonel A.S. Bates to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 June 1929, C.A.B.45 132, PRO.
210 General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 30 July and 8 August 1916, Milward Papers 6510-143-5, NAM.
211 A.T. Miller to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 January 1939, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
212 Colonel Hon. I.L.. Melville to 2nd Earl Haig, 14 May 1963, Haig Papers 347/11, NLS Acc.3155.
213 Major-General Sir Winston Dugan to Edmonds, 13 July 1937, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
214 Brigadier-General P.R. Wood to Captain Cyril Falls, [June 1937], C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
215 T.G. Taylor to Edmonds, 13 January 1930, C.A.B.45 138, PRO.
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Commander's opinion was given due weight' as it was realized
that they 'were in a better position than higher commanders
to appreciate the situation on their own fronts' •216
In 1918 General Sir Walter Braithwaite (62nd Division)
'commanded his division from his horse, in the best open
warfare style' in 'the closest personal touch with the
situation', which enabled him to "grip" his command' 217 At
Army level Allenby was prepared to listen to the advice of
others 218 while Rawlinson in November 1916 was persuaded by
Feilding (Guards Division) and Cavan (XIV Corps) to abandon
an attack. 219 Plumer took care to consult every corps and
divisional commander's opinion in order to adjust his plans
to local needs and opinions prior to the great success at
Messines in 1917.220 Byng was 'always ready to hear what one
has to say about the difficulties which have to be
surmounted' and did not 'force his own views' on
subordinates or 'insist on an attack being carried out in
accordance with his ideas' 221
The re-discovery of surprise, the chief feature of each
offensive, became a major ingredient for success in 1918 as
'the experiences of the past two years' showed that 'the
element of surDrise forms a very leading factor in the
216 Major-General Sir Hugh Tudor to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 2 December 1933,
C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
217 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 5 Apnl 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 2 1/3, IWM.
218 R.H. Andrew to Field-Marshal Wavell, 5 April 1937, Allenby Papers 6/116, LHCMA; General Sir
George Barrow to Wavell, [3 June 1938], Allenby Papers 6/11113, LHCMA.
219 Field-Marshal Earl Cavan to Edmonds, 9 April 1936, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
° Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Diary Notes, 31 March 1927, Liddell Hart Papers 11 1927/lb. LHCMA; General
Sir Charles Harington, Plumer of Messines, pp.31 6-317.
General Sir Aylrner Haldane, War Diary, 9 September 1918, Haldane Papers, NLS.
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preparation and execution of an attack' 222 At Cambrai in
November 1917 great care was 'exercised to guard against our
intention becoming known prematurely, even to our troops' 223
and 'measures against leakage of information' 224 included
keeping G.H.Q. staff in the dark about the plan until late
September 1917 and informing Army Commanders (except Byng)
only on the eve of the attack.
As a result the British 'did in fact pull off a real
surprise, not only on the Hun, but on the gossip-mongers
round London dinner tables where to our shame and horror, we
had learnt that all our previous Offensives had been
discussed weeks before they had taken place' 225 There was
no preliminary bombardment or registration by the artillery
and the infantry divisions, reinforcing artillery and tanks
'were moved as late as possible from distant billets by
rail' and their arrival camouflaged and strictly regulated
to prevent detection by the Germans. 226 Predicted artillery
fire and the tank's ability to crush the formidable wire
defences of the German Hindenburg Line made long wire-
cutting programmes by the artillery, which negated surprise
previously, no longer necessary.
222 General Sir Herbert Lawrence, The Influence of Increased Strength on German Intentions during 1918,
Ia/43614, 1 January 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 27, PRO.
Bernard Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter VII, pp.2-3, C.A.B.45 208, PRO.
General Sir Hugh Elles to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Notes on Official History - Battle of
Cambrai, 23 March 1944, C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
225 Brigadier-General E.N. Tandy to Edmonds, Personal Note on Cambrai Plan, 4 December 1944,
C.A.B.45 118, PRO.
" S.S.218, Operations by the Australian Corps against Hamel, Bois de Hamel and Bois de Vaire, 4 July
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The Battle of Cambrai became the model for the British
attacks at Hamel and Amiens in 1918 when strategic deception
became a major weapon in the British arsenal. The success
of the Australian Corps at Hamel 'was largely due to the
secrecy with which they were prepared' with 'every
precaution' being taken 'not only to deceive the enemy and
to do nothing to arouse his suspicion, but also to prevent
our own troops from knowing that an attack was intended' •227
Great care was also taken to preserve the secrecy during
subsequent operations by Fourth Army at Amiens on 8 August
2281918; by Third Army on 21 August 1918;	 and by Second Army
on the Clercken-Passchendaele Ridge in September 1918.229
Redeployment of the Canadian Corps was made 'with every
conceivable precaution for secrecy' and deception measures
such as installing dummy tanks, continuing normal radio
traffic, and the movement of some Canadian units to the
Second Army front in the Kemmel area, 23° which 'quite misled
the Canadian troops', who 'spoke of the "coming offensive to
retake Kemmel"!' 231 'No outward preliminary preparations at
all that could be spotted' were allowed and as a result the
Germans 'were completely taken by surprise and
227 GHQ T 9, Notes on Recent Fighting No.19, Attack carried out by the Australian Corps near Hamel on
the 4th of July, 1918, 5 August 1918, W.O.58 70, PRO.
228	 .	 .Lieutenant-Colonel C.J. Aston, M.C., to Bngadier-General Sir James Edinonds, 3 October 1937,
C.A.B.45/1 84, PRO.
229 Lieutenant-Colonel C.R. Newman, Second Army Artillery Instructions No.1, 20 September 1918,
W.O.158 211 PRO.
230 .Lieutenant-Colonel F.H. Lister, Notes on Operations of First French Army, 29 July and 2 August 1918,
Lister Papers, LHCMA.
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demoralised', 232 enabling the troops to achieve 'their
objectives quickly with very little loss' •233
From 8 August 1918 the British 'realized that the
corner had been turned' and 'seized the initiative once
more' •234 Senior commanders such as Byng, Harper, Godley,
and Rawlinson were 'confident that we shall get the Germans
235back to the Hindenburg Line'. 	 By September 1918 the
German was 'no longer the same man that he used to be' and,
although he was 'still capable of putting up quite a good
fight', 236 was 'on the hop' and 'thoroughly disorganised'.237
G.H.Q. concluded that with German resources badly over-
stretched there was a unique opportunity to gain a decisive
238
victory.
By October 1918 there was 'little doubt that our
breaking the whole of the Hindenburg systems of defence has
had a great effect on the enemy' and he was 'ready to make
peace on our terms', 239 being 'thoroughly demoralised' and at
'the end of his man power' 240 By November 1918 'the Bosch
infantry was not fighting well and handing itself in pretty
freely' even though 'the artillery was pretty active'.241
232 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
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Unlike in 1916-17 there was a consensus that that 'we have
given the Germans a severe blow' obtaining 'the greatest
victory which a British Army has ever gained' •242 The
optimism of the hierarchy was shared by front-line troops
who with high morale just wanted to get after the Germans,243
who 'fled like rabbits'. 244
 But 'the training of four years'
taught the British 'not to count our successes beforehand'
even with 'the whole German line to the south tottering'.245
While Foch talked of still fighting in 1919 Haig
believed that the Allies 'ought to hit the Boche	 as hard
as we could' in order to 'get peace this autumn',246
calculating that the enemy's resistance could be 'completely
broken' without 'another campaign next year' •247	 In
September 1918 Haig travelled to London 'to impress on the
Home Authorities the importance of hitting as hard as we
could up to the mud time' but, while Wilson (C.I.G.S.)
agreed that 'there was ample evidence of the deterioration
of the Boch', Haig, handicapped by his previous over-
optimism in 1916-17, had difficulty in persuading the
Government.
In particular Milner (Secretary of State for War), who
thought that Haig was 'ridiculously optimistic' and was
'afraid he may embark on another Passchendaele', warning
that 'if he knocked his present Army about there was no
242 Field-Marshal Earl Haig to his wife, 27 August 1918, Haig Papers, Acc. 3155, No.152, NLS.
243 Major-General A.N. Floyer-Acland, Journal, pp.1 03-104, Floyer-Acland Papers, IWM.244 Lieutenant G.H. Thomas to his parents, 5 September 1918, Thomas Papers, IWM.
245 Bernard Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter X, p.!, C.A.B.451208, PRO.
246 FieldMarSha1 Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 11 August, 1918, Henry Wilson Papers, IWM.
247 Haig, Appreciation of the Present Situation, O.A.D.90, 1 August 1916,, W.O.158 21, PRO.
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other to replace it' •248 Fortunately Haig's optimistic views
were now tinged with a new realism and more in tune with his
subordinates. Indeed, Haig and his Army Commanders all
agreed in October 1918 that 'the enemy is fighting a very
good rear-guard action' and that 'the enemy has not vet been
sufficiently beaten as to cause him to accett an ignominious
249IDeace'.
In the end the greatest strength of the British Army
was its supreme self-confidence, which allowed it to keep
going where all the other nations who entered the war in
1914 had suffered mutinies or collapsed. One of the British
Army's most important achievements has gone largely
unnoticed: namely, that the B.E.F. 's morale remained
remarkably high till the end of the war. Optimism was
necessary to carry through such a war. Before the British
could defeat the German Army in 1918 they had to learn to
temper their confidence with realism. A vital precursor to
victory was that the Army should have an objective and
realistic analysis of the tactical possibilities and not, as
one Brigadier-General complained, display 'rather a Micawber
attitude of expecting something good to turn up' 250 But the
price of that lesson in 1916 and 1917, notably on the Somme
and in Flanders, was a high one and Haig, in particular,
must bear a heavy responsibility for the over-ambition,
248 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 9 and 23 September 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
249 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 31 October 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 37, PRO.
250 Brigadier-General R. FitzMaurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 7 November 1936,
C.A.B.45/133, PRO.
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Training the New Armies so that they were capable of
defeating the Germans presented a major challenge for the
British Army. The formation, equipment, and training of the
30 divisions of the New Armies and the increase in strength
of the B.E.F. from six to 60 divisions in less than two
years was a major achievement, Certainly, at first the
British Army had neither the experience, training, nor
ability to match the Germans in the tactical realm and 'in
an army the greater part of which had had no experience of
any war except this war of trenches, a certain lack of
tactical sense was perhaps not to be wondered at' . Against
the skill of the Germans the British pitted inexperienced
and undertrained troops. In September 1916 Foch noted
simply that 'our Divisions were green soldiers & his were
veterans' because the British Army had had to expand from '6
to 60 Divisions'.2
The daunting task of raising and training a large and
powerful army while deeply engaged in a major war was
considerably worsened by the rapid expansion of 1915-16.
This process produced a 'lack of uniformity of training
throughout the British armies in France' resulting in 'the
'General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter VIII, p.86, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 12 and 13 September 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
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unevenness of the worth of battalions' as late as April
19l8. The best solution would have been to expand the
original eight Regular Divisions of the B.E.F. 'by
amalgamating less regular forces with it' to create 'quite a
considerable Army'.
But in reality it proved impossible to harness the
'undeveloped power' of the Empire when 'the bulk of our
highly trained regular officers are at once carted off to
France'	 and killed 'in the first two months' of the war.5
The advice of Haig that the B.E.F. should not 'go over for 2
or 3 months' during which time 'the immense resources of the
Empire' could be developed 6 was ignored. In November 1914
Haig reiterated that, since 'it will be many months before
the new forces forming in England can take the field',
British policy 'ought therefore to be to husband the
strength of our present field army as much as possible' .
The failure to amalgamate the New Army Brigades and
Battalions with Regular Divisions once in France to give
them experience and raise their efficiency was a more
culpable mistake. 8 The main value of the Regular British
Army in 1914 was 'as a picked force of professional
soldiers' but, unfortunately, this expertise was not
employed to provide 'a sufficiently strong nucleus of first
Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier, Impressions and Recollections, p.217 and 221.
Earl Haig to Lord Haldane, 4 August 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 1, PRO.
Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney, Diary, 29 January 1917, Pinney Papers, IWM.
6 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 5 August 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
Haig, Diary, 18 November 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 2, PRO.
8 Brigadier-General Philip Howell to [Wickham] Steed. 10 November, 1914, Howell Papers IV/C/2 66,
LHCMA.
General Sii Sidney Clive, Diary, 27 November 1914, Clive Papers 111/1/65, LHCMA.
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rate trainers & leaders' to raise rapidly 'the standard of
efficiency as a whole' 10 'All regular officers without
exception' thought that 'the formation of new units is being
overdone' and wanted existing Regular units to absorb the
newly raised troops in the form of drafts, 1' mixing the
'very good army' of Regulars in France and the 'second rate
army' of civilians to form one 'good army'.
To do this the alternatives were either 'to draft your
reinforcements onto existing units' or to place plenty of
regular officers and N.C.O.s into the new units.'2 Either
method ensured an interchange of personnel in which New Army
officers would learn from attachment to Regular units while
allowing regulars, 'who have been through the mill' and were
'now rather stale', to take a well-earned rest while
training the Yeomanry and New Armies. 13 Aware of the poor
quality of the battalion and company commanders of the
newly-raised formations, Maxse urged in early 1915 the
employment of junior captains and subalterns, who had gained
priceless war experience with the B.E.F., to command
battalions of the New Armies, which contained excellent raw
material especially the junior officers who 'necessarily
lack experience in leadership', and raise their skill
levels.
'° General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 1 August 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Haldane, War Diary, 1 August 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
12 Brigadier-General Philip Howell to [Wickham] Steed, 11 November, 1914, Howell Papers W C/2 67,
LHCMA.
Howell to his wife, 3 November, [1914], Howell Papers W/C/3 82, LHCMA.
14	 Sir Ivor Maxse, Notes on the New Armies by a Divisional Commander, 3 February 1915, Maxse
Papers, IWM 69/53/5.
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Aware of 'the danger of sending out the new army in
corps or armies, whose staffs and officers have not got
experience',' 5 and of 'the necessity of using the troops by
battns',' 6 Sir John French, the Commander-in-Chief,
supported by Haig (First Army) fought in January 1915 to
replace Lord Kitchener's proposal to send out the New Armies
as armies and corps with that of sending them 'out by
Battalions or even Brigades, for incorporation in our
existing Divisions and Corps' •7 French won the agreement
of the War Cabinet that 'the New Army will not come out in
larger bodies than Divisions' ' and that 'two seasoned
brigades and one new brigade will form a division' •9 Maxse
also suggested that the twelve divisions of the First and
Second New Armies should exchange two battalions in each
brigade for two, experienced battalions as soon as they
landed in France in order to create homogeneous Divisions.20
Unfortunately, this good advice was not acted upon.
Kitchener refused to split up the New Armies and amalgamate
them with the formations already in France maintaining that
'such a use of the New Army would ruin it' •21 Instead
'whole brigades and even divisions' of the New Armies were
General Sii Sidney Clive Diary, 5 January 1915, Clive Papers HI/i 83, LHCMA.
'6 Field..M&shal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 9 January 1915, Wilson Papers, IWM.
Earl Haig, Diary, 4 January 1915, and Expansion of the British Army in the Field, 11
January 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 3, PRO.
IS Haig, Diary, 20 January 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 3, PRO.
' Haig, Diary, 26 January 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/3, PRO.
20 General Sir Ivor Maxse, Notes on the New Armies by a Divisional Commander, November 1914, Maxse
Papers, IWM 69/53/5.
21 Lieutenant-General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, undated,
C.A.B.45/120, PRO.
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'coming out to take the field'. 22 This method of expanding
the Army contrasted sharply with the way in which the
Dominions formed new divisions. Following the Gallipoli
campaign the Australians doubled the number of battalions by
splitting the original existing units and using
reinforcements to bring both halves upto full strength
giving 'a veteran character and a feeling of brotherhood to
the whole force' 23
The failure to mix the raw Kitchener Army troops with
more experienced troops cost the Army many lives. 24
 The
heavy casualties sustained by 'newly arrived units' in late
1914 demonstrated that there could be no 'real, rapid
training unless the trainers are regular officers & men who
have been through the mill t and that '10%, 20% even 30% of
the casualties' which had occurred in divisions newly
arrived in the theatre 'during their first engagements,
might have been avoided'. 25 The 'fatal policy of trying to
form new units (big units, like divisions) instead of
drafting onto old ones' resulted in 'a terribly big bill' in
the form of heavy casualties and lost trenches even in
formations like the 28th Division formed from 'real good
regular battalions from India' 26
Brigadier-General Philip Howell to [Wickham] Steed, 11 November, 1914, Howell Papers IV/C/2 67,
LHCMA.
General Sir John Monash to his wife, 22 April 1916, quoted in P.A. Pedersen, Monash As Military
Commander, p.113.
24 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 July 1915, Haldane Papers Acc.20248, NLS.
25 Howell to [Wickham] Steed, 10 November, 1914, Howell Papers IV C 2 64, LHCMA.
26 Howell to his wife, 20 February 1915, Howell Papers IV/C/3/ 113, LHCMA; see also Major-General Lord
Loch to George V, 19 April 1915, Loch Papers 71/12 1, IWM.
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The older and more established divisions, for example,
had a distinct advantage notably the 7th Division which was
'quite one, if not the best of the Divisions in our Army'
whose arrangements for 1 July 1916 were 'particularly good'
because they 'had a great deal of experience', having 'taken
part in every attack from NEUVE CHAPELLE, FESTUBERT,
LOOS'. 27 The failure to put reinforcements such as the 28th
Division into the line gently as 'new boys' resulted in
heavy casualties. 28 A huge 'waste of human material' within
New Army formations such as the 34th Division, which had
'never done any good' and was seen as 'a "used-up division"'
despite the 'd-ed good men' in its ranks, resulted from a
shortage of leadership to provide the required training.29
Throughout the war the comparative low level of
training achieved by the troops and their junior leadership
was a serious problem. General Sir Reginald Stephens (5th
Division) lamented that 'most of our troubles have come from
our lack of training'	 The lack of training was reflected
in the poor performance of the British Army. General Sir
Ivor Maxse blamed 'the local success of the enemy' at
Cambrai in late November 1917 on the 'lack of battle-
training' in the infantry and the Machine Gun Corps.31
27 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to [Major-General W.P. Braithwaite], 28 August 1916, Montgomery-
Massmgberd Papers 48/21, LHCMA.
28 General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 23 and 24 February 1915, Kitchener Papers
WB/13 and 15, PRO 30/57.
Brigadier Hon. William Fraser, 1 November 1917, quoted in General Sir David Fraser (editor), In Good
Company: The First World War Letters and Diaries of The Hon. William Fraser, Gordon Highianders,
p.173.
° General Sir Reginald Stephens, Points from the late Operation [October 1917], p.8, Stephens Papers
69/70 1, IWM.
General Sir Ivor Maxse, Note by a member of the Court of Enquiry, p.i, paras.1-2, 28 January 1918,
W.O.158 53, PRO.
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While in September 1918 Harper (IV Corps) felt that 'it was
evident during the earlier stages of the recent operations
that British troops had not reached a sufficiently high
standard of training to mariivre successfully in the field
throughout the varying stages of the battle'.32
The British 'fought the war after 1914, (or say 1915)
with almost untrained men, and whenever we had to move, in
1917, and especially in 1918, the troops did not know how to
do it, nor did the artillery know how to support them' and
as a result there was 'unnecessary slaughter, and the non-
attainment of objectives'	 One staff officer concluded
that from the Battle of Arras in early 1917 until the end of
the war G.H.Q. did not understood 'with what poor &
untrained material we were fighting'	 Haldane (3rd
Division) stated in early 1916 that 'the authorities quite
forget that one's officers are young and those in command of
companies have only about one year's service and cannot
therefore show the knowledge and initiative of those we had
earlier in the war'. 35 Owing to rapid promotion, 'most of
the brigadiers and C.O's now are not competent to teach' .
The British Army had expanded too rapidly for the
quality of its training and leadership to be unaffected and
shortages of both within the New Armies were major obstacles
to effective training on a large-scale. The Regular Army
32 Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918,
Montgomery-Masssingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
B Major-General C.G. Fuller to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 July 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
' Colonel E.M. Birch to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 September 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 6 April 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Haldane, War Diary, 22 June 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
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was 'dwindling at a most alarming rate' while the New Armies
were 'increasing at an equally alarming rate'. 37 The
Battles of 1914 at Mons, Le Cateau, the Marne, the Aisne,
and Ypres 'practically wiped out the men of the original
Expeditionary Force' 38 so that during the period 1915-17
the B.E.F. was 'an army of amateurs - not professionals' -
lacking the skills 'good enough to attack, break through,
and carry on a pursuit'
Rapid expansion diluted the officer and N.C.O. cadres
to such an extent that the bulk of junior officers and the
majority of other ranks who went into action had no pre-war
service. General Sir Henry Rawlinson calculated in 1915
that owing to casualties the 'officers were at least 50%
less efficient than they were last Autumn and our troop
leading is correspondingly less good' and this was having 'a
marked effect on our fighting efficiency' 	 A shortage of
well-trained junior leaders was to be a major problem
throughout the war. Commanders complained about the quality
of the leadership at regimental level. Haldane (3rd
Division) noted in early 1916 that 'the troops have been
badly trained at home, there being few people with knowledge
to do the work' 41 and G.H.Q. noted that 'officers and
troops generally do not now possess that military knowledge
" Brigadier-General Philip Howell to [Wickham] Steed, 11 November 1914, Howell Papers IV C/2 67,
LHCMA.
Colonel R: Macleod, Memoir, p.107, Macleod Papers, LHCMA.
General Sir Charles Chant to the Earl of Rosebery, 24 January 1916, Grant Papers, LHCMA.
40	 .General Lord Rawimson to the Adjutant-General of the Forces, 24 June 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 23,
PRO 30/57.
41 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 25 February 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
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arising from a long and high state of training which enables
them to act promptly on sound lines in unexpected
situations' 42
In mid-1916 de Lisle (29th Division) complained that he
was 'short of some good battalion commanders for training'
the troops. 43 In late 1916 the poor quality of the
regimental officers in the 57th Division rendered them unfit
to command a platoon or to read a map, 44 while Rawlinson
(Fourth Army) commented that on arrival in France the troops
'were very green and their officers want a good deal of
training'. 45 Deverell (3rd Division) noted that 'a trained
soldier can not be made in a few weeks and trained leaders
require long training and practice' and that 'inexperienced
officers and men must have experienced leaders immediately
46
with them.
Heavy casualties exacerbated this problem in 1916-17.
By late September 1914 the 4th Division had 'only one
commanding officer left, all the other 11 having been either
killed or wounded' .	 similarly by mid-1915 the 7th
Division had lost the best of its officers and men and 'the
ranks now contain many new hands who are inexperienced at
the job' •48 At the Battle of Loos 5/Lincoins lost 22
42 G.H.Q., S.S. 109, Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, 8 May 1916, p.2.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 10 May 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256/1O, PRO.
Colonel C.J.L. Allanson, Diary, 3 December 1916, quoted in Allanson of the 6th, edited H. Davies,
p.1 23.
General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 9 March 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
Field-Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell to Captain Cyril Falls, 24 November 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
General Lord Rawlmson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 24 September 1914, Kitchener Papers WE 2,
PRO 30 57.
Rawlinson to Colonel B. FitzGerald, 21 June 1915, Kitchener Papers WE 23, PRO 30 57.
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officers and 460 men and 'with the exception of the M.G.
officer, every officer in the battalion was killed or
wounded' resulting 'in almost a complete lack of leadership
for the battalion as a whole' . 	 Corkran (5th Brigade)
reported in October 1915 that 'the esprit de corps of the
old units were lacking in battalions' and that owing to hard
fighting 'some of the battalions seemed to lack the fighting
energy and morale which characterised the original units of
the expeditionary force' o
On 1 July 1916 the 11th Brigade (4th Division) lost its
six Commanding Officers and Brigadier-General as casualties
(4 killed) and one battalion, 1/Somerset Light Infantry,
lost 26 officers and 438 other ranks, including the
Commanding Officer and the Adjutant (both killed) and 'no
single officer of those who formed up in the assembly
trenches prior to the attack' was 'available for duty at the
end of the day'	 The 23rd Division in August 1916 had
'great difficulties in getting Officers & N.C.O.s of any
standing at all', having 'lost about 5,000 all ranks' as
casualties on the Somme. 52 At the end of 1917 after the
Battles of the Somme, Arras, Ypres, and Cambrai 'the wastage
in officers & N.C.O.s, as well as men was appalling' and it
was wonderful 'how battalions managed to carry on, subject
Colonel T.E. Sandall to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 27 June 1926, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
5°Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 23 October 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 6, PRO.
V.H.B. Majendie to Edmonds, 25 October 1929, C.A.B.45/136, PRO.
52 Fjeld..Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 13 August 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
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as they were to a continuous loss of trained & experienced
53personnel'
By the autumn of 1915 'the majority of professional
soldiers' in the line 'were either promoted N.C.O.s or very
recent products of Sandhurst'	 The dearth of experienced
officers was a major disadvantage to the newly formed New
Armies. The "K3" Divisions, such as the 21st and 24th
Divisions, were manned with untrained officers, especially
subalterns, and lacked trained instructors as the best
retired and "temporary" officers had already been allocated
to the "Ki" and "K2" divisions and Cadet Battalions were not
formed until early 1916 so that newly commissioned officers
received no training before joining their battalions. 55 In
the 24th Division there 'was a paucity' of the ex-regular
officers while 'the younger ones were mostly the cast-offs
of the Old Army owing to mental or physical disabilities' 56
The 21st Division 'had one inherent weakness in the paucity
of Regular Officers' so that when it 'landed in France, no
Battalion had more than one Regular Officer besides the C.O.
(who was in all cases a 'Dug out')'
	
and 'the actual
number of regular and ex-regular officers in the 13
Battalions was 14, exclusive of the Batt[alio]n
Com[man]d[e]rs', practically all of whom were old Indian
[Army] Dugouts.58
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Major J. Buckley to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 1 January 1927, C.A.B.45 120, PRO.
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The problem of untrained regimental officers and
N.C.O.s is too often forgotten when discussing the
performance of the generals. The efficiency of British
units rested almost entirely on the small handful of regular
officers, who after 1915 were forced to do the work of their
junior officers and N.C.O.s, having to train them as well as
the men. 59 Owing to the shortage of experienced trainers
during training in the U.K., Forestier-Walker (21st
Division) and his staff "ran" not only the Divisional
schemes but 'also conducted nearly all' the Infantry Brigade
tactical exercises. 6° Much training was unsatisfactory
because many of the young officers and N.C.O.s had not
learned how to teach their troops and regimental officers
lacking 'a thorough grounding in military knowledge'.6'
Williams (37th Divisions) reported that 'officers were
often very tired when relieved' because 'with the present
inexperienced troops the company officers are always on duty
and so get little sleep when fighting is going on' •62
Should these become casualties the efficiency of a unit
tended to drop rapidly. For example, one officer on
assuming command of the 9/K.O.Y.L.I., found that, as a
result of the heavy casualties sustained on the Somme
including two C.O.s and all the Battalion staff, 'no one
Brigadier G.R.P. Roupell, V.C., Memoirs, pp. 23 and 65, Roupell Papers PP/MCRJ56 GRI, 1WM.
60	 Sir George Forestier.Walker to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 December
1927, C.A.B.45 121, PRO.
61 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 21 February and 22 June 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
62 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 11 May 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 18, PRO.
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left knows anything and all has to be organised' .' A major
shortcoming affecting the quality of the British Army's
training was a severe shortage of good N.C.O.s. The loss of
experienced N.C.O.s in battle affected the performance of
units; one platoon commander complained in August 1916 that
when his platoon sergeant - 'one of the best N.C.O.'s in the
Company' - got wounded the platoon 'wasn't anything like it
was without him' 64
Haig commented in October 1915 that 'with the
Territorial & new troops one misses the junior officers with
some tactical knowledge & training' who could 'act on the
spot at the right moment' . 	 One major reason for 'our
painfully slow progress and heavy losses throughout the
Somme battle' was 'the lack of initiative on the part of our
Junior Regimental Officers and N.C.O.s, due, of course, to
lack of training'. 66 Stephens (5th Division) noted that
'the men were inclined to be trench-bound' and lacking in
initiative so that having taken a trench they were 'quite
satisfied to sit in it and hold it very much as if it were
part of the old permanent line' rather then consolidating it
against counter-attack and preparing for the next attack.67
The junior leaders were not equal to their tasks
demonstrating a tendency to panic, to surrender if cut off,
63 General C.A. Milward, War Diary, 13 September, 5-7 October, and 5 November 1916, Milward Papers
65 10-143-5, NAM.
Second-Lieutenant A.M. Jameson to his mother, [August 1916], Jameson Papers, IWM.
65 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, to his wife, 14 October 1915, Haig Papers 141, NLS.
Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Nosworthy to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 July 1935,
C.A.B.45/134, PRO.
67 General Sir Reginald Stephens, 'lessons from the recent offensive Operations, [?September 1916],
Stephens Papers 69 70/1, IWM.
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and to suffer heavy casualties by employing large bodies of
men in close order.68
In early 1917, G.H.Q. noted that the advance to the
Hindenburg Line was '"sticky"' because the majority of
officers and N.C.O.s 'have had little or no experience in
anything but trench warfare' and recommended that 'no
opportunity should be lost, either by tactical schemes or
otherwise, of teaching open warfare tactics and especially
the use of ground to all officers and N.C.O.s' •69 Allenby
(Third Army) believed that 'the companies having been so
long in trenches were now like "blind puppies" and unable to
see the features of the ground and take advantage of the
cover afforded for turning out the enemy's machine guns' 70
'Three years of trench warfare had left its mark' 71
and it was 'a matter of comment at the time' that 'the
stickiness of many operations' was 'not due to the mud but
what was called trenchitis of the brain' •72 Throughout 1917
'the German forces seemed to have more initiative than had
the British' at junior leadership level with corporals and
sergeants holding onto piliboxes or trenches 'determinately'
whereas if 'our troops lost their officers too often they
retired not because they had been beaten' but simply to
68
G.H.Q., S.S.478 (Translation of a German Document), Experiences of the IV German Corps in the
Battle of the Somme During July 1916, G.H.Q. IaJ20245, 30 September 1916, Montgomery-
Massmgberd Papers 49, LHCMA.
69 G.H.Q., S.S.156, Notes on Recent Operations Compiled by G.S. Fourth Army, G.H.Q. O.B. 1782/A,
April 1917, p.5, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 51, LHCMA.
'° Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 14 April 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/17, PRO.
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'receive orders from someone more senior'	 In early 1918
Army Commanders were still worried about the training of
their troops; Plumer (Second Army) complained that his
troops 'are untrained, with indifferent officers & although
as brave as possible they simply don't know their
business', 74 while Byng (Third Army) was anxious 'not so
much from want of numbers as from want of training of men &
of officers'
One Brigadier-General thought that 'the perfectly
incredible ignorance of our jolly New Army' was 'absolutely
inevitable' given that the expertise of the Regular Army had
'become instinct only by years of business, experience, &
learning' whereas the New Army's training was 'surface deep
at best' •76 Whereas the Germans had personnel trained under
national service and 'could therefore devote much more time
and attention to thinking out new methods etc', the British
'had to do all that was possible against time with untrained
civilians'	 British junior leaders, both young officers
and N.C.O.'s, 'were just as gallant as the Germans, but were
at great disadvantage' because of a 'lack of military sense
and instinct'. 'Most of the Germans had gone through their
2-years' period of compulsory training & were real soldiers,
with a well developed military instinct' whereas 'many of
our young officers came straight from an office stool or
Earl Stanhope to Captain Cyril Falls, 21 September 1938, C.A.B.45/1 16, PRO.
74 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 17 April 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
' Wilson, Diary, 2 May 1918, Wilson Papers, IWM.
76 Brigadier .General F.A. Maxwell to his wife, 20 September 1917, Maxwell Papers 7402-31-31, NAM.
Brigadier-General C.G. Stewart to Falls, 16 January 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
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some commercial employment' and 'could not be expected to be
in the same class as leaders' •78 The 'extraordinary lack of
skill' shown by the British troops on the Somme reflected
the fact that the percentage of the French troops who 'had
had no prewar training' was 'at the very most 10% and
probably considerably less' whereas that of the New Army
troops 'with any prewar training [was] at a maximum of 3% or
4% of the personnel' .
Equally disastrous was the shortage of trained men,
especially after the heavy losses suffered by battalions in
the attr±t±onal fighting of 1916-17. General Lord Jeffreys
(57th Brigade) complained in October 1916 that the drafts of
reinforcements had not had much training ° and indeed one
Lance Corporal, arriving on the Somme with some
reinforcements, 'did not know how to load his rifle' •81 By
1917, when 'large new drafts' of reinforcements formed 50%
of Brigades, commanders had to rely on 'short intensive
training' to turn the new men 'into soldiers, as apart from
brave men dressed in khaki'. 82
 Reinforcements from home
'were but partially trained' because 'the period of training
at home for infantry had been reduced, except for the
Guards, to about three months' •83
78 Major-General W.L.O. Twiss to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 18 September 1938,
C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
79 Bngadier W.E. Clark to Edmonds, 21 November 1934, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
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As the war progressed the quality of the conscripts,
who were either unreceptive, draft dodgers or very young
troops, deteriorated in contrast to the volunteers of the
New Armies in 1915 and 1916.84 In December 1917 Haldane (VI
Corps) received reports from two Commanders, Deverell (3rd
Division) and Nicholson (34th Division), that the troops
were fed up with the war. 85 The Army 'was beginning to feel
the strain of the heavy casualties and unpleasant conditions
under which fighting was taking place on the Ypres front'
and its morale 'was becoming gradually depressed' 86 After
the battles of March 1918 the British Army, badly depleted
by heavy casualties, was receiving very young
reinforcements, mainly of boys of 19 87 while many officers
and N.C.O.s were young and inexperienced.88
During the war the 'tight regimental system of
reinforcements' broke down 'in the face of heavy and uneven
Infantry casualties' 89 A common complaint by Battalion,
Brigade and Divisional commanders was the disastrous effect
on the morale and fighting qualities of the infantry of the
'hurried system of reinforcing units in the field', which
resulted in battalions being sent reinforcements of 'men
belonging to every kind of Corps other than their own'
84 Lieutenant-Colonel E. Hewlett to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 18 July 1918, Maxse Papers
69/53/11, IWM.
General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 26 December 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
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Regimental officers remonstrated at the 'pernicious habit of
drafting officers and men of different regiments to fill up
casualties often quite unnecessarily i.e. 50 Dublin Irishmen
put into kilts in the Seaforths in the same brigade whilst
in same draft 50 English recruits were sent to the
Dublins' 91
Misgivings were also experienced by commanders that too
much time was devoted to the construction of defences,
fatigues and recreation to the detriment of training. As
late as October 1918 a common complaint by Divisional and
Corps Commanders was the lack of time and opportunity to
train their men. 92 Training in France was made more
difficult by additional factors, notably the 'great
pressure' to avoid 'the destruction of crops' which was
'maintained by the French Authorities', whose reluctance to
provide 'adequate areas' for training was 'extremely
detrimental' to the training of the Army. Finding the time
and space 'to carry out training in back areas undisturbed'
was equally difficult especially when Divisions in reserve
'almost without exception' were called upon 'to provide
large working parties'. 93 The infantry were expected to
supply men for fatigues and 'a host of other duties, which
' Brigadier W.F. Jefferies to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 29 March 1930, Jefferies Papers,
LHCMA.
92 Major-General C.N. Nicholson to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 10 October 1918; Major-General
John Ponsonby to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 11 October 1918; Lieutenant-General A.E.A.
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Brigadier-General C. Bonham-Carter, Training in France, 8 July 1918, Maxse Papers 69 57/11, IWM.
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ought to be performed by men drawn from other sources than
fighting formations about to go into action' .
One Brigade commander complained that, although 'C.O.s
always live in hope of the Div[ision] being one day out of
the line without any working parties to be found', a long
rest of ten days for a battalion to train was a rarity
except when 'training for a special operation'. 95 More
typically 11th Division when resting 'only got two or three
days training' before going back into the line again. 96 At
Arras the 51st Division 'had a very serious lack of
training' because it had been 'continuously in the line
without rest since its arrival in France on 1st May 19l5'.
In late 1917 the 34th Division was 'tired out and suffers
from not having had a sufficiently long time out of the line
for training' 98 while in the 20th Division 'one brigadier
went so far as to say that he considered his men were not in
a fit state to withstand a heavy attack'.99
From 1915 onwards the British were providing large-
scale training in an ever-increasing number of schools of
instruction for all ranks. The development of Army Schools
was 'due to the individual effort' of General Sir Charles
Monro (Third Army) 'who first originated the idea' .00
Brigadier-General M.L. Homby, 116th Brigade, to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, XVIII Corps, 28
July 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
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Worried by the rapid deterioration in the standard of
officers in France, Monro decided to set up an Army
School,'°' establishing the Third Army School for the
instruction of 50 officers and 50 N.C.O.s in a month's
course. By late 1915 and early 1916 the Third Army School
of Instruction was attended by 100 officers and 100 N.C.O.s
for one month's course 102 and in April 1916, Henry Wilson
(IV Corps) found it 'a most admirable place' and 'quite the
best run school I have seen in this country', obtaining 'a
lot of tips for our School' •103
This was destined to be the seed from which sprang not
only the Third Army School but, later on, a school in each
Army and dozens of Corps and Divisional Schools as well.'04
In early 1916 the types of schools and the lengths of
courses run by corps and divisions varied tremendously 105
and many had been set up during the winter of l9l5l6.b06
Haig noted in May 1916 that de Lisle (29th Division) had
'recently started a divisional school' when 'other divisions
have had them going since November last'
	 The Battle of
the Somme re-emphasised the need for schools and by the
winter of 1916-17, visiting various Divisional Schools, Haig
was impressed by the good work that was being done to train
Major-General J.F.C. Fuller to his mother, 12 October 1915, Fuller Papers IV 3 163, LHCMA.
102 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 23 December 1915 and 11 March 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 7 and 9,
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young officers and N.C.O.s as platoon commanders.'° 8 But as
late as September 1917 there were only 17 Schools for 20
109Corps.
By 1917 a whole system of schools at Army, Corps,
Divisional and even Brigade level had been established. The
G.H.Q., Army and Corps Schools had been established in
France 'to assist in the individual training of junior
officers and N.C.O.s' The G.H.Q. Schools dealt with special
arms or services, for example the Machine Gun School, Anti-
Aircraft Gunnery School, and the Physical and Bayonet
Training School etc., while Army and Corps Schools had been
established to train junior officers and N.C.O.s. to become
110
efficient instructors'.	 By December 1916 G.H.Q. Schools
included the School of Gunnery and the Senior Officers'
School for Battery and Battalion Commanders respectively in
the U.K.; the Machine Gun School at Camiers; the Junior and
Senior Staff Schools at Hesdin; The R.F.C. School of Aerial
Gunnery at Camiers and Carmont; the Cadet School at
Blendecques for commissions from the ranks; the Wireless
School at Campagne; S Base Training Camps at Etaples (2),
Calais, Havre and Rouen; the Machine Gun Base Depot at
Camiers; and the Physical and Bayonet Training School.'11
The Five Armies each had Schools for the Infantry,
Artillery, Trench Mortars, Sniping, and Signalling, while
108 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 and 20 December 1916, 12, 13, and 14 February 1917, Haig Papers,
W.O.256/14, PRO.
'° Haig, Diary, 23 September 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 22, PRO.
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Schools for Bombing, Musketry, Mounted Troops and Lewis
Gunners were at either Corps or Divisional level.' 12 Army
Schools included the Infantry School to train company
commanders and N.C.O.s as well as commanding officers, the
Trench Mortar School, the Artillery School, the Telescopic
Sight School to train battalion sniping officers and
N.C.O.s, the Signalling School, and the Musketry Camp while
the Corps Schools were the Combined Lewis Gun and Stokes
Mortar School and the Signalling School. The Divisional
Infantry School was to 'teach junior officers and N.C.O.s to
become platoon commanders and platoon sergeants' h13 Every
battalion was required from 1916 in accordance with G.H.Q. 's
instructions to retain a permanent Instructional Staff,
114
which did not go into battle.
All these problems had a dramatic effect on the British
tactical performance. Rather ironically given its poor
reputation on the Somme and at Passchendaele, following
reforms adopted after the Boer War, the B.E.F. in 1914 was
'the most efficient body of troops that ever took the field'
115 and impressed by its tactical expertise 'the Germans
called the British professional Army "a perfect thing
apart"'."6 Indeed, General Sir Ivor Maxse claimed that
112 G.H.Q., Summaiy of Schools of Training for the British Expeditionaiy Force during Winter 1916-
1917, no date [?December 1916], Haig Papers, W.O.256 15, PRO.
113 Fourth Army: Courses of Instruction During the Winter, 1 November 1916 - 1 April 1917, Fourth Army
G.S. 318, 8 January 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
' G.H.Q., S.S.152, Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in France, quoted in Lieutenant-
General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918, Montgomery-
Masssingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
" Major-General Beauvoir de Lisle, Report on Operations by 29th Division, January 27th, 1917, 30
January 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
116 Colonel R. Macleod, Memoirs, p.99, Macleod Papers 1/1, LHCMA.
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before 1914 'our minor tactics were ahead of both French and
117German'.	 Major-General G. P. Dawnay (M.G.G.S., G.H.Q.)
agreed that the British 'were far ahead of the Continental
Armies in tactics before the war' and that by 1918 the
'German and French tactics more and more closely follow the
principles of our pre-war Field Service Regulations'."8
Unsurprisingly, British tactical methods at regimental
level quickly deteriorated from the high standards of 1914
as the Regular Army ceased to exist and 'too much attention
had been given in training the New Armies to "the bomb and
119the bayonet", and too little to the use of the rifle'.
One regimental officer noted 'the cult of the bomb was
strong during 1916-17' 120 in which 'the men seem to have
given up the rifle for those wretched bombs and can think of
nothing but the latter when any enemy are about' 121 having
the 'tendency to throw a bomb when a rifle could be used
with equal, if not greater, effect'.' 22 On the Somme 'owing
to lack of training in the rifle & an over partiality for
bombs' the troops 'could not hit the enemy' at 300 yards,
when 'the Archers of Crecy would have made better
shooting' •123 It was very hard to get the men to use their
rifles 124 as 'both sides at this period seemed to be
" Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, Draft No.4 on Refonn of Schools in France, [August 1918], Maxse
Papers, 69 53 12, IWM.
118	 G.P. Dawnay to Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden-Bell, 27 July 1918, Dawnay Papers
69 21 3, IWM.
' t9 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoir, Chapter XXVI, Edmonds Papers 111110 6, LHCMA.
120	 L.H. Cockran to Edmonds, 23 January 1934, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
' Lieutenant-Colonel T.S. Wollocombe, Diary, p.170, Wollocombe Papers, IWM.
Major-General J.S.M. Shea to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, The Preliminary Notes on the Tactical
Lessons of the Recent Operations, 10 August 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
' Brigadier-General W.D. Croft to Edmonds, 28 November 1929, C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
124 Lieutenant-Colonel R. Oakley to Edmonds, 11 August 1935, C.A.B.45 136, PRO.
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suffering from the bombing mania' 125 In late 1917 the fact
that some troops 'had little skill in the use of their
rifles and had inevitably lost confidence' was perceived as
'one of the factors that led to a definite lowering of
morale, observed not only by anyone moving about the Army,
but reported by censors'.' 26 G.H.Q. noted in early 1918 that
in the past 'the importance of the bomb' had been 'unduly
emphasized at the expense of the rifle and bayonet' •127
As the war progressed, the better commanders began to
demand musketry practice and slowly British tactical skill
began to improve. As early as July 1915 the Third Army
stressed that 'all infantry battalions when at rest must be
practised for at least 14 hour daily in rapid loading and in
rapid fire' and that 'the use of the rifle from behind all
classes of cover with the least possible exposure must form
part of the daily routine of training' 128 In 1915 expecting
his battalions to train at musketry for 'at least 2 hours
per day' Heneker constructed 'a 50 yards range' for
battalions to practice 'rapid fire and fire discipline by
sections' 129 One battalion commander issued an order that
'every man was to fire at least 50 rounds a day when in
line' and eventually increased it to 100 rounds.' 3° IX Corps
' Lieutenant-Colonel R.V. Turner to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, November 1934 and 22
September 1930, C.A.B.45/l38, PRO.
126 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.8, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 1 and
9/2 CCC.
127 G.H.Q., S.S.135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B./1635, January 1918,
Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
128 Special Points with regard to the Training of Infantry, Third Army G. 192, [July 1915], Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 37, LHCMA.
129 General Sir William Heneker, Diary, 3 and 5 August 1915, Heneker Papers, IWM.
W.D. Croft to Edmonds, 28 November 1929, C.A.B./132, PRO.
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noted that on the Somme 'some Brigades have realised that
the rifle has been neglected during trench warfare and that
more musketry training is required'	 and 'undoubtedly this
period was the turning point' marking 'a return of sane use
of weapons and movement' •132 Training in June 1917 37th
Division stressed that 'every effort must be made to raise
the standard of musketry training throughout the
Division'	 In the 9/DLI rifle drill took place not only
'in reserve or out of the line but actually in the line'.134
By early 1918 the 58th Division carried out musketry
training in the trenches every day 135 while in the 42nd
Division Sections were 'practised in firing five rounds
rapid from their positions at least twice during their tour
in the line'.' 36 One Brigadier-General expected his men to
be able to 'fire 15 aimed rounds a minute'.' 37 In early 1918
G.H.Q. emphasised that 'the rifle and bayonet are, and
always will be, principal weapons of every infantryman' who
were to 'use it freely and confidently to overcome
opposition and repel counter-attacks'.'38
' IXth Corps Notes on Information collected from Various Sources including Troops who have been
engaged in the Recent Fighting, 31 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
132 Colonel R.V. Turner to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, November 1934, C.A.B.45/138, PRO.
133 Lieutenant-ColonelJ.G. Dill, Training in the Bomy Area, 37 Division No.G.1475, pp.1-2, 7 June 1917,
Dill Papers 113 2, LHCMA.
Colonel W.D.B. Thompson, Biography of Brigadier-General R.B. Bradford, V.C., M.C., p.12, Bradford
Papers, IWM.
General Sir Ivor Maxse, Lecture by Corps Commander on Organization for Training, Senior Officers'
Conference, XVIH Corps, 17 February 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/10, IWM.
Major-General A. Solly-Flood, 42nd East Lancashire Division, "Go One Better", published by Gale &
Polden Ltd, Aldershot, 20 February 1918, Brigadier-General Hon A.M. Henley Papers, IWM.
137	 ,,Bngadier-General Hon A.M. Henley, Lecture: February 1918 , February 1918, Henley Papers, IWM.
138 S.S.135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B. 1635, January 1918,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
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This musketry training enabled the infantry to become
self-reliant employing their own rifles to fight. Musketry
practice 'by day and night' allowed one battalion to repel a
heavy German counter-attack at Ypres inflicting 'enormous
casualties' •139 The 6/Northumberland Fusiliers in April 1918
employed the rapid musketry of the "Old Contemptibles" in
1914 to drive off the enemy infantry, who came within 40
yards, 'with heavy losses'.' 40 In a counter-attack in mid-
September 1918 'whole platoons of the enemy infantry were
simply mown down' by 'first rate troops', who were 'well
trained in musketry', and the ground was 'covered with
German corpses' •141 This superb musketry can be compared
favourably with the German reliance on the machine gun and
the grenade and neglect of the rifle even late in the war.'42
One complaint was that the troops instead of acquiring
the tactical knowledge required in open warfare were 'over
trained at Saluting, Close Order Drill in the ranks, Bayonet
& P.T. and Bomb throwing' 	 because the infantry 'had so
concentrated on bombing & sticking sacks with their
bayonets.'44	For example, General Sir William Heneker (8th
Division) was 'rather too keen on spit and polish and
outward appearance at the expense of efficiency with the
139 Colonel H.D. Buchanan-Dunlop to Captain Cyril Falls, 11 December 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
Lieutenant A. Thompson, Statement regarding the circumstances of his capture by the enemy, p.3,
Thompson Papers, IWM.
" Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 19 September 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 36, PRO.
142 Bngadier-General Hon A.M. Henley, Diary, 4 September 1918, Henley Papers, IWM.
General Sir Julian Byng to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, [July 1918], Maxse Papers 69 57/11,
IWM.
' Colonel H.D. Buchanan-Dunlop to Falls, 11 December 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
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weapons with which the men were armed'	 Platoon and
section commanders also spent too much time teaching the
mechanics of the Lewis Gun so that the 'tactical handling of
the gun & dispositons of the teams in action are hardly ever
practised' •146 There was a tendency 'even at Lewis gun
schools to concentrate too much on turning Lewis gunners
into skilled armourers, far too much time being spent on
teaching stripping and mechanism, and far too little on the
tactical handling of the gun' 147	 that 'they were utterly
"fed up" with the war' 148
General Sir Reginald Stephens (5th Division) worried
that on the Somrne 'our infantry has displayed the most
magnificent courage but, I think it is admitted, a want of
cunning'.'49 Major-General H.L. Reed (15th Division)
complained that the troops 'suffered from want of knowledge
on the part of junior leaders how to advance against M.G.s'
and 'how to avoid bunching & crowding & so making the very
best target for the boche Machine Gunners'.' 5° In September
1918 Harper (IV Corps) noted that 'in the past the main
efforts in training had been directed too much towards the
training of the body and too little toward the training of
the mind' with an over-emphasis on elementary training such
as close order drill rather than on tactical work, training
Brigadier G.R.P. Roupell, V.C., Memoir, p.1, Roupell Papers PPIMCRJ56 GR5, IWM.
146 Major-General G.D. Jeffrey to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 9 September 1918, Maxse Papers
69/53 12,IWM.
' Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918,
Montgomery-Masssingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
148 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs ofAn Unconventional Soldier, p.278.
General Sir Reginald Stephens, Bedfords at Falfarnount [1916], p.1, Stephens Papers 69/70 1, IWM.
'° Major-General H.L. Reed, V.C., to Maxse, 1 September 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
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the men 'to act as individuals with an individual
intelligence' 151
At the end of the Somme Battle Fourth Army concluded
that 'one of the principal lessons of the fighting of the
last four months' was 'the need for more tactical training
for Company and Platoon Commanders' to give them 'the
necessary tactical knowledge and initiative to take
advantage of initial success' •152 As a result in April 1917
the Fourth Army issued a collection of tactical schemes
setting realistic exercises for Company, Platoon and Section
commanders to discuss, undertake and solve both indoors and
outdoors,'53 which was quickly taken up by G.H.Q. and re-
issued to the whole Army,'54 and stressing the importance of
Corps and Divisional Commanders ensuring that tactical
exercises and instruction in billets were carried out during
the winter 'to spread this essential knowledge of elementary
tactics and the use of ground'
During operations at Ypres in 1917 Second Army
emphasised that it was 'more and more evident that greater
stress must be laid on training in open warfare to encourage
initiative and power of leading in the ranks of Junior
N.C.O.s and Privates, which are so necessary when Officers
'' Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918,
5 
Montgomery-Masssingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
1 2 Major-General A.A. Montgomery, M.G.G.S. Fourth Army, to III, XIV, I Anzac, and XV Corps, Fourth
153Army No. 4 14(G), 10 November 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48 4, LHCMA.
Major-General A.A. Montgomery, Notes on Tactical Schemes, Fourth Army No. G.S. 623, 15 April
1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
S.S.159, Notes on Tactical Schemes Compiled by Fourth Army, G.H.Q. O.B. 1793 35, May 1917,
155Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
Major-General A.A. Montgomery, M.G.G.S. Fourth Anny, to III, XIV, I Anzac, and XV Corps, Fourth
Army No. 414(G), 10 November 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 48 4, LHCMA.
258
become casualties'. 156 By the end of the war in November
1918 G.H.Q. was clear that 'the success of an offensive
campaign' depended not only on 'the will to go forward' but
also 'the skill to go forward', in other words the
'offensive spirit' combined an 'eagerness to fight and the
knowledge of how to fight'.'57
In late 1918 Byng felt that 'by means of experience in
this open air warfare - platoon and Co[mpany] commanders are
improving in tactics to a very great extent' 158 and that
'our men are fighting better than they have ever done, and
are killing more Germans'.' 59 Hastings Anderson (M.G.G.S.,
First Army) also noticed the 'marked improvement in minor
tactics' and maintained that 'the proof lies in the reduced
casualties with which we have been able to achieve
successful results in dealing with the enemy's m.g.s and
Rear Guards' •160 Major-General Sir John Ponsonby (5th
Division) commented that 'indeed one of the most gratifying
features' of the operations after 21 August 1918 had 'been
the way in which young officers of all services have been
prepared to assume responsibility and act on their own'.
There were also numerous examples of Privates and N.C.O.s
taking over command when officer had been killed. This
improvement in tactical handling of troops and initiative
' 56 Major..General C.H. Harington, Comments On Operations, 20th Sept., 1917, Second Army, 28
September 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
' 57 S.S. 135, The Division In Attack, November 1918, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
158 General J.H.G. Byng to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 25 October 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53 12,
IWM.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 5 November 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 37, PRO.
'° Major-General W.H. Anderson to Maxse, 14 October 1918, Maxse Papers, 69/53/1 2, 1WM.
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had been achieved despite the few opportunities for training
since the Division had returned from Italy in April 1918.161
How was this improvement achieved? G.H.Q. did not
begin to respond to the challenge of training a mass army
until late 1916. Henry Wilson, convinced of the importance
of 'the education & training of Of ficers',' 62
 'straf fed'
Kiggell, the C.G.S. at G.H.Q., in March 1916 'about giving
us proper teachers for our schools' because 'the present
casual arrange [men]ts are disgraceful' P163 G.H.Q. did not
seem to be concerned with large-scale training ignoring the
necessity of sponsoring training schools and the setting up
of training schools and the evolution of ideas was left to
the ad hoc efforts of senior commanders.' 64 One Brigadier-
General complained in early 1917 that 'most of what has been
done in the training line in France is due more to
individual efforts of Army, Corps, Divisions and Brigade
commands than to any clear direction' from G.H.Q.' 65 Prior
to 1917 there was little direction of training by Brigade
and Divisional Commanders to ensure that 'a uniform system
throughout' and, if a battalion was good, it was 'in spite
of the Higher Commanders (e.g. Brigade and Divisional) in
the Division' 166 In December 1916, Haldane noted that 'at
161 5th Division Report on Operations, August 21st - September 4th, pp.6-7 and 15, General Sir John
Ponsonby Papers 6306-69-1, NAM.
162 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 1 January 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
163 Wilson, Diary, 15 March 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
164 Wilson Diary, 11 and 28 August, 6 September, 21 October 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM; General Sir
Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 24 October 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
165 Brigadier-General R.J. Kentish to General Sir Ivor Maxse, 21/22 February 1917, Maxse Papers 69 57 7,
IWM.
Kentish to Maxse, 21 22 February 1917, Maxse Papers 69 57 7, IWM.
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last G.H.Q. had woken up' asking for proposals on the
subject of organisation for attack whereas before it had
always been the case that 'the initiative comes from below
and not from above' because those in command had 'no
experience of the fighting at first hand' •167
During 1916 'in some units not a single platoon was
organised' 168 and many battalions were 'not organised in
permanent sections and platoons' so that 'the men do not
know to which platoon of section they belong' and subalterns
were 'too frequently shifted from platoon to platoon and
even from Company to Company' •169 In January 1917,
Montgomery (M.G.G.S., Fourth Army) informed Butler
(D.C.G.S., G.H.Q.) that, having 'talked to a great many of
our Division and Brigade Commanders', he was 'quite certain
that the general feeling in the Army is that G.H.Q. must lay
down a definite organization for a platoon, company and
battalion, and that they must also lay down a standard form
of attack for a platoon, company and battalion'. Cavan (XIV
Corps) confirmed that 'any authoritative book of
instructions for the training of the Platoon is not only
necessary and urgent, but would be heartily welcomed by
every Commander to whom I have spoken' and urged that 'no
time should be lost in drawing up "Instructions for the
167 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 9 December 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Precis of the Remarks made by the Army Commander at the Conference held on 27 December 1916,
Fifth Army G.A. 68 0/29, 28 December 1916, Maxse Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
169 General Sir Ivor Maxse to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, 31 July 1916, Maxse Papers, 69 53/7,
IWM.
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Training of a Platoon for offensive action", as soon as
possible' 170
Montgomery also noted that there was no universal
doctrine in the British Army unlike the French Army, which
was 'months ahead of us in practising these principles' and
ensuring that 'exactly the same methods' were universally
applied, and 'until you give us some guidance from above we
shall be unable to catch them up'. Montgomery thought that
there were 'plenty of experienced Divisional Commanders'
notably Strickland (1st Division), Deverell (3rd Division)
Maxse (18th Division), and Shea (30th Division) 'all of whom
have commanded brigades, and two of them battalions, during
the war' who could advise G.H.Q. on training.'71
A major innovation in early 1917 was the introduction
of a training section at G.H.Q. as the result of pressure
from the Armies. In early 1917 Brigadier-General A. Solly-
Flood, who had been appointed by G.H.Q. to organise
instructional classes for Lieutenant-Colonels and Majors in
October 1916, was brought to G.H.Q. to inaugurate a Training
Directorate for all arms and services in France in order to
re-model the battle manuals of the British Army and revise
tactical doctrine.' 72 With plenty of front-line experience
as commander of 35th Brigade and of training as Commandant
of the Third Army Officers' School experimenting in late
' 70 Field-Marshal Earl of Lord Cavan to Fourth Anny, 30 January 1917, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers
93, LHCMA.
171 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, 27 January 1917,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
172 Brigadier-General J.E. Edmonds, Official History, 1916, Volume II, p.571-572.
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1916 with new infantry formations,' 73
 Solly-Flood was ordered
to 'inaugurate a Training Directorate for all arms and
services in France' and provide 'for the co-ordination of
all training whether carried out under G.H.Q., the Armies,
the Corps or the Divisions'.'74
As B.G.T., Solly-Flood attempted 'to ensure uniformity
in teaching' by 'the issue of pamphlets laying down
principles or in reporting lessons learnt during fighting'
and by setting up 'in each Army a permanent demonstration
platoon to show methods of applying principles of tactics in
the best way under various conditions' 	 The important
reforms carried out by the new training Section at G.H.Q.
was the restoration of the platoon organisation as a focus
for new tactical change, standardising recent innovation for
the Army in manuals such as S.S.143 and S.S.144 issued in
February 1917.
The experiences on the Somme laid the foundation for
what would be the decisive tactical reappraisal in the
B.E.F. in the winter of 1916-17 and the tactics, which the
British were to employ from the summer of 1917 onwards, had
been formulated. S.S.143 made official the new doctrine,
which combined the weapons adopted by the infantry since
1914 into a self-contained unit capable of training and
fighting on its own.' 76 Hitherto the only manual available
173 Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs ofAn Unconventional Soldier, p.242.
174 Brigadier-General Ri. Kentish to General Sir Ivor Maxse, 21 22 February 1917, Maxse Papers 69 57/7,
IWM.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.7, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
S.S. 143, Instru ctions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, G.H.Q. O.B. 19191, February
1917, Maxse Papers 6953 11.
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to Platoon commanders had been 'Infantry Training', which
had been written pre-war and pre-trench warf are.' 77 S.S.143
was a vital milestone in tactics, making a changeover from
the Victorian era of riflemen in lines to the twentieth
century era of flexible small groups built around a variety
of weapons. The new edition of S.S.143 issued in February
1918 178 was to be 'the manual upon which the victories of
1918 were won by the British and American Armies'.'79
From 1916 onwards G.H.Q. issued a large number of
publications which, being regularly updated, were designed
to aid the training of formations and units, notably on
artillery in offensive operations (S.S.98); co-operation of
aircraft with artillery (S.S.131); the training and
employment of Divisions for offensive action employing the
various combined arms (S.S.135); recreational training
(S.S.137); the training and tactics employed by the infantry
(S.S.143); communications (S.S.148); Instructions for
training within Schools at G.H.Q., Army, and Corps level
(S.S.152); Tactical Schemes to train junior officers and
N.C.O.s (S.S.159); the use of smoke (S.S.175); infantry and
tank co-operation and training (S.S.204); and tank co-
operation with other arms (S.S.214) •180 Another series of
pamphlets entitled The Experiences of Recent Fighting, such
as S.S.111 (on gas), S.S.119 (on the Somme), S.S.158, 160-
'"Siegfried Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, pp.186-187.
178
G.H.Q., S.S. 143, The Training and Employment of Platoons, 1918, February 1918, Maxse Papers, IWM.
Lord Gorell, One Man Many Parts, p.204.
'° G.H.Q., S.S.135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B./1635, January 1918,
Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
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161 (on the battles which took place in the spring of 1917),
S.S.170-174 (on Messines), and S.S.218 (on Hamel 1918)
disseminating the lessons learnt in the battles of 1916-18.
By the beginning of 1918 it cannot be said that G.H.Q.
failed to provide guidance because 'the principal S.S.
publications to which Infantry Commanders should turn to for
further information on the various branches of infantry
tactics and organisations' included manuals on a
multiplicity of technical and training matters.'8'
Yet it was felt by mid-1918 that 'the progress in
obtaining uniformity of training was not rapid enough' and
that the appointment of a general of high rank was required
'to compel Army and Corps Schools to adopt similar
methods' •182 tJniacke, Deputy Inspector General of Training
from July 1918, observed that the Training Branch at G.H.Q.
had 'generally neglected the somewhat important matter of
instruction' and 'still more the question as to whether
instruction once given was ever properly applied' •183
Montgomery (M. G . G. S., Fourth Army) admitted in November 1918
that, although the 'system which has been evolved during the
last three years' worked 'very well indeed in two out of the
five Armies', in the other three armies the system had not
worked so well because 'people have not done their job and
' Recent Publications, Appendix H of G.H.Q., S.S.143 (The Training and Employment of Platoons,
1918), G.H.Q. O.B. 1919T, February 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
182 General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.24, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2, CCC.
183 Major-General H.C.C. Uniacke to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 30 June 1918, Maxse Papers,
69 53/10, 1WM.
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have not taken sufficient interest in the show' •184
Dawnay (M.G.G.S., Staff Duties) argued that the German
success in the Spring of 1918 'proved, above all things, the
necessity for thorough training on the recognised tactical
principles' and that, because 'there is no doubt that our
own troops suffered from lack of sufficient training', 185
 it
was 'a matter of the highest urgency to take steps to
improve the efficiency of training throughout the Armies in
France' 186 Therefore, since the great administrative burden
on the Training sub-section at G.H.Q. made the installation
of some further machinery was 'very necessary', Haig
established an Inspectorate of Training to supervise
training throughout the Armies in France and to ensure that
the British Armies in France had 'adequate machinery to
assist in bringing the training to a high pitch' •187
Maxse, an excellent trainer of troops, was appointed
Inspector-General of Training 'to assist the troops and
their commanders' to train the Armies in France and 'if
possible to help in co-ordinating the training in England
and France' and was 'empowered to visit any formation, unit
Major-General Sir A.A. Montgomery to [Major-General G.P. Dawnay], Fourth Army, 2 November
1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
' Major-General G.P. Dawnay, M.G.G.S. (Staff Duties) G.H.Q., to the Director of Military Operations,
War Office, G.H.Q. O.B./2266, 8 July 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
'Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to The Secretary, the War Office, G.H.Q. O.B./2255, 16 June 1918,
Maxse Papers 6953 11, IWM.
Major-General G.P. Dawnay, M.G.G.S. (Staff Duties) G.H.Q., to the Director of Staff Duties, War
Office, G.H.Q. O.B. 2266,9 July 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
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or training establishment' at 24 hours. 188 Organised to
'interpret G.H.Q. doctrine as regards training and inculcate
uniformity throughout the British Forces',' 89 Maxse and his
staff were to 'devote their energies to assisting Army and
subordinate Commanders to improve the standard of training
in all arms of the service' 190 When an Assistant Inspector
of Training (Major-General Lord Dugan) recommended the
sacking of the Commandant and Chief Instructor of the X
Corps School because they lacked drive and were too old,
Maxse was able to appeal to the C.G.S. (Lawrence) to ensure
their removal despite the opposition of the Corps commander
191(Stephens).
The appointment of Maxse as Inspector-General of
Training in 'revolutionising the whole of the training
arrangements',' 92 was intended by Dawnay to produce 'a
renaissance in tactics' and a return to the 'old pre-war
principles',' 93 providing the bureaucratic machinery capable
of producing uniform organisation and doctrine, which was
such a feature of the German Army. This was seen by Hunter-
Weston (VIII Corps) as 'one of the finest moves we made for
the improvement of our Army' 194 and by Hastings Anderson
188	 s, uMajor-General G.P. Dawnay, Appendix A , Duties of Inspector General of Trammg, G.H.Q.
O.B./2255, 20 June 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53/11, IWM.
189 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, Inspector General's Conferences, July - August 1918, Maxse
Papers, 69/53 12, IWM.
190 General Sir Herbert Lawrence, Record of a Conference ofArmy Commanders held at HESDIN on
Friday, 5th July, 1918, O.A.D.291 34 2, 5 July 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/33, PRO.
19% Major-General Lord Dugan, Visit to Xth Corps School, 28 August 1918; General Sir Ivor Maxse to
General Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, 29 August 1918; General Sir Reginald Stephens to Lieutenant-
Colonel JC.H. Hamilton, 25 September 1918, Stephens Papers 69/70 1, IWM.
192 Major-General G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 14 June 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 2 1/3, IViM.
193 Dawnay to his wife, 17 September 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21 3, IWM.
194 Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 18 October 1918,
Maxse Papers, 69 53 12, IWM.
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(M.G.G.S., First Army) as providing 'the benefit of uniform
organisation in the battalion and training'.'95
It has been that Maxse, as Inspector General of
Training, 'radically recast the tactical doctrine on lines
that followed but improved on the new German tactics' 196
is doubtful, however, that there was enough time to make a
radical difference in the short time between Maxse's
appointment in July 1918 and the beginning of the British
counter-stroke on 8 August 1918. For progressive commanders
little that Maxse taught was radically innovative. For
example, having spent all day at a 'demonstration & lecture'
by Maxse, Strickland (1st Division) saw 'nothing new in
it'.' 97
 Maxse's main impact was as a conduit throughout the
army for a more systematic dissemination of tactical
doctrine, which had been developed in 1916-17. Solly-Flood
had 'introduced many drastic changes in Training & in
methods of attack & defence' and later claimed that 'Maxse
got all the kudos & all the rewards, but it was not he who
198did the work'.
Solly-Flood had a point. The assumption that the Army
lacked any structure for training the New Armies in France
and suffered from an anarchy in training doctrine until mid-
1918 ignores the fact that a large number of training
schools were already established within the B.E.F. and that
' Major-General W.H. Anderson to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 14 October 1918, Maxse Papers,
69 53/12, IWM.
'Sir Basil Liddell Hart to Captain G.C. Wynne, 17 June 1958, Wynne Papers, LHCMA.
' General Sir Peter Strickland, Diary, 16 August 1918, Strickland Papers P.362, IWM.
Major-General Arthur Soily-Flood to Bngadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 26 November 1930, CAB
45 137, PRO.
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a Directorate of Training had been in existence since early
1917, producing manuals and pamphlets and making a very
significant contribution to victory. The increasingly
skilled performance of the British on the battlefields of
1917 and 1918 rested on the training which began in some
cases as early as 1915 but in all cases began in real
earnest in late 1916 or early 1917, when the British Army
began to concentrate much more on training after the jolt of
the Somme in 1916. Thereafter, there was much more emphasis
on training as the war progressed and generals realised its
overwhelming importance.
The phenomenon of a collapse in tactical expertise is
often ignored in assessing the achievements of the British
Army during the First World War. It is perhaps no small
coincidence that it was not until late 1917, three years
after the beginning of the war that the British were able to
be on equal terms with the Germans and a similar length of
time was to pass until the Battle of Alamein in 1942 when
the British were to find a winning formula in the Second
World War. A new British Army rose swiftly out of the blood
and mud of the Somnie campaign. The events of 1917 provided
the British commanders with further battle experience and,
sound tactical theory aside, it was training within the
schools system, which ensured the battlefield efficiency and




The First World War was shaped by dramatic developments
in communications, transportation, and weapons technology
and by the impact of that new technology upon tactics. The
war on the Western Front, often portrayed as a mindless
slugging match, was actually surprisingly dynamic at the
tactical level. The failure to conduct significant
manoeuvre at the tactical level was the root cause of the
inability of armies to achieve strategic success during the
First World War. Successful operational manoeuvre depended
directly on success at the tactical level, specifically
conduct of tactical manoeuvre. Much of the war was spent
searching for the means to restore mobility to the
battlefield and to smash the enemy's ever-more complex
defences.
The British faced the problem of how to break down the
German defensive system. This tactical problem was defined
by one regimental officer, who had served on the Western
Front, as 'how to surprise, overrun, and penetrate a well-
sited defence system some four miles deep, the front edge of
which was only a short distance from one's own, protected by
massive wire entanglements and covered by the flanking fire
of machine-guns and a wall of fire from artillery and
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mortars of all calibres sited in depth' . Robertson
(C.G.S., G.H.Q.), outlining the British difficulties during
the war, noted in 1915 that 'these Germans are dug in up to
the neck, or concreted' in 'one vast fortress, without any
of the disadvantages attaching to it' so that 'attack on a
narrow front & we are enfiladed at once' while an 'attack on
a wide front is impossible because of insufficient
ammunition to bombard and break down the defences' •2
As early as September 1914 the 4th Division noted that
'the Germans handle their machine guns very skilfully' .
German machine guns were 'most admirably handled' and 'most
difficult to discover' causing 'more than half' of the
British casualties at Neuve Chapelle. 4 Early in the war the
British 'had not been able to find a satisfactory antedote'
to machine-guns but commanders, such as Rawlinson, were
confident that if they could 'only find a way of silencing
these weapons' their task 'would be easy for their infantry
are poor creatures, mostly Landsf.6 The British had to
slowly and painfully learn the best ways of overcoming what
one staff officer called 'our arch enemies'.1
4-L4-
'Major-General R.C. Money quoted by Major-General E.K.G. Sixsmith, British Generalship in the
Twentieth Centuiy, p.157.
2 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Lieutenant-General Sii Launcelot Kiggell, 20 June 1915, Kiggell
Papers N/i, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General J.A.L. Haldane, 10th Brigade, to 4th Division, 26 September 1914, and 4th Division
G. 100 to Ill Corps, Suggestions for Short Instructions for Benefit of Formations and Individuals arriving
in the Theatre of War based on the Experience gamed in the Campaign, 28 September 1914,
4 Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 32, LHCMA.
General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 23 March 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 17,
PRO 30 57.
Rawlinson to Kitchener, 23 March 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 17, PRO 30 57.
6 Rawlinson to Kitchener, 5 June 1915, Kitchener Papers WB/22, PRO 30 57.
' General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 30 April 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
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By the end of 1916, it was recognised that 'what have
most impeded our advance during the recent fighting on the
SOMME have been machine guns manned by alert and determined
men, firing from shell holes and other positions which
cannot be identified, behind, and well clear of, the enemy
trenches' •8 The Fourth Army concluded from the fighting of
1915-16 that 'the chief danger the infantry have to face is
the machine gun' which to avoid the creeping barrage on the
front and support trenches were now 'placed several hundreds
of yards behind the enemy's front line' and 'difficult, if
not impossible, to locate before the attack commences',9
being 'hidden, not in substantial emplacements, but in
grass, hedges, shell holes etc, where they are difficult to
locate, and so destroy' .j
Once the infantry got beyond the carefully prepared
artillery support, they were unable to exploit the initial
success beyond the village of Neuve Chapelle to seize the
Aubers Ridge. As Haig's Artillery Adviser at First Army
reported after the battle, the failure of the infantry to
advance beyond Neuve Chapelle was not the result of a lack
of determination but the result of the failure of the
artillery to keep up with the infantry after the initial
bombardment and to the strength of the German machine gun
8 Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston to Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, 29 October
9 1916, Butler Papers 69 10/1, IWM.
Notes on the Lessons of the Operations on the Somme as regards Infantry Attack formations and the
Employment of Specialists, Fourth Army No. G.S. 360, 1 December 1916, Maxse Papers 69 53 8A,
IWM.
'°	 A.A. Montgomery to XIII, XV and LX Corps, Fourth Army No. 264(G), 20 July 1916,
Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 48 16, LHCMA.
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defences which were in depth behind their front line
system." The attempt to rush through the German defences,
well entrenched and secured by machine-guns, failed because
the strong-points or hinges, which had to be lifted before
the defensive system could be toppled, remained intact.
In the most disastrous attempt to smash through the
German defences on 1 July 1916, the infantry advanced 'to
the attack in dense lines, almost shoulder to shoulder',
casting aside all previous training based on fire and
movement.'2 The lessons of the pre-war "fire with movement"
training, which emphasized that 'no movement towards the
enemy can take place, in modern warfare, unless the
advancing troops are covered by fire', were ignored and
resulted in heavy casualties. 13 Major-General R. Wanless
O'Gowan thought that 'G.H.Q. did not quite trust the
training of the Infantry' and was told by Sir Henry
Rawlinson just before 1st July that 'the attack must be made
in waves with men at fairly close intervals in order to give
them confidence; this was wrong & entailed heavy casualties;
the men would have done better in small groups & were quite
well enough trained to adopt that formation' as the 31st
Division had done 'quite a lot of musketry' and 'the
results, although they did not come up to the Old Army, were
M.G.R.A., First Army, Control of Fire during the Operations 10-16 March, 1915, undated, W.O.95/1 54,
PRO.
12 Lieutenant-Colonel G.C.W. Gordon-Hall to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 19 October 1934,
C.A.B.45 134, PRO.
Major O.M.T. Frost to Edmonds, 5 July 1930, C.A.B.45 133, PRO.
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not at all bad, especially in rapid firing'
	 This lesson
had to be relearnt during 1916-17.
The improvement in British tactical skill and the
ability to penetrate the German defences in 1917 and 1918
was the result of the adoption of a platoon organisation,
which gave the infantry its own weapons and emphasised a
return to fire and movement recommended by innovative
divisional commanders, such as Deverell (3rd Division),
Stephens (5th Division), and Maxse (18th Division), during
1916. In September 1916, Stephens advocated a new platoon
organisation of two rifle sections, including rifle
grenadiers, a bomber section and a Lewis Gun section to
replace the platoon of four rifle sections, which had been
employed on the Somme.' 5 Shea (30th Division) summed up the
main lesson of the fighting on the Somme as being that 'the
platoon will be the "fighting unit" and will be self-
contained' and that 'the object of this organisation and
training is to develop the use of all weapons in
combination' with each platoon having Lewis Gunners,
Bombers, Rifle-grenadiers ('its own "infantry artillery"'),
and riflemen so as 'to exploit to the full and in
combination all weapons, thus giving greater power of
offence while if possible employing fewer men' •16
The new self-contained platoon was designed to exploit
the increased fire-power given to the infantry by the rifle
'i Major-General R. Wanless O'Gowan to Captain Cyril Falls, 8 October 1938, C.A.B.45/1 16, PRO.General Sir Reginald Stephens, 'Lessons from the recent offensive Operations', c. September 1916, p.6,
Stephens Papers 69 70 1, IWM.
6 General Sir John Shea to Major-General Lord Loch, 8 December 1916, Loch Papers 7112 5, IWM.
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grenade and the Lewis Gun, which was 'a very valuable
addition to the fire power of a unit, especially in the
attack',' 7 to deal with enemy strongpoints and enable the
infantry to fight its own way forward. In February 1917
G.H.Q. laid down the organisation of the Battalion
constructed around a platoon of 1 Lewis Gun Section, 1
Bombing Section and 2 Sections of Riflemen, as the 'unit for
fighting and training' containing 'all the weapons with
which the Infantry is now armed',' 8 and provided guidance on
formations for the infantry in assaults which had
'frequently been employed with success in recent fighting'
and which were to 'be adopted throughout all Armies in
France , • 19
Within each platoon, the rifle-grenadiers were intended
to form half of the covering fire team, together with the
Lewis gun, while the assault team was made up of the hand-
grenade section and the rifle section. By the summer of
1917 the platoon, considered 'the principal unit of the
Army', was 'self-contained' and 'an army in miniature' with
its own fire support with 'the Lewis guns supplying covering
machine gun fire; the rifle grenadiers acting as artillery;
and the riflemen making the infantry assault' •20 One
Divisional Commander noted that 'too much attention cannot,
Field-Marshal Sir John French to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 8 August 1915, Kitchener Papers
WA/118 PRO 30 57.
18 Organization of the Infantry Battalion, G.H.Q. O.B. 1919, 7 February 1917, Montgomery-Massmgberd
Papers 93, LHCMA.
'9 Lieutenant-General L.E. Kiggell, The Normal Form ation for the Attack; outlining the principles to be
adopted throughout all Armies in France, G.H.Q. O.B.1919/T, 14 February 1917, Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
20 Capin A.O. Pollard, V.C., M.C., D.C.M., Fire-Eater: The Memoirs of a V.C., p.249.
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in my opinion, be devoted to training platoon and section
commanders in the co-operation of Lewis Guns, grenades and
rifle grenades for dealing with the hostile resistance'.2'
Abandoning the "bomb", infantry tactics from 1917 depended
on the rifleman and the Lewis gun working in combination and
the German machine guns ceased to intimidate.
S.S.143 recommended that the different weapons of the
four sections should be used in conjunction with riflemen
and bombers advancing on a flank while the Lewis gunners
gave covering fire and rifle bombers opened up 'a hurricane
bombardment on the point of resistance'. 22 An attack by the
1st Borders in January 1917 demonstrated such tactics.
Establishing a barrage of rifle grenades from the front,
Corporal Robins 'on his own initiative (but in accordance
with previous training) moved round' the flank of the German
strong point and brought 'his Lewis Gun into action
enfilading the rear trench' in order to cut off and force
the surrender of three German machine guns. 23 The capture
of Quarry Post by a company of the 5/Royal Berkshires (35th
Brigade, 12th Division) during the Battle of Cambrai on 20
November 1917 'was an example of skilful use of all the
infantry weapons of the period, a barrage of Stokes Mortars
and rifle grenades smothering the fire of defenders' •24
21 General Sir Reginald Stephens, Points from the late Operation [October 1917], p.8, Stephens Papers
69/70/1, IWM.
S.S. 143, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, G.H.Q. O.B. 19 19T, February
1917, Maxse Papers 69/53 11.
Major-General Beauvoir de Lisle, Report on Operation by 29th Division, January 27th, 1917, 29th
Division, 30 January 917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 93, LHCMA.
24 Bngadier..Genersl Berkeley Vincent to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 4 September 1944,
C.A.B.45/1 18, PRO.
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By late 1918 the principles of fire and movement were
was recognised as the 'bedrock of infantry tactics' with the
Lewis Gun section providing the 'fire' and the rifle section
the 'movement', with each platoon divided into two rifle and
two Lewis Gun sections. 25 The Training Leaflet No.4 issued
by I.G.T. in October 1918 gave six drill formations for
company and platoon commanders to train the two rifle and
two Lewis gun sections of platoons in fire and movement.26
G.H.Q. also stressed that Lewis gunners as 'the framework of
the infantry advance' were to 'be trained to push well
forward with the leading riflemen' and that 'every effort
must be made to teach them how to use ground and take
advantage of cover' •27
The years 1917-18 saw a new flexibility in British
attack formations as 'the infantry radically altered their
tactics', in which 'two lines of skirmishers acted as an
advanced-guard; loose groups followed, ready to manoeuvre
against strong points' •28 As early as July 1916 30th
Division noted that the 'best formation in which to advance'
was within 'small handy columns'. 29 XIII Corps emphasised
that 'small columns must be ready at once to manoeuvre round
and attack in flank and rear any parties of the enemy or
Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 1.G.T., to General Sir Herbert Lawrence, C.G.S., G.H.Q., 12 August
261918, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
Inspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No.4, Training Leaflets,
27 September 1918- February 1919, Crecy-en-Ponthieu, February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, 1WM.
S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.5, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers
92, LHCMA.
28
29 1igadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the RoyalArtillery, p.l&3, Anstey Papers, RAI.
Lieutenant-Colonel W.F. Weber, 30 Division G.902, 15 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers
47, LHCMA.
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strong points which hold up the waves in front'. 3° In 1917
XVIII Corps advocated 'a more elastic infantry formation for
the attack' employing platoons 'working in depth rather than
battalions stereotyped in waves' so that behind the initial
assault wave "worms" of 'little columns of units in depth'
were ready to "stalk" the enemy 'on a narrow front close to
the barrage'. 3' The Second Army noted that 'the waves of
attacks' employed at Ypres in late 1917 did 'not give
sufficient elasticity' to counter the new conditions being
experienced 32 and abandoning linear formations advocated
that the troops 'should move in small columns in file, the
formation which the nature of the ground forces the men to
adopt eventually'
Copying German infiltration tactics used at Arras,
Ypres and Cambrai in 1917 the 4th Seaforth Highlanders
developed 'the "Dribbling" method of attack in which,
'instead of advancing in waves parallel to the objective',
the attacking troops were 'deployed in sectional columns in
single file' and '"dribbled" forward in small numbers until
close enough to their objective to launch the final
assault'. The troops then advanced 'irregularly by short
rushes' while others provided covering fire 'to pick off
enemy machine gunners, and, by keeping up an accurate and
deliberate fire' kept the enemy's heads down. Such methods
3°XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.5, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
XVIII Corps No. G.S.70, 21 August 1917, Maxse Papers, IWM.
32 Major-General C.H. Harington, Further Notes On Operations, 26th Sept. and 4th Oct., 1917, Second
Army, 12 October 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
Major-General C.H. Harington, Comments On Operations, 20th Sept., 1917, Second Army, 28
September 1917, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
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were designed 'to reduce casualties' by limiting 'the
targets presented to hostile machine guns'. 34 By early 1918
the platoon attacked with either one section thrown out as
skirmishers and three sections advancing behind in single
file or "worms" or each section advancing in single file
preceded by its two scouts.35
By late 1917 it was expected that 'one or two
determined men' should be able to clear 'a fortified shell-
hole' with the bayonet and four men could 'take a "Pill box"
by fire and movement' 36 By August 1918 Maxse's I.G.T.
staff believed that '3 men can be a fighting unit' capable
'of "stalking" a hostile light machine gun' by fire and
movement. 37 Harper (IV Corps) advocated that platoons
should first 'locate the machine guns by means of patrols'
and then 'stalk them, under cover of Lewis gun and rifle
fire, until within close enough range to hit the team or the
gun with the bullet or rifle grenade'.38
Above all, frontal attacks were to be resisted.
Acknowledging that the temptation for officers who saw an
attack fail was to 'pour in more men is very great',
Stephens encouraged platoon and section leaders in 1916 to
4th Seaforth Highlanders, The Counter-Stroke: A Proposed Method ofAssembly and Assault, [1917],
Maxse Papers 69 53 10, IWM.
See Plate IA and Plate lB from S.S. 143, The Training and Employment of Platoons, 1918, G.H.Q.
O.BJ1919T, Februasy 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 11, IWM.
Some Notes Made by a Battalion Commander after our Successful Attack on Wurst Farm Ridge on 20th
37September 1917, no date, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General W. Dugan, Some Points brought out during a visit to 31St Division on 29-8-18, 29
3 kugust 1918, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, N Corps, September 1918,
Montgomery-Masssingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
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think 'of a way to get round the flanks'. 39
 The experiences
of Divisions on the Somme showed that rather than
reinforcing troops held up by 'carefully entrenched
positions with well concealed M.G. emplacements', which was
'usually inadvisable', it was better to aid the progress of
their neighbours 'by acting offensively and aggressively
against the flank of the enemy who is holding them up'
XIII Corps noted that 'all ranks' must have the idea of
outfianking enemy resistance 'so thoroughly ingrained in
them that they will be ready to press on to their own
objective irrespective of what occurs on their right or
left' 41
Stephens stressed in the training of the troops that
that 'any enemy resistance that is left must be overcome by
their own weapons' •42 The infantry were not to rely on the
artillery or tanks but were to employ fire and movement at
the platoon level to reach their objectives, making
intelligent use of the fire-power of the bomb, rifle
grenade, rifle and Lewis gun to overcome opposition. One
Divisional Commander in October 1917 commented that 'the
French method of capturing strong points by working round
them with Lewis Guns, which had been frequently practised in
training, 'proved most successful'. 	 If held up by
Major-General R.B. Stephens, Lessons from the recent offensive Operations [1916], p.5, Stephens
Papers 69/70 1, IWM.
° Major-General W.T. Furse to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, 9th Division, 26 July 1916,
Montgomeiy-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.5, Montgomery-Massmgberd Ptpers 47, LHCMA.
42 Major-General R.B. Stephens, [Bedfords at Falfamount 1916], p.2, Stephens Papers 69 70 1, IWM.
Major-General R.B. Stephens, Points from the late Operation [October 1917], p 8, Stephens Papers
69 70 1, IWM.
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opposition, platoons were expected under the new doctrine to
'obtain superiority of fire and envelope one or both flanks'
and also to help neighbouring units which were held up by
employing fire and movement tactics.
Experiences at Ypres confirmed that German strong
points were 'inclined to surrender when the attacking
parties begin to work round towards the rear of the
buildings'	 and that once attacking troops can outflank a
fortified position the defence cracks up at once'." Cator
(58th Division) emphasised in September 1917 that the 'flank
attack should be frequently employed in preference to the
straight-forward frontal attack from one line to another'
because 'it takes the enemy by surprise, strikes at his
weakest point, his flank, and affects the morale of his
troops, who do not put up such a strong resistance as when
frontally attacked'. It was important that during training
flanking manoeuvres 'should be thoroughly drilled into the
men so that on meeting with a point of resistance it becomes
a second nature to engage it from the front by fire with a
portion of the party told off for its capture, while the
remainder work round its flanks and behind it'. 47 XVIII
Corps concluded that 'surprise is to be the first and chief
consideration and all concerned should be reminded that the
44 £5. 143, Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, G.H.Q. O.B. 19191, February
45 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53/11.
Major-General H.R. Davies to Maxse (XVIII Corps), Narrative of Operations, 8- 30 August 1917, 11
Division No. G.S. 640, 5 September 1917, p.21, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8, IWM.
Some Notes Made by a Battalion Commander after our Successful Attack on Wurst Farm Ridge on
47 20th September, 1917, no date, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
Major-General A.B.E. Cator to Maxse (XVIII Corps), Narrative of Operations, 19-27 September
1917, 58 (London) Division No.G.S.1023 77/55, 18 October 1917, pp.1-2, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8,
IWM.
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Germans put their hands up directly they are attacked from
their rear', stressing that 'surprise is essential to
success' 48
By late 1918 tactical doctrine emphasised pressing
forward boldly without worrying about the flanks, and on
bypassing the enemy's defences to maintain the momentum of
the advance. As one division noted, failure to adhere to
'the principle of Infiltration' could mean that 'the whole
advance of a Brigade' was stopped 'because one or two
patrols have met with resistance'. Subordinate units were
reminded that 'where one part of the line is held up, troops
on the right and left should move on, and those points,
where resistance is least or non-existent, should be used as
means of filtering through supporting or strengthening
forces'
IV Corps stressed 'the advantages of being able to
manoeuvre reserve platoons into positions from which they
can surprise the enemy from a flank' and the importance of
mutual support, where neighbouring units held up by pockets
of the enemy holding out would be assisted by a flank attack
to clear such resistance. 5° Platoons were to capture their
objectives, not stopping until organised resistance was met,
regardless of their flanks and 'if one of the leading
platoons is definitely held up, and the other is still
Major H.E. Franidyn to 51st and 58th Divisions, XVIII Corps No. G.S.66 114, 28 August 1917, Maxse
Papers 69 53 11,IWM.
Lieutenant-Colonel W.S. Whetherby, 61st Division G.C.40 28, 2 September 1918, Maxse Papers
69/53/12, IWM.
° Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Guiding Principles in Tactics and Training for Platoon and Section
Commanders, IV Corps, 23 October 1918, Maxse Papers, 69 53/12, IWM.
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making ground, the supporting platoons drive home the attack
of the latter' in order to 'make a gap through which the
supporting companies can penetrate' 51
By the end of the war G.H.Q. emphasised that 'the idea
must not be allowed to gain ground, however, that an
offensive is impossible under any conditions without a
barrage of great density or without the co-operation of
tanks' and asserted that 'the infantry must never for a
moment be permitted to consider that it merely exists to
follow up an artillery barrage or to accompany a "tank
battle"' but was adamant that 'the infantry must always be
prepared to fight its way forward by means of its own
weapons, making use of all cover available to facilitate its
advance'. The successful conduct of a battle depended upon
the rapidity with which local successes was gained and
exploited and attacks were to be 'pushed to the fullest
extent possible' allowing an 'initial success' to be
'exploited at once by the bold and rapid intervention of all
available troops' taking every advantage of the enemy's
disorganisation' by pressing the attack 'relentlessly at
points where the enemy's resistance is weak' and employing
reserves 'where progress is being made and not in places
where the attack has been checked' •52 'Where an attack has
completely failed' the assault 'should generally not be
renewed until the defence has been shaken by further
51 Inspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No.4, Training Leaflets,
September 1918 - Februaiy 1919, Crecy-en-Ponthieu, February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
52 5S 135 The Division In Attack, pp.8-9 and 20-23, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
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bombardment, by the infantry fire fight, by the bringing up
of additional means of assistance to the infantry (e.g.
tanks), or by an enveloping movement'.53
By October and November 1918 the staff of the I.G.T.
were promulgating 'the system of exploiting the "soft
spot"' 54 at battalion level in which it was emphasised that
'the enemy's defences will not be equally strong along the
whole front' and that it was the task of platoons to 'find,
penetrate and exploit' these "soft spots". Leading platoons
were to push 'boldly forward regardless of open flanks' with
the object of bypassing 'organized resistance' to exploit
gaps in the enemy's defences and to outflank strong-points
and machine guns. This required initiative, determination,
skilful leadership and, above all, co-operation between
well-trained sections 'all steeped in the same doctrine and
working to one plan'	 The 38th Division in the crossing
of the River Selle in October 1918 employed these "soft
spot" tactics.56
When open warfare returned in the final advance of
1918, it became even more important 'not to push frontally
against his Machine Guns, but always to try to turn a
flank'	 Any platoon, which was held up, was not
53 S.S. 135, The Division In Attack, p.8, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers
92, LHCMA.
54 Bngadier-General W. Dugan, Notes on a Visit to llAmerican Corps, 10 November 1918, Maxse Papers,
69 5312, IWM.
" Inspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No.13, Training Leaflets,
September 1918 - February 1919, Crecy-en-Ponthieu, February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
Major-General H.D. de Pree, The 38th (Welsh) Division in the Last Five Weeks of the Great War,
Chapter III, p.473, Journal of the Royal Artillery, Volume LVffl, No.3, NAM.
Major-General R.B. Stephens, Lecture [September 1918], Stephens Papers 69 70/1, IWM.
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reinforced but was to provide covering f ire. 58 At battalion
level it was made clear that a supporting company 'does not
reinforce a company which is definitely held up, it supports
the company that is making progress' and that platoons were
to be detached 'to attack in flank the enemy who are holding
up neighbouring units'. 59
 The weaknesses and holes in the
enemy defences were to be exploited rather than reinforcing
previous failures. 60
 In November 1918, Braithwaite's IX
Crops 'forced the passage of the [Sambre] Canal at two
points' while putting down 'a barrage of smoke and gas on
the rest of the front' and then by 'striking outwards, the
defenders of the Canal were captured from the rear' by an
attack which was 'a complete surprise' 61
The Army could not just depend on superior infantry
tactics to win the war but had to develop the means of
either destroying or neutralising the enemy's defences - the
obstacles to a successful advance by the infantry. The
British spent 1915-17 searching for fire-power to support
the infantry's advance and the "weapons system" to unlock
the formidable defences on the Somme and at Passchendaele.
In early April 1917 one corps commander noted that the key
to success was a combined operation by the different arms
because 'our present troops, excellent as they are for a
Inspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No.4, Training Leaflets,
September 1918 - February 1919. Crecy-en-Ponthieu, February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
59 lnspector-General of Training, British Armies in France, Training Leaflet No.4, Training Leaflets,
September 1918 - February 1919, Crecy-en-Ponthieu, February 1919, Maxse Papers 69 53 12, IWM.
60	 W.R. Birdwood to Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse, 30 October 1918, Maxse Papers,
69 53 12, IWM.
61 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 5 November 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/37, PRO.
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regular attack on trenches, are not to be relied on when
anything like open warfare supervenes' and 'they can only go
forward safely covered by an artillery barrage and if
possible with the assistance of tanks' since 'Machine guns
are the weapons that trouble most when open warfare comes'
and 'with the present army, tanks, smoke and gas shell are
needful to neutralize them' 62
By the end of 1917 by developing along several learning
curves the British evolved tactics, which employed combined
arms to overcome the German defences. For example, the
capture of the Westhoek Ridge by the 74th Infantry Brigade
on 10 August 1917 took place under an artillery barrage
supported by 36 machine guns with the infantry surrounding
and capturing any strong points holding up the advance while
the inevitable German counter-attacks 'were annihilated by
our artillery and machine gun fire' 63 Employing a skilful
combination of overwhelming firepower and new infantry
tactics the British sought to undermine the German defence
in depth and return some mobility to the battlefield.
The successful advance by the 51st Division of 1,000
yards towards Poelcappelle in September 1917, stressed 'the
success of the methods employed to overcome the system of
defence in depth by concrete "pill-boxes" and shell-hole
posts' including incessant use of the rifle by the infantry,
barrages by the artillery both to support the infantry and
General Sir Aylmer Haldane to Field-Marshal Lord Plumer, 16 April 1917, Spears Papers 2 2, LHCMA.
Operations 10th, 11th August, 1917, 74th Infantry Brigade, [August 1917], Montgomery-Massmgberd
Papers 94, LHCMA.
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to neutralise the defences and counter-attacks, a barrage by
thirty-two machine guns, and the employment of twelve
tanks." Aircraft and tanks (new weapons developed during
the war) formed with the artillery and infantry (the
traditional arms) an all-arms team, which returned mobility
to the battlefield.
Gradually different weapons coalesced into one weapons
system in which co-operation between arms provided the
solution to breaking through the German defences. Harper
(51st Division) concluded that 'it is now proved that we can
blow the Boches out of any line & then hold it against
counter attacks' .	 In 1917 generals like Plumer showed at
Messines 'by use of siege methods' and at Broodseinde 'by
attacking on a narrow front with a thousand yards' deep
barrage, that a breach could be made', 66 employing the arms
in combination.
By early 1918 this team-work was well-established and
the British sought 'to establish a mastery over the enemy's
aircraft and artillery' and 'to protect the advance of our
infantry against rifle and machine gun fire by a moving
barrage of artillery and machine gun fire carefully
organised in depth' •67 Tanks were seen as one way 'to make
up to a certain extent for the lack of training on the part
of our troops, i.e. a poorly trained Division with Tanks
Major-General G.M. Harper to Maxse (XVIII Corps), Report on the Advance towards Poelcappelle by
the 51st (Highland) Division, 20 September 1917, undated, Maxse Papers, 69 53 8, IWM.
65 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 28 September 1917, Wilson Papers, IWM.
Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, Chapter XXVI, Edmonds Papers 111110 6, LHCMA.
S.S.135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B. 1635, January 1918,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
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will achieve what it would take a very highly trained
Division to do without tanks'. 68 The operations of the 5th
Division with the Third Army on 21 - 23 August 1918 provide
an example in which the infantry, artillery and tanks worked
in combination to overcome the German defences, notably the
German wire and machine guns, relying on the initiative of
junior officers to overcome difficulties and exploit
opportunities to advance or to aid the advance of others.69
Artillery, machine-guns, riflemen, and tanks had become
the four elements of an offensive team, which were an
essential part of any successful attack. The British high
command believed that success could only result from the co-
operation of all arms. By November 1918, G.H.Q. outlined
the now standard doctrine that the 'infantry must be
practised in co-operation with the artillery, trench
mortars, tanks, machine guns, and combat patrol aeroplanes,
which accompany them in attack' 	 When all these newly
developed weapons began to work as a team as they did from
1917, the Germans were unable to find an answer toJsheer
power of the British assault. During the advance after
September 1918 'the thickest barbed wire entanglements were
crossed, and the enemy seemed either disinclined or else
incapable of stopping us when we attacked under a
barrage' • 71
Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Butler, Memo., HI Corps, 24 May 1918, Butler Papers 69 10 1, IWM.
5th Division Report on Operations, August 21st - September 4th, pp.1-7, General Sir John Ponsonby
70 Papers 6306-69-1, NAM.
S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.5, G.H.Q. T/1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massmgberd
Papers 92, LHCMA.
Bernard Freyberg, A Linesman in Picardy, Chapter X, p.14, C.A.B.45 208, PRO.
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The British began to develop use of machine guns en
masse to provide covering fire for their infantry as one
solution to the enemy's own machine guns. Machine-guns were
employed from the Somme in 1916 onwards 'for overhead fire
to cover advancing infantry, for establishing barrages
against counter-attacks and for holding in advance of
captured trenches to cover consolidation' and to provide 'a
machine gun barrage for a depth of 1,000 yards' freeing the
infantry to deal with the enemy infantry. 72 Following the
experiences of the Fourth Army in the German retreat to the
Hindenburg Line, G.H.Q. noted in April 1917 that 'the value
of machine guns in covering the advance of troops with
enfilade, oblique, or overhead fire was most marked'
especially when employed 'well forward' .
By August 1917 the British were 'well ahead of the
enemy' in the use of 'barrages and covering fire, offensive
and defensive, by massed machine guns' which had 'been
brought to a high pitch of perfection' and could 'afford
very great assistance to an attack' and 'render counter-
attacks almost, if not quite, impossible' . 	 During the
Third Battle of Ypres Machine Gun barrages were employed in
both the offensive, covering 'the advance of the infantry to
each objective by searching the ground about 400 yards in
front of the Artillery barrage', and the defensive, placing
72 th Corps Notes on Information collected from various Sources including troops who have been
in the Recent Fighting, 31 July 1916, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
S.S.156, Notes on Recent Operations Compiled by G.S. Fourth Army, G.H.Q. O.B. 1782 A, April 1917,
p.6, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 51, LHCMA.
74 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to the five Army Commanders, O.B. 2089, 7 August 1917,
Haig Papers, W.O.256 21, PRO.
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'a protective barrage about 400 yards' in front of the
objective while it was being consolidated. 75 By 1918 the
main employment of machine guns 'to provide covering fire
for the attacking infantry' and 'to assist in the defence of
the position won and to repel counter-attacks', as well as
'to inflicting losses on the enemy and to reducing his
morale' with harassing fire by day and night, was well-
established.76
Crucial to success was the development of artillery.
By 1917 the British held 'the view that ground is gained by
the artillery, that ground is defended by artillery, that
battles are won by artillery and that battles are lost by
lack of artillery' . 	 Against a strong enemy with
interlocking defences there could be no hope of infiltration
tactics without a devastating avalanche of shells to shatter
the cement holding the corner stones of the defences
together. Fourth Army noted the importance of artillery to
the success of operations following its experiences on the
Somme, contrasting the successes on 14 and 27 July, notably
when the capture of Delville Wood 'was rendered a certainty
by the enormous concentration of guns - 1 Gun to three yards
- the Infantry assaulting under a barrage fired from over
200 Field Guns on a comparatively narrow front', with the
failures to take Guillemont because of 'the difficulties of
Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 69, 12 August 1917, Maxse
76 Papem, 69 53 8A, IWM.
S.S.135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B. 1635, January 1918,
77 Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 69, 12 August 1917, Maxse
Papers, 69 53 8A, IWM.
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concentrating artillery f ire'. 78 By 1918 'an effective 18-
pdr. barrage' was considered to consist of one gun per 20
yards against defensive lines with dugouts and one gun to 15
yards against shell-hole positions.79
When criticising generals for employing long artillery
bombardments to soften up the German defences, which put the
enemy on full alert, it is often forgotten that the
technology for predicted fire was first employed at Cambrai
in November 1917. From 1915 wire obstacles posed a
difficult dilemma because 'to "strafe" it with artillery'
simply led the Germans to expect an attack while if left
uncut it was difficult for the assaulting troops to enter
the enemy's trenches. 8° These problems were not solved until
1917 by the development of new technology and artillery
tactics as one important ingredient in the formula of
success in 1918. By the end of 1915 British hopes lay in 'a
greater development of artillery power rendered by an
increased supply of guns and ammunition, and a greater
experience in the handling of them' in order to produce 'a
really crushing and stunning artillery bombardment' which
'once commenced, will continue in ever increasing volume,
knowing no cessation or even pause until the time of assault
arrives, and which will then advance like a wave in front of
78 Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], p.5, Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 48 12, LHCMA.
79 Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, N Corps, September 1918,
Montgomery-Masssmgberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
80 Major CC. May, Diary, 22 January 1916, May Papers, IWM.
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the infantry - overwhelming all in its path' •81
Although the Germans had noted an improvement in the
way that the British artillery on the Sornme had 'registered
skilfully and inconspicuously', 82
 the British still employed
a long preparatory bombardment, which aimed at 'the
demoralisation of the enemy and the methodical destruction'
of his defences. 83 Haig 'undervalued the immense growth of
the German defensive system' which could no longer 'be
battered out of shape by a few hours' bombardment',84
especially as, without the artillery resources of 1917-18,
the Fourth Army 'were in fact short of artillery for the
task' they 'were asked to achieve' and were 'trying to reach
objectives which were out of the reach of our artillery' •85
Indeed, 'the inadequacy of the attack' and of 'the artillery
massed' for it which 'was the major cause of the failure of
the assault to penetrate more than a limited distance on the
first day' •86	 should be remembered that in 1916 the
French forces on the Somme, enjoyed an enormous advantage in
heavy artillery compared with Rawlinson 87 and that Foch,
their commander, 'had heaps of heavy guns and went forward
line by line on a time programme, and told his generals that
81 The IV Corps Artillery at the Battle of Loos, pp.27-28, December 1915, Montgomery-Massingberd
82 1pers 45, LHCMA.
S.S.486. Extracts from German Documents Dealing with "Lessons Drawn from the Battle of the
Somme ", General Staff (Intelligence) G.H.Q. 1aJ20958, 11 October 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd
83 Papers 49, LHCMA.
Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], p.6, Montgomery-
Massmgberd Papers 48 12, LHCMA.
Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.1 12, Anstey Papers, RAI.
Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.22,
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159 1, LHCMA.
Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.1 69, Anstey Papers, RAT.87 Colonel C.E. CaUwell to Colonel J.H. Boraston, 24 April 1926, Boraston Papers 7113 1, IWM.
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if anyone went beyond 1,000 yds he would turn him out',
losing only 5,000 casualties compared to 70,000 lost by the
British in July 1916 88
The Battle of the Somme produced one very important and
successful development: the creeping barrage, which was
employed on a large scale for the first time. 89 The
attacking troops hugged the creeping barrage as closely as
humanly possible in order to be 'on or under the edge of the
artillery barrage and ready to rush the trench the moment
the barrage lifts' as it was 'cheaper to lose men by our own
artillery fire than to give the enemy time to bring his
machine guns up from their dug-outs'. 9° The 19th Division
concluded that to keep the enemy's machine-guns quiet 'an
intense barrage must be put up just prior to the infantry
assault' and 'so accurately timed that the infantry
regardless of loss from an occasional 'short' round, can
advance under it and enter the hostile trench immediately
the barrage lifts'	 This lesson was emphasised by other
corps and divisions on the Somme and by the Fourth Army and
the creeping barrage and stationary barrages moving forward
according to a timetable had been established by the end of
1916 as 'the best basis on which to operate'.92
General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 7 July 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VHI, p.10, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2,
CCC.
90 IXth Corps Notes on Information collected from various Sources including troops who have been
in the Recent Fighting, 31 July 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Johnson, Notes on the Recent Operations - 2nd Phase: 20th - 30th July 1916,
19th Division, September 1916, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
92 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 19 December 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
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To attain the best results very close co-operation was
necessary between infantry and artillery, which took time to
develop. At first close liaison between the artillery and
the infantry was difficult to achieve. One Divisional
Commander on the Somme noted that 'with a few brilliant
exceptions Heavy Artillery observers were too far back and
too optimistic as to their probable performances' and
advocated a closer liaison between the artillery and
infantry. 93 Another noted the importance of the infantry
being supported by its own divisional artillery because the
tendency in which Divisions were 'of necessity put in very
quickly one after the other' and 'very frequently' supported
'by guns of another division' 	 prevented close co-operation
between the infantry and artillery. The Fourth Army after
the Battle of the Somme came to the conclusion that 'it is
distinctly advantageous that Divisions should be supported
by their own Divisional Artilleries, under the command of
their own C.R.A.s'.95
The lesson that good artillery co-operation was vital
seems to have been learnt quite well throughout the B.E.F.
by the later stages of the Somme but the Infantry were too
often 'required to conform their movements strictly in
accordance with the barrage programme', 96 reinforcing the
' Major-General G.T.M. Bridges, Some Further Notes on the Recent Operations, by the Divisional
Commander, 9 September 1916, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
' Major-General J.S.M. Shea to Major-General A.A. Montgomery, The Preliminary Notes on the tactical
Lessons of the Recent Operations, 10 August 1916, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], p.2, Montgomery-
% Massmgberd Papers 48 12, LHCMA.
Artillery Lessons drawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], pp.7-8, Montgomery-
Massmgberd Papers 48/12, LHCMA.
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tendency for tactics to be somewhat stereotyped and 'the
Artillery programmes were sometimes inclined to be too
"wooden", trust being implicit in the rather new Creeping
Barrage'	 Edmonds noted that 'an artillery barrage was
insufficient, it could not account for every enemy machine
gun; even the creeping barrage, dropping ahead of the
assault, when it came into practice in 1916, was
insufficient, except when employed on an immense scale' .
Commanders were already becoming aware on the Somme in 1916
of the dangers of 'trying to do every attack by barrage and
relying on stereotyped tactics' which meant that 'the Bosch
always knows by our barrage where we are going to attack and
when we are'. 99 Nevertheless, one Corps Commander
complained in November 1918 that 'Div. Genis. still, in some
cases, will not move forward without an artillery barrage,
and continue to order bdes, to make certain laid-down bounds
and "leap-frog" their troops during an advance', causing
delay and taking away responsibility and initiative from
brigadiers and their troops.'°°
As the war wore on, British doctrine laid great stress
on the need for the troops to operate behind a great weight
of artillery fire to neutralise rather than destroy the
defences. A movement away from long bombardments and a
return to the surprise bombardment, without registration
97 Lieutenant-Colonel G.P. MacClellan to Bngadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 115 March 1936,
C.A.B.45/132, PRO.
98 Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoir, Chapter XXVI, Edmonds Papers HhJ10 6, LHCMA.
Brigadier General T.H. Shoubridge to Major General F.I. Maxse, 30 July 1916, Maxse Papers, 69 53/7,
IWM.
100 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 8 November 1918, Haldane Papers, NIS.
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from a mass of guns assembled secretly, which ushered in the
employment of new tactics at Cambrai in November 1917,101
took longer to become established practice. The hurricane
bombardment of 6-8 hours used so effectively by the Germans
in March 1918 might have been employed by the British in
1917 but they were 'still obsessed with the idea that the
total destruction of all enemy defences must be achieved
before the attack' and were 'therefore still wedded to
lengthy preliminary bombardments of several days which
sacrificed all the advantages of surprise'.' 02 They only
gradually learnt that 'the main advantages to be derived
from Artillery fire was in its power of neutralising the
hostile rifle, machine gun and artillery fire, as opposed to
the destruction of trenches & obstacles' •103 Unfortunately,
the long preliminary bombardments employed in 1917
'inevitably indicated the general front of an intended
attack and allowed the Germans to reinforce his
artillery' 104
An attempt by Allenby (Third Army) prior to the Battle
of Arras to achieve a surprise, by employing a short, sharp
artillery bombardment rather than a week's bombardment which
had preceded the Somme attack,'° 5 met much resistance, being
opposed by G.H.Q. as inadequate to deal with the German
o' Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.85, Anstey Papers, RAI.
102 Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Notes For My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 3 1 85, LHCMA.
103 Alanbrooke, Notes For My Memoirs, Alanbrooke Papers 3 1 85, LHCMA.
'° Colonel S.W.H. Rawlins, A History of the Development of the British Artillery in France, 1914-18,
Rawlins Papers 1162, RAI.
R.H. Andrew to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, 13 August 1937, Ailenby Papers 6/V1116; General Sir
Charles Grant to Wavell, 21 November 1936, Allenby Papers 61V11126, LHCMA; see also Field-Marshal
Lord Allenby to his wife, 10 and 12 April, [1917], Allenby Papers 1 8 2 and 1 8 4, LHCMA.
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defences. Home (First Army) wished to employ a long
bombardment before the attack on Vimy Ridge and was
supported by G.H.Q. General Sir Arthur Holland (C.R.A.,
Third Army), who had instigated this plan, was promoted to
command the I Corps and replaced by a more conventional
officer (Major-General R. St. C. Lecky) in order to lengthen
the bombardment to forty-eight hours.'°'
G.H.Q. had some good reasons for opposing the idea of a
short, intensive bombardment. Calibration in the field
artillery was still rather elementary while flash-spotting
and sound-ranging were not very far advanced. Without such
aids the accuracy of unobserved fire attained at Cambrai and
afterwards was scarcely possible. Moreover, the high rate
of fire proposed for the short bombardment would have made
observation of fire very difficult from the ground or from
the air.'°7 Also all the Corps Commanders and their chief
staff officers and most of the Divisional commanders were
hostile to the scheme,'° 8 and fellow Army commanders, such as
Rawlinson, were also opposed to a forty-eight hours
intensive bombardment •109
Yet in the final analysis Allenby was correct about the
difficulties of wire-cutting because the wire on the
106 Extract from Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke to General Sir Clement Armitage, [1934], Spears Papers
2/3 2 LHCMA.
107 Field-Marshal Lord Allenby to Major-General Sir Edward Spears, 31 October 1934, Spears Papers
2 3/2, LHCMA; R.H. Andrew to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, 13 August, 1937, Allenby Papers 6/V1116;
General Spencer E. 'Tom' Hollond to Wavell, 4 December, [1936-1938], Allenby Papers 6/VIIJ3O and
6/V1113 1; General Sir Charles Grant to Wavell, 21 November, 1936, Allenby Papers 6/VII/26, LHCMA;
Extract from Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke to General Sir Clement Armitage, [1934], Spears Papers
23/2 LHCMA.
108 Captain Cyril Falls to Wavell, 10 December, 1936, Allenby Papers 6/V11123; General Sir Charles Grant
to Wavell, 21 November, 1936, Allenby Papers 6/V11126, LHCMA.
109 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 21 January 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC.
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Wancourt-Feuchy Line could not be cut in ten days, let alone
two or four. The Army in 1917 remained divided about the
best tactics to employ. While some, like General Sir
Beauvoir de Lisle thought with hindsight that it was quite
feasible for the troops to '"bullock through"' with the aid
of wire-cutters if the defence was adequately shell-shocked
by H.E. shells of large calibre guns and gassed (this was
precisely what the Germans did in their great offensives in
the Spring of 1918 when they did very little wire-cutting in
the battle zone defences) 110 others, such as Haldane
considered that there were not enough tanks available and
that the wire being 'exceedingly formidable' could not be
cleared by a short bombardment alone.' 1' General Sir Percy
Radcliffe (B.G.G.S., Canadian Corps) felt in hindsight that
'of course, we could never have got our infantry through the
old established defences, such as Thiepval or Vimy, after
only a few hours' bombardment' • 112
Nevertheless, from 1916 onwards new tactics were
developed which 'fixed the artillery doctrine which was to
be followed for the rest of the war and which was to form
the basis of post-war training'." 3 Following problems with
the quality of the ammunition issued to the artillery on the
Somme in 1916, when it was estimated that one shell in three
I0 Captain Cyril Falls to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, 10 December, 1936, Allenby Papers 6/V11123; General
Sir Beauvoir de Lisle to Wavell, 3 September, 1936, Allenby Papers 6/V/28, LHCMA.
General Sir Aylmer Haldane to Major-General Sir Edward Spears, 31 October 1934, Spears Papers
2 3 52-56, LHCMA.
112 General Sir Percy Radcliffe to General Sir Noel Birch, 8 July 1918, Colonel S.W.H. Rawlins Papers
1162, RAI.
113 Bngadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.229, Anstey Papers, RAI.
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did not explode," 4 the introduction of an instantaneous fuse
was eagerly awaited to improve the performance of the guns
employed on the Somme." 5 Moreover, use of the new 106 fuse
ensured that the advance was not hindered by the destruction
of the ground, which was so prevalent with the "delay
action" fuse used by the artillery upto 1917.116
Following the Battle of the Somme Fourth Army staff,
pointing out 'the paramount importance of the factor of
accuracy' for the artillery when supporting the infantry,
stressed the necessity of calibrating guns and correcting
for the temperature of charge and air; the barometer, the
wind; and the wear of the guns." 7 New equipment and methods
of sound-ranging, flash-spotting, survey, calibration,
photography were gradually developed and employed in 1917.118
By late 1917 the British artillery had become very efficient
employing new techniques such as calibration. By the end of
the war the calibration of each field gun, a procedure
available only to the Garrison Artillery before the war,
gave the accuracy required." 9 All these improvements were
the result of 'the slow evolution of an artillery doctrine,
which had been going on for three years'.'2°
" Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 9 March 1918, W.O.256 28, PRO.
115 Artillery Lessons ckawn from the Battle of the Somme, [November 1916], p.10, Montgomery-
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By mid-1918 the lessons of Cambrai had been learnt and
Birch (M.G.R.A., G.H.Q.) was stressing that a preliminary
bombardment should not hinder the advance by turning the
ground 'into a crater-field'. 12' By the end of 1918, in
order to ensure the advantage of surprise, British doctrine
stressed the importance of being able to either 'dispense
entirely with a preliminary bombardment, and to rely upon
other means, such as tanks, to crush passages through the
enemy's wire and to prepare the way for the assaulting
infantry' or to rely on a short bombardment 'of extreme
violence' to ensure 'not so much the destruction of the
enemy's defences as the demoralization of his troops, the
neutralization of his artillery, trench mortars and machine
guns, wire-cutting and the destruction of his observation
stations, command posts and centres of communication' 122
As Haig noted the 'excellent photos' taken by
aeroplanes meant that attacks could 'all be planned out
beforehand' in the minutest detail.' 23 Before the Battle of
Neuve Chapelle the Intelligence of the First Army employed
air reconnaissance to obtain tactical information about the
German defences.'24 Air reconnaissance was still in its
infancy in early 1915 using hand-held cameras but it
revolutionised military intelligence by enabling a close and
121 M.G.R.A.'s remarks on proof copy of S.S.214, Tanks and Their Employment in Co-operation with Other
Arms, [July 1918], W.O.158 832, PRO.
' S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.20, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd
Papers 92, LHCMA.
123 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 25 February 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 3, PRO.
124 Brigadier-General John Charteris, At G.H. Q
. , 24 February 1915, p.77.
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complete picture of the enemy's defences to be provided with
great precision.
Air power developed a new tactical function by
providing observation for the British artillery, locating
enemy defences and batteries, and reporting through "contact
patrols" on the positions of the advancing British troops.
Ultimately, such developments and improvements in the
handling of the R.F.C. greatly assisted the better
performance of the British artillery during 1917 and 1918.
As early as September 1914 'much use had been made of
observers in aeroplanes to locate the enemy's guns and
trenches, as well as to direct the fire of our own
artillery' •125 By 1915 aircraft were already very important
in providing "the eyes'T for the artillery, locating and
reporting the positions of enemy targets. From Neuve
Chapelle in March 1915 onwards aerial photography provided
photographic maps which gave a comprehensive picture of the
whole German defensive system so that for the first time in
history the British Army went into action with an intricate
map of the enemy's defences.' 26 During the Battle of Loos in
September 1915 'constant air photographs were taken to try
and locate machine-gun emplacements, strong points, etc.,
with considerable success' for the artillery.' 27 During the
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 18 September 1914, Haig Papers, W.O.256 1, PRO.
H.A. Jones, War in the Air, Volume II, pp.87-9 I; General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Wars and
27 
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I Brigadier-General A.A. Montgomery, Lecture given on action of IV Corps at Loos, 25th September
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Battle of the Somme the R.F.C. issued 45,000 photographic
prints while 19,000 negatives were taken.'28
'The value of daily aeroplane photographs' which were
'taken and developed' each day was noted by the XIII Corps
who also stressed the importance of close co-operation
between the artillery and the R.F.C. observers.' 29 Fourth
Army concluded that 'the great development in combined and
artillery and aeroplane work' on the Somme required that
'increased importance' be given 'to thorough cooperation
between these arms'.' 3° Following the experiences of 1917,
two manuals, S.S.l31 and S.S.135, published in December 1917
and April 1918 respectively,' 3' outlined the important
contribution which aircraft provided for the all-arms team,
notably locating targets for and directing the artillery's
fire, reporting the dispositions of both the British and
enemy infantry, and providing intelligence for the high
command.
Ground support, another important facet of airpower,
was developed in 1916-17. The Germans noted that on the
Somme 'the enemy's airmen were often able to fire
successfully on our troops with machine guns, by descending
to a height of a few hundred metres' and were keen to learn
the 'lesson to be learnt from this surprisingly bold
' 28 Field..Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 28 November 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 14, PRO.
129 XIII Corps, Lessons Deduced, [August 1916], p.2, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 47, LHCMA.
' 30 Haig, Diary, 28 November 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256/14, PRO.
'' S.S. 131 Co-operation ofAircrafl with Artillery (December 1917) and S.S. 135 Co-operation between
Aircraft and Infantry (April 1918).
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procedure on the part of the English airmenv.'32 By August
1917 R.F.C. low-flying aeroplanes were co-operating with the
infantry by attacking the enemy's infantry, artillery,
trenches,' 33 and corps commanders, like General Sir Ivor
Maxse, were advocating 'a more extensive use of low-flying
aeroplanes' in order not only 'to attack strong points,
nests of machine guns, infantry advancing or massing for
counter-attack, and the personnel of enemy's batteries' but
also 'to deal with the enemy's anti-tank guns and forward
batteries' which otherwise would prevent 'the effective use
of Tanks in large numbers' 	 By late 1917 close air
support was already commonplace.
During the German Spring Offensive low-flying aircraft
played an important part, notably in March and April 1918
when the 'concentration of every available fighter on low-
flying action' against the enemy breakthrough '"froze up'
the German advance'.'35 The importance of air power and
British dominance of the air was shown during the last
months of the war when the R.A.F. 'had the upper hand of the
Bosch the whole time' and 'had some extraordinary good days
on the back roads in the Bosch area shooting down guns and
transport'.' 36 At the end of the war G.H.Q. noted that 'the
'32 SS478 (Translation of a German Document), Experiences of the IV German Corps in the Battle of the
Somme During July 1916, G.H.Q. Ia/20245, 30 September 1916, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 49,
LHCMA.
Adv. H.Q. R.F.C., 'A Review of the Principles Adopted by the Royal Flying Corps Since the Battle of
the Somme', 23 August 1917, W.O.256 22, PRO.
'34 Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 70, 21 August 1917, Maxse
5 Papers, 69 53/8A, 1WM.
' See J.C. Slessor, Air Power and Armies, p.105; Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Military
Operations: France and Belgium, 1918, Volume IV, pp.323-327 and 380 et seq.
136	 A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
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essential preliminary to all other aerial work is to gain at
least a local and temporary superiority in the air' but once
that had been achieved 'offensive action against enemy
troops and transport by means of machine gun fire and bombs
by low flying machines' became 'feasible and must be
vigorously undertaken' •137
The tank helped to give more mobility on the
battlefield because as one Brigadier-General on the Somme
commented 'they produced the effect of fire superiority for
which we are otherwise entirely dependent on the artillery
and produced it at the time and place required as the action
progressed' .'' Another Brigadier noted that the tanks
provided the means once again 'to surprise, mystify, and
hoodwink your enemy' for they 'could take the place of heavy
guns, which would otherwise be wanted to cut the wire, and
which would give the show away by their mere presence on the
roads weeks before they opened f ire'.' 39 By early 1918 the
tank ('a mechanically propelled armoured battery') was a
major component in a successful assault, providing the
mobility, security and offensive power with which 'to reduce
resistance to the infantry advance' and 'to offer local
protection to the infantry attack'.
Close co-operation between tanks, artillery, and
infantry was essential to take 'full advantage' of 'the
' 37 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.29, G.H.Q. T/1635, November 1918, Montgornery-Massmgberd
Papers 92 LHCMA.
138 Brigadier-General H.C. Rees, 11th Brigade, to 4th Division, 3 November 1916, p.2. Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 48 3, LHCMA.
' Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Croft, Three Years With The 9th (Scottish) Division, pp. 146-147.
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opportunities Tanks may create' and also to protect the
tanks from enemy anti-tank guns.'4° G.H.Q. maintained that
'tank units must be trained to co-operate with other arms in
the attack' '' and 'if tanks were to be used to the best
advantage, there must be the closest co-operation between
them and other arms'. 142 In breaking down 'organized
resistance, the tank was allotted two separate roles in co-
operation with the infantry: either to replace the barrage
or to accompany the infantry to deal with particular strong
points.'43 At the end of the war doctrine decreed that 'in
addition to assisting the advance of the infantry across the
enemy's organized system of defences, the tank in open
warfare was 'rapidly to exploit any success which had been
obtained by disorganizing the enemy's reserves and breaking
up his communications' •144
However, tanks were extremely vulnerable to enemy fire
and mechanically unreliable in 1916-17 and an intense debate
occurred within the British hierarchy over their employment.
The correct operational employment of tanks was evolved in
1917 and gradually their strengths were acknowledged. It
was the tanks from 1917 and particularly in 1918, which in
the close support role delivered the hammer punch allowing a
'40 S.S.135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B./1635, January 1918,
Montgomeiy-Massmgberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
' S.S.135, The Division In Attack, pu, G.H.Q. T 1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massmgberd
Papers 92 LHCMA.
'42 S.S.214, Tanks and Their Employment in Co-operation with Other Arms, p.3, August 1918,
W.O.158 832, PRO.
' Lieutenant-General G.M. Harper, Notes on Tactics and Training, IV Corps, September 1918,
Montgomery-Masssingberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.7, G.H.Q. T/1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massmgberd
Papers 92, LHCMA.
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breakthrough. G.H.Q. concluded in December 1916 that 'in
the present stage of development, tanks must be regarded as
entirely accessory to the ordinary methods of attack, i.e.,
to the advance of Infantry in close co-operation with the
Artillery'	 At Arras in early 1917 'the tanks owing to
shortage of numbers and poor tactical employment achieved
very little'.'46 During the Third Battle of Ypres 'the Tank
was being used outside its limitations' 	 and 'many were
frittered away in the Ypres salient'.'48
In August 1917, Maxse was advocating that the
employment of tanks 'to neutralize strong points, nests of
machine guns and generally to facilitate the task of the
infantry' and as a means 'of economizing man-power and
minimising casualties'.' 49 New artillery tactics combined
with better tank techniques to provide the means to unlock
the German defences but this was only made finally clear by
the success by the British at Cambrai on 20 November 1917
and the great offensives of the Germans in the spring of
1918. At Cambrai tanks were used in large numbers for the
first time, making passages in the wire for the infantry and
demoralising the German defenders.' 5° They were, however,
'45 s.S. 135, Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive Action, issued by the General Staff,
December 1916, p. 41, Major-General Sir Hugh Bruce-Williams Papers 77 189 6, IWM.
' Major Hon D.G. Fortescue to Captain Cyril Falls, 6 February 1938, C.A.B.45 116, PRO.
'Preliminary Report on Tank Corps Operations with the Third Army 20th Nov. - 1St Decr. 1917, Tank
Corps S.G..500 233, 14 December 1917, Maxse Papers 69/53/12, IWM.
General Sir Charles Bonharn-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter LX, p.41, Bonham-Carter Papers, CCC.
I Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse to Fifth Army, XVIII Corps No. G.S. 70, 21 August 1917, Maxse
Papers, 69 53 8A, IWM.
'°Brigadier-General J. Hardress Lloyd, Report on 3rd Brigade Tank Corps Operations with Third Army
Nov. 20th to Nov. 27th 1917, 3rd Brigade Tank Corps G.S. No.1140, 22 December 1917, and
Preliminary Report on Tank Corps Operations with the Third Army 20th Nov. - 1st Decr. 1917, Tank
Corps S.G..500 233, 14 December 1917, Maxse Papers 69 53/12, IWM.
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vulnerable to German machine gunners and artillery suffering
heavy casualties.'5'
Many British commanders simply had not learned how to
employ tanks properly. Although recognising that tanks were
useful for mopping up and dealing with machine guns,
Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell in August 1917 felt
that 'a check must be kept on the enthusiasts'. 152 As late
as February 1918, when Major-General Sir John Capper
(Director-General of Tanks, War Office) came to breakfast to
enlist his 'sympathy in Tanks', Rawlinson 'would have none
of him'	 As late as July 1918 some of the Staff at G.H.Q.
were alleged to be not yet convinced of the tank's value and
to be holding Haig back in developing them.' 54 But attitudes
did change. In June 1918 a converted Rawlinson was
employing demonstrations to encourage 'the Australians to
understand and appreciate the Tanks' • ' Montgomery
(M.G.G.S., Fourth Army) was enthusiastic about the
employment of Mark V tanks on 4 July 1918 at Le Hamel 'which
helped enormously to save casualties' •156
By August 1918 Britain had 18 tank battalions in France
to support 54 Divisions or a ratio of 1 to 3•157 Haig
himself notified Lawrence (C.G.S.) in August 1918 that
151 Notes on the Offensive against Cambrai, unsigned, no date, Maxse Papers 69 53/8A, IWM.
152 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to General Sir Hubert Gough, 7 August 1918, Kiggell Papers
v/i 14, LHCMA.
General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 3 February 1918, Rawlinson Papers 1 9, CCC.
154 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 9 July 1918, Haldane Papers Acc.20250, NLS.
Rawlinson, Diary, 30 June 1918, Rawlinson Papers 111, CCC.
156 Major-General A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 8 July 1918, Montgomery-
Massingberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
'"Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Military Operations. France and Belgium, 1918, vole V,
pp.521-34.
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Byng's Third Army was to be provided with the latest Mark V
tanks in order to 'carry out a surprise attack on as large a
scale as possible with the object of breaking the enemy's
front & disarranging his plans' •158 Haig was generous in
praising the Tank Corps for its contribution to the final
victory, noting in his dispatch of the final months of the
war that 'since the opening of our offensive on 8 August,
tanks have been employed on every battlefield and the
importance of the part played by them in breaking up the
resistance of the German infantry can scarcely be
exaggerated'. 159 Montgomery noted in October 1918 that 'the
tanks have been of very great assistance to us, and there is
no doubt they are a great adjunct to an infantry attack,
although they will not win the war by themselves, as some
people seemed to think at one time' •160
The tendency to see the British as 'enthusiastic but
tactically incompetent schoolboys',' 6' in contrast to German
soldiers who are almost always perceived as incomparable
tacticians ignores the British tactical expertise prior to
the war and development during the war as part of a
continuing learning curve. The tactical innovation achieved
in 1916-17 has, unfortunately, been obscured by the lack of
operational progress and heavy losses in the mud of Ypres in
' Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, 12 August 1918,
Lawrence Papers, NLS.
' 59 Ljeutenant .Colonel J.H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches (December 1915 - April 1919), 21
December 1918, p.302.
'°	 A.A. Montgomery to Major-General J.S.M. Shea, 28 October 1918, Montgomery-
Massmgberd Papers 91, LHCMA.
161 B.I. Gudmundson, Stormtroop Tactics, p.175; see also Martin Samuels, Doctrine and Dogma, pp.152 if.
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late 1917 and by the contrasting rapid German advance in the
Spring offensive of March 1918. In reality in tactical
affairs the Germans had been overtaken by the British
tactics of late 1918 and were unable to provide an answer to
their new firepower and tactics of infiltration.
By the end of 1917 the British had developed a modern
doctrine of offensive warfare for the era of the machine gun
and artillery fire. The emphasis was on flexibility and
elasticity and much depended on the initiative of junior
officers and battalion commanders. To do this took time and
much training but the fact that the British Army was able to
do so by 1918, forging a powerful weapon which was able to
manufacture the victories of the Last Hundred Days, suggests
that the British Army and its leadership was much more
impressive and effective than a concentration on the poor
performances of 1915-17 alone would suggest. The faults
exposed by the failures during the period of 1915-17 serve
as an important contrast to the successful application of
all-arms co-operation in 1918. Prior to 1918 the British
were seeking an unlimited breakthrough success, which was
simply impossible to achieve at that time.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
A Strategy for Victory
The foremost strategic problem for the British high
command during the early years of the war was that of
conducting a successful strategic offensive and here was the
biggest learning curve of all. The British high command
lacked the experience at the operational level to control
the large battles, which occurred during the Great War, and
this was reflected in a poor operational performance during
1915-17. It was at this operational level that much of the
damage to reputations would be inflicted and the British
proved to be least well-equipped to adjust to the problems
of trench warfare. This inexperience of the operational
level was a recurrent problem dogging the British Army until
1917, which accounts for the failure to gain tangible
results until 1917-18. During this process the British Army
was hobbled by a serious doctrinal controversy in which the
Army's doctrine of seeking a quick, decisive victory had to
conform to the harsh reality of tactical stalemate in the
trenches. As a result, stunning displays of all-arms co-
ordination at Broodseinde and Cambrai were executed in
something of a strategic vacuum.
Part of this learning curve required the development of
G.H.Q. from what was essentially an Army Headquarters into a
large staff of the type, such as S.H.A.E.F. during the
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Second World War, capable of managing continental operations
on an unprecedented scale. By 1918 the enormous staff of
the Quartermaster General alone could be likened to a great
modern industrial organisation such as Shell or I.C.I.' The
growing pains of G.H.Q. were reflected in the mediocre
performance of 1915-17 while it is surely no coincidence
that when G.H.Q. was at last functioning properly in 1918
victory was finally achieved.
The British lagged behind the Germans badly in
developing the bureaucratic apparatus at G.H.Q. to analyse
problems, 'some branch whose chief duty it is to think',
which was noticeably absent in the British Army in 1915_17,2
and was not able to catch up with the dynamic leadership of
Ludendorff until 1918. As an institution G.H.Q. was hastily
and imperfectly improvised during mobilisation and did not
function properly as the "brain" of the Army during 1914-15.
Matters were made worse by personality clashes within the
General Staff.
Following Henry Wilson's outspoken behaviour during the
'Curragh Mutiny' in March 1914, Asquith's Liberal government
had vetoed his appointment as C.G.S. at G.H.Q. by Sir John
French and Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray was
brought in from 2nd Division to be C.G.S., although
originally intended to be Quartermaster-General, and Major-
General Sir William Robertson was given the post of
'Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars. pp.5-6.
2 Brigadier-General C.D. Baker-Carr, From Chauffeur To Brigadier, p.89.
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Quartermaster-General. 3 As a result, 'G.H.Q. was almost
entirely staffed from the M.O. Directorate', with Colonel
G.M. Harper as G.S.O.l, and having worked with Wilson (the
Sub-Chief) for years they continued to regard him as their
chief and looked to him for orders' while Murray, the C.G.S.
'a comparative stranger, knowing nothing of the plans drawn
up with the French, was in a position of the greatest
difficulty' . Murray complained later that 'the senior
members' of the G.H.Q. staff 'ignored me as far as possible,
continually thwarted me, even altered my instructions' .
Matters were not helped by the fact that, although
possessing a thorough knowledge of staff duties in general,6
Murray was 'by nature petulant' and 'difficult to work
with', 7 being cordially disliked by his subordinates 8 as
'incompetent, cantankerous, timid & quite useless' . Murray
and Harper were continually rowing 10 and on 24 August
Harper 'let his personal feelings get the better of him' and
'stuck his toes in the ground refusing to do anything for
Murray and consequently Lord Loch had to write messages even
though it was not his job which caused a most unpleasant
"atmosphere" as Harper resented it'	 Henry Wilson had to
intervene to persuade Sir John and Murray from sacking
Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, pp.1 95-196; General Sir Walter
Kirke, Lieut.-General Sir George Macdonogh, G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., p.6, Kirke Papers, IWM.
General Sir Walter Kirke, Lieut.-General Sir George Macdonogh, G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., p.6, Kirke
Papers, IWM.
General Sir Archibald Murray to Glyde, 22 December 1930, Spears Papers 2/3 77-85, LHCMA.
6 Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, p.1 98.
Major-General Lord Loch, Diary, 24 August 1914, Loch Papers 71/12 1, IWM.
8 General Sir Henry Rawlmson, Diary, 4 December 1914, Rawlinson Papers 11, CCC.
Brigadier-General Philip Howell to his wife, 27 February 1915, Howell Papers IV C 3 115, LHCMA.
'°	 Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 14 September 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
H Loch, Diary, 24 August 1914, Loch Papers 7 1/12 1, IWM.
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Harper.'2 It was 'rather sad' and 'deplorable' that Murray
was still making distinctions between members of the General
Staff, and 'talking of "my men" and "his men" after working
together for a month'
There were also complaints that French surrounded
himself with a personal staff, including Colonel the Hon. W.
Lambton (Military Secretary), Colonel Brinsley Fitzgerald
(Private Secretary), Lieutenant-Colonel Fitzgerald Watt and
Captain F.E. Guest (A.D.C. ․ ), who lived in his quarters in
St Omer replacing his official staff. Few shared Sir John
French's high regard for this personal staff who were seen
by outsiders as being 'such awful courtiers',' 4 'very
stupid' and 'making mischief like old women'.' 5 One
regimental officer felt that G.H.Q. was 'full of the most
extraordinary scaliwags', who were 'no use to anyone & get
in many people's way' 16 Lord Esher warned Sir John French
that this '"War Cabinet" requires strengthening' and that
the King regarded his advisors as trouble-makers.'7
Sir John French required a strong personality as C.G.S.
to offset his limitations, notably his lack of staff
experience. Murray was also insufficiently robust, fainting
at one point 'when some bad news came in' ' at St. Quentin
of Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand at Le Cateau on 26
12 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 7 September 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 18 September 1914, Clive Papers 1111 24, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General Philip Howell to his wife, 27 August 1915, Howell Papers N C/3 216, LHCMA.
' Margot Asquith to Field-Marshal Sir John French, 2 July 1915, French Papers, IWM.
16 Howell to his wife, 28 September 1914, Howell Papers IV C/3 70, LHCMA.
Lord Esher to Sir John French, 26 June 1915, French Papers, IWM; M.V. Brett (ed.), The Journals and
Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher, Volume III, pp.247-248.
s General Sir Henry Rawlinson Diary, 30 October 1914, Rawlinson Papers 11, CCC.
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August 1914. As a combination Sir John French and Murray
were 'between them quite unable to size up a position or to
act with constancy for 24 hours' 19 and often 'were out
motoring & playing the ass all day' •20 Murray became 'a
cipher at G.H.Q.' 21 with Sir John French ignoring his
General Staff 'chiefly because Murray is incapable of
managing them and getting any good work out of them' •22
'Rendered useless, because the C.G.S. does not represent
them', 23 G.H.Q. was 'incapable of organising an attack on a
large scale' 24
The performance of G.H.Q. during the retreat from Mons
when it panicked and fled from St. Quentin to Noyon without
notifying its change of address to the Corps, 25 was
inglorious. Major-General Lord Loch, G.H.Q. Liaison Officer
with II Corps, felt that G.H.Q. had 'lost their heads' and
that an order to throw away ammunition so as to carry men on
wagons' had merely 'put the cap on the demoralisation' 26
General Sir Aylmer Haldane (10th Brigade) witnessed the
demoralising effect of 'such a mad order' on the 4th
Division. 27 In early September 1914 the General Staff at
19	 .Field-Marshal Sir Hemy Wilson, Diary, 28 September 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
20 Wilson, Diary, 6 September 1914, Wilson Papers, IWM.
21 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 28 November 1914, Rawlinson Papers 11, CCC.
22 Rawlinson, Diary, 6 December 1914, Rawimson Papers 11, CCC.
General Sir Sidney Clive Diary, 29 December 1914, Clive Papers 1111/82, LHCMA.
a Rawlinson, Diary, 6 December 1914, Rawlrnson Papers 11, CCC.
Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, Memoirs, August 1914, Edmonds Papers 111/9 5-6 and 11,
LHCMA; Wilson, Diary, 27 August 1914, Wilson Papers DS/MISC 801V, IWM; Lieutenant-Colonel
R.M. Luckock, Lecture IV, Mons and the Retreat, p.1 5a, Lectures on the Western Front in The Great War
to the Staff College, Camberley, February 1920, Dill Papers (Old List) 3 2, LHCMA.
Major-General Lord Loch, Diary, 28 August 1914, Loch Papers 7112 1, IWM; see also Luckock,
Lecture IV, Mons and the Retreat, pp.1 5-1 5a, Lectures on the Western Front in The Great War to the
Staff College, Camberley, February 1920, Dill Papers (Old List) 3 2, LHCMA; Brigadier-General Sir
James Edmonds, Memoirs, War: August 1914, Edmonds Papers 11119 11, LHCMA.; General Sir Horace
Smith-Domen, Memories of Forty-Eight Years Service, pp.416-417.
27 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 28 August 1914, Haldane Papers, NLS.
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G.H.Q. were 'in the depths of gloom' preparing to retreat to
the Bay of Biscay 28 that the French Liaison Officer with
British Army told G.Q.G. that the B.E.F. had lost all
29
cohesion.
When eventually sent home in January 1915 and replaced
by Robertson, 3° it was felt that Murray had been 'intrigued
out' by Henry Wilson, who 'got French influence to bear with
Sir J. F[rench] ,31 The French Government was indeed
heavily involved in his replacement. 32 Robertson admitted
after the war that, although tempted by the extra pay, he
had not wanted the job because he knew that he was not the
first choice and that the Commander-in-Chief had previously
asked for Wilson to succeed Murray. 33 Like Murray,
Robertson's influence was diminished by Sir John French's
tendency to listen to Henry Wilson, who dined at French's
personal table, while Robertson was relegated to a junior
Mess, 34 although his predecessor had lived with the
Commander-in-Chief and had no separate mess of his own.35
As C.G.S., Robertson was hampered by an 'unofficial
adviser', a rival 'of similar rank' but 'totally different
temperament', 36 whose relationship with the Commander-in-
General Sir George Macdonogh to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 16 March 1927; see also
Edmonds, G.H.Q. Pessimism during the Mons Retreat, undated, C.A.B.45 129, PRO.
Brigadier-General E.L. Spears, Liaison, 1914, p.240.
3° General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 25 January 1915, Rawlinson Papers 1/1, CCC.
General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS; Field-Marshal Sir Douglas
Haig, Diary, 22 January 1915, Haig Papers.
32 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 29 December 1914 and 21 January 1915, Clive Papers 1111 82 and
88-89, LHCMA.
B Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, p.21 8.
General James Marshall-Cornwall, Haig As Military Commander, p.13 8.
B Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, p.222.
3° Clive, Diary, 13 October 1915, Clive Papers 1112 68, LHCMA.
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Chief was especially close and cordial having been in his
confidence in 1914 more than any other member of G.H.Q.'s
Staff. 37 Wilson was believed to be an 'agent provocateur'
attempting to remove Robertson 'whom he dislikes'.38
Relations further deteriorated when the removal of Harper 'a
close and trusted friend of Henry Wilson'	 was 'carried
out in a very untactful way', 4° fuelling a mutual antagonism
41	 .	 .	 .	 42between Robertson, who was 'suspicious' and 'hostile',
and Wilson, who was 'rather upset by the changes made in his
absence' touring the French front.43
Substantial changes in personnel were made by
Robertson, who although accused of picking staff officers
like Perceval 'who will do nothing but just what they are
told', 44 selected a team of talented staff officers, such as
Macdonogh (B. G. I.), a man of 'many outstanding talents'
and Maurice (the B.G.O.), who possessed 'quite exceptional
talents' 46 and was seen by a French staff officer as one of
the few flexible British staff of ficers. 47 But problems
remained, however, with the performance of G.H.Q. as the
central bureaucracy of the B.E.F. during 1915. Despite
Major-General Sir C.E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Volume I, p. 205.38 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 30 June 1915, Haldane Papers, NLS.
General Sir Walter Kirke, Lieut.-General Sir George M.W. Macdonogh, G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., p.3,
Kirke Papers, IWM.
4° General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 29 January and 8 February 1915, Rawlinson Papers 11, CCC.
' Rawlinson, Diary, 12 June 1915, Rawlinson Papers 1 3, CCC.
42	 Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 8, 18, 26 February, 6 and 21 March, and 2 and 6 May 1915,
Wilson Papers, IWM.
General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 28 January 1915, Clive Papers 1111 90-91, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General Philip Howell to his wife, 8 February 1915, Howell Papers IV C/3 108, LHCMA.
Kirke, Lieut-General Sir George M.W. Macdonogh G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., p.6, Kirke Papers,
WMK1O, IWM.
Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal, p.22!.
Clive, Diary, 22 March 1916, Clive Papers 1112/141, LHCMA.
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their talent, these officers were inexperienced in the staff
work required in continental warfare. Major-General Sir
Frederick Maurice admitted after the war that difficulties
were caused at the Battle of Loos by the inexperience of
G.H.Q.'s Staff in operational matters.48
Maurice and his Operational Staff were very active in
writing papers discussing the new tactical realities	 but
attempts by these officers to think change tactics in 1915
floundered on the opposition of Sir John French, who
continued to believe in the efficacy of the cavalry on the
modern battlefield and 'still adhered obstinately to the
idea of hordes of mounted men sweeping over Europe' so He
allowed his favourite, Haig, to continue to pursue the
chimera of the breakthrough. French remarked that
'sometimes a Staff must be made to understand that a General
intends to conduct a Campaign in his own way or not at
all', 51 and Haig noted in March 1915 how Sir John made a
point of seeing him alone in order to underline Robertson's
lowly status as an administrator, who carried out rather
than instigated policy.52
But, above all, Sir John French, 'un beau sabreur of
the old-fashioned sort' 	 and 'a brave fighting general'
48 Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 10 January 1926, CAB
45 120, PRO.
See, for example, 'G.S. Notes on Operations 1915', W.O. 158/17. PRO.
50 Brigadier-General P. Howell to his wife, 16 January 1915, Howell Papers W C 3 103, LHCMA.
' Field-Marshal Sir John French to Field-Marshal Earl Kitchener, 15 December 1914, Kitchener Papers
WA/46, PRO 30 57.
52 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 17 March 1915, W.O.256 3, PRO.
Edrnonds, Memoirs, Chapter III, Edmonds Papers 111/8 and 111/10, LHCMA.
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who was 'out of his professional depths', 54 failed to
realise the necessity of employing G.H.Q. as a well-oiled
machine under his C.G.S. ready to give advice. Robertson
complained that 'Sir J. chopped & changed everyday & was
quite hopeless', 55 while Whigham (Sub-Chief) 'was very sick
as he had to cancel & then re-write his orders' .	 Indeed
G.H.Q. was split up for the Neuve Chapelle battle, the
Battle of Aubers, 57 and again for the Battle of Loos when
Sir John French established his advanced command post at an
inaccessible chateau near Lillers, leaving his C.G.S.
(Robertson) and staff at St. Omer, 25 miles away. 58 Sir
John French was not a Staff College graduate and he tended
to undervalue the professional training of staff officers.
With his extensive staff experience in many ways Haig
acted as 'his own Chief of Staff' and worked at his own
house, away from the offices of the G.H.Q. staff 	 while
the actual incumbent, Kiggell, seldom contradicted his
strong-willed leader and was more of a clerk than an
executive instrument, 60 having 'little to do except to see
things go smoothly'. 61 Although 'straight and charming',
Kiggell was 'unknown to the Army' and 'neither organises nor
assists the work of the Staff.62
54 Bnan Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, pp.301 and 313.
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 29 July 1915, Wilson Papers, IWM.
Wilson, Diary, 27 May 1915, Wilson Papers, IWM.
General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 16 March and May 1915, Kirke Papers, IWM.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 24 September and 9 October 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256 5-6, PRO.
General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 4 January 1918, Clive Papers 1114/88, LHCMA.
60 Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with [General] Sir Hubert Gough, 9 April 1935, Liddell Hart Papers
11 1935 72, LHCMA.
61 Brigadier-General John Charteris, At G.HQ., p.74.
62 Clive, Diary, 6 December 1917, Clive Papers 1114 80, LHCMA.
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Haig would not tolerate criticisms or suggestions from
his staff very easily. When in October 1917, Colonel
Rawlins frankly told him that if the Passchendaele offensive
continued, no artillery would be available for a 1918 spring
offensive, Haig reportedly went white with anger and said,
'Col. Rawlins, leave the room'. When Edmonds agreed with
Rawlins, Haig added: 'You go toot 63 This was the only
occasion when Edmonds heard anyone really stand up to Haig
and tell him the truth, noting that he could make
suggestions to Robertson or Macdonogh, but not to Haig.64
Kiggell would 'neither represent contrary views to Haig nor
decide between contrary views when representing Haig' .
Haig's staff was 'an excellent machine, formed to carry
out his ideas and intentions' they initiated 'nothing' 66
'Tavish t Davidson (B.G.O., G.H.Q.), although 'a charming
fellow' 67 and 'quite able', 68 lacked the necessary drive and
personality to influence the head-strong Haig and it was not
until Brigadier J.G. Dill became B.G.G.S., Planning in March
1918, that a permanent Plans sub-section was created and a
real grip was felt on the helm. 69 A small advance had been
the formation of a small planning team, a special sub-
division of the Operations Section at G.H.Q. consisting of
63 Bngadier..General Sir James Edmonds, 'Memoirs', Chapter XXVI, p.1, Edmonds Papers, LHCMA.
Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Edmonds, 1938, Liddell Hart Papers 111938 59, LHCMA.
65 Liddell Hart, Talk with Sir Hubert Gough, 9 April 1935, Liddell Hart Papers 111935/72, LHCMA.
Lord Esher, Diary, 1 June 1916, 2 16.
67	 G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 27 February 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21 3, IWM.
General Sir Walter Kirke to his wife, 6 February 1917, Kirke Papers, IWM.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter VII, p.13, and Chapter IX, p.6, Bonham-
Carter Papers 9 1-2, CCC; Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, Memoirs ofAn Unconventional Soldier, pp.140-
141; Liddell Hart, Talk with J.F.C. Fuller on 1 October 1929, Liddell Hart Papers 111929 Ib, LHCMA,
and Talk with General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, 12 December 1935, Liddell Hart Papers 11/1935/114,
LHCMA.
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Lieutenant-Colonel C.N. Macmullen and Major Lord Gort as his
assistant, created especially to study the problem of an
offensive in Flanders in January 1917. But the advice of
this section and that of Davidson (B.G.0) was often ignored,
notably in the planning for Third Ypres.
It was not until 'a reorganisation of the General Staff
at G.H.Q.' occurred with the replacement of Kiggell
(C.G.S.), Butler (D.C.G.S.), Maxwell (Q.M.G.), and Charteris
(B.G.I.) by Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Lawrence, Major-
General G.P. Dawnay, Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Clarke,
and Brigadier-General Edgar Cox respectively, 70 providing
new blood and new ideas in January 1918, that strong
direction and a well-balanced team emerged at G.H.Q.
Lawrence placed great stress on personal contact with
formations in the field, spending a great part of his time
visiting Army, Corps and Divisional H.Q.s informally.7'
Lawrence, 'cold and laconic', 72 with 'outstanding
ability', 73 'great strength of character and very clear
judgement'	 was, unlike Kiggell, an impressive and
significant figure. 75 Lawrence was adamant that he would
'certainly refuse to act on the same lines as Kiggell, who
had become rather like a superior A.D.C. & was absolutely
70 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 5 June 1918, Clive Papers 1114/133, LHCMA.
71 [Colonel Hon. I.L. Melville], Note on 'Gen. The Hon. Sir H.A. Lawrence', May 1960, Lawrence Papers,
NLS.
72 Major-General Sir John Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
General Sir Charles Bonham-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.13, Bonham-Carter Papers 9 2,
CCC.
' Brigadier-General John Chartens, At (3.H. Q. , p.286.7 Lieutenant-Colonel A.N. Lee, Memoirs, p.165, Lee Papers, 1WM.
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unknown in the army', 76 accompanying Haig on his visits to
the divisions, corps and armies in the field and in his
conferences with his French Allies and his Army
Commanders, 77 and insisting on having the right to attend
all conferences between Haig and other Staff Officers at
G. H. Q 78
Having accepted Lawrence against his will, Haig soon
began to appreciate him, 79 praising his 'cool judgement,
equable temperament, and unfailing military insight'.80
Very soon Haig had 'complete confidence' in Lawrence who was
allowed greater responsibility, for example in July 1918
sending reserves to aid the French when Haig was absent in
London. 8' Lawrence's integrity and wisdom certainly infused
a new spirit into the General Staff at G.H.Q. 82 producing
83
'an atmosphere of smooth and effortless efficiency'. 	 Haig
was not only better informed but also better advised.
According to Davidson, 'Haig & Lawrence never liked each
other either before or after 1918, but for the war in 1918,
they were a superb combination with the most supreme
confidence in each other' 84 working very closely together
in planning and execution of operations 85 notably 'the
76 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 5 January 1918, Clive Papers 11/4 89, LHCMA.
" Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 30 January; 7, 13, 15 and 27 February; 4 March; 28 and 29 April; 16, 17,
and 31 May 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/27, 28, 29 and 30, PRO.
78 [Colonel Hon. I.L. Melville}, Note on 'Gen. The Hon. Sir H.A. Lawrence', May 1960, Lawrence Papers,
NLS.
Sir John Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
J.H. Boraston, Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, p.240.
81 Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
82 General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall, Haig as Military Commander, p. 257.
Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
84 Davidson to Fulford, 4 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
85 Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
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August offensive, which smashed the Hun and smashed him so
badly that he never recovered, and from then on, it was
success after another for us' •86 In his final despatch Haig
noted that Lawrence had held the position of C.G.S. 'with an
unfailing insight, calm resolution and level judgement which
neither ill-fortune nor good were able to disturb'.87
Lawrence was an 'able man' with a 'pleasant and
tactful' manner remaining 'unflustered' at times of crisis'
and whose judgment 'was always sound' and 'unerring in
spotting the weak point of a case' but 'above all he had a
really good business head' 88 Colleagues found that they no
longer had to consult Haig on all matters now that they
could now get their 'work done with C.G.S. 'whereas
beforehand they 'could get nothing done, as K[iggell] would
not take responsibility' •89 Undoubtedly 'with his virile
personality Lawrence proved in the last year of the war a
more stimulating support for the Commander-in-Chief',90
running G.H.Q. '"like a well-oiled machine" ' and
providing 'complete coordination of planning & execution'
for the first time.92
At last G.H.Q. had a team capable of fighting a modern
war and much of the credit for its creation can be given to
Lawrence, who reorganized the General Staff and promoted new
Major-General S.S. Butler, Memoirs, p.39, Butler Papers, IWM.
Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Boraston (editor), Sir Douglas Haigc Despatches, p.350.
Butler, Memoirs, pL34, Butler Papers, IWM.
General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 5 June 1918, Clive Papers 1114 133, LHCMA.
9° Reverend G.S. Duncan, Douglas Haig as I knew him, p.'lO.
91 General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle, ReminLrcences of Sport and War, p.253.
92 Major..General Sir John Davidson, Notes on 'Haig & Lawrence', 3 March 1954, Lawrence Papers, NLS.
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and efficient staff officers to key jobs at G.H.Q., such as
93Dawnay, an 'exceptionally able' and 'first rate man' ;
Dill, 'a splendid staff officer'	 with 'a brilliant brain'
who was later C..I.G.S.;95 and Cox, more realistic than
96Charteris, was 'a very, very first class Chief of
Intelligence', 97
 and 'probably one of the best military
brains of his generation' whose impact 'at G.H.Q. was
striking' •98 Lawrence himself was willing to delegate power
to and open to ideas from such officers.99
The weakness of G.H.Q. as an institution was reflected
in the length of time needed to develop a strategy capable
of winning the war. Regarding the annihilating battle as
central to its war-fighting doctrine, the Army was
ideologically opposed to siege warfare stressing that 'since
the object of war can only be attained by the destruction of
the enemy's field armies, all fortress warfare must be
considered as subsidiary to that end', and advocated where
possible 'an attack without recourse to siege operations' •b00
When faced with the strategic alternatives of either 'bite
and hold' (siege) or breakthrough (conventional) operations,
the Army leadership was predisposed towards the latter
whereas the stalemate in the trenches increasingly
General Sir Charles Bonharn-Carter, Autobiography, Chapter IX, p.13, Bonham-Carter Papers 9/2,
CCC.
Bonham-Carter, Memoir, Chapter LX, p.6, Bonhain-Carter Papers, IWM.
Major-General S.S. Butler, Memoirs, p.34, Butler Papers, IWM.
General Sir Walter Kirke, Lieut.-General Sir George M.W. Macdonogh, G.B.E., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., p.9,
Kirke Papers, IWM.
Major-General G.P. Dawnay to his wife, 30 August 1918, Dawnay Papers 69 21/3, IWM.
98 Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, p.313, Anstey Papers 1159/10, RAI.
General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 2 and 6 March 1918, Clive Papers 1114 100-102, LHCMA.
Field Service Regulations, Part I, Operations. 1909 (Reprinted, with Amendments, 1912), General
Staff, War Office, pp.127-128, 157, 162-163.
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necessitated commanders focusing on the former. For much of
the war the high command was divided by this issue, which
was only finally resolved in late 1917.
In December 1914, one staff officer noted that 'opinion
is gaining ground that the way to work is to capture a
trench, organize its defence, and wait for a counter-attack,
which is sure to come; so as to make the Germans lose
heavier in the counter-attack than we lost in the attack'
As a battalion commander, Stephens believed that 'the
offensive actions of the past year have proved that it is
impossible to break through either the German or the Allied
lines, as they now exist, on the Western Front'. 102 The high
command, notably Haig, insisted on pursuing the unrealistic
aim of overrunning the German defences in one, huge blow in
pursuit of 'the apparently impossible break-through',103
which was to be the modus operandi until late 1917.
In March 1915 Haig attacked at Neuve Chapelle 'with the
definite objective of advancing rapidly (and without check)
in the hope of starting a general advance' 104 in which the
Germans were to be carried 'right off their legs' •105 The
operation at Neuve Chapelle was not planned as 'a very
limited objective,' 06 as the Corps Commander (Rawlinson) and
his two Divisional commanders wished, 'a minor operation'
101 General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 19 December 1914, Clive Papers 111 77, LHCMA.
I Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Stephens, Outline of a Scheme for a General Offensive, B.R.73, 24 December
1914, Stephens Papers 69 70 1, IWM.
103 General Sir John Burnett-Stuart, Memoirs, Chapter VIII, p.86, Burnett-Stuart Papers, LHCMA.
on Conference held at Bethune on 5 March 1915, First Army H.Q., W.O. 95/1 54, PRO.
' °5 Memorandum by G.O.C. First Army, 28 February, 1915, W.O.158 181, PRO.
106 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 2 March 1915, Haig Diaries, PRO.
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whose conception was 'to capture a trench here, or a trench
there', but as 'a serious offensive movement with the object
of breaking the German line' 107 to capture Aubers Ridge.'°8
Haig was convinced that a golden opportunity to push his
reserves through to capture the Aubers Ridge had been
squandered at Neuve Chapelle because of over-caution,
believing that 'if Rawlinson had only carried out his orders
and pushed on from the village at once, we would have had
quite a big success' 109
A consistent advocate of siege tactics and limited
objectives to wear down the Germans during the period 1915-
17, Rawlinson opposed Haig's breakthrough strategy. As a
result of his experiences at Neuve Chapelle, Rawlinson, was
'content with capturing another piece out of the enemy's
line of trenches and waiting for the counter attack',"°
believing that 'we can always take a line of trench 1000
yards long and hold it against counter attack' and that 'in
doing so we ought to kill 4 Germans for every one of our own
men' which 'raises our moral and lowers the enemy's' while
inflicting 'heavy losses on the enemy'
Rawlinson was convinced that 'if we had not tried to do
too much our losses would have been one quarter what they
were and we should have gained as much ground',' 12 believing
107 First Army, Notes at Conference held at Bethune on 3rd March, 1915, undated, W.O.95 154, PRO.
oj Memorandum by G.O.C. First Army, 28 February, 1915, W.O.158 181, PRO.
'°	 Earl Haig to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 2 April 1915, Kiggell Papers HhI
LHCMA.
"°	 Lord Rawlinson Diary, 14 March 1915, Rawlrnson Papers 1/1, CCC.
Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 1 April 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 18, PRO 30 57.
I 12 Rawimson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 1 April 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 18, PRO 30/57.
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that 'it was not in the first assault that the casualties
occurred but in the subsequent attacks on the various
prepared keeps and redoubts which the enemy had constructed
in the rear of their front line of defence' •h13 Haig 'would
have been better advised to content himself with the capture
of the village instead of going on with the attack' in an
attempt to break through and that 'had he been content with
the village we should have gained just as much ground and
reduced our casualties by three quarters'. 114 Such limited
objectives did not, however, result 'in any decisive victory
which could affect the final issue of the war' and 'only
very slowly forces the enemy's line back towards their own
frontier' 115
Noting that the British assault at Neuve Chapelle
'failed to penetrate the enemy's front', flu Cane (M.G.R.A.,
G.H.Q.) also advocated a series of limited attacks in which
'the first assault would be prepared and delivered as at
NEUVE CHAPELLE' but 'should not be pressed so far as to
carry the infantry beyond the range of artillery support'
and 'the first step should then be consolidated, counter-
attacks repelled and a fresh advance prepared for'. The
next step would 'take place as soon as possible' with fresh
troops and the process 'repeated till the enemy's resources
113 General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 15 March 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 16,
PRO 30 57.
"4 Rawrn Diary, 25 March 1915, Rawlinson Papers 11, CCC.
115 Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 1 April 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 18, PRO 30 57.
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are exhausted' and his resistance so weakened that 'a bid
for decisive victory' could be launched.'16
The General Staff at G.H.Q. developed the concept of
'two distinct operations', namely 'the preparatory action'
to use up the enemy's reserves relying on the fact that
'once the ground won has been consolidated' the inevitable
enemy counter-attack was 'likely to be far more costly to
him than to us' and that 'a series of attacks in the same
neighbourhood, if each is preceded by a careful registration
of the objective by the artillery' would result in 'a slow
but steady advance on our part from trench to trench,
unaccompanied by very heavy casualties' and 'the decisive
attack' to break through, 'carried out on the lines adopted
, 117
at Neuve Chapelle . 	 At the Battle of Aubers Ridge in
April 1915 the same mistake was made of 'hammering at the
enemy's defences' after the initial success losing 5000 men
for little gain whereas if the British had been 'content
with the capture of the Village and stopped at the end of
the first day' their losses 'would have been only 2300'
having 'killed twice that number of Germans."8
Thus, in 1915 the fundamental differences over
operational methods, which were to dog British planning
until late 1917, were outlined. The indecision over whether
it was 'a problem of moving warfare, checked momentarily by
field defences, as Haig thought' or a 'basic problem of
116 Brigadier-General J.P. du Cane, Memo. onNeuve Chapelle, pp.1-4, 15 March 1915, W.O.158 17, PRO.
G.H.Q., 'General Staff Notes on the Offensive', [April 1915], W.O. 158/17, PRO.
General Lord Rawlinson to Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener, 21 April 1915, Kitchener Papers WB 1 9A,
PRO 30 57.
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siege warfare, the methodical approach and the blasting of a
breach as Rawlinson believed'," 9 had a fatal impact on the
campaigns of 1916 and 1917, leaving a legacy of bitterness
over the British generalship during the war. In mid-1915
Hugo Montgomery (Oa, G.H.Q.) noted that each attack 'had
been gradually brought to a standstill by the arrival of
reserves on the defending side' and had merely pushed 'the
line back for a short distance at the expense of very heavy
casualties'. The enemy trenches resembled 'an elastic band
which can be pushed back with sufficient force but which it
is very difficult to break through' •120 Faced with stalemate
Montgomery also emphasised the distinction between 'a
"wearing" attack' to 'gradually draw in all the enemy's
reserves' and a decisive attack launched 'with a view to
breaking through' 121
The debate about the efficacy of limited and unlimited
objectives for an offensive was continued again during the
planning before the Battle of Loos. Noting that the French
had failed to take Loos village six months before and that
the Germans had fortified the area with great diligence
since, Rawlinson advocated a series of siege operations to
wear down the Germans, being 'strongly of the opinion that
the capture of Hill 70 cannot be undertaken successfully in
one rush, but that it should be divided into at least two,
if not three, distinct but consecutive operations' to take
" Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the RoyalArtilleiy, p.112, Anstey Papers, RAI.
120 Major-General H. de F. Montgomery, Siege Operations, pp.1-3, [May - June 1915], W.O.158 17, PRO.
121 Montgomery, Co-operation with the French m the Offensive, pp.1-2, 19 June 1915, W.O.158 17, PRO.
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the German front line, Loos village, and then Hill 70 over a
period of a week or ten days. 122 Once again Haig refused to
accept limited objectives and remained obstinately in favour
of a dramatic breakthrough; announcing that 'the enemy is to
be beaten on a certain length of front and driven out of it,
and must not be allowed time to reform in rear of the
captured trenches' by 'a violent and continuous action' 123
Haig promulgated 'the principle that men must go forward as
fast and as far as possible once the attack is launched' 124
and Gough (I Corps) stressed that 'this attack, by its
suddenness and the size of the force employed, is aimed at
capturing the enemy's second line, viz., HULLUCH-STAELIE-
125HAISNES, in practically one rush'.
In post-battle assessments IV Corps felt that lacking
'the means wherewith to carry out the big thing, then the
1st Army should have given a limited objective' 126 and
outlined the risks and advantages involved between the
alternative strategies. In 'the "all out" attack or the
attempt to break through the enemy's whole system of
defences at one rush', experience had shown that 'what we
gain in the first rush is the easiest gain and very often
much more than we are finally left in possession of' so that
'victory is almost as disorganising as defeat and no victory
' General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Proposals for the Attack of Loos Village and Hill 70, Fourth Corps
No.H.R.S.503, 22 August 1915, W.O. 95 157, PRO.
First Army G.S.164(a), General Principles for the Attack, 6 September 1915, W.O.95 158, PRO.
124 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 14 September 1915, Haig Papers, W.O.256/5, PRO.
125 General Sir Hubert Gough to First Army, I Corps No.494(G)51, p.2, 17 September 1915, W.O.95 592,
PRO.
126 [Brigadier-General A.A. Montgomery] to [Brigadier-General F.B. Maurice], H.Q. IV Corps, 13 October
1915, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 40, LHCMA.
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is more disorganising than one in which the attack is to go
"all out" and units start with the intention of going
forward until exhausted' •127 By contrast a limited objective
was 'by far an easier task' and offered a chance 'to inflict
local loss on the Germans' or 'to draw in as many local
reserves' but did not offer the same 'big results', which
had so narrowly been missed at Loos. 128
 In December 1915
Stephens, now a brigade commander, was 'very thoroughly
convinced that the surest way of obtaining decisive results
is not by attempting to break through the enemy's front at
one blow but by wearing down his power of resistance by a
methodical advance from trench line to trench line on a very
wide front'.129
Yet ironically Sir John French was replaced as
Commander-in-Chief by Haig who remained the main proponent
of the decisive battle. Gough complained that in 1916-17
that 'Haig's conferences were too big & too formal & Army
Commanders only attended to hear Haig's plans, never to
discuss them and 'there were not enough discussions, between
the H.Q. Staff and the Army Commanders concerned, - when we
could sit round a table with the maps before one, & really
thrash out the problems' 130 Most of the Army Commanders
127 [Montgomery], Lecture Given at Head-Quarters, 3rd Army, on 14th December, 1915 on action ofIV
Corps atLoos, 25th September, 1915, W.O.95 711, PRO.
1 Brigadier-General A.A. Montgomery, Lecture given on action of IV Corps at Loos, 25th September
1915, 14 December 1915, Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 45, LHCMA.
I Brigadier-General R.B. Stephens, Memo, to 8th Division, B.R.75, 25 December 1915, Stephens Papers
69/70 1, IWM.
130 General Sir Hubert Gough to Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds, 27 May 1945, C.A.B.45 140, PRO.
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were reputed to be scared of Haig 131 and since it was not in
his nature to seek counsel in 'marked contrast' to Allenby
and Kitchener, who were open to advice, Haig was 'as a rule
intolerant of any opinion that differed from his own'.' 32 It
was difficult for a subordinate to express criticism when
Haig resented opposing views or gratuitous advice, telling
Birdwood (Fifth Army) that '"I won't have anyone criticising
my orders"' 133
The General Staff at G.H.Q. noted in January 1916 that
'the lesson of the war up to date is that a carefully
prepared attack, if supported by an unlimited expenditure of
munitions, causes more loss to the defence than to the
attack in the first stages of the operation' but that 'owing
to the depth and strength of the defences, the attack loses
the advantages of the preparation and the artillery support
which it started with'. The inescapable conclusion was that
'operations intended merely to cause loss to the enemy, at a
less cost to ourselves, should not be pushed to the point
where effective artillery support is lost and where
disorganisation sets in'	 Haldane (3rd Division) also
advocated attacks 'with a limited oblective' to make 'the
enemy quit his front system of trenches and force him to
' Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds to General Sir Aylmer Haldane, 17 March 1931, Haldane Papers,
NLS; Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Talk with Edmonds, 23 September 1929, Liddell Hart Papers, 111929 15,
LHCMA; Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Diary, 12 July and 22 June 1916, Wilson Papers, IWM.
132 General Sir George Barrow to Field-Marshal Earl Wavell, [3 June 1938], Allenby Papers 6111T/3,
LHCMA.
' Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Tea with General [Sir John] Dill, 24 August 1931, Liddell Hart Papers,
11/1931/ic, LHCMA
General Staff, Generalfactors to be weighed in considering the allied plan of campaign during the
next few months, pp.2-3, 16 January 1916, W.O.158 19, PRO.
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move his heavy guns back' allowing the attackers to take
advantage of the enemy's disorganisation to consolidate and
prepare for another attack, envisaging a strategy of limited
attacks 'on front after front of Corps or Armies, so that
the enemy is constantly having to rebuild his line and shift
or lose his guns' becoming disheartened and allowing the
British to 'escape the heavy losses which invariably result
from pushing on after the first day of attack'
The War Office was opposed to 'a big push' in 1916 as
Kitchener preferred 'to continue small offensives with a
view solely to killing Germans' on the premise that it was
'impossible' to finish the war in 1916 and that 'it would be
unwise' to make 'an attack "au fond" incurring 50 or 60,000
casualties which could not be replaced' •136 While Robertson
concluded that 'we shd. not be helping the French by
throwing away thousands of lives in knocking our heads
against a brick wall' 137 and tried to persuade G.H.Q. that
'the road to success lies through deliberation' and 'nothing
is to be gained but very much is to be lost by trying to
push on too rapidly', believing that 'the thing is to
advance along a wide front step by step to very limited and
moderate objectives, and to forbid going beyond those
objectives until all have been reached by the troops
138
engaged'.
General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 25 March 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
136 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 29 and 30 March 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1 5, CCC.
General Sir Sidney Clive, Diary, 26 July 1915, Clive Papers 1112 26, LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, 5 July 1916, Kiggell
Papers IV/3, LHCMA.
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Aware that all his Corps Commanders were opposed to an
unlimited offensive on the Somme Campaign in 1916 and
thinking it 'wiser to adopt the limited one and to look to
winning this war in 19171,139 Rawlinson pointed out that the
depth and strength of the German defences in both the front
and second defensive systems and in the 'strongly fortified
villages' such as Mametz and Beaumont made a breakthrough
unlikely to succeed. Convinced that a breakthrough involved
'very serious risks' leaving the troops disorganised,
without effective artillery, and vulnerable to the German
counter-attack, Rawlinson once again advocated a series of
limited advances, aiming 'to kill as many Germans as
possible with the least loss to ourselves' by seizing points
of tactical importance with good observation which would
force the Germans to counter-attack 'under disadvantages
likely to conduce to heavy losses' and take full advantage
of the materiel superiority of the Entente over the
140Germans.
Yet Haig still planed 'to go for an unlimited
offensive' 141 in 'a gamble which involved considerable
risks'. 142
 Given the choice between a breakthrough battle to
gain decisive results and a battle of attrition to inflict
heavy casualties by limited but systematic advances, Haig
maintained his stubborn obsession with the elusive decisive
' 39 Genera! Sir Hem-y Rawlinson, Diary, 31 March 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1 5, CCC.
°Rawlrnson, Plan for Offensive By Fourth Anny, G.X.3 1, 3 April, 1916, W.O.158 233, PRO.
' Rawlinson, Diary, 23 May 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1 5, CCC.
142 Rawlinson, Plan for Offensive Operations by Fourth Army, Fourth Army G.X.3 1, 19 April, 1916,
W.O.158 233, PRO.
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battle. Dismayed, when studying Rawlinson's proposals for
attack, to learn that 'his intention is merely to take the
enemy's first and second system of trenches and "kill
Germans"', Haig determined that 'we can do better than this
by aiming at getting as large a combined force of French and
British as possible across the Somme and fighting the enemy
in the open'
Haig wished to 'attack the enemy vigorously on as wide
a front as possible' in order to capture the front line
system and then envelope the enemy's defences.' 43 Haig once
again wanted to overcome 'the whole of the enemy's defences
144 .in one rush as was attempted at Loos' 	 in the for lorn
hope of 'breaking the line and gambling on rushing the third
line on the top of a panic'.' 45 Haig was still inclined 'to
favour the unlimited with the chance of breaking the German
Line' 146 rather than an attack for limited objectives. In
July 1916 G.H.Q. hoped to 'first effect a breach in the
enemy's outer systems of defence' with the infantry and
artillery and then 'to exploit it without a moment's delay
and to the utmost of our resources' by 'at once pushing
mobile troops through the breach to operate to an y great
distance beyond it' •147
Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 5 April 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
General Sii Henry Rawimson, Plan for Offensive By Fourth Army, G.X. 3/1, 3 April 1916,
W.O.158/233, PRO.
Rawlinson, Diary, 1 April 1916, Rawlmson Papers 1 5, CCC.
Rawimson, Diary, 4 April 1916, Rawlinson Papers 1 5, CCC.
Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell, Notes of the Conference of Army Commanders on 18 March
1916, O.A.D.291 9, 24 March 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
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Haig criticised the methodical advance being planned by
the 18th Division because 'much valuable time' was being
lost and insisted that instead the 'men should be training
to go forward to the maximum of their power 148 and of
Hunter-Weston (VIII Corps) who 'was only going to take the
enemy first system to begin with, and proceed slowly stage
by stage' believing that 'if he attempts to do it piece by
piece, the enemy will bring on reserves (as the French have
done at Verdun, though surprised at first) and the position
will only be gained after great sacrifice of life'
In comparison the French Army 'went forward line by
line on a time programme', losing only 5,000 casualties
compared to the 70,000 lost by the British early in July
1916.150 Aware that the attack of the XIII and XV Corps at
Montauban succeeded because 'their task was less ambitious',
Major-General Hon. William Lambton (4th Division) noted that
in 'going for a big thing' in 'a very optimistic vein'
everything 'had to go like clockwork' •151 The success of
limited objectives was shown again on the Somme by the
successful attacks on 14 July and 15 September 1916, and
later at Vimy Ridge, Messines, and Hill 70 in 1917.
Clearly the tactical method of rigid adherence to time-
tabled attacks was ill-suited to the break through strategy
adopted by G.H.Q. but had possibilities if allied to a
148 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 12 May 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 10, PRO.
149 Haig, Diary, 7 and 8 April 1916, Haig Papers, W.O.256 9, PRO.
° General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 7 July 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
151 Major-General Hon. W. Lambton to [Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson], 18 July 1916, Maurice
Papers 3 5/28, LHCMA.
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strategy of limited objectives. Haldane concluded that,
since 'the enemy can always recover from a frontal attack
and hold another line', operations should concentrate on
taking positions to 'cause the enemy continual loss' and to
obtain good observation for the artillery, complaining that
by 'seeking to win their objective quickly', G.H.Q. had
failed to assemble sufficient troops to take advantage of
the lack of German reserves and were then forced to resort
to the dubious tactic of attrition, 'pure "Bludgeon work",
which is so frightfully costly'. Haldane advocated the
launching of 'a great feint attack' on the Somme 'as the
containing attack' to pin down German reserves before
launching another surprise attack without a preparatory
bombardment 'where the ground was suitable' and supported by
massed tanks to destroy the wire in order to break
through. 152
By early 1917 when the French under Nivelle 'talked
about "breaking through"' British generals were sceptical
having given up 'that catch word some time ago' 153 and
believing that 'you cannot smash right through deep and
strong defences in the course of a day' and a breakthrough
'in 24 to 48 hours' was 'most ridiculous' and 'entirely
wasted the lessons of the last two years and a half' •154
Comparing 'the school of the Great Offensive, of large
' General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 10 and 22 October 1916, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Field-Marshal Lord Byng to Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode, 30 May 1917, Chetwode Papers P.183,
IWM.
'' Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson to Field-Marshal Earl Haig, 20 April 1917, Haig Papers,
W.O.256/17, PRO.
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numbers on long fronts, for unlimited objectives' and 'the
school of small and sudden offensives with comparatively
small forces on limited fronts for limited objectives' and
concluding that 'both schools were wrong, and have been
proved wrong over and over again', Henry Wilson suggested
that 'a middle course of big operations on long fronts for
limited objectives' was 'by far the wisest plan', inflicting
'a maximum of damage to the enemy with a minimum loss to
ourselves' and keeping him 'in a state of constant tension
and anxiety' •155 But the most important idea - a series of
offensives along the whole front to exhaust and confuse the
enemy, which was the winning Allied strategy in 1918 - had
still to be fully formulated.
As the war progressed, there was considerable dissent
and debate grew within the army, as an alternative theory of
limited objectives emerged and gradually gained the
ascendancy over the breakthrough as the preferred
operational method, providing a template for generals, such
as Montgomery, to follow in the Second World War. The
doctrinal split within British operational planning came to
a head during the planning for the Third Battle of Ypres in
mid-1917. Lieutenant-Colonel C.N. Macmullen, leading the
small planning team created especially to study the problem
of a Flanders offensive, advocated the employment of limited
objectives carried out step by step within the range of
155 Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Note by Lieutenant-General Sir H.H. Wilson K.C.B., D.S.O., 30 April
1917, W.O.106 1512, PRO.
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powerful artillery support to capture the Passchendaele
Ridge. 156 This agreed with proposals for a limited offensive
in Flanders by the commanders on the ground, Plumer and
Rawlinson,'5' who concluded that the lesson of the Somme was
to refuse to allow the infantry 'to carry out an assault
unless the hostile trenches had been absolutely pulverised'
and to undertake 'only a very limited objective in depth' •158
But Gough and Haig had more ambitious plans to smash through
the German defence with one decisive blow.
In response to these ambitions Davidson (B.G.O.)
outlined limited operation, which was to prove so successful
for the British in 1917-18 in unlocking the German defensive
system, advocating 'a deliberate and sustained advance'
divided up into 'a succession of operations' to a depth of
not less than 1,500 yards and not more than 3,000 yards'.
This 'deliberate and sustained advance' was designed not
only to take advantage of the success of 'the first day's
operations' when the enemy was in 'a state of
disorganisation' but also to be 'in a position to deliver a
second and well organised attack'. An limited objective for
each successive step ensured that 'the infantry was not
pushed too far and that the objectives are well within their
reach' and that 'a good line of departure for the next
operation' was secured since experience showed that 'with
C.N. Macmullen, Summary of the proposed Northern operations in chronological
order, 20 February 1917, W.O.158 214, PRO.
Field-Marshal Lord Plumer to G.H.Q., 30 January 1917, W.O.l58 38, P.R.O. and General Sir Henry
Rawimson to G.H.Q., 9 February 1917, W.O.l58 214, P.R.O.
158 Rawlinson, Diary, 7 December 1916, Rawimson Papers 1 7, CCC.
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sufficient and efficient artillery preparation we can push
our infantry through to the depth of a mile without undue
losses or disorganisation'.
Davidson concluded that, if a series of such advances
were repeated every two or three days and the momentum
maintained, the cumulative pressure of the sustained
succession of blows would destroy the German reserves
without excessive demands being placed on the attacking
infantry. Believing that 'an "all-out" attack' to break
through was only viable when the enemy was beaten and in
disarray, Davidson questioned the feasibility of a decisive
offensive. Instead he promulgated a step by step advance
with limited objectives under the artillery's powerful
support to inflict maximum losses on the enemy strength and
morale while reducing to a minimum the casualties and strain
on the British troops. 159 Rawlinson also urged Haig 'to make
Goughy undertake deliberate offensives' so that the troops
did 'not go beyond the range of their guns or they will be
driven back by counter attacks' 160
Davidson's plea for limited objectives faced much
opposition from the proponents of the breakthrough. Gough
contended that limited objectives did not 'reap all the
advantages possible resulting from the first attack' .
Ambitious for 'an advance to THOUROUT and ROULERS' to
Major-General Sir John Davidson to the C.G.S., Operations by Second and Fifth Armies for the capture
of the Passchendaele-Staden Ridge, 26 June 1917, W.O.158 249, PRO.
'° General Sir Henry Rawlmson, Diary, 3 July 1917, Rawimson Papers 1/7, CCC.
161 Memo, by General Sir Hubert Gough on the G.S. Note of 26 June, addressed by General Davidson to
C.G.S., dated 26 June 1917, W.O. 158 249, PRO.
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inflict a 'decisive defeat upon the enemy',' 62 Gough remained
adamant that 'any thoroughly prepared attack can break
through any defences which the enemy can devise' maintaining
that 'the great initial success of the 1st July, 1916, 13th
November, 1916, and 9th April, 1917, are sufficient proof
that this claim is not too great'.' 63 Gough was confident of
reaching the third objective (Green Line), an advance of
3,500 yards, and hoped to each the Red Line beyond the
164fourth (Black Line) with battle patrols.
Haig over-ruled his own planners with 'the general
intention of wearing out the enemy' and 'the strategical
idea of securing the Belgian Coast and connecting our front
with the Dutch frontier' by first capturing 'the bridgehead
formed by the Passchendaele-Staden-Clercken ridge' and then
pushing 'on towards Roulers-Thourout, so as to take the
German coast defences in the rear' •165 Whereas Macmullen,
Plumer and Rawlinson 'had recognized that the problem before
them was a siege operation and wished to proceed step by
step, in a repeat of earlier 'rush tactics' Haig sought 'to
silence the enemy's artillery and burst a way through in one
assault'. Where 'the Operation Section urged a succession
of limited attacks; the Fifth Army proposed to go as far as
possible in the first rush, hoping to reach a depth of 5,000
162	 N. Malcolm, Fifth Army, Notes for Conference -24 5 1917, 23 May 1917, Maxse
Papers 69 53 8A, IWM.
163 Malcolm. Note by M.G.G.S. on principles upon which FifTh Army Commander proposes to carry out the
forthcoming operations, Fifth Army S.G.671 1, 7 June 1917, W.O.158 249, PRO.
164 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 21 July 1917, Rawlinson Papers 1/7, CCC; Memo. by General Sir
H. Gough on the G.S. Note of26 June, addressed by General Davidson to C.G.S., 26 June, 1917,
W.O.158 249, PRO.
165 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 14 June 1917, Haig Papers, W.O.256 19, PRO.
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yards, which would be beyond the range of all except the
heaviest artillery, in 8 or 9 hours'.'"
Once his breakthrough operations, which had been 'ill-
considered and the probabilities of success not sufficiently
weighed', 'proved an expensive fiasco' 167 Gough was forced
to repeat the small attritional attacks of the Sornme while
G.H.Q. rethought its strategy. More receptive to Davidson's
concept of limited objectives, Kiggell now considered that
it was 'beyond dispute that we should so limit each advance
as to ensure having fit and organised units at the end of
it' and that the British should only 'go all out',' 68 pushing
the advance and the men 'to the utmost limits' when the
enemy was beaten and 'so exhausted and disorganised that he
cannot hit back effectively'. Kiggell now suggested that
the offensive should consist of a series of consecutive
blows in which 'our furthest objective must be not only
within the power of our artillery, but within the power of
our infantry' allowing them to beat off the enemy counter-
attacks and to 'exhaust the enemy as much as possible and
ourselves as little as possible in the early stages of the
fight' 169
In reply Rawlinson once again outlined the choice
between 'a decisive battle with an unlimited objective' and
'a battle of attrition', which was 'by far the most suitable
Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the RoyalArtillery, pp.192 and 169, Anstey Papers, RAI.
167 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, War Diary, 4 September 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
168 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to General Sir Hubert Gough. 7 August 1918, Kiggeil Papers
V 114, LHCMA.
169 Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Kiggell to the five Army Commanders, O.B. 2089, 7 August 1917,
Haig Papers, W.O.256 21, PRO.
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at the present juncture', noting that the British had failed
'to carry out a battle of attrition on absolutely definite
lines, with successive objectives well within covering range
of artillery and well within the physical capacity of the
infantry'. Rawlinson contrasted attempts at breaking the
enemy line at Loos in September 1915 and on the Somme in
July and September 1916 (where 'although the crust of the
enemy's defence was broken' the over-ambitious objectives
had resulted in 'very heavy losses', 'disorganization from
which it took many days to recover' and 'a disheartening
effect on the morale of the troops, who felt that they had
been called upon to carry out tasks beyond the limit of
their powers') with limited operations at Longueval in July
1916, Vimy in April 1917 and Messines in June 1917 (where
'the objectives given were well within the physical capacity
of the troops' and 'they reached their final objectives with
their energies comparatively unimpaired, and consequently,
in a state to throw back any counter-attacks that were
likely to be put against them').
Rawlinson advocated delivering 'a succession of
carefully worked out hammer blows on the enemy at short
intervals with the object of definitely beating him to his
knees so that there is no question that his morale is
finally broken'. By relying on his artillery, Rawlinson
hoped to reduce the numbers of infantry assaulting, 'thus
economising troops and saving valuable time' so that greater
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reserves were available for the next phase of the attack.'7°
This strategy was implemented by Plumer's Second Army in
September and October 1917 and the final offensive, which
brought victory in 1918. Davidson's tactics prevailed as
Plumer (Second Army) began a series of limited battles,
which unlike previous battles planned as a single-action
breakthrough formed a succession of 'bite and hold'
operations to wear down the enemy over many days, leaving
the breakout and exploitation until a later, final phase
when the enemy was too weak to resist. Aware that German
tactics relied on the defence in depth and counter-
attacks,'71 objectives were selected to give 'the greatest
advantages to defeat the enemy counter-attack', which were a
'real opportunity for inflicting loss on the enemy', and
left the infantry 'in condition to consolidate and hold the
points gained' 172
Plumer's tactics employed a methodical advance in steps
with strictly limited objectives 'making four steps of
approximately 1500 yards each with each division on a
frontage of no more than 1000 yards' and 'to support them he
wanted his allotment of artillery doubled, asking for 1,339
guns and howitzers for the offensive front alone'. The
German defensive system 'failed with terrible losses against
'° General Sir Henry Rawlinson to G.H.Q., Fourth Army No.806 (G), 9 August 1917, Montgomery-
Massmgberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
''Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Mitchell, The Enemy's Tactical Methods East of Ypres, Second Anny
172 
Intelligence, 16 September 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 95, LHCMA.
Major-General C.H. Harington, Notes on Training and Preparations for Offensive Operations, Second
Army, 31 August 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 94, LHCMA.
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the systematic advances of Plumer'.' 73 During the battles of
the Menin Road (20 September), Polygon Wood (26 September),
and Broodseinde (4 October), the scale of success was
comparable with that of Arras or Messines in 1917 or Amiens
in 1918.
The battle of Broodseinde was 'by far the best thing
the Second Army ever did','74 notable as one of a growing
number of 'black days of the German army', in which their
entire front-line system was overrun with relatively light
casualties to the attacker.'75 The success of Second Army's
limited objectives, in which German policy of the counter-
attack 'suffered heavy losses and was quite fruitless',
forced a switch in German tactics to holding the front-line
in force.' 76 At last the British had got to grips with
German defensive tactics.
The year 1917 'witnessed the turn of the tide' not only
because 'those hammer blows were struck which led to the
final victory in 1918' 177 but also because the correct
operational methods had at last been adopted, using siege
tactics, providing a glimpse of the succession of battles,
which were to provide victory during the last Hundred Days
of the war in late 1918. Unfortunately, this success has
been overshadowed by Haig's stubborn refusal to cut his
' Brigadier E.C. Anstey, The History of the Royal Artillery, pp.180 and 169, Anstey Papers, RAI.
General Sir Charles Harrngton to Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, 9 November 1934, Maurice
Papers 3 2 7, LHCMA.
Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium. 1917, Volume H,
176 
pp.xi and 303.
Translation of 5th [German] Guards Brigade Order I.Br. 1125, General von Radowitz, 29 September
1917, G.H.Q. Ia/40569, 7 October 1917, Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 95, LHCMA.
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losses in October, once the weather had turned, continuing
the battle into the now infamous Passchendaele stage, in
which 'many thousand valuable lives' 178 were lost in 'rather
doubtful victories' 179
British planning had finally abandoned the breakthrough
as an operational method and the strategy of attacks on
multiple axes was developed. In early 1918 Stephens (5th
Division) proposed a strategy of 'many limited offensives
carried out as quickly as possible one after the other - as
fast as the guns can get there' but each offensive was 'to
be sternly shut down after the first success' because 'we
never lose many on the first day of a successful show, its
afterwards [that] the losses come' and the 'first days can
be so prepared nowadays that they are bound to succeed' •180
In marked contrast to Loos, the Somme and
Passchendaele, the Battle of Amiens was closed down by Haig
as soon as it was realised that the German resistance was
hardening, 181 switching the main axis of attack to the Third
Army area and attacking on the Scarpe on 21 August 1918.182
Haig refused to carry out Foch's order to continue the
Amiens offensive when informed by Lambert (32nd Division) of
growing resistance and also postponed the attack on the
Roye-Chaulnes front because Currie (Canadian Corps) and
178 General Sir Aylmer Haldane, Autobiography, Volume II, p.421, Haldane Papers, NLS.
Haldane, War Diary, 14 November 1917, Haldane Papers, NLS.
°	 Sir Reginald Stephens to Field-Marshal Sir John Diii, 6 March 1918, Dill Papers V8, LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, The Autobiography of a Gunner, p.34,
82 
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 159/I, LHCMA.
Field-Marshal Earl Haig to Lieutenant-General the Hon. Sir Herbert Lawrence, 12 August 1918,
Lawrence Papers, NLS.
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Rawlinson (Fourth Army) warned that it 'would be a very
costly matter' 183
Haig had by mid-1918 begun to give effective army
commanders, such as Rawlinson, and corps commanders, such as
Currie, Haldane and Monash, greater participation in
planning. For example, Rawlinson proposed the offensive at
Amiens launched on 8 August to Haig and when Rawlinson
suggested the discontinuation of the Amiens offensive Haig
agreed 'without a murmur' 184 Haig met his Army commanders
prior to the Battle of Amiens alone with his C.G.S. and 'had
a general talk for l hours' to discuss 'the policy and
future plans of the Generalissimo (Foch)' and 'they
appreciated the opportunity of being able to state their
views to me personally instead of before a number of staff
officers as on one of the periodical conferences with army
commanders and staffs' •185 Haig met his five Army commanders
and his C.G.S again on 30 August to tell them 'the general
plan decided on by Foch' in order that 'they might realize
that the enemy would be engaged by the Allied Armies on a
very wide front from now on' •186 Considerable power in the
B.E.F. had shifted to the army commanders, in particular to
the experienced Byng and Rawlinson. Later, Haig sent
Lawrence to see Home and Currie, 'to tell them that I have
no wish to attack the Queant-Drocourt line, if they have any
183 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 10 and 14 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/34, PRO.
General Sir Henry Rawlinson, Diary, 16 July, 14 August, and 15 August 1918, Rawlinson Papers, CCC.
185 Haig, Diary, 29 July 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/33, PRO.
'Haig, Diary, 30 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/35, PRO.
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doubts about taking it' since he 'was opposed to doing more
attacking than was absolutely necessary' •187
British doctrine stated that 'the development of active
operations, whether undertaken by ourselves or the enemy,
may normally be expected to take the form of a methodical
and progressive battle, beginning with limited objectives
and leading up by gradual stages to an attack on deep
objectives in chosen portions of the front'. Each attack
was one of 'successive steps in a continuous offensive' for
carefully selected intermediate objectives which would 'best
facilitate the reorganization of the infantry for the next
stage of the attack' and final objectives providing 'a good
defensive line well within the physical capacity of our
infantry and the zone of effective artillery support' yet
with the 'good observation over the enemy's defences' and
suitable positions for the artillery, ready for 'the
resumption of the attack at the earliest date possible'. It
was emphasised that the offensive should 'be composed of
several carefully prepared attacks' and carried out as 'a
series of rapid blows, each delivered before the enemy has
had time to reorganize after the previous one' •188
The doctrine followed by the British Army in the last,
successful campaign of the war was summed up by G.H.Q. as
consisting of 'a series of attacks delivered on a wide
front, but not necessarily on a continuous front' and
187 Field-Marshal Earl Haig, Diary, 31 August and 1 September 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256/36, PRO.
18 S.S.135, The Training and Employment of Divisions, 1918, G.H.Q. O.B. 1635, January 1918,
Montgomery-Massmgberd Papers 92, LHCMA.
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employing 'a series of minor operations' to occupy the
enemy's outpost zone in front of his main battle position
'in order to capture and to occupy suitable ground from
189
which to initiate attacks on his main defensive system'.
Attacks were also made where a deep thrust would bypass any
centres of resistance and was likely to unhinge the German
defences. For example, on the 'capture of the high ground
between Croisilles and Heninel' by XVII Corps (Fergusson) in
August 1918, Haig 'pointed out that a door into the
Hindenburg Line had been opened, so it was no longer
necessary to make attacks along our whole front to take it'
but that 'it ought now to be possible to pass troops through
the gap already made, and take the Hindenburg defences in
the rear' •190 Similarly, in August 1918 the 9th and 29th
Divisions of XV Corps (de Lisle) took the Outersteene ridge
'which looks back into the back of the enemy's defended
191	 .line'.	 By September 1918 it is clear that the British
understand the necessity of fighting separate operations to
capture the outpost zone and the main battle position when
the Germans were adopting a defence in depth giving the
enemy two alternatives - either to 'continually give ground
and to prepare new lines of resistance in rear - a policy he
could not adopt indefinitely' - or 'to strengthen the force
in occupation of his outpost zone and to accept battle in
' 89 S.S.135, The Division In Attack, p.8, G.H.Q. T/1635, November 1918, Montgomery-Massingberd
Papers 92, LHCMA.
°Fie1d-Marsha1 Earl Haig, Diary, 26 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 35, PRO.
'' Haig, Diary, 18 August 1918, Haig Papers, W.O.256 35, PRO.
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that area' with his troops 'exposed to the full power of the
attacking artillery' 192
Attacks were be made as a series of interlinked thrusts
on a wide front of 40-50 miles rather than on a narrow front
as in 1917 in order to ensure that the Germans could not
collect large forces of artillery on the flanks of the
British offensive and to force the Germans to disperse their
resources.' 93
 M.G.G.S., Fourth Army described how after the
Battle of Amiens on 8 August 1918, 'first of all the First
Army, then the Third and then the Fifth' joined the
attack,' 94 stretching and confusing the enemy.
In the final four months of the war the British Army
captured more German prisoners than the American, Belgian
and French armies combined.' 95
 By the end of October 1918
the British Army had 'engaged and defeated' 100 German
divisions since 8 August 1918 while the Americans, Belgians
196
and French combined had beaten only 98. 	 The Fourth Army's
campaign compared favourably in terms of captured prisoners
and equipment and the smallness of their casualties 'with
those of the Second World War in North Africa, Italy or
Normandy' 197
G.H.Q., T/9, Notes on Recent Fighting No.20, 6 September 1918, W.O.58/70, PRO.
General Sir Noel Birch to General Sir Percy Radcliffe, 5 July 1918, Colonel S.W.H. Rawlins Papers
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H.M.S.O., pp.727.
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The German Army had been defeated in the field as the
result of a 'relentless and methodical hammering on a shaken
enemy' 198 but also the discovery of a sensible and effective
operational strategy. At the operational level the British
had discovered a very effective technique by mid-1917 to
compensate for the deficiencies of training, which had so
handicapped them in 1915-17. Rather than a single strategic
thrust, a series of powerful successive multi-army strategic
operations along several axes of attack were employed to
destroy the German Army. This renaissance in British
military thought in 1917-1918 has been overshadowed by the
horrific casualties of the Somme and Ypres.
Major-General H.D. de Pree, The 38th (Welsh) Division in the Last Five Weeks of the Great War,
Chapter lv, p.136, Journal of the Royal Artillery, Volume LVIII, No.3, NAM.
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CONCLUS ION
The long succession of pyrrhic victories, which
characterised the Allied campaigns on the Western Front, did
irreparable damage to the credibility of an entire military
generation who rose to high command in the British Army
during the First World War. As a result, since the 1920s,
British generals and senior officers have been stereotyped
as Colonel Blimps who allowed their troops to be butchered
through incompetent tactics and an abject slowness to
reform. Undoubtedly this Blimpishness, epitomised in the
post-war Low cartoons, was one facet of the Army which
underpinned the great resolve and stubborn will to win
required in modern wars and shown by the Army's leadership
in the long, hard campaign required to defeat Germany.
Unfortunately, this stereotype does little to aid
comprehension of the inner workings of the Army, or to
understand how the traditions and bureaucracy, inseparable
from all military hierarchies, affected the manner in which
the war was conducted by the Army's leadership. British
generalship was the product of a particular system, and not
just the fruit of the peculiar idiosyncracies and
shortcomings of particular individuals at G.H.Q. Nor does
it explain why it was that of all the armies, which went to
war in 1914, the British was the only one that had not
mutinied on a large scale or simply disintegrated by 1918.
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Unlike the continental armies of France, Germany, and
Russia, the raison d'être of the British Army was to provide
a garrison for an Empire, which was shielded from potential
foes by a large and dominant Royal Navy. The rigours of
defending the Empire had important consequences in shaping
the identity of the elite of the British officer corps and
in turn the conduct of the war.
The emergence of a solution to the tactical and
operational problems of 1914 can be traced through a series
of learning curves, which when synthesised gave birth to a
new, modern style of warfare. The Somme marked the
beginning of a steep learning curve in many areas, which was
uneven but capable of carrying the army to victory, a major
achievement that has not been properly appreciated. During
the early years of the war, an inexperienced but over-
confident hierarchy emphasized accomplishments rather than
shortcomings. Realistic evaluations of German capabilities
were too often replaced with bureaucratic optimism, the
result of the unwillingness or inability of many leaders to
examine previous mistakes closely even when there was enough
critical information to show that over-optimism was
unwarranted. The official "party line" of optimism pervaded
the hierarchy, which as a result lost touch with reality,
tending to accept only that information that they wanted to
hear and ignoring the warnings of subordinates. Under the
prevailing climate of optimism professionalism was eroded;
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optimistic commanders were more likely to be promoted while
the careers of subordinates who made realistic but
pessimistic objections stagnated.
Attitudes in 1915-17 were epitomised by the way in
which over-confident and over-ambitious generals were
deluded by technology into an over-reliance on artillery and
made little effort to achieve operational or tactical
surprise, allowing the Germans to turn prospective
breakthroughs into punishing and costly battles of
attrition. Haig epitomized the faith that victory would be
won and his flawed personality made him the most
controversial general of the Great War. Growing realism
from 1917 onwards made victory in 1918 possible. The
turning points were the failure of the Flanders offensive in
July 1917, the German counter-attack at Cambrai. in November
1917, and the German Kaiserschlacht of March 1918, which
convinced even Haig that the enemy should not be over-rated
and encouraged him to introduce more realistic operational
methods and re-emphasize the importance of surprise.
One factor in this change in emphasis was the
replacement in 1916-18 of tired or mediocre commanders,
paving the way for a new generation of professional
soldiers. The evidence suggests that there was a learning
process in the early years of the war as the Army leadership
struggled to come to terms with an unfamiliar situation and
in 1915-17 younger, middle-ranking officers often had to
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'carry' their superiors. Older and incompetent senior
commanders and staff officers were gradually replaced by
more energetic men who had learnt many harsh lessons during
the war. The leadership qualities of the British generals
of the First World War as a group of men have been much
disparaged. Painting the B.E.F.'s commanders as uniformly
incompetent is both unfair and greatly exaggerates the case
against the generals.
Although the British Army in the Great War did provide
a number of examples of incompetence, the real weakness of
the British leadership was inexperience of continental
warfare and the severe dilution of that leadership by the
rapid expansion of the army and the heavy casualties of
trench warfare. Most senior officers had little practical
experience of large-scale operations, having made their
reputations policing the Empire in campaigns on the North
West Frontier or in Africa, and had little opportunity to
learn before being thrust into battle. Their responses to
fighting European armies were unsurprisingly conditioned by
their colonial experiences. The heavy losses of 1914-15
made disastrous inroads upon the numbers of trained and
experienced officers available. The shortage of experienced
senior officers at all levels was a major factor in
hindering the quick assimilation of complex lessons early in
the war.
Many senior officers failed when confronted by the
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professionalism of the Germans in 1916-18 and were removed
but as the generals gained experience through on-the-job
training the turnover rate became relatively low. In the
reconstruction of the British Army command, the criterion
for promotion became ability on the battlefield and by 1918
a meritocracy based on promotion for able and experienced
officers was established within the Army leadership, which
listened to each other and adapted decisions accordingly.
The offensive of 1918 was entrusted to those officers who
had shown their abilities in the short but terrifyingly
intense battle-school of 1916-17. A growing professionalism
within the army's elite ensured victory for the British Army
in 1918.
The offensive on the Western Front would not have
succeeded without the solid performance of the British army,
corps and divisional commanders, as well as their troops.
The British Army was not an unchanging monolith composed of
stupid Blimps that overwhelmed the Germans with sheer
numbers, but rather a force that improved steadily during
the war. By 1917-18 Britain had developed commanders who
were thoroughly tempered by war, capable of coping with the
complexities of modern operations and achieving effective
parity in performance. This achievement plus the
quantitative advantage more than compensated for any
continuing tactical deficiencies.
The great strength of the British high command was that
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it was able to produce at all levels that minimum of high
calibre commanders, such as Allenby, Byng, Home, Plumer,
Rawlinson, Currie, Maxse, Monash, de Lisle, Tudor, and
Carton de Wiart, capable of attaining victory. The
divisional commanders provided most of the operational
leadership and were the key leaders. While recognizing the
weaknesses in the B.E.F.'s command system, the hackneyed
stereotype of chateau generals requires revision. Over-
concentration on Haig and his own clique at G.H.Q has over-
shadowed the very real advances made throughout the rest of
the hierarchy, which has been tarred by Haig's extreme
loyalty to friends such as Butler, Charteris, Gough, and
Kiggell and his inability to choose close subordinates with
any judgement, which while making him more likeable, was a
fatal flaw for a "great captain".
With its colonial background, the British Army also had
to develop a modern, professional and efficient staff
system. This depended upon the stability of staff
personnel, which was disrupted by a large turnover in the
most senior staff positions during the period 1915-16. The
practice of frequently replacing staff personnel prevented a
long tour of duty, which provided continuity of thought and
leadership on the staff. The commanders frequently did not
trust their staff officers, who lacked experience, and often
usurped their functions reducing their status, lowering
their morale, and altering the relationship between the
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commander and his staff. In contrast to the rapid turnover
in the early years of the war when the staff were not in
their posts long enough to provide needed direction to their
formations, the lengthy tenures of the staff in the later
years provided continuity of thought and leadership, in
which officers became well versed in the functions of the
Staff.
British commanders and staffs had to learn how to run
large-scale operations the hard way under combat conditions.
Staff functions became more responsive and multi-faceted
than ever before, demanding a high degree of teamwork,
efficiency and knowledge. To achieve a "staff culture" of
greater flexibility and effectiveness, the British high
command were required to improve its staff training,
procedures and techniques. By 1918 the staff involved in
the planning process at all levels were very experienced and
well practised in working together having, in many cases,
worked as a team in 1916-17. Their hard work,
professionalism, flexibility and abiding cheerfulness under
great pressure throughout the final campaign were second to
none.
In the matter of the higher direction of war, the
organization of G.H.Q. in 1914 had been essentially a
hastily improvised Army Headquarters but developed slowly
into a large staff organization, similar to S.H.A.E.F.
during the Second World War, capable of managing a
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continental war on a scale never seen before. Under
Robertson in 1915 and Kiggell in 1916-17 G.H.Q. grew in size
and complexity. One important step in early 1917 was the
formation of a Training Section to give the Staff a greater
role in the development of tactical and operational
doctrine. A further step in implementing the transformation
of G.H.Q. into a powerful 'military brain' at the disposal
of the Commander-in-Chief was taken in late 1917 with the
re-organisation of the staff under Lawrence, who oversaw a
thorough overhaul of G.H.Q.'s organization into an
operational and planning monolith of more appropriate
proportions and gave the staff at G.H.Q. a greater sense of
professionalism and realism. G.H.Q.'s role throughout the
war in disseminating new ideas and its willingness to
embrace technological solutions should not be
underestimated. G.H.Q. was responsible for running the
successful operations of 1918.
Poor training was probably the single most serious
weakness of the British Army in 1915-17 and a continual
handicap for all British units. The New Armies had been
hastily formed from volunteers who had no formal training
and resulted in a lack of qualified leadership at all
levels, both officer and N.C.O., leaving the Army without a
strong base of experienced leaders. While there were many
outstanding exceptions, large numbers of the "amateur"
officer corps lacked professional knowledge, aggressiveness,
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leadership ability, and a professional commitment to
soldiering. The rapid expansion of the army severely
strained the British training system, which was largely
based on a regimental system designed to train a small,
professional army for colonial warfare rather than a large,
conscript army for continental warfare.
This expansion had a pervasive, adverse impact on
training, which was often disrupted by operational
requirements. The low state of training was not only one of
the major causes of the low level of battle effectiveness
but also the greatest obstacle in improving that capability.
Poor leadership seriously affected all efforts to create an
effective fighting force, starting a cycle of poor training
and poor fighting proficiency, which was a residual problem
that lasted the whole war and a continuing source of
concern. Massive efforts were made to improve the quality
of the troops by the establishment of a school system of
training, which had to be developed from scratch.
The entire process took years of work but was
essential. Training schools had to be improvised quickly
and during the period 1915-17 were expanded rapidly to train
the great influx of recruits into the New Armies. The
expansion of the British Armies placed great demands on the
new training schools, which expanded to offer training at
G.H.Q., Army, Corps, and Divisional level teaching troops,
notably Officer's and N.C.O.s, how to operate equipment and
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new tactical techniques. Only through intensive training
could divisions approach a common standard of battle
effectiveness. Even a limited period of training made a
tremendous difference in a division's efficiency.
The schools system was the most successful innovation
in 1916-17, successfully developing the numbers of
professionally competent officers and N.C.O.s. Although at
first providing little tactical knowledge or practice in
combined arms warfare, the schools helped to create a
standard of training for the whole Army, raising the quality
and competence of the junior leadership and turning out
specialists in increasing numbers to satisfy the mounting
demands for skilled instructors within the Army. This laid
a foundation upon which the British Army built during the
last two years of the war steadily improving its efficiency
and competence. The British Army of 1918 was well-equipped
and schooled by four years of hard campaigning.
One great problem was the lack of appreciation by
senior officers, notably at G.H.Q., of the value of training
schools and a Training Section to produce training manuals
and develop tactical doctrine was not set up at G.H.Q. until
early 1917. As late as 1916 the training provided in France
was due more to individual efforts of Army, Corps, Divisions
and Brigade commands than to any clear direction from Higher
Command. Confident of victory, G.H.Q. had neglected
training and provided no central control of innovation in
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tactics, delaying the systematic introduction of new
training methods and tactics until 1917. 1917-18 saw signs
of greater flexibility at the tactical level and an
increasingly successful standardisation of organisation and
doctrine, which was such a feature of the German Army. The
ad hoc development of doctrine and tactics by senior
officers in the absence of any direction from G.H.Q. during
1915-16 was in marked contrast to the efforts made by the
high command in 1917-18 to improve training methods and to
develop better tactics.
Early in the war the British struggled to create a
force with a coherent combined arms doctrine but by mid-1917
the B.E.F. had found an operational style of attack
employing the highly effective, limited-objective set-piece,
under an umbrella of artillery employed in enormous yet
well-controlled quantities to support the infantry advance.
Although cumbersome and imperfect, this type of set-piece,
attritional battle was appropriate given the state of
training and tactical effectiveness of the British armies
and reflected the increasing materiel strength and tactical
sophistication of the British Army from mid-1916 onwards.
By late-1917 the British had abandoned the idea of the
penetration and exploitation. Attempting a strategic
breakthrough against the German Army was extremely risky as
the British found out to their cost on 1 July 1916 and 31
July 1917. Instead the British embraced the tactics of the
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limited objective attack which took a 'bite' out of the
German defences, achieving break-ins that could be exploited
to depths of up to two or three thousand yards and covered
by the artillery. Once the assault had penetrated the outer
crust of the German defences, the momentum of the attack had
to be kept going, taking the enemy out in 'digestible
bites', preferably with a pause between each 'bite' to build
up gun ammunition, move guns forward and re-organise the
troops. These were the "stepping stones" that enabled the
British to break-in into the depth of the German defences.
The trick was to avoid too long a pause between 'bites' or
phases, allowing operational sustainability.
At Cambrai in November 1917 the problem of the tactical
penetration of the front was resolved on the basis of well-
organised co-operation between the combat arms, bringing the
new infantry and artillery tactics together for the first
time in large-scale operations. But the broader
significance was that in applying these tactics and
techniques it provided a blueprint, which the British would
use to produce stunning results on the Western Front in the
second half of 1918. Massive British manpower, armour, air
and artillery superiority was employed in huge set-piece
battles from late 1917 to 1918, which relied on careful
preparation and the massive firepower provided by the
combined arms of infantry, machine-guns, artillery, tanks
and aircraft to crush the German defences.
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Modern offensive forces, above all the large-scale
employment of tanks and aircraft, opened up the possibility
of overcoming the enemy's defensive systems. Employing the
technique of the massive set-piece battle the British Army
emerged victorious in November 1918. Overall the cautious
fire-power approach, which was adopted in 1917-18, was
largely justified, since the 1916-18 experiences on the
Western Front had demonstrated that simple numerical
superiority was not enough to ensure Allied successes over
the Germans. That the British Army had got from its 1916
nadir to a point in 1918 where it could take on the highly
effective German Army, and consistently win, despite its
limitations, was a tremendous achievement, of which British
commanders were justly proud.
One factor inhibiting the performance of the British
Army in 1915-17 was poor operational planning. By 1914 the
British Army had evolved a tactical doctrine aimed at
fighting a short war in Europe. This allowed it to develop
doctrine within the existing colonial traditions, which
shaped tactical responses to war during 1914-16. Training
and doctrine on the cheap, a recurring theme in British
military history, contributed to the poor quality of the
available British generals and the operational failures of
this period. Although the British Army possessed in the
Field Service Regulations a doctrine, which provided the
linkage between the strategic, operational and tactical
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levels of warfare, doctrinal development was haphazard and
largely the product of hasty improvisation rather than
doctrinal debate and the exchange of ideas in peace.
For the British officers trained in colonial warfare,
the operational level of conflict barely existed and they
had no experience of the operational level. The peacetime
structure of the British Army did not encourage officers
automatically to think in operational terms. Much of the
controversy of the war years was much less concerned with
the adoption of new weapons than with the choice between two
radically different concepts of strategy, attrition and
manoeuvre. In 1915-17 the emphasis was on ambitious
attempts to break through the German defences and restore
mobility whereas in 1917-18 faith was placed instead in set-
piece battles to grind down the enemy.
Haig's view of the offensive was frequently at odds
with those of many other military planners while he pursued
the chimera of the decisive breakthrough with great
tenacity. Differences in opinion as to ultimate goal - a
decisive or limited offensive - continued to haunt British
planning until mid-1917. Haig placed strategic conditions
on all his battles that hindered his commanders from making
proper use of the new techniques that were available to them
by 1917 - techniques that he did not fully understand
himself. Whereas Haig and Gough advocated a strategy of
annihilation to crush the enemy and quickly achieve
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strategic ends, Plumer, Robertson, and Rawlinson pressed for
restraint and adoption of a strategy of attrition to cope
with the appalling destructiveness of modern war.
In advocating the concept of "attrition" during the
Great War, generals increasingly assumed that in modern war
victory could not be achieved by a single attack or a
single, continuous offensive. Only when all the enemy's
forces and means were exhausted in the struggle, and when he
was unable to continue armed resistance, only then could
final victory over the enemy be counted on. This conclusion
regarding the inevitability of a protracted war was
questioned by Haig who naturally gravitated towards a
strategy of annihilation. Advocating a strategy of
annihilation and over-estimating the power of modern
artillery to devastate enemy defences, Haig rejected the
strategy of attrition.
Haig's conception of the offensive, which prevailed in
1915-17, resulting in over-ambitious offensives and
attritional battles in which the British suffered needless
casualties for little commensurate gain, is the one history
remembers and dominates perceptions of the way the war was
fought. Prior to Cambrai Haig strung out his divisions and
artillery along a broad front so that, in particular, the
British offensives on the Somme and at Ypres lacked
concentration and as a result failed to achieve decisive
results. The war had become one of attrition, but the high
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command was dedicated to the idea, and therefore committed
to the strategy, of a short war and a decisive victory. The
unpopularity of a "strategy of attrition" until late 1917 is
explained by the Army's doctrine, which stressed that only
the "strategy of annihilation" could provide victory, and
appeared to be confirmed by its most recent experiences of
large-scale war - the swift offensive operations leading to
the fall of Pretoria during the Boer War.
But by mid-1917 the British had a masterplan for
winning the war, which revolved around a shift from a
strategy of decisive blows to a strategy of attrition. The
turning-point in the great strategic debate of the war
between the contending strategic schools of "attrition" and
"annihilation" was concluded in mid-1917 by the adoption of
the concept of successive, limited operations. The pattern
of Haig's methods of attack in 1917-18 in massing huge
quantities of men and material to crush the enemy in a set-
piece battle, closely resembled and were the model of
military excellence for Montgomery's style of warfare in
1942-45. The impossibility in modern warfare of destroying
an enemy army by a single blow compelled the British to
achieve this by a series of successive operations.
The change in emphasis away from big battles in favour
of successive, limited operations, begun during the Third
Battle of Ypres as an ad hoc response to the switch in
command from Gough to Plumer, became enshrined as official
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doctrine in mid-1918. Plumer's offensive represented a
radical departure from the past British strategy and
tactics. The attacks were characterised by massive co-
ordinated assaults against German defensive positions with
infantry, tanks and artillery. Plumer's success at Ypres
rested on the lavish use of artillery and infantry to
support tanks in a drive against a well-prepared German
position, and was crucially important for the development of
British tactics for the rest of the war.
The large-scale and high intensity of simultaneous
attacks over an extended area outpaced and overloaded the
decision-making of their German opponent. By mid-1918,
British operational methods had improved. Gone were the
days of general advances on a broad front, instead, tanks,
infantry, artillery and aircraft were concentrated in key
"breakthrough sectors" and breaches made in German defences
using massive artillery bombardments. Deception measures
prevented the defenders from concentrating their resources,
while constant air strikes disrupted enemy supply lines and
delayed the movement of reserves.
The abandonment of the breakthrough strategy in 1918 in
favour of a series of inter-linked limited offensives, which
gave the British more options in their axis of attack
bypassing enemy strongpoints, returned considerable autonomy
to his commanders in the field. The emphasis on securing
limited objectives against counter-attacks meant that
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potential (but risky) opportunities to win battles were not
exploited but the logic of attrition suggested that as long
as the Allies avoided defeats, and thus sustained their own
morale, sheer weight of numbers eventually would secure
victory. A point ignored disastrously by Haig while
planning his over-ambitious offensives during 1915-17.
By employing a new operational style based on a series
of simultaneous and successive operations, which
concentrated the available forces against several, narrow
sectors of the front (rather than dissipating it evenly
along a broad front) and limited the freedom of manoeuvre
for the defender's reserves, the British managed to
manoeuvre their wary opponent out of successive defensive
positions in 1918. Operations on a wide front, executed by
the five armies co-operating with one another on a series of
axes led to the creation of enormous breaches in the enemy
fronts, which resulted in the enemy defence being chopped
into pieces and destroyed piecemeal, becoming so
disorganised that he suffered a series of successive
strategic defeats.
At this operational level the object of the great
British offensives on the Western Front in the second half
of 1918 was nothing less than unhinging the enemy's entire
defensive system. The victories from Amiens onwards,
however ponderous, were genuine nonetheless, and the careful
but unimaginative professionalism set the pattern for the
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British generalship until the Armistice, slowly grinding the
enemy into submission by the inexorable logic of an
attritional war of materiel. By 1918 the British
operational art of war had come of age, as an evolution of
British military thinking, which had been forged by the
harsh realities of 1915-17. The war made the Army more
coherent and professional in its approach to development,
doctrine and training but, as the pragamatic approach had
appeared to work during the war, there was no incentive to
analyse the demands of modern command and no wide-ranging
system of reform was advocated after 1918.
Although internal factors, such as the personalities
and mistakes of Haig and his staff at G.H.Q., the over-
optimism of the high command, and the culture of the pre-war
Regular Army, were contributory factors to the mistakes made
in 1915-17 neither the army's culture nor individuals can be
blamed for the problems faced during the war. Inevitably
Haig and G.H.Q. must accept much of the blame for ignoring
the importance of training until 1917 and implementing an
over-ambitious strategy until late in 1917, by which time
much damage to the Army's reputation had been done. Haig
merely personified much that was wrong with the Army as a
whole but it is clear that Haig's approach to operational
planning and the atmosphere of fear engendered by G.H.Q.
abrogated constructive dialogue within the high command.
But far more fundamental problems faced the Army.
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Rather than judging them, individually and
collectively, as Colonel Blimps, it is important to remember
that the generals expanded a small, professional army
organised to garrison colonies into a large army of amateurs
capable of facing and defeating the German Army, the best
continental army in the world. When the British Army's
colonial organisation, small officer corps, and large
numbers of untrained and volunteer troops, are taken into
account, it is clear that although some, notably Haig,
Kiggell, Gough, Haking, and Charteris, did not perform well
at different levels and periods of the war, the overall
performance of the generals was very creditable overcoming
many serious handicaps to win the war.
External factors, such as British inexperience of
continental warfare, new technology, and tenacious German
resistance provide a much more reliable means of
understanding the problems faced by the British Army when
apportioning blame for the heavy losses of the war. The
poor British performance for much of the Great War cannot be
blamed solely on the social background of the Army elite and
opposition to new ideas by reactionary senior officers,
although resistance to change was a factor. The real
explanation lies more in the unpreparedness of the small
British Army in 1914 for a continental commitment.
This explains the inexperience in handling large
formations and the practice of command and staff work, which
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an European war entailed and an organisation capable of
managing such a war effectively. The role of the British
Army as a garrison for the Empire, whose imperial role was
dominated by world-wide policing duties, provides a better
clue towards the problems the British generals had in
adapting to the new conditions on the Western Front than any
alleged rigidity and inflexibility amongst senior officers.
Far-reaching consequences stemmed from this lack of
experience of continental warfare, which was a factor of far
greater importance than the social composition of the
officer corps in explaining the failures of 1915-17.
Given the difficulties faced by the Army it is not
surprising that the path towards victory was not smooth and
was at first painfully slow. Hindered throughout the war by
the small size and inexperience of its military elite, the
British had to improvise a Nation in Arms for the first time
in their history. British generals were so busy learning to
manage this tremendous growth of their army that they had
little time to ponder tactical reforms. These institutional
handicaps make the great victories of 1918 all the more
remarkable. In the end a growing professionalism within its
elite ensured victory for the British Army in 1918 and like
the rest of the Army G.H.Q. had achieved an organisation and
expertise which allowed it to plan and implement a war-
winning strategy.
Haig's mistakes, which in retrospect made the
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achievement of 1918 seem like a pyrrhic victory, should not
obscure the achievements of his commanders and the British
Army as a whole. What must not be forgotten is that Haig
relied on his army, corps and divisional commanders and
staffs to train the army and to implement his strategy and
it was ultimately the learning process undertaken by these
men during 1916-17, which allowed Haig to finally triumph in
1918. With hindsight this strategy could have been
implemented some two years earlier in 1916 although it is
doubtful if the results would have been quite so conclusive.
German resistance was still very strong in 1916-17.
The Somme marked the beginning of a steep learning
curve in many areas and the last two years of the war saw
many innovative efforts to break the stalemate of trench
warfare and restore manoeuvre to the battlefield. Those
efforts did not bear fruit completely in 1917 and 1918, but
the ideas behind them were taken up and improved forming the
basis for the tactics of the Second World War. Between 1917
and 1918, a revolution took place, which amounted to the
birth of modern warfare. All this was achieved while the
Army had to undergo a rapid expansion training and absorbing
huge numbers of ill-trained soldiers, whose bravery was only
matched by their inexperience.
The tempo of the learning curve quickened as the war
progressed and can be divided into four specific phases: the
opening period of mobile warfare (August - November 1914);
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trench stalemate while the army rapidly expanded (December
1914 - June 1916); an interval of debate when the army
realised the need for change and rapidly implemented new
techniques (July 1916 - August 1917); a revolutionary phase
which saw a qualitative shift or leap' causing a dramatic
transformation in doctrine represented by the battles of
Cambral, Hamel and Armies (September 1917 - November 1918).
The Army had progressed along a number of learning curves in
leadership, staff work, training, tactics and operations and
had radically overhauled its methods to evolve new




Biographies of The War Managers:
Biographies are provided for a group of 700 Officers
who formed the military elite of the Imperial Forces holding
the principal senior command, administrative, medical and
staff posts within the B.E.F., notably at G.H.Q, the Armies,
Corps, Divisions, and the Tank and Royal Flying Corps and
managing the operations of the British Army on the Western
Front, 1914-1918.	 For each individual certain standardized
biographical facts such as the date of birth, date of death,
posts held, occupation of father, schools attended, branch
of service, foreign service, awards and decorations,
publications, have been recorded. Among the most important
special characteristics on which information was sought were
their education, miltary training, branch of service, battle
experience, religion, politics, service record, etc.
The most fruitful sources consisted of the Army List,
Who's Who, Kelly's, and similar biographical dictionaries
and encyclopedias. Other printed sources include memoirs,
obituaries and articles about prominent figures. The
private papers of individual officers are also able to
provide kinds of information which do not normally appear in
printed sources. The sources, unfortunately, are not always
consistent in their accuracy or criteria of information.
For some individuals it is possible to gather very adequate
information on their education but not on parental
occupation. For others it was vice versa. It was difficult
to obtain biographical information on some lower ranking and
Dominion officers in particular but, nevertheless, despite
the inconsistency of some of the sources, it is possible to
analyse the top levels of the military elite of the B.E.F.
and to identify some trends revealed by the data.
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Adair, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Shaf to (born 1878)
St. Edwards School, Oxford and Oriel College, Oxford.
Joined Cheshire Regiment, 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902;
Brigade-Major, U.K. and B.E.F., 1914-16; G.S.O.2, 25th
Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, XVIII and XIX Corps, 1917;
G.SO1, 8th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, X Corps, 1918;
G.S.O.2, American Staff College, 1918; G.S.O.2, L. of C.,
1918-19; retired 1928. Won Golf Championship of Southern
India, 1908.
Alderson, Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin Alfred Harvey (1859-
1927)
Joined Royal West Kent Regiment, 1878; South Africa, 1881;
Egypt, 1882 and 1884-85; South Africa, 1896 and 1900-1902;
O.C. Mounted Infantry, Aldershot, 1897-99; Inspector-General
of Mounted Infantry, South Africa, 1902-03; G.O.C. 2nd
Brigade, 1903-07; 6th (Poona) Indian Division, 1908-12;
Mounted Division, Central Force, U.K., 1914; Canadian
Division, 1914-15; Canadian Corps, 1915-16; Inspector-
General of Canadian Forces in UK, 1916; Inspector of
Infantry, 1916-18; retired, 1920. Author of With the
Mounted Infantry and Mashonaland Field Force (1896), Pink
and Scarlet: Hunting as a School for Soldiering (1900), and
Lessons from 100 Notes made in Peace and War (1900)
Alexander, Major-General Ernest Wright (1870-1934)
Harrow and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1889; O.C. 22nd
and 27th Brigades, R.F.A., 1914-15; V.C., 1915; B.G.R.A.,
{2-7-t-h Division, 1915-16; B.G.R.A., XV Corps, 1916-17;
B.G.R.A., XI Corps, 1917-18; M.G.R.A., First Army, 1918-19;
retired, 1920.
Alexander, Major-General Henry Lethbridge (1878-1944)
Militia; joined Dorset Regiment, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-1902; Staff Captain, Eastern Command, 1911-14; D.A.A. &
Q.M.G., 8th Division, 1914-15; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 8th
Division, 1915-16; A.A. & Q.M.G., Junior Staff School,
France, 1916-17; D.A. & Q.M.G., XIV Corps, France and Italy,
1917-18; D.A. & Q.M.G., G.H.Q., Italy, 1918-19; retired,
1927.
Alexander, Major-General Ronald Okeden (1888-1949)
Born in Ceylon. Bedford. Emigrated to Canada. Canadian
Militia, 1908; Royal Canadian Regiment, 1910; served with
24th Canadian Battalion; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, 2nd Canadian
Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, 2nd Division, 1918-19; p.s.c.,
1919; Major-General, 1940.
Allanson, Colonel Cecil John Lyons (1877-1943)
Bedford and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1897;
transferred to Indian Army (42nd, later 6th Gurkha Rifles),
1902; p.s.c., 1907; A.D.C., 1899-1902, and Private
Secretary, 1908-11, to Governor of Bengal; Military
Secretary to Governor of Madras, 1912-15; O.C. 6th Gurkhas,
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Gallipoli, 1915 (wounded three times, despatches, and
recommended for the V.C. and given the D.S.O.); G.S.O.1 57th
Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.l, War Office, 1917-19; retired,
1920.
Allardyce, Brigadier John Grahame Buchanan (1878-1949)
Sedburgh and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1897; South
Africa, 1899-1902; Captain, 1905; D.S.O., 1917; Deputy
Assistant Inspector-General of Training, G.H.Q., 1918-19.
Allen, Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Seymour (born 1879)
St. Paul's School. Joined Lancashire Fusiliers, 1900;
D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 42nd Division, U.K. and M.E.F., 1911-15;
G.S.O.2, 42nd Division, M.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 64th
Division, U.K., 1916; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 11th Division, 1916-
17; 3rd Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, 12th Division, 1917-18, and
51st Division, 1919; D.S.O., 1919.
Allenby, Edmund Henry Hyriman (Field-Marshal Viscount
Allenby) "The Bull" (1861-1936)
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined 6th Dragoons, 1882;
transferred to 5th Lancers, 1905; p.s.c, 1897; Bechuanaland
Expedition, 1884-85; Zululand, 1888; and South Africa, 1899-
1902; O.C. 5th Lancers, 1902-06; 4th cavalry Brigade, 1906-
10; Inspector of Cavalry, 1910-14; G.O.C. Cavalry Division,
1914; Cavalry Corps, 1914-15, V Corps, 1915; Third Army,
1915-17; C-in-C, E.E.F., 1917-19; created Field-Marshal and
Viscount, 1919; High Commissioner Egypt and Sudan, 1919-25.
His only son was killed in action in 1917.
Anderson, Lieutenant-General Charles Alexander (1857-1940)
Charterhouse. Entered Royal Artillery, 1876; Jowaki
Afreedee Expedition, 1877-78; Afghan War, 1878-80; Burma,
1885-86; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Mohmands Expedition,
1908; G.O.C. Troops, South China, 1910-13; 7th (Meerut)
Indian Division, 1913-15; Indian Corps, 1915; XV, XVII and
XI Corps, 1915-16; I Corps, 1916-1917; Southern Command,
India, 1917-19; retired,
Anderson, Lieutenant-General Sir Desmond Francis (1885-1967)
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined Devon Regiment, 1905; transferred
East Yorkshire Regiment, 1910; G.S.O.2, 8th Division, 1917;
War Office, 1917-18; 5th Division, 1918; and V Corps, 1918;
G.S.O.3, V Corps, 1915-16; Brigade-Major, 36th Brigade,
1916-17; G.S.O.2, 8th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, War Office,
1917-18; G.S.O.2, V Corps, 1918; G.S.O.2, I Corps, 1918;
G.S.O.l, 25th Division, 1918-19; G.O.C. 45th Division, 1940;
Assistant C.I.G.S., 1940; G.O.C. III Corps, 1940-43; II
Corps, 1943-44; retired 1944; Trustee of the Imperial War
Museum, 1945.
Anderson, General Sir (Warren) Hastings (1872-1930)
Eldest son of General David Anderson. Marlborough and
R.M.C. Joined Cheshire Regiment; 1899; South Africa, 1899-
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1902; p.s.c., 1905; G.S.O.3 and 2, War Office, 1906-li;
G.S.O.2, Southern Command, 1911-14; G.S.O.l, Staff College,
1914; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914; G.S.O.l, 8th Division,
1914-15; B.G.G.S., XI Corps, 1915-16, and XV Corps, 1916-17;
M.G.G.S., First Army, 1917-19; Commandant, Staff College,
Carnberley, 1919-22; Quartermaster-General, 1927-30. Brother
of Vice-Admiral D.M. Anderson.
Anley, Brigadier-General Barnett Dyer Lempriere Guy (1873-
1954)
Portora, Enniskillen. Joined Essex Regiment, 1894; South
Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, D.S.O.); p.s.c., 1908;
G.S.O.3, Coastal Defence, Eastern Command, 1909-12; G.S.O.3,
War Office, 1912-13; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1913-14; A.P.M.,
5th Division, 1914-15; D.A. & Q.M.G., 3rd Division, 1915;
O.C. Battalion, Machester Regiment, 1915; G.S.O.1, Ripon
Training Centre, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 41st Division, 1916-17;
G.O.C. 183rd Brigade, 1918-19; 3rd London Brigade, 1920-21;
Commandant, Senior Officers' School, 1921-25; G.O.C. 25th
Brigade, 1926-28; retired, 1928.
Anstey, Brigadier Edgar Carnegie (1882-1958)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artilley, 1900; p.s.c.;
West African Frontier Force, 1907-10; Brigade-Major, R.A.,
1st Division, 1914-15, and 29th Division, M.E.F., 1915;
G.S.O.3, G.H.Q., M.E.F., G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915-16;
G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., France, 1916-17; G.S.O.l, G.H.Q., 1917;
G.S.O.1, 50th Division, 1917-18; B.G.S., Western Command,
India, 1932-35; retired, 1935; G.S.O.2, Historical Section,
War Cabinet, 1940-42. Military Correspondent, Sunday Times
and Daily Sketch, 1942-44, and Daily Despatch and Sunday
Chronicle, 1944-45, and author of (1936), The Mystery of the
Blue Inns (1937), and Peace in Our Time (1945)
Arines, Colonel Reginald John (1876-1948)
Bishop's Stortford College and Militia. Joined North
Staffordshire Regiment, 1899; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1902;
G.S.O.3, Second Army, 1914-15; G.S.O.3, R.F.C., 1915;
Brigade-Major, 2nd Brigade, R.F.C., 1916; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1917; G.S.O.1, Supreme
War Council, Versailles, 1918; S.O.1, H.Q., R.F.C., 1918-19;
retired, 1919; O.C. 10th Suffolk Home Guard, 1940-43.
Armitage, General Sir (Charles) Clement (1881-1973)
Marlborough. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; South Africa,
1901-1902; p.s.c.; D.A.A.G., G.H.Q., 1914; G.S.O.3, 14th
Division, 1915; G.S.O.2, 14th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1916; G.S.O.1, 1916-17; G.S.O.l, G.H.Q, 1917-18;
G.S.O.l, 8th Division, 1918; G.S.O.l, 3lth Division, 1919;
D.S.O., 1916 and 1918; Commandant, Staff College, Carnberley,
1934-36; G.O.C. lth Division, 1936-38; Master General of the
Ordnance, India, 1938-42; retired 1942.
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Ashmore, Major-General Edward Bailey "Splash" (1872-1953)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891; South
Africa, 1899-1900 (severely wounded); p.s.c., 1907; G.S.O.,
War Office, 1908-12; Military Secretary to Inspector of the
Overseas Forces, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, Central Force, Home
Defence, U.K., 1914; O.C. 1st Wing, R.F.C., 1915; 1st and
4th Brigades, R.F.C., 1916; B.G.R.A., 29th Division, 1916-
17; London Air Defences, U.K., 1917-21; Territorial Air
Defence Brigades and Inspector A.A., 1924-28; retired 1929.
Author of Air Defence (1929).
Aspinall-Oglander, Brigadier-General Cecil Faber (1878-1959)
Born Cecil Faber Aspinall. Rugby and Militia. Joined the
Royal Munster Fusiliers, 1900; Ashanti, 1900, South Africa,
1900-1902; North-West Frontier, 1908; p.s.c., 1908; Staff
Captain and G.S.O.3, H.Q., India, 1909-13; Special
Employment, 1913-14, and G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914-15;
G.S.O.2 and 1, G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q.,
France, 1916; G.S.O.1, 8thDivision 1916-17; B.G.G.S., VIII
Corps, 1917-19; retired, 1920. Author of the Official
History, Military Operations, Gallipoli (2 volumes), 1929-
32. Became Aspinall-Oglander by deed poll in 1927.
Asser, General Sir (Joseph) John (1867-1949)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Dorsetshire Regiment, 1887;
Soudan, 1897-99; Soudan, 1910; Adjutant-General, Egyptian
Army, 1907-14; retired, July 1914; re-employed as
Commandant, L. of C., 1914-15; Base Commandant, 1915-16;
restored to active list, 1916; G.O.C. L. of C. Area, 1916-
19; British Troops in France and Flanders, 1919; retired,
1930. Brother of Brigadier-General V. Asser.
Atkinson, Lieutenant-General Edwin Henry de Vere (1867-1947)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1885;
Burma, 1889-90; Zhob Valley Expedition, 1890-91; Instructor,
R.M.A., 1896-99; Chief Engineer, I Corps, 1916-17; Chief
Engineer, First Army, 1917-19; Engineer-in-Chief, India,
1923-24; Master General Supply, India, 1924-29; Master
General of the Ordnance, India, 1929-30; retired, 1930.
Babington, Lieutenant-General Sir James Melville (1854-1936)
Wimbledon School. Joined 16th Lancers, 1873; Bechuanaland,
1884-85; South Africa, 1899-1901; G.O.C. New Zealand Defence
Forces, 1902-07; retired, 1907; G.O.C. Lowland Mounted
Brigade, 1908-13; 23rd Division, 1914-18; XIV Corps, Italy,
1918-19; C.-in-C., British Forces in Italy, 1919; retired
1919.
Baillie, Colonel Hugh Frederick (1879-1941)
Son of General D.J. Baillie. Wellington. Joined Seaforth
Highianders, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; Nigeria, 1903-
04; p.s.C.; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., Highland Division, Scottish
Command, 1909-13; wounded, October 1914; G.S.O.3, 15th
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Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, 51st Division,
1916; G.S.O.2, 15th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, III Corps,
1917; G.S.O.1, 15th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q.,
1918; Assistant Director (Staff Duties), G.H.Q., 1918-19;
retired, 1925. Brother of Colonel D.G. Baillie.
Bainbridge, Major-General Sir (Edmund) Guy Tulloch (1867-
1943)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined East Kent Regiment, 1888;
Dongola Expedition, 1896 (despatches); Nile Expedition,
1897-98 (despatches) ; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches) ;
p.s.c., 1910; G.S.O.1, Western Command, 1912-14; B.G.G.S.,
First Army, U.K., 1914-15; G.O.C. 110th Brigade, 1915-16;
25th Division, 1916-18; Inspector of Infantry, 1918-19; 1st
Division, 1919-23; Retired, 1923.
Baker-Carr, Brigadier-General Christopher D 'Arcy Bloomfield
Saltren (1878-1949)
Charterhouse. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1898; Nile Expedition,
1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Assistant
Instructor, School of Musketry, Hythe, 1904-06; retired,
1906; attached as a driver to G.H.Q., 1914; Commandant,
Machine Gun School, G.H.Q., 1914-16; Machine Gun Officer
(G.S.O.2), G.H.Q., 1916; O.C. t C' Battalion, Tank Corps,
1916-17; 1st Brigade, Tank Corps, 1917-18. Author of
memoirs, From Chauffeur to Brigadier (1930).
Baldock, Major-General Thomas Stanford (1854-1937)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1873;
p.s.c., 1888; South Africa, 1901-1902 (despatches); G.O.C.
49th Division, 1911-15; severely wounded, July 1915; and
retired 1916. Author of Cromwell as a Soldier (1899).
Bannatine-Allason, Major-General Sir Richard (1855-1940)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1875; Afghan
War, 1878-80; Soudan, 1885; South Africa, 1899-1903;
attached to Japanese Army, Manchuria, 1905; G.O.C. Nowshera
Brigade, India, 1910-14; 51st (Highland) Division, B.E.F.,
1914-15 (sacked); 61st Division, U.K., 1915-16; 64th
(Highland) Division, U.K., 1916-17; retired, 1918. Assumed
additional name of Allason, 1885.
Barnardiston, Major-General Nathaniel Walter (1858-1919)
Grandson of 4th Earl of Dartmouth, son of Colonel N.
Barnardiston, and nephew of Admiral T. Barnardiston.
Educated privately; Merton College, Oxford; and Militia.
Joined Middlesex Regiment, 1878; p.s.c., 1888; South Africa,
1901-02; Assistant Commandant, R.M.C., 1906-10; G.S.O.l
(Assistant D.M.T.), War Office, 1910-14; G.O.C. North China,
1914-15 (captured Tsingtao, 1914); 39th Division, B.E.F.,
1915-16; Military Attache and Head of British Mission in
Portugal from 1917; died August 1919. Brother of
Lieutenant-Colonels E. and S.J.B. Barnardiston.
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Barne, Brigadier William Bradley Gosset (1880-1951)
Clifton; R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1899; West African
Frontier Force, 1905-08; p.s.c., 1910; Staff Captain, Coast
Defence, Eastern Command, 1913-14, and Thames and Medway
Defences, 1914; D.A.A.G., VII Corps, 1915-16; Brigade-Major,
Royal Artillery, 48th Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, Western
Command, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, 1st Division, 1918; G.S.O.2, XIX
Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 7th Division, Italy, 1918-19; C.R.A.,,
Gibraltar, 1930-34; B.G.R.A., Eastern Command, 1934-37;
retired 1937. M.F.H., Royal Calpe Hunt, Gibraltar, 1933-34.
His brother was Bishop of Lahore.
Barnes, Major-General Sir Reginald Walter Ralph (1871-1946)
Westminster and Militia. Joined 4th Hussars, 1890; with
Spanish Army in Cuban Insurrection, 1895; South Africa,
1899-1902 (severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.);
Instructor, Cavalry School, 1906-07; A.M.S., to Governor,
Malta, 1909-11; O.C. 10th Hussars, 1911-15; G.O.C. 446-th
Brigade, 1915-16; 32nd Division, 1916-1917; 57th Division,
1917-19 (wounded twice, 1914-18); retired, 1921. One of the
close Army friends of Winston Churchill (in Cuba together).
Barratt, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Sheridan (1891-1966)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1910; graduated
from C.F.S. as a pilot and seconded to R.F.C., June 1914;
transferred to R.A.F., 1918; M.C., 1916; O.C. 6th Squadron,
R.F.C., 1916; 3rd Wing, R.F.C., 1917; 2nd Wing, R.A.F.,
1918; S.O.1, H.Q., R.A.F., 1918; C.M.G., 1919; Commandant,
R.A.F. Staff College, 1936-39; A.O.C. R.A.F., France, 1940;
Army Co-Operation Command, 1940-43; Technical Command, 1943-
45; Inspector-General of the R.A.F., 1945-47; retired, 1947.
His brother was killed in action, 1915.
Barrow, General Sir George de Syxnons "Billy" (1864-1959)
Son of Major-General de Symons Barrow. Stubbington House,
Hampshire; R.M.C. Joined Connaught Rangers, 1884;
transferred to Indian Army (4th Bengal Cavalry), 1886;
Waziristan Expedition, 1894-95; China, 1900; p.s.c., 1898;
G.S.O.2, Staff College, Quetta, 1911-12; O.C. 35th Scinde
Horse, India, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, Cavalry Division, 1914;
B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps, 1914-15; G.O.C. Mhow Cavalry
Brigade, 1915; B.G.G.S., X Corps, 1915; G.O.C. 1st Indian
Cavalry Division, 1915; M.G.G.S., First Army, 1915-17;
G.O.C. 7th Division, 1917 (sacked); 3rd Mounted and 4th
Cavalry Divisions, 1917-19; A.G., India, 1923-24; G.O.C.
Eastern Command, 1924-28; retired, 1929. Author of The Life
of General Sir Charles Carmichael Monro, GCB GCMG (1931,
q.v.) and The Fire of Life.
Barter, Lieutenaxit-General Sir Charles St. Leger (1856-1931)
Educated abroad. Joined 105 Foot, 1875; p.s.c., 1896;
Ashanti, 1895-96; Tirah Campaign, 1897-98 (despatches);
South Africa, 1899-1901 (wounded, despatches); Instructor,
R.M.C., 1884-89; D.A.A.G., War Office, 1889-94; Military
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Secretary to the Governor of Cape Colony, South Africa,
1894-95; O.C. 2/K.O.Y.L.I.; Poona Brigade, India, 1909-13;
47th Division, 1914-16 (sacked)
Bartholomew, General Sir William Henry "Barty" (1877-1962)
Newton College, Devon, and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery,
1897; p.s.c., 1910; G.S.O.3, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1915; G.S.O.l, 4th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.l, War
Office, 1916-17; B.G.G.S., XX Corps, E.E.F., 1917-18;
B.G.G.S., G.H.Q., Egypt, 1918; Commandant, Imperial Defence
College, 1929-31; D.M.O. and I., War Office, 1931-34;
C.G.S., India, 1934-37; G.O.C. Northern Command, 1937-40;
retired, 1940.
Barton, Group Captain Robert John Fergusson (1891-1988)
Wellington and R.M.C. Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1910;
transferred to R.F.C., 1914, and R.A.F., 1918; pilot, 4th
Squadron, 1914-15 (severely wounded); Staff Captain, 2nd
Brigade, R.F.C., 1916; Brigade-Major, 2nd Brigade, R.F.C.,
1916-17; G.S.O.2, H.Q., R.F.C., 1917-18; S.Q.l, H.Q.,
R.F.C., 1918-19; O.C. No.1 Flying Training School,
Netheravon, 1929-31; retired, 1931. Shot for Scotland at
Bisley.
Battye, Colonel Basil Condon (1882-1932)
South-Eastern College, Ramsgate, and R.M.A. Royal Albert
Medal, 1906. Entered Royal Engineers, 1910; Somliland,
1903-04; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.3, 50th Division, 1915-16;
Brigade-Major, 141st Brigade, 1916; G.S.O.2, III Corps,
1916-17; A.Q.M.G., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 34th Division, 1918-19
(wounded, despatches)
Baumgartner see Percy
Bayley, Colonel Arthur George (1878-1949)
Shrewsbury and R.M.C. Joined Oxfordshire and
Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 1898; South Africa, 1899-
1902; Brigade-Major, U.K. and B.E.F., 1914-16; G.S.O.2, 56th
Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, Senior Officers' School, Aldershot,
1916-17; G.S.O.1, 14th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Machine
Gun Corps Training Centre, 1918-19; retired, 1935.
Lecturer, 1936, and Librarian, 1939, at Staff College,
Camberley, and Head of Department of Military Studies,
University of London, 1940.
Beck, Major-General Edward Archibald (1880-1974)
Wellington and R.M.C. Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1900;
South Africa, 1898-1902; employed with Egyptian Army, 1909-
12; Brigade-Major, 45th and 44th Brigades, U.K. and B.E.F.,
1914-16; ]J.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.2, France, 1916; G.S.O.2, 56th
Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, XI Corps, France and Italy,
1917-18; G.S.O.1, 41st Division, Italy, 1918-19; Director of
Personal Services, War Office, 1938-40; G.O.C. 9th Division,
1940; retired, 1940.
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Becke, Brigadier-General John Harold Whitworth (1879-1949)
Trinity College, Glenalmond, and Militia. Joined
Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment, 1901; South Africa,
1899-1902; transferred to R.F.C., 1912; O.C. 2nd Squadron,
R.F.C., 1915; 1st Wing, R.F.C., 1916; 4th Brigade, R.F.C.,
1916-17; 2nd Brigade, R.F.C., 1917-18; retired, Jtl92G.	 J
Beckwith, Major William Malebisse (1877-1952)
Eton and New College, Oxford. Joined Coldstream Guards,
1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); retired as
Captain, January 1914; G.S.O.3, XI Corps, 1915-16; D.S.O.,
1916; G.S.O.2, XI Corps, 1916-18; G.S.O.2, 74th Division,
1918; G.S.O.1, 30th Division, 1918-19. Married the third
daughter of the 7th Duke of Richmond, 1904.
Beddington, Brigadier Sir Edward Henry Lionel "Moses" (1884-
1966)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 16th Lancers, 1902; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3,
2nd Cavalry Division, 1914-15; Brigade-Major, 4th Cavalry
Brigade, 1915; G.S.O.2, Indian Cavalry Corps, 1915; M.C.,
1915; G.S.O.2, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, Fifth
Army, 1916; G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1916-1917; D.S.O., 1917;
G.S.O.1, Fifth Army, 1917-19; C.M.G., 1919; retired, 1920;
re-employed, 1940-45; Brigadier, 1942.
Belgrave, Lieutenant-Colonel John Dalryznple (born 1881)
Malvern and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; South
Africa, 1902; Staff Captain, 8th Brigade, 1914; G.S.O.3,
First Army, 1915; G.S.O.2, 2nd Division, 1915-16; D.S.O.,
1916; G.S.O.2, XIV Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., Egypt,
1917; G.S.O.1, Cyprus, 1917-18; G.S.O.l, 12th Division,
1918-19; Lieutenant-Colonel, 1921. Elder brother of Colonel
H.D. Belgrave, D.S.O.
Bernard, Lieutenant-General Sir Denis John Charles Kirwan
"Podge" (1882-1956)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1902; p.s.c.;
G.S.O.3, 10th Division, U.K. and M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, 10th
Division, M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915-16;
G.S.O.1, 4th Australian Division, E.E.F. and B.E.F., 1916-
17; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., France, 1917-18; G.S.O.l, Inspector-
General of Training, 1918; Director of Recruiting and
Organization, War Office, 1934-36; G.O.C. 3rd Division,
1936-39; Governor and C.-in-C., Bermuda, 1939-41; retired
1941.
Bertram, Lieutenant-Colonel William Robert (1888-1970)
Wellington and R.M.A. Joined Gordon Highlanders, 1907;
retired, 1911; emigrated to Canada; served with 8th Canadian
Battalion, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 1st Canadian Division, 1916-17;
D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, Canadian Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.l, 2th
Canadian Division, 1918-19; C.M.G., 1919.
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Bethell, Major-General Sir (Hugh) iCeppel "Beetle" (1882-
1947)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1901;
p.s.c.; transferred to 9th Gurkha Rifles, 1905, and 7th
Hussars, 1914; Staff Captain, Meerut Cavalry Brigade, 1914-
15; Brigade-Major, 8th Cavalry Brigade, 1915; 0_C. 1/
Northamptonshire Regiment, 1915-16; G.0.C. 74th Brigade,
1916-18; D.S.0., 1917; G.0.C. 66th Division, 1918-19;
C.M.G., 1918; C.B., 1919; G.0.C. Presidency and Assam
District, 1930-34; retired, 1935. A headstrong character
and at 36 the youngest British Divisional Commander on the
Western Front. His father also served during the war!
Bidduiph, Brigadier-General Harry (1872-1952)
Grandson of Robert Biddulph, M.P.; fourth son of General Sir
Robert Biddulph, R.A.; and nephew of 1st Baron Bidduiph
(Banker and Liberal M.P., 1865-1900). Charterhouse.
Entered Royal Engineers, 1892; Tirah Expedition, 1897-98;
Waziristan Expedition, 1902; Staff Captain, War Office,
1907-12; Chief Instructor, School of Military Engineering,
1912-14; D.S.O., 1917; A.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., 1918; Chief
Engineer, XIX Corps, 1918; Deputy Engineer in Chief and
Inspector of Mines, G.H.Q., 1918-19; C.M.G., 1919; Chief
Engineer, Southern Command, 1927-28; retired, 1929. Brother
of Lieutenant-Colonel Hope Bidduiph, D.S.O., and Lieutenant-
Colonel M. Bidduiph, 0.B.E. Two sons also joined the Army.
Bingham, Major-General Hon. Sir Cecil Edward "Cis" (1861-
1934)
Second son of 4th Earl of Lucan. 4ed-i-igtoTi. Joined 3th
Hussars, 1882; transferred to 2nd Life Guards, 1886, and 1st
Life Guards, 1892; Ethiopia, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1900
(A.D.C. to Sir John French); 0.C. 1st Life Guards, 1906-10;
2nd Cavalry Brigade, 1910-11; 4th Cavalry Brigade, 1911-15;
1st Cavalry Division, 1915; Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; Reserve
Centre, Ripon, 1916; 73rd Division, U.K., 1916-17; 67th
Division, U.K., 1917-19. Elder brother of Major-General
Hon. Sir F.R. Bingham, R.A. His son was killed in action,
September 1914.
Birch, Colonel Edward Massy (1875-1964)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.0.); p.s.c., 1909;
G.S.0.2, Mauritius, 1911-14; G.S.0.2, 25th Division, U.K.
and B.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.l, 25th Division, 1916-17;
G.S.0.1, Fifth Army, 1917; G.S.0.1, 17th Division, 1917-19;
retired, 1924.
Birch, General Sir (James Frederick) Noel "Curly" (1865-
1939)
Marlborough and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1885;
Ashanti Expedition, 1895-96; South Africa, 1899-1902;
G.S.0.1, Cavalry Corps, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps,
1915; M.G.R.A., G.H.Q., 1916-19; Director of Remounts, 1920-
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21; Director-General of the Territorial Army, 1921-23;
Master General of the Ordnance, 1923-27; retired, 1927.
Brother-in-law of Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode (q.v.).
Author of Modern Riding and Modern Riding and Horse
Education. Reputed to be 'two metres tall'. Director of
Vickers -Armstrong.
Birdwood, William Riddell (Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood)
"Birdy" (1865-1951)
Clifton, Militia, and R.M.C. Joined 12th Lancers, 1885;
transferred to Indian Army (11th Bengal Lancers), 1887;
Hazara Expedition, 1891; Isazai Expedition, 1892; Tirah
Campaign, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902
(severely wounded, despatches); Assistant Military
Secretary, South Africa and India, 1902-04; Military
Secretary, India, 1905-09; C.S.O., Mohmand Expedition, 1908;
G.O.C. Kohat Independent Brigade, 1909-12, Secretary to the
Army Department, India, 1912-14; I ANZAC Corps, 1916-18;
Fifth Army, 1918-19; G.O.C. Northern Command, India, 1920-
24; C.-in-C., India, 1920-24; Field-Marshal, 1925; Baron,
1938. Author of Khaki and Gown (1941) and In My Time
(1946). One of five sons to serve in the army in India,
notably Brigadier-General H.B. Birdwood and Lieutenant-
Colonel G.T. Birdwood, and father of Lieutenant-Colonel Hon.
C.B. Birdwood. A pre-war protege of Field-Marshal Lord
Kitchener. One brother was the brother-in-law of Field-
Marshal Sir William Robertson (q.v.). Another was killed in
action in 1914. Played rugby for Richmond. 'Best Off icer-
at-Arms' two years running in India. A competent commander
who frequently visited the front line.
Black, Lieutenant-Colonel Claud Hamilton Griffith (born
1881)
Cheltenham and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1900; transferred to
Indian Army, 1901, and to 12th Lancers, 1914; p.s.c., 1912;
Staff Captain/G.S.O.3, H.Q., India, 1909-10; G.S.O.3, 2nd
Cavalry Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.3, 1st Division, 1916;
G.S.O.2, 1st Division, 1916-18; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, VI
Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 40th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1927;
re-employed in the War Office, 1939.
Blackader, Major-General Charles Guinard (1869-1921)
Aldin House School and abroad; Joined Leicester Regiment,
1888; West Africa, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-
1902; O.C. 2/Leicesters, 1912-15; G.O.C. Garhwal Brigade,
1915; 38th (Welsh) Division, 1916-18 (sick)
Blacklock, Major-General Cyril Aubrey (1870-1936)
Eton and Militia. Joined K.R.R.C., 1901; South Africa,
1899-1902; retired, 1904; O.C. 10/K.R.R.C., 1915-17; D.S.O.
and Bar, 1916; G.O.C. 182nd Brigade, 1917; 97th Brigade;
1917-18; 9th Division, March 1918; 39th Division, March -
August 1918; 63rd Division, 1918-19 (wounded, despatches,
C.M.G., C.B.); retired, 1920.
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Blair, Brigadier-General Arthur (1869-1947)
Cheltenham and R.M.C. Joined K.O.S.B., 1890; p.s.c., 1897;
Nile, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1901 (severely wounded,
despatches, D.S.O.); Staff Captain/G.S.O.3, War Office,
1907-08; Brigade-Major, 10th Brigade, 1908-11; G.S.O.2,
South Africa, 1912; G.S.O.2, Egypt, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1914; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 27th Division, U.K. and
B.E.F., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 5th Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 23rd
Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., V Corps, 1916; G.O.C. 201st
Brigade, U.K., 1916-17; South Midlands Reserve Brigade,
1917; No.3 Section, Tyne Garrison, 1917-18; Tees Garrison,
1918-19.
Blair, Colonel James Molesworth (1880-1925)
Winchester and Magdalen College, Oxford. Served in South
Africa as a volunteer and nominated by the C.-in-C. for a
commission, 1901; Joined Royal Highianders, 1901; Mohmand
Expedition, 1908; transferred to Gordon Highianders, 1911;
p.s.c., 1913; Military Attache, Petrograd, 1914-18; G.S.O.l,
V Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, Belgian H.Q., 1918; G.S.O.1,
Military Mission to Far East, 1918-20; Military Attache,
Belgrade and Prague, 1921-25.
Blamey, Field-Marshal Sir Thomas Albert (1884-1951)
Australian. Public School, Wagga Wagga. Australian Staff
Corps, 1906; p.s.c., 1914; G.S.O.3, 1st Australian Division,
M.E.F., 1914-15; 2nd Australian Division, M.E.F., 1915; A.A.
& Q.M.G., 2nd Australian Division, M.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.l,
1st Australian Division, 1916; O.C. 2nd Australian
Battalion, 1916; 1st Australian Brigade, 1916-17; D.S.O.,
1917; G.S.0.l, 1st Australian Division, 1917-18; B.G.G.S.,
Australian Corps, 1918-19; D.M.O., Australia, 1919-20;
G.O.C. 10th Australian Brigade, 1926-31; 3rd Australian
Division, 1931-37; knighted, 1935; 6th Australian Division,
1939-40; Australian Corps, A.I.F., 1940-41; C.-in-C.,
Australian Army, 1941-1945; Deputy C.-in-C. Middle East,
1941; G.O.C.-in-C. Allied Land Forces South Western Pacific
Area, 1942-45; Field-Marshal 1950. Able and hard-working.
Blewitt, Lieutenant-Colonel Guy (1884-1969)
Eldest son of Major-General W.E. Blewitt. Harrow and R.M.C.
Joined Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 1905;
Staff Captain, 5th Brigade, '9l5-1GT Brigade-Major, 167th
Brigade, 1916; M.C., 1916; G.S.O.2, 18th Division, 1916-17;
G.S.O.2, VII Corps, 1917; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2 (Chief
Instructor), Senior Officers' School, Aldershot, 1917-18;
G.S.O.2, VII Corps, 1918; G.S.O.2, 19th Division, 1918;
G.S.O.2, VIII and XVIII Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, VIII Corps,
1918; G.S.0.1, 8th Division, 1918-20 (wounded twice);
retired to take up farming, 1922; Meat and Livestock Officer
(Midland Area), Ministry of Food, 1939-45. Deputy
Lieutenant for Essex and Master of the Essex and Suffolk
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Hounds (Essex side) . Brother-in-law of Major-General C.E.D.
Budworth (q.v.).
Blore, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Richmond (1871-1955)
Marlborough. Joined K.R.R.C., 1890; Chitral, 1895; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); p.s.c., 1907; Bazar Valley
Field Force, 1908; D.A. & Q.M.G. and G.S.O.2, India, 1907-
11; Commandant, School of Musketry, India, 1913-15; G.S.O.2,
34th Division, 1916; G.S.O.l, 71st Division, U.K., 1916-17;
G.S.O.1, 30th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Western Command,
1918-19; retired 1919.
Boileau, Colonel Frank Ridley Farrer (1867-1914)
Cheltenham. Entered Royal Engineers, 1887; South Africa,
1899-1902; p.s.c.; D.A.A.G., War Office, 1902-05; Professor,
Staff College, Quetta, 1906-10; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division, 1910-
14; died of wounds, 26 August 1914, having shot himself.
Bols, Lieutenant-General Sir Louis Jean (1867-1930)
His father was in the Belgian Diplomatic Service. Lancing
College and R.M.C. Joined Devonshire Regiment, 1887;
p.s.c.; Burma, 1891-92; Chitral Relief Force, 1895; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.2, Staff College,
1912-14; O.C. 1/Devons, 1914-15 (wounded); G.O.C. 84th
Brigade, 1915; B.G.G.S., XII Corps, 1915; M.G.G.S., Third
Army, 1915-17; G.O.C. 24th Division, 1917; C.G.S., E.E.F.,
1917-19; Governor and C.-in-C. Bermuda, 1927. Father of
Major-General E.L. Bols.
Bonham-Carter, General Sir Charles (1876-1955)
Grandson of G.W. Norman. Clifton and R.M.C. (Sword of
Honour). Joined Royal West Kent Regiment, 1896; South
Africa, 1900-01; p.s.c., 1904; Instructor, R.M.C., 1905-07;
D.A.A. & Q.M.G., Coast Defence, Southern Command, 1907-10;
G.S.O.2 (Liaison Officer), B.E.F., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 50th
Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 7th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1,
G.H.Q., 1916-17; B.G.G.S., III Corps, 1917; B.G.G.S.
(Training), G.H.Q., 1917-18; B.G.G.S., VII and II Corps,
1918-19; D.S.D., War Office, 1927-31; G.O.C. 4th Division,
1931-32; Director-General, Territorial Army, 1933-36;
Governor and C.-in-C., Malta, 1936-40; retired, 1940.
Brother of Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter and Sir Maurice Bonham-
Carter, who married the only daughter of H.H. Asquith.
Boscawen, Major Hon. George Edward (1888-1918)
Second son of 7th Viscount Falmouth. Eton. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1907; Lieutenant, 1910; wounded and D.S.O., 1914;
Brevet Major, 1916; G.S.O.2, R.A., Fourth Army, 1916-17;
G.S.O.1, R.A., Fourth Army, 1917; died of wounds, May 1918.
Bourne, General Sir Alan George Barwys (1882-1967)
Chelteriham; Entered Royal Marine Artillery, 1899; p.s.c.,
1915; served with Grand Fleet, 1914-17; G.S.O.2, 11th
Division, 1917-18; D.S.O., 1918; G.S.O.2, Third Army, 1918;
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G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1918-19; A.A.G., Royal Marines, 1933-
35; Colonel Commandant, Portsmouth Division, 1935-38; A.G.,
Royal Marines, 1939-43; retired, 1943.
Bowdler, Lieutenant-Colonel Basil Wilfred Bowdier (l73-
1930)	 I
Bedford. Entered Royal Engineers, 1892; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3,
War office, 1910-13; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.2,
Ia, G.H.Q., 1914-16; G.S.O.1, l.a., G.H.Q., 1916-19;
retired, 1922.
Bowly, Colonel William Arthur Travell "Boy" (1880-1957)
Winchester, Oxford and Militia. Joined Royal Warwickshire
Regiment, 1905; transferred Dorset Regiment, 1912; A.D.C. to
General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien (G.O.C. Southern Command,
1913-14; II Corps, 1914, and Second Army, 1914-15); G.S.O.3,
G.H.Q., 1915; G.S.O.3, IV Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, IV Corps
and 37th Division, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1918;
G.S.O.l, O.a., G.H.Q., 1918; Personal Military Secretary to
the Secretary of State for War, 1918-19; O.C. 2/Royal
Warwickshire Regiment, 1930-33; A.A.G., Aldershot Command,
1933-35; retired, 1937; Commandant, Duke of York's Royal
Military School, 1937-45. His brother was lost at sea in
January 1918.
Boyce, Major-General Sir William George Bertram (1863-1937)
Royal School, Armagh. Joined Berkshire Regiment, 1887;
transferred to Army Service Corps, 1892; South Africa, 1899-
1900 (despatches, D.S.O.); Commandant, A.S.C. Training
Establishment, 1909-13; Assistant Director of Supplies and
Transport, Aldershot, 1913, and Eastern Command, 1913-14;
Deputy Director of Transport, B.E.F., 1914; Director of
Transport, B.E.F., 1914-19. Director of Rolls Royce Ltd.
Boyd, Major-General Sir Gerald Farrell "Gerry (1877-1930)
St. Paul's. In the ranks, Devon Regiment, 4 years 200 days;
Sergeant, 1899; commissioned, East Yorkshire Regiment, 1900;
transferred to Leinster Regiment, 1904, and Royal Irish
Rifles, 1915; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches,
D.C.M., D.S.O.); Brigade-Major, 11th Brigade, 1912-15;
G.S.O.2, 1st Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 8th Division, 1915-16;
B.G.G.S., V Corps, 1916-8; G.O.C. 170th Brigade, 1918; 46th
Division, 1918-19 (severely wounded and despatches);
Commandant, Staff College, Quetta, 1923-27; Military
Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, 1927-30.
Boyd-Rochfort, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold (1881-1960)
Eton. South Africa, 1899-1901; joined 21st Lancers, 1901;
Instructor, R.M.C., 1908-12; Captain, 1912; Staff Captain,
6th Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15; Brigade-Major, 9th Cavalry
Brigade, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 24th Division, 1916-17; M.C.;
D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, Tank Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, No.3
Tank Group, 1918-19; retired, 1920. Stockbroker who ran his
own stud-farm, "Tally Ho". Champion Officer at Arms in the
387
Army. His eldest brother, Arthur, won the V.C. and his
elder brother, Cecil, was a famous horse trainer world-wide.
Bradford, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Austen (born 1879)
Eton and R.M.A. Joined K.R.R.C., 1899; South Africa, 1899-
1902; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, G.H.Q., U.K., 1914-15; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., U.K., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, II Corps, 1916-17; G.S.O.2,
Third Army, 1917; G.S.O.i, Third Army, 1917; retired, 1920.
Braine, Brigadier Herbert Edmund Reginald Rubens (1876-1942)
Duiwich and Militia. Joined Royal Munster Fusiliers, 1900;
South Africa, 1900-02; North-West Frontier, 1908; p.s.c.,
1910; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, War Office,
1914; G.S.O.3, 8th Division, 1914-15; Brigade-Major, 19th
Brigade, 1915; G.S.O.2, XIII Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.l, War
Office, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 34th Division, 1917; G.S.O.l, 29th
Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Third Army, 1918-19; G.O.C.
133rd Division, 1928-30; 12th Brigade, India, 1930-33;
retired, 1933.
Braithwaite, General Sir Walter Pipon (1865-1945)
Bedford, Victoria College, Jersey, and R.M.C. Joined
Somerset Light Infantry, 1886; p.s.c., 1899; Burma, 1886-87
(despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); D.A. &
Q.M.G., II Corps and Southern Command, 1902-05;
D.A.A.G./G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1906-08; G.S.O.i, Staff
College, 1908-09; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1909-li; Commandant,
Staff College, Quetta, 1911-14; D.S.D., War Office, 1914-15;
C.G.S., M.E.F., 1915; G.O.C. 62nd Division, 1915-18; VII
Corps, 1918; IX Corps, 1918-19; Western Command, India,
1920-23; Scottish Command, 1923-26; Eastern Command, 1926-
27; A.G. to the Forces, 1927-31; retired, 1931. His only
son was killed in action, 1916.
Bray, Major-General Sir Claude Arthur (1858-1934)
Winchester and R.M.C. Joined 30 Foot, 1878; transferred
Army Pay Department, 1891; Afghan War, 1880; South Africa,
1899-1901 (despatches, C.M.G.); Chief Paymaster, Army Pay
Department, 1906; Chief Accountant, Northern Command, 1906-
07, and H.Q., South Africa, 1907-10; Paymaster, Southern
Command, 1910-14; Paymaster-in-Chief, G.H.Q., 1916-18;
retired, 1918.
Bridges, Colonel Arthur Holroyd (1871-1953)
Blundell's School, Tiverton, and R.M.C. Joined Durham Light
Infantry, 1891; transferred to the Indian Army (116th
Mahrattas), 1892; South Africa, 1899-1900; East Africa,
1901; p.s.c., 1904; Commandant, School of Musketry, India,
1907-11; Instructor, R.M.C., Duntroon, 1913-15; G.S.O.l, 1st
Australian Division, 1916; G.S.O.l, 2nd Australian Division,
1916-18; D.S.O., 1917; O.C. 11th Mahrattas, Mesopotamia,
1918-20; 53rd Brigade, 1920-21; retired, 1925.
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Bridges, Lieutenant-General (George) Torn Molesworth (1971-
1939)
Newton College, Devon. Entered Royal Artillery, 1892; South
Africa, 18 99-1902 (severely wounded, despatches); East
Africa, 1902-04 (severely wounded); transferred to 4th
Dragoon Guards, 1908, and 4th Hussars, 1914; p.s.c.;
Military Attache, Brussesl, Hague, Copenhagen, Christiania,
1910-14; rallied troops during the Mons Retreat with a tin
whistle and a drum; G.S.O.1, Belgian H.Q., 1914-15; G.O.C.
19th Division, 1915-17 (wounded); Head, British Military
Mission to U.S.A., 1918; Chief of Military Mission to the
Army of the Orient, 1919-20; retired, 1922; Governor,
Sout14nAustra1ia, 1922-27. Author of Alarms and
Excursions (1940). His wife was a friend of the Asquiths.
His step-son was killed in action, 1914. When wounded
losing his leg he told the hospital staff to feed it to his
pet lion which, having been won by a friend in a Red Cross
raffle in Paris and become the 19th Division's mascot, was
short of meat.
Bridgford, Brigadier-General Robert Ja.tnes (1869-1954)
Charterhouse and Militia. Joined Manchester Regiment, 1889;
South Africa, 1899-1902; transferred to Shropshire Light
Infantry, 1905; O.C. Battalion of Shropshire Light Infantry,
1914-15; G.O.C. 18th Brigade, 1915-17; 2nd Reserve Brigade,
1917-18; 31st and 32nd Divisions, 1918 (wounded) ; 222nd
Brigade, U.K., 1918-19; retired, 1922.
Briggs, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles James (1865-1941)
Educated privately in France and Germany and at R.M.C.
Joined 1st Dragoon Guards, 1886; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); Natal Native Rebellion, 1906; Brigade-Major,
3rd Cavalry Brigade, 1899-1900; O.C. 1st Imperial Light
Horse, 1901-02; 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1913-15; 3rd Cavalry
Division, 1915; 28th Division, 1915-16; XVI Corps, Salonika,
1916-19; British Forces, Salonika, 1919; retired, 1923.
Brind, General Sir John Edward Spencer "James" (1878-1954)
Grandson of General Sir James Brind and his father served in
the Connaught Rangers. Wellington and R.M.A. South Africa,
1899-1900; entered Royal Artillery, 1900; p.s.c.; D.A. &
Q.M.G., 2nd Division, 1914-15; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.2, X
Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 56th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1,
First Army, 1916-17; B.G.G.S. XI Corps, 1917-19; D.C.G.S.,
India, 1931-32; G.O.C. 4th Division, 1933-35; Adjutant
General, India, 1936-37; G.O.C. Southern Command, India,
1937-41; retired, 1941. Brother of Admiral Sir (E.J.)
Patrick Brind and father of Major-General P.H.W. Brind and
Brigadier J.L. Brind. His daughter married Lieutenant-
General Sir William Oliver.
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Broad, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Noel Frank (1882-1976)
Wellington and Pembroke College, Cambridge. South Africa,
1901-02; entered Royal Artillery, 1905; p.s.c., 1914; Staff
Captain, R.A., 37th Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915;
Brigade-Major, R.A., 23rd Division, 1915; D.A.A.G. (S.O. to
G.O.C. R.A.), III Corps, 1915-16; D.A.A.G. (S.O. to
M.G.R.A.), Reserve Army, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, R.A., Fifth Army,
1917-18; G.S.O.l, 74th Division, 1918-19; G.O.C. Aldershot,
1939-40; Eastern Army, India, 1940-42; retired, 1942.
Broadwood, Lieutenant-General Robert George (1862-1917)
Charterhouse. Joined 12th Lancers, 1882; Dongola, 1896
(despatches); Egypt, 1898 (despatches); and South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches, C.B., 1900); G.O.C. Natal, 1902-04;
Orange River Colony District, South Africa, 1904-06; South
China, 1906-10; Lieutenant-General, 1912; retired, 1913;
G.O.C. 57th Division, 1916-17; died of wounds, 21 June 1917.
Brooke, Alan Francis (Field-Marshal Viscount Alaribrooke)
"Brookie" (1883-1963)
Fifth son of Sir Victor Brooke, Baronet. Educated in France
and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1902; Staff Captain,
2nd Indian Cavalry Division, 1915; Brigade-Major, R.A., 18th
Division, 1915-17; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, R.A., Canadian
Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, R.A., First Army, 1918-19; D.M.T.,
War Office, 1936-37; G.O.C. Mobile Division, 1937-38; A.A.
Command, 1939; Southern Command, 1939 and 1940; II Corps,
B.E.F., 1939-40; C.-in-C., Home Forces, 1940-41; C.I..G.S.,
1941-46; created Field-Marshal, 1944, and Viscount, 1946.
Keen ornithologist.
Brooke-Popham, Air Chief Marshal Sir (Henry) Robert Moore
"Brookha.m" (1878-1953)
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined Oxfordshire Light Infantry,
1898; South Africa, 1900-02; p.s.c., 1910-11; Pilot's
Licence (No.108), 1911; transferred to R.F.C., 1912; O.C.
2nd and 3rd Squadrons, R.F.C., 1912-14; D.A.A. & Q.M.G.,
R.F.C., 1914; 3rd Wing, R.F.C., 1915; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.l,
R.F.C., 1915-16; ]J.A. & Q.M.G., R.F.C., 1916-17; D.Q.M.G.,
R.F.C., 1917-18; Director of Research, Air Ministry, 1919-
21; Commandant, R.A.F. Staff College, 1921-26; A.O.C.
Fighting Area, R.A.F., 1926-28; Iraq, 1928-30; Commandant,
Imperial Defence College, 1931-32; A.O.C. Air Defence of
G.B., 1933-35; Inspector-General, R.A.F., 1935-37; retired
1937; Governor, Kenya, 1937-39; C.-in-C., Far East, 1940-41;
retired, 1942. Assumed by royal licence the additional name
of Popham, 1904.
Bruce, Colonel George David (born 1872)
Son of Major-General A.A. Bruce. Joined Royal Fusiliers,
1893; transferred to Indian Army (61st Pioneers), 1897;
North-West Frontier, 1897-97; China, 1900; p.s.c.; Brigade-
Major, North Lancashire (later 154th) Brigade, 1910-15;
G.S.O.2, 16th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.l, 14th Division
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1916-17; G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1917-18; D.S.O., 1918;
G.S.O.1, H.Q., India, 1918.
Bruce-Williams see Williams, Hugh Bruce
Bryant, Lieutenant-Colonel Alan (1869-1917)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Gloucestershire Regiment;
p.s.c., 1902; Instructor, R.M.C., 1903-04; Brigade-Major,
12th and 8th Brigades, 1904-07; G.S.O.2, Coast Defence,
Eastern Command, 1908-11; G.S.O.2, Canadian Forces, 1912-14;
G.S.O.2, 18th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 18th Division,
1915-16; G.S.O.1, 56th Division, 1916; D.S.O., 1917; O.C.
Battalions, Welsh Regiment and Northumberland Fusiliers,
1917; killed in action, 17 October 1917.
Buckland, Major-General Sir Reginald Ulick Henry (1864-1933)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1883; Soudan, 1885
and 1888 (despatches) ; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches) ;
Egyptian Army, 1888-89; Survey Duty, Lagos, 1890-91;
Adjutant, School of Military Engineering, 1895-99;
Instructor, School of Gunnery, 1904-07; Chief Instructor,
School of Gunnery, 1907-08; Chief Engineer, Egypt, 1913-14;
IV Corps, 1914-16; and Fourth Army, 1916-19. Died in 1933
after being knocked down by a motor car.
Buckle, Brigadier-General Archie Stewart (1868-1916)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1888; p.s.c.;
Soudan, 1898; G.S.O.2, South Africa, 1909-13; G.S.O.1, 19th
Division, 1915-16; B.G.R.A., 17th Division, 1916; died, 18
August 1916.
Buckle, Major-General Christopher Reginald (1862-1952)
Sherborne and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1883; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); D.A.A.G., South
Africa, 1902; A.M.S. to Indian Army Corps and G.O.C.-in-C.,
Southern Command, 1902-05; Brigade-Major, R.A., Gibraltar,
1908-11; G.O.C. Harwich Defences, 1913-14; B.G.R.A., No.6
Group, H.A.R., 1916; Brigadier-General, Heavy Artillery, VII
Corps, 1916; B.G.R.A., XVII Corps, 1916-17; M.G.R.A., Second
Army, 1917; M.G.R.A., G.H.Q., Italy, 1917-18; M.G.R.A.,
Second Army, 1918-19; M.G.R.A., Army of the Rhine, 1919;
retired 1920. His only son was killed in action, 1918.
Budworth, Major-General Charles Edward Dutton liBuddyll (1869-
1921)
Educated privately and at the R.M.A. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1889; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches) ; Chief
Instructor, School of Gunnery; B.G.R.A., 1st Division, 1915;
IV Corps, 1915-16; X Corps, 1916; M.G.R.A., Fourth Army,
1916-19. Author of various military pamphlets. Brother-in-
law of Lieutenant-Colonel Guy Blewitt (q.v.).
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Buif in, General Sir Edward Stanislaus (1862-1939)
Stonyhurst; Tinity College, Dublin; and Militia. Joined
Yorkhire Regiment, 1884; Burma 1892-93; South Africa, 1898-
1902; G.O.C. Essex Infantry Brigade, 1911-13; 2nd Brigade,
1913-14 (wounded) ; 28th Division, 1914-15 (sick) ; 60th
Division, U.K., France, Salonika, and E.E.F., 1915-17; XXI
Corps, E.E.F., 1917-19; retired, 1925.
Burkhardt, Colonel Valentine Rodoiphe (1884-1967)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1903; Captain,
1914; Staff Captain, R.A., 28th Division, 1914; D.A.A. &
Q.M.G., 42th Division, 1915-17; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2,
British Military Mission at French Headquarters, 1918;
G.S.O.1 with the French First Army, 1918; Military Attache,
Peking, 1932-34; G.S.O.1, China Command, 1936-39; retired,
1939; Military Attache, China, 1939; retired, 1941. First
Class Interpreter in Chinese and author of Chinese Creeds
and Customs (1953-58).
Burnett-Hitchcock, Lieutenant-General Sir Basil Ferguson
(1877-1938)
Harrow, Brighton College, and R.M.C. Joined Nottinghamshire
and Derbyshire Regiment, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1900;
p.s.c., 1904; Staff Captain, Eastern Command, 1905-08;
G.S.O.2, Bermuda, 1910-12; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 4th Division,
1912-15; G.S.O.2, 47th Division, 1915; A.Q.M.G., V Corps,
1915; G.S.O.1, 47th Division, 1915-16; D.A. & Q.M.G., IX
Corps, 1916; D.A. & Q.M.G., XIV Corps, 1916-17; Director of
Mobilization, War Office, 1917-21; G.O.C. 55th Division,
1926-28; 4th Indian Division, 1928-30; retired, 1933.
Renowned for his efficient staff work.
Burnett-Stuart, General Sir John Theodosius "Jock 1' (1875-
1958)
Repton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1895; p.s.c.;
North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902; Staff
Captain/G.S.O.3, War Office, 1908-09; G.S.O.2, War Office,
1908-09; G.S.O.2 (D.M.O.), New Zealand, 1910-12; G.S.O.2,
Staff College, Camberley, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, 6th Division,
1914-15; G.S.O.1, 15th Division, 1915; G.S.O.l (Commandant,
Staff Course), G.H.Q., 1915-16; B.G.G.S., O.b., G.H.Q.,
1916-17; B.G.G.S., VII Corps, 1917; Deputy Adjutant-General,
G.H.Q., 1917-19; G.O.C. Madras District, India, 1920-22;
D.M.O. and I., 1922-26; G.O.C. 3rd Division, 1926-30;
British Troops in Egypt, 1931-34; Southern Command, 1934-38;
retired, 1938. Efficient if somewhat highly-strung.
Burrowes, Brigadier-General Arnold Robinson (1869-1949)
Malvern and R.M.C. Joined Royal Irish Fusiliers, 1888;
Hazara Expedition, 1891; p.s.c., 1898; South Africa, 1899-
1902; D.A.A.G. & Q.M.G., Bermuda, 1906-07; G.S.O.2, Bermuda,
1907-10; G.S.O.l, 61st Division, U.K., 1915-16; G.S.O.l,
66th Division, U.K. and France, 1916-18; Base Commandant,
1919; retired, 1920. He was the designer of the service web
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equipment worn throughout the Army. Author of The 1st
Battalion The Faugh-A-Ballagho in the Great War (1925)
Burstall, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Edward (1870-1945)
Canadian. Bishop's College School, Lennoxville, and R.M.C.
Entered Royal Canadian Artillery, 1892; Yukon Force, 1898-
99; South Africa (1st Canadian Contingent), 1899-1902
(despatches); p.s.c., 1906; O.C. Royal Canadian Horse
Artillery, 1907-11; Inspector of Canadian Artillery, 1911-
14; B.G.R.A., 1st Canadian Division, 1914-15; C.R.A.,
Canadian Corps, 1915-1916; G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Division,
1916-19; Q.M.G., Canada, 1919-20; Inspector-General, Canada,
1920-23; retired, 1923.
Burtchaell, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Henry (1866-1932)
United Services College and Trinity College, Dublin.
Entered Army Medical Service, 1891; North-West Frontier,
1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Assistant
Director-General, A.M.S., War Office, 1910-14; S.O. to
D.G.M.S., B.E.F., 1914-15; A.D.M.S., B.E.F., 1915-18;
D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1918-19; D.M.S., India, 1919-23; retired,
1923.
Butler, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Harte Keatinge (1870-
1935)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Dorset Regiment, 1890; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded, despatches); p.s.c.,
1906; Brigade-Major, Aldershot, 1906-10; G.S.O.3, Aldershot
Command, 1911-14; O.C. 2/Lancashire Fusiliers, 1914; 3rd
Brigade, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., First Army, February - June
1915; M.G.G.S., First Army, June - December 1915; D.C.G.S.,
G.H.Q., 1915-18; G.O.C. III Corps, 1918-19; Western Command,
1924-28; retired, 1-9-2-&
Butler, Major-General Stephen Seymour (1880-1964)
Winchester and Militia. Joined Royal Warwickshire Regiment,
1899; transferred to South Staffordshire Regiment, 1908;
South Africa, 1899-1901; King's African Rifles, 1905-08;
explored Northern Arabia disguised as a Bedu, lecturing to
R.G.S. on return, 1907-08; Egyptian Army, 1909-15; G.S.O.3,
ANZAC Corps, M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, ANZAC Corps, M.E.F.,
1915; G.S.O.2, ANZAC Corps, France, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, Fifth
Army, 1918; G.S.O.1 (Deputy Chief, Intelligence), G.H.Q.,
1918-19; Inspector-General, West African frontier Force,
1926-30; Kaid, Sudan Defence Force, 1930-35; G.O.C. 48th
Division, 1935-39; retired, 1939; re-employed, 1939-43. His
brother was killed in action, 1916.
Buzzard, Brigadier-General Frank Anstie (1875-1950)
St. Paul's and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895;
p.s.c., 1912; Staff Captain, R.A., 4th Division, 1908-11;
G.S.O.2, Wessex Division, 1914; G.S.O.l, 43rd (Wessex)
Division, U.K., 1914; G.S.O.2, 2nd Division, 1915; G.S.O.1,
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9th Division, 1915; served with R.A., 1916-18 (wounded,
Despatches); D.S.O., 1917; and Bar, 1919; retired, 1921.
Byng, Hon. Julian Hedworth George (Field-Marshal Viscount
Byng of Vimy) "Bungo" (1862-1935)
7th son of 5th Earl of Straf ford. Eton and Militia. Joined
10th Hussars, 1883; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1884; South Africa,
1899-1902; O.C. 10th Hussars, 1902-04; Commandant, Cavalry
School, Netheravon, 1904-05; G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade,
1905-07; 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1907-09; East Anglian
Division, 1910-12; Eygpt, 1912-14; 3rd Cavalry Division,
1914-15; Cavalry Corps, 1915; IX Corps, M.E.F., 1915-16;
XVII Corps, France, 1916; Canadian Corps, 1916-17; Third
Army, 1917-19; Baron, 1919; Governor-General, Canada, 1921-
26; Chief Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, 1928-31;
Viscount, 1928; Field-Marshal, 1932. Brother-in-law of
Field-Marshal Lord Cavan (q.v.). Another brother-in-law was
killed in action in 1914.
Caldecott, Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Lawrence (1874-1927)
Rugby; Oriel College, Oxford; and Militia. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1900; Tibet, 1903-04; A.D.C. to Leiutenant-
Governor, Burma, 1907-10; Captain, 1913; service with
R.G.A., 1914-18; D.S.O., 1916; Deputy-Assistant Inspector-
General of Training, 1918-19. Played cricket for Hampshire;
rode winner of jumping championship of Burma.
Cameron, General Sir Archibald Rice (1870-1944)
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined Royal Highianders, 1890;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded, despatches);
Military Secretary to Governor of Cape Colony, 1905-08;
Instructor, R.M.C., 1909-13; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1914;
G.S.O.2, 5th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1915;
B.G.G.S., X Corps, 1915-18; B.G.G.S. (additional), Fourth
Army, 1918; B.G.G.S., IX Corps, 1918-19 (wounded,
despatches); D.S.D., War Office, 1925-27; G.O.C. 4th
Division, 1927-31; Scottish Command, 1933-37; retired, 1937.
Cameron, Major-General Neville John Gordon (1873-1955)
Son of General Sir William Cameron. Wellington and R.M.C.
Joined Cameron Highianders; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898; South
Africa, 1900-02; A.A. & Q.M.G., ith Division, 1914; G.S.O.l,
Scottish Command, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 34th Division, U.K. and
B.E.F., 1915; G.O.C. 103rd Brigade, 1915-16; wounded, 1 July
1916; 151st Brigade, 1916-17; 49th Division, 1917-19; 16th
Brigade, Ireland, 1921-23; 12th Brigade, 1923-25; 49th (West
Riding) Division, 1926-30; retired, 1931. His only son was
killed in action in 1940.
Campbell, General Sir David Graham Muschet (1869-1936)
Clifton. Joined 9th Lancers, 1889; South Africa, 1899-1902;
Brigade-Major, India, 1905-09; O.C. 9th Lancers, 1912-14
(wounded); G.O.C. 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1914-16; 21st
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Division, 1916-19; G.O.C. Baluchistan District, 1920-24;
Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War, 1926-
27; G.O.C. Aldershot Command, 1927-31; Governor, Malta,
1931-36. A noted equestrian who rode many winners, notably
in the Grand National in 1896. Father of Major-General
V.D.G. Campbell.
Campbell, Major-General John (1871-1941)
Grandson of Major-General J.D. Mein. Haileybury and R.M.C.
Joined Cameron Highianders, 1892; Soudan, 1898 (despatches);
South Africa, 1900-01 (despatches); p.s.c., 1903; Staff
Captain, War Office, 1904-05; Brigade-Major, Aldershot,
1905-08; Chief Instructor, School of Musketry, Hythe, 1909-
13; O.C. 2nd Cameron Highlanders, 1914-15 (wounded); 121st
Brigade, 1915-18; 31st Division, 1918-19; 11th Brigade,
1919-21; retired, 1921.
Campbell, Colonel Robert Bruce (1878-1963)
Bedford and Militia, Canada. Joined D.C.L.I., 1900;
transferred to Gordon Highlanders, 1908; South Africa, 1900-
01; Superintendent of Gymnasia, Southern Command, 1910-15;
Assistant Inspector, Gymnasia, 1915-16; Superintendant of
Gymnasia, G.H.Q., 1916-17; Inspector of Physical and Bayonet
Training, G.H.Q., 1917-18; Inspector of Physical Training,
Aldershot Command, 1918; retired, 1925. Director of
Physical Education, Edinburgh University, 1930-46. Renowned
for his blood-curdling lectures on use of the bayonet.
Author of A Ten-Round Contest and The Foster-Brothers.
Campbell, Lieutenant-General Sir Walter (1864-1936)
Wellington; Trinity College, Cambridge; and R.M.C. Joined
Gordon Highlanders, 1887; p.s.c.; Waziristan, 1894-95;
Chitral, 1895; Tirah, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); A.Q.M.G., Scottish Command,
1911-14; A.A. & Q.M.G., 6th Division, 1914; D.A. & Q.M.G.,
III Corps, 1914-15; D.A. & Q.M.G., Third Army, 1915;
D.Q.M.G., M.E.F., 1915-19; Q.M.G. to the Forces, 1923-27;
retired, 1927.
Capper, Major-General Sir John Edward (1861-1955)
Grandson of W.T. Copeland, M.P., owner of the Copeland
potteries. Wellington College. Entered Royal Engineers,
1880; Tirah, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches);
Commandant, Balloon School, 1903-10; Superintendent of the
Balloon Factory, Farnborough, 1906-09; Commandant, School of
Military Engineering, 1911-14; Deputy Inspector of
Communications, 1914-15; Chief Engineer, III Corps, 1915;
Chief Engineer, Third Army, 1915; G.O.C. 24th Division,
1915-17; M.G. Corps Training Centre, U.K., 1917; Director-
General, Tank Corps, U.K., 1917-18; G.O.C. 64th Division,
U.K., 1918-19; Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey, 1920-25;
retired, 1925. Both his brother, Major-General Thompson
Capper (q.v.), and his only son were killed in action during
the war. Also brother of Brigadier-General W.B. Capper and
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Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Capper. A soldier of progressive
ideas, meeting the Wright brothers in 1904 and pioneering
balloons and aircraft, he was a leading figure in British
military aeronautics prior to the war and was then involved
in the development of the tank during the war.
Capper, Major-General Thompson "Tommy" (1863-1915)
Grandson of W.T. Copeland, M.P., owner of the Copeland
potteries. Haileybury. Joined East Lancashire Regiment;
p.s.c., 1897; Chitral Relief Force, 1895; Soudan, 1898;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (D.S.O.); Professor at Staff
College, 1902-03; D.A.A.G., Staff College, 1904-05;
Commandant, Staff College, Quetta, 1906-11; G.O.C. 13th
Brigade, 1911-14; Inspector of Infantry, 1914; 7th Division,
1914-15 (wounded twice). Died of wounds, 27 September 1915.
Brother of Major-General Sir John Capper (q.v.), and
Brigadier-General W.B. and A.S. Capper.
Carey, Major-General George Glas Sandemnan (1867-1948)
Winchester. Entered Royal Artillery, 1886; South Africa,
1900; B.G.R.A., 27th Division, 1915; B.G.R.A., XI Corps,
1915-17; G.O.C. 139th Brigade, 1917-18; 20th Division, 1918-
19; Troops in Jamaica, 1920-22; retired, 1922.
Carr, Lieutenant-General Laurence (1886-1954)
Uppingham and R.M.C. Joined Gordon Highlanders, 1906; Staff
Captain, 20th Brigade, 1916; D.S.O., 1916; Brigade-Major,
45th Brigade, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, 51st Division, 1917;
G.S.O.2, 5 Corps, 1917; G.S.O.2, XVIII Corps, 1917-18;
G.S.O.l, 4th Division, 1918-20; D.S.D., War Office, 1938-39;
Assistant C.I.G.S., 1939-40; G.O.C. I Corps, 1940-41;
Eastern Command, 1941-42; Senior Military Adviser, Ministry
of Supply, 1942-44; retired, 1944. Brother-in-law of Major-
General Sir James Burnett, Dart.
Carter, Major-General Sir Evan Eyare (1866-1933)
King's School, Canterbury; Trinity College, Oxford; and
London School of Economics. Joined Leicestershire Regiment,
1889; transferred to Army Service Corps, 1890; p.s.c., 1896;
South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches, C.M.G.); D.A. & Q.M.G.,
War Office, 1901; Chief Instructor, A.S.C. Training
Establishment, 1905-08; Assistant Director Supplies and
Transport, London District, 1912; Colonel i/c A.S.C.
Records, Woolwich Dockyard, 1913-14; A.Q.M.G., Lines of
Communication, 1914-15; Director of Supplies, G.H.Q., 1915-
19; retired, 1921.
Carter-Campbell, Colonel George Tupper Campbell (1869-1921)
Joined Scottish Rifles, 1889; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); Adjutant, Volunteers, 1904-07; O.C. 2nd
Cameronians, 1915; 94th Brigade, 1915-18; 51st Division,
1918-19. An outstanding officer and a very fine type of
Regular officer of his day who had the gift of inspiring his
subordinates.
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Carthew, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Walter Colby (1880-1955)
Uppingham and Militia. Joined Northumberland Fusiliers,
1900; South Africa, 1899-1902; West African Frontier Force,
1902-07; retired as Lieutenant, 1909; Barrister, Inner
Temple, 1910; re-employed with R.F.C., 1914; O.C. 4th
Squadron, R.F.C., 1916; 1st Wing, R.F.C., 1917; 81st Wing,
R.A.F., 1918; S.O.1, R.F.C., 1918-19; Recorder of Maidstone,
1936-51; re-employed, 1941-43.
Cator, Major-General Albemarle Bertie Edward "Alby" (1877-
1932)
Eton and Militia. Joined Scots Guards, 1897; South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches) ; Adjutant, Scots Guards, 1912-13;
D.S.O., 1914; Brigade-Major, 20th Brigade, 1914-15; O.C. 2nd
Scots Guards, 1915-16; 37th Brigade, 1916-17; 58th Division,
1917-18 (sick); G.O.C., 10th Brigade, 1924-25; Lucknow
District, India, 1927-31.
Cavan, Earl of, Frederick Rudolf La.mbart "Fatty" (1865-1946)
Eldest son of 9th Earl of Cavan, who he succeeded in 1900.
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1885; South
Africa, 1901 (despatches); O.C. 1st Grenadier Guards, 1908-
12; retired, November 1913; re-employed, August 1914; G.O.C.
2nd London Brigade, 1914; 4th Brigade, 1914-15; Guards
Division, 1915-16; XIV Corps, France and Italy, 1916-18;
British Troops in Italy, 1918-19; Aldershot, 1920-22;
C.I.G.S., 1922-26; Field-Marshal, 1932. Brother-in-law of
Field-Marshal Lord Byng (q.v.). Regarded as one of the best
Corps commanders on the Western Front.
Cavendish, Brigadier-General Frederick William Lawrence
Sheppard Hart "Caviare" (1877-1931)
Wellington and R.M.C. Joined 9th Lancers, 1897; South
Africa, 1899-1902; p.s.c., 1910-12; G.S.O.3, War Office,
1913-14; G.S.O.3, 3rdCavalryDivision, 1914-15; G.S.O.2,
attached French Army, 1915-16; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1,
British Military Mission with French Army, 1916-18;
B.G.G.S., British Military Mission with French Army, 1918-
19; O.C. 9th Lancers, 1920-24; 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1924-28;
retired, 1928.
Cayley, Major-General Douglas Edward (1870-1951)
Son of Deputy Surgeon-General H. Cayley. Clifton and R.M.C.
Joined Worcestershire Regiment, 1890; South Africa, 1900-
02; O.C. 4th Worcesters, 1914-15; 88th Brigade, 1915-17
(gassed) ; 110th Brigade, 1918; 19th Division, 1918-19
(wounded thrice, despatches); retired, 1919. Brother of
Major-General Sir Walter Cayley and father of Commander R.D.
Cayley, R.N.
Cecil, Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald Edward (born 1878)
Grandson of 2nd Marquis of Salisbury, son of Lord Arthur
Cecil, and cousin of Viscount Cecil of Cheiwood
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(Conservative M.P., 1906-23). Winchester and Trinity
College, Cambridge. Joined 18th Hussars, 1899; transferred
to 21st Lancers, 1899; O.C. 21st Lancers, 1916-17; G.S.O.2,
58th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, th Cavalry Division, 1917-18;
G.S.O.2, Cavalry Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 1st Cavalry Division,
1918-19; retired, 1921.
Charles, Lieutenant-General Sir (James) Ronald Edmonston
(1875-1955)
Wincester and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1894; South
Africa, 1899-1900; Bazar Valley and Mohmand Field Forces,
1908; p.s.c.; G.S.O.1, Lahore Division, 1915; B.G.G.S..,
Indian Corps, 1915; B.G.G.S., XV and XVII Corps, 1915-18;
G.O.C. 25th Division, 1918-19; D.S.D., India, 1921-23;
Commandant, R.M.A., 1924-26; D.M.O. and I., War Office,
1926-31; M.G.O., 1931-34; retired, 1934.
Charles, Lieutenant-Colonel William Gwyther (1880-1925)
Felsted School. Joined Essex Regiment, 1900; p.s.c.;
employed with West African Frontier Force, 1903-05; G.S.O.1,
40th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Third Army, 1918-19.
Charlton, Air Commodore Lionel Evelyn Oswald "Leo" (1879-
1958)
From an old Northumbrian Catholic family. Brighton College.
Joined Lancashire Fusiliers, 1898; transferred to R.F.C.,
May 1914; p.s.c., 1914; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded
twice, D.S.O.); West African Frontier Force, 1902-07; air
reconnaissance officer attached to II Corps, 1914 (wounded);
O.C. 8th Squadron, 1915; G.S.O.1, Military Aeronautics
Department, War Office, 1916-17; Director, Miltary
Aeronautics, War Office, 1917; G.O.C. 5th Brigade, R.F.C.,
1917-19 (wounded); retired, 1928. New Statesman's Air
correspondent. Author of A Hausa Reading Book, Chariton
(1931), More Chariton (1940), War From The Air, and War Over
England. A friend of E.M. Forster.
Charrington, Lieutenant-Colonel Sydney Herbert (1878-1954)
Eton. Joined 15th Hussars, 1899; retired to Kenya, 1912;
re-employed as Signalling Off icer,East Africa, 1914;
G.S.O.3, 2nd Mounted Division, Gallipoli, 1915; G.S.O.2,
Southern Force, Egypt, 1916; O.C. 3rd Tank Battalion,
France, 1917-18; 5th Tank Brigade, 1918-19; reverted to
unemployment, 1919.
Charteris, Brigadier-General John (1877-1946)
Son of Professor M. Charteris, Glasgow University.
Merchiston School. Entered Royal Engineers, 1896; p.s.c.;
A.M.S. to G.O.C. Aldershot, 1912-14; A.D.C. to G.O.C. I
Corps, 1914; G.S.O.2 (I), I Corps, 1914-16; B.G.G.S.
(Intelligence), G.H.Q., 1916-18; retired, 1922. Author of
Field-Marshal Earl Haig (1929), At G.H.Q. (1931), and Haig
(1933)
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Charteris, Colonel Nigel Keppel (1878-1967)
Grandson of 9th Earl of Wemyss and 6th Earl of Albermarle.
Winchester; Christ Church College, Oxford; and Militia.
Joined Royal Scots, 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); Instructor, School of Musketry, 1913-15;
Commandant, Machine Gun School, G.H.Q., M.E.F. and B.E.F.,
1915-16; Chief Instructor (G.S.O.2), Machine Gun Corps,
1916-18; Deputy Instructor Machine Gun Units (G.S.O.l),
Fourth Army, 1918-19; retired, 1929. Author of Some
Lectures and Notes on Machine Guns (1914).
Chetwode, Sir Philip Waihouse (Field-Marshal Lord Chetwode)
(186 9-1950)
Succeeded his father as 7th Baronet, 1905. Eton and
Militia. Joined 19th Hussars, 1889; Burma, 1892-93; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.O.C. 5th Cavalry Brigade,
1914-15; 2nd Cavalry Division, 1915-16; Desert Column,
E.E.F., 1916-17; Eastern Force, E.E.F., 1917; XX Corps,
E.E.F., 1917-19; A.G., 1922-23; C.G.S., India, 1928-30; C.-
in-C., India, 1930-35; Field-Marshal, 1933. Ornithologist.
Brother of Vice-Admiral G.K. Chetwode, brother-in-law of
General Sir Noel Birch (q.v.), and father-in-Law of Sir John
Betjeman, the Poet Laureate.
Chichester, Major-General Sir Arlington Augustus (1863-1948)
Son of Major-General J.O. Chichester. Cheltenham and R.M.C.
Joined Dorsetshire Regiment, 1884; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches) ; G.S.O.2, Southern China, 1903-07;
A.A. & Q.M.G., II Corps, 1914; G.O.C. Brigade, Reserve
Troops, B.E.F., 1914; 5th Brigade, 1914-15; D.A. & Q.M.G.,
III Corps, 1915; ]J.A. & Q.M.G., Second Army, 1915-17;
D.Q.M.G., Italy, 1917-18; D.A. & Q.M.G., Second Army, 1918-
19; retired, 1920.
Church, Colonel George Ross Marryat (1868-1940)
Son of General T.R. Church. Trent College, Nottingham.
Entered Royal Artillery, 1886; G.S.O.3 and G.S.O.2,
(Censor), B.E.F., 1914-17; Deputy Chief Field Censor,
G.H.Q., 1917; G.S.O.1, Intelligence, G.H.Q., 1917-18; Base
Commandant, France, 1918-19; retired, 1920.
Clarke, Colonel Arthur Lionel Crisp (1874-1935)
Rugby and Militia. Joined Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches);
p.s.c.; Assistant Instructor, School of Musketry, 1902-04;
G.S.O.3, War Office, 1907-08; G.S.O.2, South Midland
Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 48th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.2,
27th Division, B.E.F. and Salonika, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 27th
Division, Salonika, 1916; G.S.O.1, 69th Division, U.K.,
1916-19; retired, 1920.
Clarke, Lieutenant-Colonel Mervyn Officer (1878-1963)
Son of Surgeon-General J.J. Clarke. Harrow. Joined Royal
Fusiliers, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; p.s.c., 1913;
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G.S.O.2, 17th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, Staff Course,
Cambridge, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, II Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 33rd
Division, 1918; 20th Divisions, 1918 (sacked) ; O.C. 3rd
Royal Fusiliers, 1918-19. Well known for playing all games,
his caustic remarks, and for his outspokenness.
Clarke, Colonel Reginald Graham (1879-1959)
Harrow and Militia. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment,
1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches) ; Assistant
Instructor, School of Musketry, 1910-13; Instructor, School
of Musketry, 1915; Instructor, Machine Gun Corps Training
Centre, 1915-16; Chief Instructor (G.S.O.2), Machine Gun
Corps Training Centre, 1916; Chief Instructor, Machine Gun
Corps, 1918; D.S.O., 1918; Deputy Instructor, Machine Gun
Units, Third Army, 1918-19; retired, 1928.
Clarke, Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Edwards (1871-1962)
Educated privately, at Taunton and R.M.C. Joined Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers; 1890; Tirah, 1897-98; South Africa,
1901-02; D.A.A.G., Aldershot, 1912-14; D.A.A. & Q.M.G. and
D.A. & Q.M.G., I Corps, 1914; A.Q.M.G., I Corps, 1914-15;
G.O.C. 23rd Brigade, 1915; D.A. & Q.M.G., XII Corps,
Salonika, 1915; D.A. & Q.M.G., H.Q., Salonika, 1915-17;
D.A.G., France, 1917; Q.M.G., France, 1917-19; Q.M.G. to the
Forces, 1919-23; retired, 1926.
Clayton, Colonel Edward Robert (1877-1957)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire
Light Infantry, 1897; Tiral Expedition, 1897-98; p.s.c.;
G.S.O.2, XI Corps, 1916; O.C. 6th Scottish Rifles, 1916-17;
G.S.O.2, VI Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1918-19;
retired, 1930.
Clayton, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Thomas (1855-1933)
Entered Army, 1876; Bechuanaland, 1884-85 (despatches);
Ashanti, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, C.B.) ;
Director of Supplies, War Office, 1906-10; Major-General i/c
Administration, South Africa, 1911-15; Inspector-General of
Communications, B.E.F., 1915; retired, 1917.
dive, General Sir (George) Sidney (1874-1959)
Descended from Clive of India and son of General E.H. Clive,
M.P. Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1893;
Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1900; p.s.c., 1904;
G.S.O.1, Mission to French Army, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., Mission
to French Army, 1916-18; B.G.G.S. (Intelligence), G.H.Q.,
1918-19; Military Governor, Cologne, 1919; British Military
Representative, League of Nations, 1920-22; Military
Attache, Paris, 1924-27; Director of Personal Services, War
Office, 1928-30; Military Secretary to the Secretary of
State for War, 1930-34; retired, 1934. Son-in-law of F.W.
Buxton, M.P.; father of Brigadier A.F.L. Clive, D.S.O.,
M.C.; and brother-in-law of Lieutenant-Colonel R.V. Buxton,
Brigadier J.L. Buxton, and Major-General G.P. Dawnay (q.v.).
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Cobbe, General Sir Alexander Stanhope (1870-1931)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir A.H. Cobbe. Wellington and
R.M.C. Joined South Wales Borderers, 1889; transferred to
Indian Army, 1892; p.s.c.; Chitral Relief Force, 1895
(despatches); South Angoniland Expedition, 1898; Expedition
against the Kwarnba, 1899 (despatches); Ashanti, 1900
(severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); Somaliland, 1902-04
(despatches, V.C.); G.S.O.1, H.Q., India, 1910-14; G.S.O.1,
Lahore Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., I Corps, 1915-16; D.S.D.
and D.M.T., India, 1916; G.O.C. 7th Indian Division,
Mesopotamia, 1916; III Indian Corps, Mesopotamia, 1916; I
Indian Corps, Mesopotamia, 1916-19; Secretary of Military
Department, India Office, 1920-26; G.O.C. Northern Command,
India, 1926-30; Military Secretary, India Office, 1930-31.
Brother of Colonel H.H. Cobbe.
Cochrane, Brigadier-General James Kilvington (1873-1948)
Bedford and R.M.C. Joined Leinster Regiment, 1893; West
African Frontier Force, 1900-03; p.s.c., 1908; G.S.O.3
(D.M.O.), New Zealand, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, 12th Division,
1914-16; G.S.O.1, 55th Division, 1916-17; Commandant, Small
Arms School, 1917; G.S.O.1 (British Mission to U.S.A.),
1917; G.O.C. 61st Brigade, 1918-20; retired, 1920.
Coffin, Major-General Clifford (1870-1959)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir I.C. Coffin. Haileybury and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1888; p.s.c.; G.O.C. 25th
Brigade, 1917-18; 36th Division, 1918-19 (V.C., D.S.O. and
Bar, despatches); G.O.C. Ceylon, 1920-24; retired, 1924.
Brother of Colonel Campbell Coffin.
Coleridge, General Sir John Francis Stanhope Duke "Daddy"
(1878-1951)
Wellington and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1898; transferred
Indian Army (8th Gurkha Rifles), 1900; p.s.c.; Tibet, 1903-
04; North-West Frontier, 1911-12; G.S.O.3, 11th Division,
U.K. and B.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, 11th Division, M.E.F., 1915-
16; G.S.O.1, 55th Division, E.E.F and France, 1916-17;
G.O.C. 188th brigade, 1917; 189th Brigade, 1917-18; G.O.C.
Northern Command, 1933; Secretary, Military Department,
India Office, 1933-36; G.O.C. Northern Command, 1936-40;
retired, 1940.
Collins, Major-General Robert John "Jack" (1880-1950)
One of eight sons. Marlborough and Militia. Joined Royal
Berkshire Regiment, 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902; Egyptian
Army, 1904-11; Somaliland, 1910; p.s.c., 1913; G.S.O.3, I
Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, Second Army, 1915-16; G.S.O.1,
Second Army, 1916; 17th Division, 1916-17; Fifth Army, 1917;
Staff School, Cambridge, 1917-18; G.O.C. 73rd Brigade, 1918-
19; D.M.T., India, 1923-26; Commandant, Small Arms School,
1929-32; G.O.C., 3rd Indian Division, 1934-38; retired,
1938; re-employed; 1939; G.O.C. 61st Division; 1939;
401
Commandant, Staff College, 1939-41; retired, 1941. Editor
of the Army Quarterly, 1942-50, and author of Lord Wavell
(1948). Brother of Rear-Admiral R. Collins and Brigadier
L.P. Collins.
Congreve, General Sir Walter Norris °Squib" (1862-1927)
Harrow; Pembroke College, Oxford; Militia; and R.M.C.
Joined Rifle Brigade, 1885; South Africa, 1899-1902 (V.C.,
wounded and despatches); Commandant, School of Musketry,
Hythe, 1909-11; G.O.C. 18th Brigade, 1911-15; 6th Division,
1915; XIII Corps, 1915-17 (wounded losing a hand); VII Corps
1918 (sick); G.O.C. Southern Command, 1923-24; Governor,
Malta, 1924-27. A country gentleman of the old school from
an old gentry family with many service connections.
Brother-in-law of General Sir John Shea (q.v.). His son,
Major W. la T. Congreve, V.C., D.S.O., M.C., was killed in
action on the Somme in 1916.
Constable-Maxwell-Scott, Major-General Sir Walter Joseph
(1875-1954)
Son of Hon. Joseph Constable-Maxwell-Scott (third son of
Baron Herries of Terregles); his mother was the great-
granddaughter of Sir Walter Scott. Stonyhurst and Militia.
Joined Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), 1897; p.s.c.; Tirah,
1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-
13; G.S.O.1, 22nd Division, B.E.F. and Salonika, 1915-17;
G.S.O.l, 33rd Division, 1917; B.G.G.S., IX Corps, 1917-18;
B.G.G.S., VII Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1934.
Cookson, Major-General George Arthur (1860-1929)
Wimbledon School. Joined 13 Foot, 1880; transferred to 90
Foot, 1880, and Indian Army (29th Cavalry), 1884; Tirah,
1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.O.C.
Lucknow Cavalry Brigade, 1911-14; 2nd Indian Cavalry
Division, 1915-16; retired, 1919.
Cory, Lieutenant-General Sir George Norton (1874-1968)
Canadian. Bishop's College School, Lennoxville, and R.M.C.,
Kingston, Canada. Joined Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1895;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; Aden, 1903; G.S.O.1, 51st
Division, 1915; 27th Division, 1915; B.G.G.S., VI Corps,
M.E.F. and Salonika, 1915-17; M.G.G.S., British Salonika
Force, 1917-19; D.C.G.S., India, 1922-26; G.O.C., 50th
Division, 1927-28; retired, 1931; re-employed, 1940-43.
Cosens, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Philip Lewes (born 1884)
Eton and Militia. Joined 1st Dragoons, 1904; Egyptian Army,
1913-15; G.S.O.3, M.E.F., 53rd Division, M.E.F., 1915;
D.A.A.G., G.H.Q., 1916; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 3rd Cavalry
Division, 1916-17; A.A. & Q.M.G., 3rd Cavalry Division,
1917-18; G.S.O.1, 3rd Cavalry Division, 1918-19; retired,
1920.
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Couper, Major-General Sir Victor Arthur (1859-1938)
Second son of Sir George Couper, 2nd Baronet. Uppingham.
Joined Rifle Brigade, 1879; Burma, 188-89; North-West
Frontier, 1897-98; Inspector of Gymnasia, 1910-14; G.O.C.
43rd Brigade, 1914; 14th Division, 1914-18; retired, 1919.
Courage, Brigadier-General Anthony (1875-1944)
Rugby. Joined 15th Hussars, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1902;
wounded, 1915; G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, Tank Corps, 1917-18; 5th
Brigade, Tank Corps, 1918; No.2 Group, Tank Corps, 1918-19;
retired, 1921. Chairman, Courage & Co. Ltd.
Cox, Brigadier-General Edgar William (1882-1918)
Christ's Hospital. Entered Royal Engineers, 1900; Sierre
Leone and Siberia, 1902-03; East Africa, 1904-09; G.S.O.3,
War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.3, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, D.M.I., War Office, 1916-17;
G.S.O.1, D.M.I., War Office, 1917-18; B.G.G.S.
(Intelligence), G.H.Q., 1918; drowned at Le Touquet, 26
August 1918. Co-author of a Text Book of Topographical and
Geographical Surveying (Second Edition, 1913). Brilliant
Intelligence Officer.
Cox, General Sir (Herbert) Vaughan (1860-1923)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined 25th Foot, 1880; transferred
to Indian Army (69th Punjabis), 1883; Afghan War, 1879-80;
Burma, 1885-89; Mohmand, 1897; Tirah, 1907-08; China, 1901-
02; O.C. 69th Punjabis, 1902-07; 4th Indian Brigade, 1912-
14; 2nd Indian Brigade, 1914; 29th Indian Brigade, Arabia,
E.E.F., and Gallipoli, 1914-15 (wounded); G.O.C. 4th
Australian Division, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1916-17; Military
Secretary, India Office, 1917-19; retired, 1921. Capable.
Crookenden, Colonel Arthur (1877-1962)
Son of Colonel H.H. Crookenden, R.A. Clifton and R.M.C.
Joined Cheshire Regiment, 1897; South Africa, 1902; p.s.c.;
G.S.O.2, 53rd Division, M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, XVI Corps,
M.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 42nd Division, M.E.F. and France,
1916-17 (invalided); G.S.O.1, 11th Division, 1917-19;
retired, 1932. Author of three Histories of the Cheshire
Regiment. Father of Lieutenant-General Sir Napier
Crookenden.
Crookshank, Major-General Sir Sidney D'Aguilar (1870-1941)
Northcotts. Entered Royal Engineers, 1889; Chitral, 1895;
C.R.E., 47th Division, 1915-16; Deputy Director of Light
railways, 1916-17; Chief Engineer, XV Corps, 1917; Deputy
Director-General of Transportation, 1917-18; Director-
General of Transportation, 1918-19; Chief Engineer, Southern
Command, 1925-27; retired, 1927.
Crossman, Colonel George Lytton (1877-1947)
Radley and R.M.C. Joined West Yorkshire Regiment, 1897;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches and D.S.O.); Instructor,
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R.M.C., 1908-12; G.S.O.2, 30th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2,
VII Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, R.F.C., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 59th
Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, Fifth Army, 1918; G.S.O.1, No.1
Tank Group, Tank Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1934.
Crozier, Major-General Baptist Barton (1878-1957)
Eldest son of the Archbishop of Armagh. St. Columba's
College, Dublin; Trinity College, Dublin; and Militia.
Entered Royal Artillery, 1898; South Africa, 1900-01;
D.S.O., 1915; S.O., R.A., XIII Corps, 1916-17; S.O., R.A.,
Second Army, 1917; G.S.O.1, R.A., Second Army, 1917;
G.S.O.1, R.A., G.H.Q., Italy, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, R.A., Second
Army, 1918; G.O.C. 43rd (Wessex) Division, 1934-38; retired,
1938.
Cubitt, General Sir Thomas Astley (1871-1939)
Haileybury and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1889;
p.s.c.; West African Frontier Force, 1898-1905 (despatches,
D.S.O.); Somaliland, 1914-16; G.O.C. 57th Brigade, 1917-18;
38th Division, 1918-19; G.O.C. Assam District, 1920-24; 53rd
Division, 1927-28; 2nd Division, 1928-31; Governor of
Bermuda, 1931-36; retired, 1936. Infamous for his use of
bad language.
Cuffe, Colonel James Aloysius Francis (1876-1957)
Queen t s Service Academy, Dublin; University College, Dublin;
and R.M.C. Joined Royal Munster Fusiliers, 1896; Nandi
Expedition, 1905-06; G.S.O.3, Third Army, 1915-16; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1916-18; G.S.O.1, H.Q., Allied Armies in France,
1918-19; retired, 1926.
Cumming, Brigadier-General Hanway Robert (1867-1921)
Joined Durham Light Infantry, 1889; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-1901; D.A. & Q.M.G., Ceylon, 1903-05; D.A.A.G., Ceylon,
1905-06; Instructor, R.M.C., 1909-13; G.S.O.2, 31st
Division, U.K., 1915; G.S.O.1, 31st Division, U.K. and
B.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 48th Division, 1916; G.O.C. 91st
Brigade, 1916-17 (sacked); D.S.O., 1917; O.C. Machine Gun
Corps Training Centre, U.K., 1917-18; 110th Brigade, 1918-
19. Killed by Sinn Fein in Ireland, 6 March 1921. Author
of A Brigadier in France, 1917-18 (published posthumously,
1922)
Cuxiinghame, Colonel Sir Thomas Andrew Alexander Montgomery
(1877-1945)
Succeeded his father, Colonel Sir William Cuninghame, V.C.,
as 10th Baronet, 1897. Eton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle
Brigade, 1897; South Africa, 1900-01 (severely wounded,
despatches, D.S.O.); D.A. & Q.M.G., 5th Division, 1909-12;
Military Attache, Vienna and Cettinje, 1912-14; G.S.O.2,
attached French Army, 1914; G.S.O.2, I Corps, 1914-15;
Military Attache, Athens, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 68th Division,
U.K., 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 34th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1,
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American Staff School, 1918; retired, 1924. Author of Dusty
Measure (1939)
Curling, Brigadier-General Bryan James (1877-1955)
Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford. Joined K.R.R.C., 1899;
South Africa, 1899-1902; p.s.c.; G.S.O.2, 29th Division,
M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.l, 26th Division, M.E.F. andE.E.F.,
1915-16; G.S.O.1, 65th Division, U.K., 1916-17; G.S.O.1,
42nd Division, 1917-18; O.C. 8th K.R.R.C., 1918; 189th
Brigade, 1918-19; retired, 1927. Brother of Lieutenant-
Colonel R.R. Curling.
Currie, General Sir Arthur William (1875-1933)
Canadian. Strathroy Model School; Strathroy Collegiate
Institute. Real estate and insurance broker. Canadian
Militia, 1897; G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Brigade, 1914-15; 1st
Canadian Division, 1915-17; Canadian Corps, 1917-19;
Inspector-General, Canadian Militia, 1919. Principal,
McGill University, 1920-33.
Currie, Brigadier-General Ryves Alexander Mark (1875-1920)
Wellington and Militia. Joined Somerset Light Infantry;
North-West Frontier, 1897; p.s.c., 1911; G.S.O.2 (commandant
Cadet School), 1915; G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.l
(Commandant, Junior Staff School), 1916-17; G.O.C. 176th
Brigade, 1917; B.G.G.S. (Commandant, Senior and Junior Staff
Courses and Staff School, Cambridge), 1917-18; G.O.C. 89th
Brigade, 1918-19. Died on active service, 30 April 1920.
Cuthbert, Major-General Gerald James (1861-1931)
Privately educated. Joined Oxfordshire Light Infantry,
1882; transferred to Scots Guards, 1882; Soudan, 1885; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches) ; O.C. 1st Scots Guards, 1904-
06; 13th Brigade, 1914; 140th Brigade, 1914-16; 39th
Division, 1916-17; 72th Division, U.K., 1917-18; retired,
1919.
Dalby, Major-General Thomas Gerald (1880-1963)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined K.R.R.C., 1899; South Africa, 1899-
1902 (severely wounded); Somaliland, 1904; Egyptian Army,
1906; O.C. 8/Berkshire, 1915-16; Instructor, Senior Officers
School, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, Training, G.H.Q., 1917-18;
G.S.O.1, Fourth Army, 1918 (severely wounded twice,
despatches, D.S.O.); retired, 1937; re-employed, 1939;
G.O.C. 18th Division, 1939-40.
Dallas, Major-General 1l4-s-be±4Grant (1866-1931)
Joined 16th Lancers, 1886; transferred to Durham Light
Infantry, 1902; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South
Africa, 1899-1902; Commandant, School of Musketry, South
Africa, 1907-11; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, IV
Corps, 1914; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1915 (sacked); G.O.C. 32nd
Brigade, M.E.F., 1915-16; 53rd Division, M.E.F. and E.E.F.,
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1916-17; 71st Division, U.K., 1917-18; 1st Cyclist Division,
1918-19; retired, 1922.
Daly, Major-General Arthur Crawford (1871-1936)
Son of General Sir Henry Daly. Winchester and R.M.C.
Joined West Yorkshire Regiment, 1890; p.s.c., 1905; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (dangerously wounded); Brigade-Major, 6th
Brigade, 1907-11; Instructor, R.M.C., 1912-14; D.A. &
Q.M.G., IV Corps, 1914; A.A. & Q.M.G., 7th Division, 1914-
15; G.O.C. 6th Brigade, 1915-17; 33rd Brigade, 1917; 24th
Division, 1917-19; Inspector-General and Military Adviser,
Ministry of Defence, Iraq, 1925-27; retired, 1928.
Daniell, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Edward Lloyd (1874-1916)
Malvern and R.M.C. Joined Seaforth Highianders, 1895;
p.s.c.; Crete, 1897; Soudan, 1898 (despatches) ; South
Africa, 1899-1901; Mohmand Expedition, 1908; G.S.O.2, 5th
Indian Division, 1911-13; G.S.O.1, 21st Division, 1915-16;
killed when his Division's H.Q. was shelled, 4 April 1916.
Davidson, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Humphrey (1886-1962)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Gordon Highlanders, 1906; G.S.O.3,
2nd Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.3, IV Corps, 1916; G.S.O.2, IV
Corps, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, R.F.C., 1917; G.S.O.1, R.F.C.,
1917-18; Director of Intelligence, Air Ministry, 1918-19;
retired, 1920; Deputy Director of Intelligence, Air
Ministry, 1939-40. Brother of Major-General Sir John
Davidson (q.v.).
Davidson, Major-General Sir John Humphrey nTavisht (1872-
1954)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined K.R.R.C., 1896; South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); p.s.c., 1907; G.S.O.3, War
Office, 1908-12; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1912-14; G.S.O.2,
III Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, First Army, 1915; B.G.G.S.,
Operations, G.H.Q., 1915-18; M.G.G.S. (Operations), G.H.Q.,
1918-19; retired, 1922. Conservative M.P., 1918-31.
Director of numerous companies, notably Vickers-Armstrong.
Author of Haig: Master of the Field (1953). Brother of
Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. Davidson (q.v.).
Davidson, Lieutenant-Colonel Norman Randall (1878-1917)
King's Scholar, Eton. Entered Royal Artillery, 1898;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.2,
Guards Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.l, 2nd Cavalry Division,
1916-17; D.S.O., 1916, and Bar, 1917. Died of wounds, 5
October 1917.
Davies, Lieutenant-Colonel Claude Martin (born 1881)
Eton and New College, Oxford. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1901;
p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, VIII Corps, M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, 52nd
Division, M.E.F., 1915-16; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.1, 52nd
Division, E.E.F., 1916; G.S.O.1, Western Frontier Force,
E.E.F., 1916; G.S.O.1, 73rd Division, U.K., 1916-17;
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G.S.O.l, 47th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 58th Division, 1918-
19; retired, 1920.
Davies, General Sir Francis John "Joey" (1864-1948)
Eldest son of Lieutenant-General H.F. Davies. Eton and
Militia. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1884; Soudan, 1885;
p.s.c., 1891; West Africa, 1892; South Africa, 1899-1902;
G.S.O.l, 1st Division, 1908-09; G.O.C. 1st Brigade, 1909-10;
B.G.G..S., Aldershot Command, 1910-13; Director Staff Duties,
War Office, 1913-14; G.O.C. 8th Division, 1914-15; VIII and
IX Corps, 1915-16; Military Secretary to the Secretary of
State for War, 1916-19; G.O.C. Scottish Command, 1919-23;
Lieutenant of the Tower of London, 1923-26; retired, 1926.
Brother of Major-General H.R. Davies (q.v.).
Davies, Major-General Henry Rodoiph (1865-1950)
Second son of Lieutenant-General H.F. Davies. Eton. Joined
Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 1884; Burma, 1887-88; Tirah,
1897-98; China, 1900; South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.2, North
China, 1906-09; O.C. 2/Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light
Infantry, 1911-15; 3rd Brigade, 1915-16; 11th Division,
1917-19 (wounded, September 1918); 49th Division, 1919-23;
retired, 1923. Brother of General Sir Francis Davies
(q.v.).
Davies, Colonel Richard Hutton (1862-1918)
New Zealander. New Zealand Staff Corps; p.s.c.; O.C. New
Zealand Mounted Rifles, South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches,
C.B.); 6th Brigade, 1910-14; 20th Division, 1914-16. Died,
5 May 1918.
Davies, Brigadier-General Walter Percy Lionel (1871-1952)
Educated privately. Militia. Entered Royal Artillery,
1893; p.s.c., 1906; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches);
G.S.O.2, India, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, Meerut Division, 1914-15;
G.S.O.1, Meerut Division, B.E.F. and Mesopotamia, 1915-16;
B.G.R.A., 13th Division, Mesopotamia, 1916-19; retired,
1924.
Dawkins, Major-General Sir Charles Tyrwhitt (1858-1919)
Joined Shropshire Light Infantry, 1878; Afghan War, 1879-80;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); A.Q.M.G.,
Eastern Command, 1910-14; A.Q.M.G,, B.E.F., 1914; D.Q.M.G.,
B.E.F., 1914-17. Sent home at the end of 1917 because of
ill-health.
Dawnay, Major-General Guy Pagan (1878-1952)
Grandson of 7th Viscount Downe and son of Lieutenant-Colonel
Hon. L.P. Dawnay. Eton; Magdallen College, Oxford; and
Militia. Joined Coldstream Guards, 1899; p.s.c., 1909;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Assistant
Secretary, Historical Section, C.I.D., 1910-11; retired,
1911; re-employed, 1914; G.S.O.2, War office, 1914-15;
G.S.O.l, G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915-16; G.H.Q., E.E.F., 1916;
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B.G.G.S., G.H.Q., E.E.F., 1917-18; M.G.G.S., G.H.Q., 1918-
19; retired, 1920. Chairman of numerous companies, notably
Financial Times and Vickers-Armstrong, and owner of Army
Quarterly, 1920-42, edited by Lieutenant-Colonel Rt. Hon.
Sir Cuthbert Headlam (q.v.). Son-in-law of F.W. Buxton,
M.P., and brother-in-law of General Sir Sidney dive (q.v.).
His son, Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Dawnay, married the
daughter of Major-General Sir Hereward Wake (q.v.).
Dawson, Brigadier-General Robert (1861-1930)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment,
1881; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. 2/Royal West Surrey,
1906-10; 148th Brigade, 1912-16; 39th Division, 1916; 219th
Brigade, U.K., 1916-17; half pay, 1917; retired, 1918.
De Brett, Brigadier-General Harry Simonds (1870-1965)
Son of Major-General Henry de Brett. Clifton and R.M.A.
Entered Royal Artillery, 1889; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier,
1897-98 (D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1900; China, 1900-01;
Somaliland, 1909-10; G.S.O.2, War office, 1910-14; G.S.O.2,
28th Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 3rd
Division, 1915-16; O.C. Brigade of R.H.A., 1916-18; retired,
1927.
De Burgh, General Sir Eric (1881-1973)
Son of Lieutenant-Colonel T.J. de Burgh. Marlborough and
Militia. Joined Manchester Regiment, 1903; transferred to
Indian Army (9th Hodson's Horse), 1904; p.s.c., 1914; South
Africa, 1902; G.S.O.2, 3rd Cavalry Division, 1916-17;
G.S.O.l, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1917-18; C.G.S., India, 1939-
41; retired, 1941. Married the daughter of Lieutenant-
General Sir Edward Fanshawe (q.v.), 1923. A brother was
killed in action in 1914.
Deedes, General Sir Charles Parker (1879-1969)
Winchester and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire Light infantry,
1899; p.s.c., 1911; South Africa, 1901-02 (despatches,
D.S.O.); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1914; G.S.O.3, G.H.Q., 1914-
15; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.S.O.l, 2nd Division, 1916-
17; Deputy ]J.S.D., War Office, 1918; Director of Personal
Services, War Office, 1930-33; Military Secretary to the
Secretary of State for War, 1934-37; retired, 1937. Played
cricket for Hertfordshire. Father of Major-General C.J.
Deedes.
De Lisle, General Sir (Henry de) Beauvoir (1864-1955)
Descended from an ancient Channel Island family. Born on
Guernsey, educated in Jersey and R.M.C. Joined Durham Light
Infantry, 1883; transferred to 5th Dragoon Guards, 1902, and
1st Royal Dragoons, 1903; p.s.c., 1899; Soudan, 1885-86
(D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); O.C.
1st Dragoons, 1906-10; G.S.O.l, Aldershot Command, 1910-11;
G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 1911-14; 1st Cavalry Division,
1914-15; 29th Division, 1915-18; XIII Corps, 1918; XV Corps,
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1918-19; Western Command, 1919-23; retired, 1926. A
renowned polo player. Author of Polo in India, Tournament
Polo, and Reminiscences of Sport and War (1939). Brother of
Brigadier-General G. de S. de Lisle.	 A dynamic commander.
De Pree, Major-General Hugo Douglas (1870-1943)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1890; p.s.c.;
North-West Frontier, 1897-98; East Africa, 1901; South
Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1906-09; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1909-10; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Division, 1912-14;
G.S.O.2, Staff College, Quetta, 1914; D.A. & Q.M.G., Lahore
Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, Lahore Division, 1915; G.S.O.l,
2nd Canadian Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1916-18;
G.O.C. 189th Brigade, 1918; 115th Brigade, 1918-19; retired,
1931. Cousin of Field-Marshal Earl Haig (q.v.) and a
Trustee of his Estate.
De Rougemont, Brigadier-General Cecil Henry (1865-1951)
Harrow, Eastbourne College, and R.M.A. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1885; p.s.c.; Dongola Expedition, 1896; Soudan,
1897-98 (wounded); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches,
D.S.O.); G.S.O.2, East Anglian ]Jivision, 1911-13; G.S.O.1,
9th Division, 1915; B.G.R.A., VIII Corps, M.E.F., 1915-16;
B.G.R.A., 63rd Division, 1916-19; retired, 1920.
Deverell, Field-Marshal Sir Cyril John (1874-1947)
Bedford. Joined West Yorkshire Regiment; 1895; p.s.c.,
1907; Ashanti, 1895-96; O.C. 4/East Yorkshires, 1915; 20th
Brigade, 1915-16; 3rd Division, 1916-19; Q.M.G., India,
1927-30; C.G.S., India, 1927-30; G.O.C. Western Command,
1930-33; Eastern Command, 1933-36; C.I.G.S., 1936-37; Field-
Marshal, 1936. He earned the reputation of being a
ruthlessly aggressive commander during the war rising from
Captain to Major-General in only two years.
Dick Cunyingham, Major-General James Keith (1877-1935)
Third son of Sir R.K. Dick Cunyngham, 9th Baronet.
Cheltenham and Militia. Joined Gordon Highlanders, 1898;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (D.S.O., despatches);
Brigade Major, 14th Brigade, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, I Corps,
1915-16; G.S.O.l, 51st Division, 1916-18; G.O.C. 152nd
Brigade, 1918 (taken prisoner, 12 April 1918); G.O.C. 53rd
(Welsh) Division, 1932-35; 4th Division, 1935.
Diggle, Lieutenant-Colonel Wadham Heatlicote (born 1885)
H.M.S. Britannia. Entered Royal Navy, 1900. Joined
Grenadier Guards, 1905; Egyptian Army, 1912-14; G.S.O.3,
42nd Division, M.E.F., 1915; Brigade Major, 156th brigade,
M.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 42th Division, M.E.F. and France,
1916-17; G.S.O.2, IV Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, IV Corps,
1918; G.S.O.1, 15th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1921; re-
employed, 1939-46.
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Dill, Fie1d-Marshal/ Sir John Greer "Jack" (1881-1944)
Cheltenham and R.M.C. Joined Leinster Regiment, 1901; South
Africa, 1901-02; p.s.c.; G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1917;
G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1917-18; B.G.G.S. (Operations), G.H.Q.,
1918-19; Commandant, Staff College, Carnberley, 1931-34;
D.M.O. and I., War Office, 1934-36; G.O.C. Palestine, 1936-
37; Aldershot, 1937-39; I Corps, 1939-40; V.C.I.G.S., 1940;
C.I.G.S., 1940-41; Field-Marshal, 1941; Head of British
Joint Staff Mission, Washington, 1941-44.
Dillon, Eric FitzGerald (Brigadier Viscount Dillon) (1881-
1946)
Grandson of 16th Viscount Dillon. Rugby and Militia.
Entered Army Service Corps, 1900; transferred to Royal
Munster Fusiliers, 1908; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1912-
14; G.S.O.3 5th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, War Office,
1915; G.S.O.2, 7th Division, 1915-17; G.S.O.2, Third Army,
1916; G.S.O.2, French Army, 1916; G.S.O.1, Mission to French
Army, 1916-18; G.S.O.l, 32nd Division, 1918-19; retired,
1925; Re-employed, 1939. Author of Memories of Three Wars
(posthumously, 1951) . Succeeded his brother as 19th
Viscount Dillon, 1934.
Dobbie, Lieutenant-General Sir William Graham Shedden (1879-
19 64)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1899;
South Africa, 1901-02; p.s.c., 1911; G.S.O.3, Second Army,
1915; G.S.O.2, 1st Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, VIII Corps,
1916; G.S.O.1, 1st Division, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1918-
19; G.O.C. Malaya, 1935-39; retired, 1939; Governor and C.-
in-C., Malta, 1940-42; retired, 1942. Author of A Very
Present Help (1945) and Active Service with Christ (1948).
A member of the Plymouth Brethren, his nephew was Major-
General Orde Wingate of Chindit fame.
Dooner, Lieutenant-Colonel John Graham (1878-1918)
Bradfield College. Entered Royal Artillery, 1899; p.s.c.;
Instructor, R.M.A., 1904-05; Assistant Adjutant, R.M.A.,
1905-06; Adjutant, R.M.A., 1906-09; G.S.O.3, War Office,
1914; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, War Office,
1915-16; O.C. Brigade, R.F.A., 1916-18; G.S.O.1, 34th
Division, 1918. Killed in action, 31 July 1918.
Doran, Major-General Beauchaxnp John Coiclough (1860-1943)
Son of General Sir John Doran. Joined 16 Foot, 1880;
transferred, 18 Foot, 1880; Afghan War, 1880; Soudan, 1884-
85; Hazara Expedition, 1888; Miranzai, 1891; Tirah, 1897-98;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded); A.Q.M.G., Irish
Command, 1908-12; G.O.C. 8th Brigade, 1912-14; 68th Brigade,
1914-15; 25th Division, 1915-16; retired, 1920. Brother of
Brigadier-General W.R.B. Doran and brother-in-law of Major-
General Sir William MacPherson (q.v.).
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Dorling, Colonel Francis Holland (born 1877)
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined Manchester Regiment, 1897;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; employed with South African
Constabulary, 1901-04; Instructor, R.M.C., 1906-10; G.S.O.3,
War Office, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., Home Forces, 1916;
G.S.O.2, VI Corps, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 46th Division, 1917-18;
G.S.O.l, Tactical School, Camberley, 1918-19; retired, 1931.
Brother of Vice-Admiral J.W. Dorling.
Douglas, Major-General Sir William (1858-1920)
Bath. Joined 1 Foot, 1878; Bechuanaland, 1884-85; p.s.c.,
1897; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. a Battalion of the
Royal Scots, 1900-04; A.A.G. and G.S.O.1, 8th and 6th
Divisions, 1906-09; G.O.C. 14th Brigade, 1909-12; East
Lancashire (later 42nd) Division, U.K., M.E.F.and B.E.F.,
1913-17; Western Reserve Centre, U.K., 1917-18.
Drake, Lieutenant-Colonel Reginald John "Reggie" (1876-1948)
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined North Staffordshire Regiment,
1890; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; Staff Captain and
D.A.A.G., War Office, 1908-12; retired, 1912; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1914-17; G.S.O.l, I.b., G.H.Q., 1917-19; retired,
1919.
Drew, Major-General Sir James Syme (1883-1955)
Harrow. Joined Cameron Highianders, 1902; D.S.O., 1916;
G.S.O.2 (Chief Instructor), Senior Officers School,
Aldershot, 1918; G.S.O.2, 15th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2,
XVIII Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.2 (Chief Instructor, Senior
Officers' School, Aldershot, 1918; G.S.O.2, 63rd Division,
1918; G.S.O.1, 29th Division, 1918-19; G.O.C. 52th Division,
1938-41; Director-General, Territorial Army and Home Guard,
1944-45; retired, 1945.
Dreyer, Major-General John Tuthull (1876-1959)
Grandson of General J.F.C. Dreyer. Royal School Armagh and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1897; South Africa, 1901-
02; Instructor, School of Gunnery, 1007-09; Experimental
Staff, Shoeburyness, 1910-13; Staff Captain, Military
Aeronautics Directorate, War Office, 1913-14; Lefroy Gold
Medal, Royal Artillery Institution, 1914; Deputy Assistant
Director of Miltary Aeronautics, War Office, 1914-15;
D.A.A.G., G.H.Q., 1915; Member, Ordnance Committee, Ministry
of Munitions, 1915-18; Assistant Director of Artillery,
G.H.Q., 1918-19; Director of Artillery, War Office, 1923-24;
retired, 1930. Brother of Admiral Sir Frederick Dreyer.
Du Cane, General Sir John Philip (1865-1950)
Grandson of Baron Lyndhurst. Wellington and R.M.A. Entered
Royal Artillery, 1884; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches);
Professor, Staff College, 1905-07; G.S.O.1, War Office,
1908-11; C.R.A., 3rd Division, 1911-12; B.G.G.S. to
Inspector-General of Home Forces, 1912-14; B.G.G.S., III
Corps, 1914-15; M.G.R.A., G.H.Q., 1915; G.O.C. XV Corps,
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1916-18; Senior British Military Representative, H.Q. Allied
Armies, 1918-19; Master General of the Ordnance, 1920-23;
G.O.C. Western Command, 1923-24; C.-in-C. British Army of
the Rhine, 1924-27, Governor, Malta, 1927-31; retired, 1931.
Author of The Campaign in Alsace 1870 (1912).
Dudgeon, Major-General Frederick Annesley (1866-1943)
Educated abroad. Joined South Lancashire Regiment, 1885;
p.s.c.; O.C. 2/South Lancashire, 1914-15; 42nd Brigade,
1915-17; 56th Division, 1917-18 (sick); retired, 1927.
Dugan, Winston Joseph (Major-General Lord Dugan) (1877-1951)
Lurgan College and Wimbledon. In the ranks 3 years 291
days; commissioned into Lincoinshire Regiment, 1900;
transferred to Worcestershire Regiment, 1904; South Africa,
1899-1902; O.C. 2/Royal Irish Rifles, 1915-16 (wounded,
D.S.O.); 184th Brigade, 1916 (wounded); 73rd Brigade, 1916-
18; Assistant Inspector of Training, 1918-19 (C.M.G.);
G.O.C. 56th Division, 1931-34; retired, 1934. Governor of
South Australia, 1934-39, and Victoria, 1939-49; created
Baron, 1949.
Duncan, Major-General Francis John (1870-1960)
Shrewsbury, Switzerland, and Germany. Joined Royal Scots,
1889; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. Battalion of Royal
Scots, 1914; 165th Brigade, 1916-17; 60th Brigade, 1917-18;
61st Division, 1918-19 (wounded); Military Attache,
Bucharest, 1919-24; retired, 1924.
Durand, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Marion (born 1876)
Son of the Rt. Hon. Sir (Henry) Mortimer Durand, G.C.M.G.,
K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., P.C. Eton. EnteredRoyalArtillery,
1896; transferred to 9th Lancers, 1896; p.s.c.; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded twice, despatches, D.S.O.);
G.S.O.1, Cavalry Corps, 1915; G.S.O.1, 1st Mounted Division,
U.K., 1915; retired, 1919.
Edmonds, Brigadier-General Sir James Edward nArchimedesM
(1861-1956)
King's College School, London, and R.M.A. (Pollock Prize and
Sword of Honour). Entered Royal Engineers, 1881; p.s.c.,
1897; South Africa, 1901-02; Instructor, R.M.A., 1890-96;
G.S.O.2, War Office, 1904-09; G.S.O.1, M.O.5, War Office,
1909-10; G.S.O.l, 4th Division, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q.,
1914-18; Deputy Engineer-in-Chief, 1918-19; retired, 1919;
i/c Historical Section (Military), Committee of Imperial
Defence, writing the Official History of the War, 1919-49.
A language expert and author of numerous articles and books,
notably Land Warfare: An Exposition of the Laws and Usages
of War on Land, for the Guidance of Officers of His
Majesty's Army (with L. Oppenheim, H.M.S.O., 1912).
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Elles, General Sir Hugh Jantieson (1880-1945)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir Edmund Elles, R.A. Clifton
and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1899; p_s.c., 1914;
South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.S.O.1,
G.H.Q., 1916; G.O.C. Tank Corps, 1916-19; D.M.O., War
Office, 1930-33; G.O.C. 42nd Division, 1933-34; Master
General of the Ordnance, 1934-37; retired, 1938.
Ellington, Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Edward Leonard (1877-
1967)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1897;
transferred to the R.A.F., 1918; p.s.c.; Staff Captain, War
Office, 1909-10; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1910-13; learnt to
fly, 1912; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1913; D.A. & Q.M.G., G.H.Q.,
1914-15; A.A. & Q.M.G., 2nd Cavalry Division, 1915; G.S.O.1,
Second Army, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., VIII Corps, 1917; Deputy
Director-General of Military Aeronautics, War Office, 1917-
18; Director-General of Military Aeronautics, War Office,
1918; C.A.S., 1933-37; Inspector-General R.A.F., 1937-40.
Evans, Brigadier-General Cuthbert (1871-1934)
Winchester and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, War Office,
1909-11; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1911-13; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q.,
1914-15; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division, 1915 (sacked) ; O.C. 45th
Brigade R.F.A. (8th Division), 1915; G.S.O.1, War Office,
1915-16; G.S.O.1, 23rd Division, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., G.H.Q.,
1918; B.G.G.S., X Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1923.
Fanshawe, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Arthur (1859-1952)
Winchester. Entered Royal Artillery, 1878; Afghan War,
1878-80; Soudan, 1885; C.R.A., Wessex Division, 1913-14;
B.G.R.A., 1st Division, 1914-15; G.O.C. 11th Division, 1915-
16; V Corps, 1916-18 (replacing his brother, Lieutenant-
General Sir Hew Fanshawe); XXIII Corps, U.K., 1918; Forth
Garrisson, U.K., 1918-20; retired, 1923. Elder brother of
Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe (q.v.) and Major-General
Sir Robert Fanshawe (q.v.). His daughter married General
Sir Eric de Burgh (q.v.), 1923.
Fanshawe, Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dairyniple Fanny"
(1860-1957)
Winchester and Militia. Joined 19th Hussars, 1882; Egypt,
1882-84; Soudan, 1884-85; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C.
Queens Bays, 1903-07; 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 1907-10;
Presidency Brigade, India, 1910-13; Jubbulpore Brigade,
India, 1913-14; 1st Indian Cavalry Division, 1914-15;
Cavalry Corps, 1915; V Corps, 1915-16 (sacked and replaced
by his brother, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Fanshawe
[q.v.]); 58th Division, 1916-17 (sacked); 18th Indian
Division, Mespotamia, 1917-19; retired, 1920. Brother of
Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Fanshawe (q.v.) and Major-
General Sir Robert Fanshawe (q.v.). Married the daughter of
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Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., in
1894. Father of Major-General Sir Evelyn Fanshawe (served
with R.F.C., 1915-19).
Fanshawe, Major-General Sir Robert "Fanny" ( 1863-1946)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Oxfordshire Light Infantry,
1883; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa,
1901-02 (wounded, despatches); O.C. Battalion of Oxfordshire
Light Infantry, 1907-li; G.S.O.l, 1st Division, 1911-14; 6th
Brigade, 1914-15; 48th Division, 1915-18; 69th Division,
U.K., 1918-19; retired, 1919. Brother of Lieutenant-General
Sir Edward Fanshawe (q.v.) and Lieutenant-General Sir Hew
Fanshawe (q.v.). Brother-in-law of Lieutenant-General Sir
Charles Knox. A good Divisional commander who got to know
his men.
Fasken, Major-General Charles Grant Mansell (1855-1928)
Son of General E.T. Fasken. Marlborough. Joined 17 Foot;
1874; transferred to 16 Foot, 1875, and Indian Army, 1878;
Afghan War, 1878-80; Aitchakzai Expedition, 1880; Hazara
Expedition, 1888 (despatches); North-West Frontier, 1900;
Somaliland, 1903-4; G.O.C. Bannu Brigade, India, 1907-li;
Major-General, 1907; retired, 1914; G.O.C. 19th Division,
1914-15 (invalided). Brother of Brigadier-General W.H.
Fasken.
Faunthorpe, Lieutenant-Colonel John Champion (1872-1929)
Rossall School and Balliol College, Oxford. Entered Indian
Civil Service, 1892. Joined Army, 1914; Military Director
of Kinematograph Operations on Western Front, 1916;
Lieutenant-Colonel and G.S.O.2, Intelligence Branch, G.H.Q.,
1917; War Mission to U.S.A., 1918; Attached British Embassy,
Washington, 1919-20; demobolised, 1920; retired from I.C.S.,
1925. A great athlete, he excelled at all sport, notably
horse racing, pigsticking, polo, rifle shooting
(representing India at Bisley), and big-game shooting, and
in natural history.
Feethain, Major-General Edward (1863-1918)
Marlborough and Militia. Joined Royal Berkshire Regiment,
1883; Camel Corps, Soudan, 1885; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); O.C. 10/Mounted Infantry, 1902; O.C. 2/Royal
Berkshires, 1911-15; C.B., 1915; 137th Brigade, 1915-16
(sick); 71st Brigade, 1916-17; C.M.G., 1917; 39th Division,
1917-18; killed in action, 29 March 1918.
Feuding, Major-General Sir Geoffrey Percy Thynne (1866-
1932)
Grandson of the 7th Earl of Digby and 2nd Marquis of Bath,
and eldest son of General Hon. Sir Percy Feilding.
Wellington. Joined Coldstream Guards, 1888; South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O., O.C. 14/Mounted Infantry);
O.C. 3/Coldstream Guards, 1912-15; 149th Brigade, 1915; 1st
Guards Brigade, 1915-16 (wounded); Guards Division, 1916-18;
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London District, 1918-20; 56th Division, 1923-27; retired,
1927. Cousin of Lieutenant-Colonel R.C. Feuding, D.S.O.,
author of War letters to a Wife (1929).
Fergusson, General Sir Charles (1865-1951)
Grandson of 1st Marquis of Daihousie. Succeeded his father
as 7th Baronet, 1907. Eton and	 Joined Grenadier RM
Guards, 1883; Dongola Expedition, 1896; Soudan, 1896-98
(severely wounded, D.S.O.); Egyptian Army, 1895-1903; O.C.
3/Grenadier Guards, 1904-07; B.G.G.S., Ireland, 1907-08;
Inspector of Infantry, 1909-13; G.O.C. 5th Division, 1913-
14; 9th Division, 1914; II Corps, 1914-16; XVII Corps, 1916-
18; Military Governor, Cologne, 1918-19; retired, 1922;
Governor-General of New Zealand, 1924-30. Father of
Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, later Baron Ballantrae and
Governor-General of New Zealand, 1962-67.
Festing, Lieutenant-Colonel Maurice Christian (born 1879)
Son of Major-General Sir Francis Festing. Winchester.
Joined Royal Marine Light Infantry, 1898; China, 1900;
Captain, 1909; Assistant Professor, Royal Naval College,
Greenwich, 1914; G.S.O.2, 3rd Canadian Division, 1916-18;
G.S.O.1, Canadian Corps, 1918-19. Brother of Brigadier-
General F.L. Festing and uncle of Field-Marshal Sir Francis
Festing (C.I.G.S., 1958-61). One of three brothers who all
won the D.S.O. A brother-in-law was killed in action in
1915 and a brother died of war wounds in 1923.
Fisher, Lieutenant-General Sir Bertie Drew (1878-1972)
Marlborough; New College, Oxford; Joined 17th Lancers, 1900;
South Africa, 1900-02; p.s.c.; learnt to fly, 1913; G.S.O.3,
Military Aeronautics, War Office, 1913-14; Brigade-Major,
6th Cavalry brigade, 1914-15; O.C. Leicestershire Yeomanry,
1915; G.S.O.1, 1st Cavalry Division, 1915-18; G.O.C. 8th
Brigade, 1918-19; (wounded twice; D.S.O., 1915, and Bar,
1918); Commandant, R.M.C., 1934-38; retired, 1938; G.O.C.
Southern Command, 1939-40. Trustee of the estate of Field-
Marshal Earl Haig (q.v.).
FitzGerald, Brigadier-General Percy Desmond (1872-1933)
Fifth Son of Hon. Nicholas FitzGerald. Oscott Roman
Catholic College and Militia. Joined East Kent Regiment,
1893; transferred to 11th Hussars, 1894; p.s.c.; South
Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1914;
G.S.O.2, 2nd Mounted Division, U.K., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 1st
Cavalry Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 1st Cavalry Division, 1915-
16; Inspector of Mounted Troops, E.E.F, 1916-17; G.O.C. 5th
Mounted Brigade, E.E.F., 1917; 22nd Mounted BRigade, E.E.F.,
1917-18; retired, 1920. Married Millicent, Duchess of
Sutherland, 1914.
Follett, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Spencer (1882-1941)
Eton and Militia. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1901; South Africa,
1899-1902; Instructor, R.M.C., 1911-14; O.C., Young
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Officers' School, 1916; G.S.O.2, 68th Division, U.K., 1916-
17; G.S.O.2, 38th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, X Corps, 1917-18;
G.S.O.l, 14th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 59th Division, 1918-
19; retired, 1929.
Ford, Major-General Sir Reginald (1868-1951)
Durham School. Entered Royal Marines, 1889; transferred to
Army Service Corps, 1893; South Africa, 1899-1901
(despatches, D.S.O.); Assistant Director of Supplies and
Transport, Aldershot, 1903-05; Deputy Assistant Director of
Supplies and Transport, Aldershot, 1905-06; Assistant
Director of Supplies, B.E.F., 1914; Deputy Director of
Supplies, B.E.F., 1914-15; D.A. & Q.M.G., XI Corps, 1915;
Director of Supplies and Transport, Levant base, M.E.F.,
1915-16; D.A. & Q.M.G., XV Corps, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1916;
D.Q.M.G., B.E.F., 1916-19; retired, 1919.
Forestier-Walker, Major-General Sir George Townshend "Hooky"
(1866-1939)
Son of Major-General G.E.L. Forestier-Walker, R.E., and
nephew of Sir George Forestier-Walker, 2nd Baronet of
Castleton. Rugby and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1884;
p.s.c, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); East
Africa, 1902-04 (despatches); B.G.G.S., Irish Command, 1912-
14; B.G.G.S., II Corps, 1914; B.G.G.S., Second Army, 1914-
15; G.O.C. 21st Division, 1915; 63rd Division, U.K., 1916;
65th Division, U.K., 1916; 27th Division, Salonika, 1916-19;
retired, 1920.
Forster, Brigadier David (1878-1959)
St. Paul's and R.M.A. (Pollock Medal). Entered Royal
Engineers, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1900; p.s.c., 1913;
G.S.O.3, 21st Division, U.K., 1915; G.S.O.2, 21st Division,
U.K. and B.E.F., 1915-16 (wounded); G.S.O.1, 50th Division,
1916 (wounded); 33rd Division, 1916-17 (wounded); War
Office, 1918-22; retired, 1934; re-employed, 1940-42.
Author of Mind and Method in Modern Minor Tactics (1919).
Very religious and an active member of the Oxford Group from
1921.
Foss, Brigadier Charles Calveley (1885-1953)
Son of the Bishop of Osaka, Japan. Marlborough and R.M.C.
Joined Bedford Regiment, 1904; Captain, 1912; won V.C. at
Neuve Chapelle, March 1915; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.2, 2nd
Canadian Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, 1st Canadian Division,
1917; G.S.O.2, Canadian Corps, 1917; G.S.O.2, Staff School,
Cambridge, 1917-18; G.S.O.2, XXII Corps, U.K., 1918;
G.S.O.1, 57th Division, 1918-20; retired, 1937; re-employed,
1940-42.
Foulkes, Major-General Charles Howard (1875-1969)
Bedford Modern School. Entered Royal Engineers, 1894;
Sierre Leone, 1898-99; South Africa, 1899-1900; Nigeria,
1903; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.O.C. Special Brigade,
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1917; Director of Gas Services, 1917-19; Chief Engineer,
Southern Command, 1924-26; Aldershot Command, 1926-30;
retired, 1930. Father of Major-General T.H.F. Foulkes.
Author of Gas! The Story of the Special Brigade (1934).
Played hockey for Scotland, 1907-09, winning an Olympic
medal in 1908.
Fowke, Lieutenant-General Sir George Henry (1861-1936)
Wellington. Entered Royal Engineers, 1884; South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches); with Japanese Army in Manchuria,
1905; Instructor, School of Military Engineering, 1906-08;
Inspector of R.E., 1913-14; Chief Engineer, 1915; Engineer-
in-Chief, 1915-16; Adjutant-General, 1916-19; retired, 1922.
Fowler, Lieutenant-General Sir John Sharman (1864-1939)
Cheltenham. Entered Royal Engineers, 1886; p.s.c.; Isaazi
Expedition, 1892; Chitral, 1895 (despatches) , Tirah
Expedition, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1911-13; Commandant,
Army Signal School, 1913-14; Director of Army Signals, 1914-
19; G.O.C. Forces in China, 1922-25; retired, 1928. Colonel
Commandant Royal Signal Corps, 1923-34. Brother-in-law of
General Sir Alexander Godley (q.v.).
Franklyn, General Sir Harold Edmund (1885-1963)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir William Franklyn. Rugby and
R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire Regiment, 1905; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3,
17th Division, 1915; G.S.O.2, 21st Division, 1916; G.S.O.2,
Staff Course, Cambridge, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, XVIII Corps,
1917; G.S.O.l, 21st Division, 1917-19; G.O.C. 50th Division,
1938-40; VIII Corps, 1940-41; Northern Ireland, 1941-43; C.-
in-C., Home Forces, 1943-45; retired, 1945. Brother of
Brigadier G.E.W. Franklyn; he married the daughter of
Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Belfield in 1913; and his son
was killed in action in 1944.
Franks, Major-General Sir George MacKenzie (1868-1958)
Marlborough and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1887;
p.s.c.; Waziristan Expedition, 1894-95; North-West Frontier,
1897-98; Soudan, 1898-99; Professor, 1909-12, and G.S.O.1,
Staff College, Quetta, 1912-14; M.G.R.A., Second Army, 1915-
17; G.O.C. 35th Division, 1917-18; Inspector-General of
Artillery, U.K., 1918-20; retired, 1928.
Freeman, Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfred Rhodes (1888-1953)
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined Manchester Regiment, 1908; learnt
to fly and transferred to R.F.C., 1913; Instructor, C.F.S.,
1914-15; O.C. 14th Squadron, Egypt, 1916; M.C., D.S.O.,
1916; 10th Wing, R.F.C., 1917; 9th (G.H.Q.) Wing, R.F.C.,
1917-18 (despatches); Commandant, R.A.F. Staff College,
1934-36; Air Member for Research and Development, Air
Council, 1936-40; V.C.A.S., 1940-42; retired, 1942; Chief
Executive at Ministry of Aircraft Production, 1942-45.
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French, John Denton Pinkstone (Field Marshal Earl of Ypres)
(1852-1925)
Eastman's Naval Academy, Portsmouth, and H.M.S. Britannia.
Entered Royal Navy, 1866; Militia, 1871; 8th Hussars, 1874;
transferred to 19th Hussars, 1874; Soudan, 1884-85; South
Africa, 1899-1902; G.O.C. 2nd cavalry Brigade, 1897-99;
Cavalry Division, South Africa, 1899-1902; Aldershot, 1902-
7; Inspector-General of Forces, 1907-11; C.I.G.S., 1911-14;
Field-Marshal, 1913; C.-in-C., B.E.F., 1914-15; C.-in-C.,
Home Forces, 1915-18; Governor-General, Ireland, 1918-21.
Created Viscount, 1915, and Earl of Ypres, 1921.
Friend, Major-General Rt. Hon. Sir Lovick Bransby (1856-
1944)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1873;
Soudan, 1898; Instructor, R.M.C., 1883-84; Secretary, Royal
Engineers Experimental Committee, 1885-89; Director of Works
and Public Stores, Egyptian Army, 1900-04; Director,
Egyptian Public Works, 1905; Assitant-Director of
Fortification and Works, War Office, 1906-08; O.C. Scottish
Coast Defences, 1908-12; Major-General i/c Administration,
Irish Command, 1913-14; G.O.C. Ireland, 1914-16; President,
Claims Commission, France, 1916-18; retired, 1920.
Fry, Major-General Sir William (1858-1934)
St. Columba's College, Dublin, and R.M.C. Joined West
Yorkshire Regiment, 1878; Afghan War, 1879-80; South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches, C.B.); Commandant, Mounted Infantry
School, Burford, 1905-06; G.O.C. lancashire District, 1907-
8; East Lancashire Division T.F., 1908-10; 58th (1st
London) Division T.F., 1912-15; 30th Division, 1915-16
(sacked); i/c Administration, Irish Command, 1916-19;
retired, 1919; Lieutenant-Governor, Isle of Man, 1919-26.
Author of 1914 (1919)
Fuller, Major-General Cuthbert Graham (1874-1960)
St. Paul's; Beaumont College; and R.M.A. Entered Royal
Engineers, 1893; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches) ;
p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, War office, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., Home
Forces, U.K., 1914; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914-15; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915; A.A. & Q.M.G., 29th Division, M.E.F.,
1915; G.S.O.l, 29th Division, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1915-17;
B.G.G.S., III Corps, 1917-19; G.O.C. 48th Division, 1931-35;
retired, 1935. Brother of Brigadier-General F.G. Fuller.
Married Princess Sophia, the daughter of Prince Vladimir
Shahoffsky, 1912.
Fuller, Major-General John Frederick Charles "Boney" (1878-
1966)
Educated Switzerland, Malvern and R.M.C. Joined Oxfordshire
and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, 1898; South Africa,
1899-1902; G.S.O.3, VII Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 37th
Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, , Third Army, 1916; G.S.O.2, Tank
Corps, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Tank Corps, 1917-18; Deputy D.S.D.,
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War Office, 1918; retired, 1933. Author of many volumes,
notably The Army in My Time (1935), Memoirs of an
Unconventional Soldier (1936), and The Last of the
Gentleman's Wars (1937). Intellectually brilliant but
unable to suffer fools gladly.
Furse, Lieutenant-General Sir William Thomas "Bill" (1865-
1953)
Third son of the Archdeacon of Westminster. Eton. Entered
Royal Artillery, 1884; p.s.c., 1897; South Africa, 1899-
1900; S.O., War Office, 1897-1900 and 1905-07; G.S.O.2,
Staff College, 1908-11; O.C. 12th Brigade R.F.A., 1911-13;
G.S.O.1, 6th Division, 1913-14; B.G.G.S., II Corps, 1915;
G.O.C. 9th Division, 1915-16; Master General of the
Ordnance, 1916-19; retired, 1920. Director, Imperial
Institute, 1926-34. Brother of Charles Furse, the painter,
and Rt. Rev. M.B. Furse, Bishop of St. Albans. "Windy Bill"
to his men.
Gage, Brigadier-General Moreton Foley (1873-1953)
Grandson of 4th Viscount Gage and son of Lieutenant-General
Hon. E.T. Gage. R.M.C.; joined 7th Dragoon Guards, 1892;
transferred, 5th Dragoon Guards, 1909; p.s.c.; Uganda
Mutiny, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); Military Attache, Washington and Mexico, 1912-
14; G.S.O.1, 3rd Cavalry Division, 1914-16; G.O.C. Lucknow
Cavalry Brigade, 1916-17. Brother of Lieutenat AE.M.B. Gage
and brother-in-law of General Sir William Peyton (q.v.).
Game, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Philip Woolcott (1876-1961)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895;
p.s.c. (won the Light-Weight Point-to-Point, 1909); South
Africa, 1901-02 (despatches); Gold Medal, United Services
Institute, 1911; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1910-13; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, IV Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 46th
Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, R.F.C., 1916; B.G.G.S., R.F.C.,
1916-18; transferred to R.A.F., 1918; Member for Personnel,
Air Council, 1923-28; retired, 1929. Governor of New South
Wales, 1930-35; Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police,
1935-45.
Cathorne-Hardy, General Hon. Sir (John) Francis "Frank"
(1874-194 9)
2nd son of 2nd Earl of Cranbrook. Eton and R.M.C. Joined
Grenadier Guards, 1894; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1900-02
(despatches); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1914; G.S.O.2, II Corps, 1914; G.S.O.2, Second Army,
1914-15; G.S.O.1, 7th Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., XIV
Corps, 1916-18, B.G.G.S., 1918, and M.G.G.S., British Forces
in Italy, 1918-19; G.O.C., Northern Command, 1931-33, and
Aldershot Command, 1933-37; retired, 1937. Brother-in-law
of 17th Earl of Derby, Conservative M.P., 1892-1906, and
Secretary of State for War, 1916-18.
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Geddes, Rt. Hon. Sir Eric Campbell (1875-1937)
Oxford Military College and Merchiston Castle School,
Edinburgh. Railway engineer before the war. Deputy
Director-General, Munitions Supply, U.K., 1915-16;
Inspector-General of Transportation, 1916; Director-General,
Transportation, 1916-17; Hon. Major-General, 1917; First
Lord, Admiralty, 1917-18; Conservative M.P., 1917-22. He
and his brother, Sir Auckland Geddes, were both government
ministers, 1917-22.
Geiger, Lieutenant-Colonel Gerald John Percival (born 1876)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1896;
Crete, 1897-98; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1916-18; G.S.O.1, with
French Army, 1918; retired, 1921.
Gellibrand, Major-General Sir John (1872-1945)
Tasmanian. King's School, Canterbury, and R.M.C. Joined
South Lancashire Regiment, 1893; transferred to Manchester
Regiment, 1900; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1900; retired,
1912, returning to Tasmania; D.A & Q.M.G., 1st Australian
Division, and D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 2nd Austalian Division,
Gallipoli (wounded twice, D.S.O., despataches), 1915; 12th
Australian Battalion, 1915-16; G.O.C. 6th Australian
Brigade, 1916-17; 12th Australian Brigade, 1917-18; 3rd
Australian Division, 1918-19 (bar to D.S.O., C.B., K.C.B.).
Commissioner of Police, Victoria, 1920-22; Member for
Denison in the Federal Parliament, 1925-28. One of the
finest Australian commanders.
Gepp, Major-General Sir (Ernest) Cyril (1879-1964)
Marlborough. In the ranks of Imperial Yeomanry, 1 year 145
days; commissioned D.C.L.I., 1901; South Africa, 1900;
Somaliland, 1909-10 (despatches); King's African Rifles,
1906-11; retired, 1911; D.S.O., 1916, and Bar, 1917; re-
gazetted, 1917; G.S.O.2, 7th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.2,
Third Army, 1917; G.S.O.1, 33rd Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1,
Third Army, 1918-19; retired, 1941; Director of Prisoners of
War Department, War Office, 1941-45.
Gerrard, Major-General John Joseph (1867-1938)
St. Augustin&s, Ramsgate, and Trinity College, Dublin.
Entered Army, 1891; Major, R.A.M.C., 1898; North-West
Frontier, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902;
A.D.M.S., 34th Division, 1915-16; D.D.M.S., VIII Corps,
1916-18; D.M.S., Home Forces, U.K., 1918; D.M.S., Fifth
Army, 1918-19; retired, 1922.
Giles, Major-General Edward Douglas (1879-1966)
Grandson of General Sir J. Schneider. Marlborough and
R.M.C. Joined Shropshire Light Infantry, 1899; transferred
to Indian Army (35th Horse), 1901; p.s.c., 1912; G.S.O.3,
Indian Cavalry Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, Indian Cavalry
Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 3rd Cavalry Division, 1916; D.S.O.,
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1916; G.S.O.2, IV Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1917-
18; G.S.O.1, British Military Mission to the U.S.A., 1918;
D.M.O., India, 1930-31; Major-General Cavalry in India,
1931-35; retired, 1935.
Girdwood, Major-General Sir Eric Stanley (1876-1963)
Educated privately and Militia. Joined Scottish Rifles,
1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); A.Q.M.G., XII
Corps, M.E.F. and E.E.F., 1915-16; G.O.C. 156th Brigade,
E.E.F., 1916-17; 74th (Yeomanry) Division, E.E.F. and
France, 1917-19; Commandant, R.M.C., 1927-31; G.O.C.
Northern Ireland District, 1931-35; retired, 1935. Brother
of Brigadier A.C. Girdwood.
Glasfurd, Colonel Alexander Inglis Robertson (1870-1942)
Eldest son of Major-General C.L.R. Glasfurd. Fettes and
R.M.C. Joined North Lancashire Regiment, 1890; transferred
to Indian Army (46th Punjabis), 1892; p.s.c., 1907; he made
an offical visit to the battlefields from the Staff College,
Quetta, 1907; North-West Frontier, 1908; G.S.O.2, 3rd
Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 48th Division, 1916-17; O.C.
40th Pathans, East Africa and Afghanistan, 1917-20; retired,
1921. Well-known big-game hunter. Author of Leaves from an
Indian Jungle (1904), Rifle and Romance in the Indian Jungle
(1905), Sketches of Manchurian Battlefields (1908), and
Musings of an old Shikari (1928).
Glasfurd, Brigadier-General Duncan John (1873-1916)
Edinburgh and R.M.C. Joined Argyll and Sutherland
Highianders, 1893; p.s.c.; South Africa (wounded twice),
1899-1900; Jubaland, 1901; O.C. 4th Somali Camel Corps,
Somaliland, 1902-04; G.S.O.2, (D.M.T.), Australia, 1912-14;
G.S.O.2, 1st Australian Division, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1914-
16; G.S.O.1, 1st Australian Division, 1916; G.O.C. 12th
Australian Brigade, 1916. Died of wounds, 12 November 1916.
Glasgow, Major-General Sir (Thomas) William (1876-1955)
Australian. Maryborough Grammar School. Entered Australian
Militia, 1899; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, D.S.O.);
O.C. 1st Light Horse, Australia, 1912-14; 2nd Light Horse,
M.E.F., 1915-16; l3thAustralian Brigade, B.E.F., 1916-18;
1st Australian Division, 1918-19. Senator for Queensland,
1920-32; Minister for Home and Territories, Australia, 1926-
27; Minister for Defence, Australia, 1927-29. Forceful.
Gleichen, Count Albert Edward Wilfred "Glick" (Major-General
Lord Edward Gleichen) (1863-1937)
Grandson of Queen Victoria's half-sister and Admiral of the
Fleet Sir George Seymour. Only son of Admiral H.S.H. Prince
Victor of Hohenlohe-Langenburg (Count Gleichen). His wife
was Maid of Honour to Queens Victoria and Alexandra.
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1881;
p.s.c., 1891; Soudan, 1884-85; Soudan, 1896; Abyssinia,
1897; South Africa, 1899-1900 (wounded, despatches);
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Military Attache, Berlin, 1903-06, and Washington, 1906-07,
when he met the Wright brothers and wrote a report on their
revolutionary tlflyereu, a significant document in early
aviation history; Assistant D.M.O., M.O.2, War Office, 1907-
11; G.O.C. 15th Brigade, 1911-15; 37th Division, 1915-16;
Director, Intelligence Bureau, Department of Information,
1917-18; retired, 1919. Author of With the Camel Corps up
the Nile (1888), With the Mission to Menelik (1897), The
Doings of the 15th Brigade (1917), and A Guardsman's
Memories (1932)
Glubb, Major-General Sir Frederic Manley (1857-1938)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1877; South
Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, D.S.O.); Chief Engineer,
Northern Command, 1909-12; Chief Engineer, Southern Command,
1912-14; C.R.E., III Corps, 1914-15; Chief Engineer, Second
Army, 1915-17; Engineer-in-Chief, Italy, 1917-18; Chief
Engineer, Second Army, 1918-19; retired, 1919. Father of
Lieutenant-General Sir John Glubb ('Glubb Pasha'), the
author of Into Battle: A Soldiers Diary of the Great War
(1978)
Glyn, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur St. Leger (1870-1922)
Grandson of 1st Baron Wolverton. Eton. Joined Grenadier
Guards, 1891; South Africa, 1899-1900; retired as Major,
1907; Liaison Officer, re-employed, 1914-19 (Despatches);
Liaison Officer, British Mission G.A.N., 1918-19. He died
in 1922 and his widow married Major-General F.W. Ramsay
(q.v.).
Godley, General Sir Alexander John "Alick" or "Lord God"
(1867-1957)
Cousin of A.D. Godley (scholar) and J.D. Godley, 1st Baron
Kilbracken, (civil servant). Royal Naval School,
Haileybury, United Services College, and R.M.C. Joined
Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1886; transferred to Irish Guards,
1900; p.s.c., 1898; Rhodesia, 1896; South Africa, 1899-1901;
Commandant, Mounted Infantry, Longmoor, 1903-06; G.S.O.1,
2nd Division, 1906-10; G.O.C. New Zealand Forces, 1910-14;
ANZAC Division, M.E.F., 1914-15; 1st ANZAC Corps, M.E.F.,
1915-16; 2nd ANZAC Corps, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1916-17; 22nd
Corps, 1918-19; Military Secretary to the Secretary of State
for War, 1920-22; G.O.C. Army of the Rhine, 1922-24;
Southern Command, 1924-28; Governor of Gibraltar, 1928-33;
retired, 1933. Author of Life of an Irish Soldier (1939).
Brother-in-law of Lieutenant-General Sir John Fowler (q.v.).
Stern but frequent visitor to the trenches.
Godwin, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Alexander Campbell
(1873-1951)
United Services College and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1895, and
Indian Army (23rd Cavalry), 1896; North-West Frontier, 1901-
02; p.s.c., 1909; G.S.O.2, India, 1913-14; G.S.O.l, 1st
Indian (later 4th) Cavalry Division, 1915-17; G.O.C. 6th
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Mounted Brigade and 10th Cavalry Brigade, 1917-18; B.G.G.S.,
Desert Mounted Corps, E.E.F., 1918-19; Major-General Cavalry
in India, 1923-27; Commandant, Staff College, Quetta, 1927-
28; G.O.C. Peshawar District, 1928-31; retired, 1932.
Gogarty, Colonel Henry Edward (1868-1955)
King's School, Canterbury, and R.M.C. Joined Royal Scots
Fusiliers, 1888; transferred to Worcestershire Regiment,
1908; p.s.c., 1897; Zhob Valley Expedition, 1890; South
Africa, 1899-1901; G.S.O.2, Malta, 1907-11; Chief
Instructor, School of Musketry, 1913-15; G.S.O.1, 2nd and
22nd Divisions, 1915 (sick); G.S.O.1, Salisbury Training
Centre, UK, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Machine Gun Corps Training
Centre, UK, 1916-17; Area Commandant, British Forces in
Italy, 1917-18; A.A.G., L. of C., Italy, 1918-19; retired,
1920.
Goldsmith, Colonel Harry Dundas (1878-1955)
Feisted School. Joined D.C.L.I., 1897; Tirah Expedition,
1897-98; Egyptian Army, 1904-06; p.s.c., 1912; G.S.O.3, War
Office, 1914; G.S.O.3, Intelligence, G.H.Q., 1914-15;
G.S.O.2, Intelligence, G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Fourth
Army, 1916; G.S.O.1, Fifth Army, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, R.F.C.,
1918-19; retired, 1935. Father of Brigadier R.B.F.K.
Goldsmith.
Gordon, Lieutenant-General Sir Alexander Hamilton "Sunny
JimR (1859-1939)
Grandson of 4th Earl of Hamilton and eldest son of General
Hon. Sir Alexander Hamilton Gordon. Winchester. Entered
Royal Artillery, 1880; Afghan War, 1880; p.s.c., 1894; South
Africa, 1899-1901; D.M.O., India, 1910-14; Major-General i/c
Administration, Aldershot, 1914; G.O.C. Aldershot, 1914-16;
IX Corps, 1916-18; retired, 1920. A pioneer of indirect
fire.
Gordon, Lieutenant-Colonel Evelyn Boscawen (1872-1963)
Stubbington House, Hampshire, and Volunteers. Joined
Northumberland Fusiliers, 1900; South Africa, 1900-02;
North-West Frontier, 1907-08; G.S.O.3, R.F.C., 1915;
G.S.O.2, R.F.C., 1915-17; Commandant, School of Aerial
Gunnery, 1917-18; S.Q.l, H.Q. Independent Force, R.A.F.,
1918; retired, 1919.
Gordon, Major-General Hon. Sir Frederick (1861-1927)
Fourth son of Lord Gordon of Drumearn. Edinburgh Academy
and R.M.C. Joined 49 Foot, 1881; transferred to Gordon
Highianders, 1881; p.s.c.; Egypt, 1882-85; Soudan, 1889;
South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. 1/Gordon Highlanders, 1908-11;
G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1911-14; G.O.C. 19th Brigade, 1914-
15; 22nd Division, U.K., B.E.F. and Salonika, 1915-17;
Brigadier-General, i/c Administration, Northern Command,
1917-18.
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Gordon-Hall, Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Charles William
(1875-1930)
Privately educated and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire Light
Infantry, 1894; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1898 (severely
wounded); South Africa, 1899-1900 (severely wounded,
despatches); G.S.O.2, Canadian Forces, 1911-14 (D.M.O.,
1913-14); G.S.O.2, 1st Canadian Division, 1914-16; G.S.O.2,
Canadian Corps, 1916; G.S.O.2, 5th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1,
5th Division, 1916-19; retired, 1921.
Gorringe, Lieutenant-General Sir George Frederick (1868-
1945)
Wellington. Entered Royal Engineers, 1888; Dongola, 1896
(D.S.O.) ; Soudan, 1897-99; South Africa, 1900-01; Soudan,
1902-04; Director Movements & Quarterings, War Office, 1906-
09; G.O.C. 18th Brigade, 1909-11; Bombay Brigade, India,
1912-15; 12th Indian Division, 1915-16, and III Indian
Corps, 1916, in Mesopotamia (severely wounded); 47th
Division, 1916-19; 10th Division, Egypt, 1919-21; retired,
1924.
Gorton, Brigadier-General Reginald St. George (1866-1944)
Feisted. Entered Royal Artillery, 1886; p.s.c.; Miranzai
Expedition, 1890; Hunza Nagar Expedition, 1891; Chitral,
1895; South Africa, 1899-1902; S.O. (Intelligence) , War
Office, 1903-07; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1909-12; Assistant
Secretary (G.S.O.2), C.I.D., 1912-14; G.S.O.2, Second Army,
U.K., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, First Army, B.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2,
8th Division, 1915; A.A. & Q.M.G., 7th Division, 1915;
G.S.O.1, 59th Division, 1916-18; A.A.G., War Office, 1918;
B.G.G.S., Dunsterforce, Mesopotamia, 1918-20; retired, 1922.
Gosset, Colonel Francis William (1876-1931)
Son of F.R. Gosset, Deputy-Serjeant-at-Arms, House of
Commons. Marlborough and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery,
1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); p.s.c., 1911;
G.S.O.3, War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914;
G.S.O.2, IV Corps, 1914; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1915; G.S.O.2,
32nd Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, 32nd Division, 1915-16;
G.S.O.1, 39th Division, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, 62nd Division,
1918-19; retired, 1930.
Gough, General Sir Hubert de la Poer "Goughie" (1870-1963)
Eldest son of General Sir Charles Gough, V.C., and nephew of
General Sir Hugh Gough, V.C. Eton and R.M.C. Joined 16th
Lancers, 1889; p.s.c., 1899; Tirah, 1897-98; South Africa,
1899-1902 (severely wounded); Professor, Staff College,
1904-06; O.C. 16th Lancers, 1907-11; 3rd Cavalry Brigade,
1911-14; 2nd Cavalry Division, 1914-15; 7th Division, 1915;
I Corps, 1915-16; Reserve Corps, 1916; Reserve Army, 1916;
Fifth Army, 1916-18 (sacked); retired, 1922. He came from a
family renowned in war - four members of his family - his
father, his uncle, his brother, and a cousin - won the V.C.
His brother, Major-General J.E. Gough (q.v.), was killed in
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action in 1915. Author of The Fifth Army (1931) and
Soldiering On (1954). An accomplished horseman, in India he
twice won the Army Cup. Energetic and open-minded but
impulsive and hot-tempered. Friend and protege of Field-
Marshal Earl Haig (q.v.).
Gough, Major-General John Edmond (1871-1915)
Youngest son of General Sir Charles Gough, V.C., and nephew
of General Sir Hugh Gough, V.C. Eton. Joined Rifle
Brigade, 1892; British Central Africa, 1896-97; Soudan,
1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; Somaliland, 1902-03 (V.C.,
1903) and 1908-09; p.s.c., 1905; Inspector-General, King's
African Rifles, 1908-09; G.S.O.l, Staff College, 1909-13;
B.G.G.S., Aldershot, 1913-14; B.G.G.S., I Corps, 1914;
M.G.G.S., First Army, 1914-15; killed in action, 21 February
1915, when he was about to take command of a Division. Both
his father and uncle and a cousin had also won the V.C.
Brother of General Sir Hubert Gough (q.v.) Protege of
Field-Marshal Earl Haig (q.v.).
Graham, Brigadier Lord (Douglas) Malise (1883-1974)
Second son of 5th Duke of Montrose. Cheltenham and R.M.A.
Entered Royal Artillery, 1901; M.C., 1915; D.S.O., 1917;
G.S.O.2, R.A., XVII Corps, 1918; G.S.O.l, R.A., Third Army,
1918-19; retired, 1936; re-employed, 1940-45; Military
Attache, Paris, 1940. Married daughter of 2nd Viscount
Knutsford.
Graham, Major-General Sir Edward Ritchie Coryton (1858-1951)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 22 Foot, 1878; transferred to the
Cheshire Regiment, 1879; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1901
(despatches, C.B.); O.C. 2/Cheshire, 1900-02; A.A.G., War
Office, 1905-08; G.O.C. 8th Brigade, 1908-12; South Midland
Division, 1914; D.A.G., B.E.F., 1914-19; retired, 1920.
Graham, Brigadier Malise (1884-1929)
Second son of Sir Reginald Graham, 8th Baronet. Eton and
Militia. Joined 16th Lancers, 1903; G.S.O.3, I corps, 1915-
16; Brigade major, 3rd Cavalry Brigade, 1916-17; G.S.O.2,
4th Cavalry Division, 1917; G.S.O.l, 4th Cavalry Division,
1917-18; G.S.O.l, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1918-20. Famous
equestrian who died from an accident while jumping his horse
at the Dublin Horse Show, 1929.
Grant, Colonel Arthur Kenneth (born 1881)
Haileybury and Militia. Joined Royal West Kent Regiment,
1900; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches); G.S.O.2, X Corps,
1916-17; G.S.O.2, Staff School, Cambridge, 1917-18; G.S.O.1,
50th Division, 1918; retired, 1937; re-employed, 1939-45;
A.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., France, 1939.
Grant, General Sir Charles John Cecil "Charlie" (1877-1950)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir Robert Grant. Harrow. Joined
Coldstream Guards, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902
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(wounded); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1912-13; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q.,
1914-15; G.S.O.1, 12th Division, 1915-17, G.S.O.1, Third
Army, 1917; G.O.C. 1st Brigade, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., H.Q.,
Allied Forces in France, 1918-19 (wounded twice); G.O.C.
Scottish Command, 1937-40; retired, 1940. His twin brother
was killed in action during the Siege of Ladysmith, 1900.
Married daughter of the Liberal politician, 5th Earl
Rosebery, 1903.
Grant, Colonel Henry Frederick Lyall see Lyall Grant
Grant, Major-General Sir Philip Gordon (1869-1943)
Educated privately and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers,
1888; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches) ;
Aden, 1903; Somaliland, 1904; Egyptian Army, 1909-14; Chief
Engineer, XV Corps, M.E.F. and France, 1916-17; Chief
Engineer, Fifth Army, 1917-19; Commandant, School of
Military Engineering, 1923-27; Inspector of Royal Engineers,
1926-27; retired, 1931. Father of Rear-Admiral John Grant,
who was the first member of the family not to serve in the
Army for nearly 200 years.
Greenly, Major-General Walter Howorth "Bob" (1875-1955)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 12th Lancers, 1895; p.s.c.; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.2, Staff
College, 1910-12; O.C. 19th Hussars, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 2nd
Cavalry Division, 1914-15; G.O.C. 9th Cavalry Brigade, 1915;
B.G.G.S., XIII Corps, 1915-16; G.O.C. 2nd Cavalry Division,
1916-18 (sick); retired, 1920.
Grierson, Lieutenant-General Sir James Moncrief "Jimmy"
(1859-1914)
Educated Glasgow Academy, Germany and R.M.A. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1877; p.s.c., 1884; Egypt, 1882; Suakin, 1885;
Hazara Expedition, 1888; South Africa, 1900; China, 1900-01;
C.S.O., II Corps, 1901-04; D.M.O., War Office, 1904-06;
G.O.C. 1st Division, 1906-10; Eastern Command; 1912-14; II
Corps, August 1914; died 17 August 1914. Expert on foreign
armies. Author of War Office handbooks, Staff Duties in
the Field (1891), Handbook of the Russian Army (1894), and
Records of the Scottish Volunteers, 1859-1908 (1908).
Grigg, Edward William Macleay (Lord Altrincham) "Ned" or
"The Scribe" (1879-1955)
Winchester and New College, Oxford. Non-regular. Editorial
staff of The Times, 1903-05 and 1908-13. 2nd Grenadier
Guards, 1915-16; G.S.O.3, Guards Division, 1916; Brigade-
Major, 2nd Guards Brigade, 1916-17; G.S.O.2, XIX Corps;
G.S.O.2, XVIII Corps, 1917; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1917-18;
G.S.O.l, Guards Division, 1918-19. National Liberal M.P.,
1922-25; Governor of Kenya, 1925-31; National Conservative
M.P., 1933-45; Minister Resident in the Middle East, 1944-
45; created Baron Altrincham, 1945.
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Grove, Colonel Thomas Thackeray "Tom" or "Uncle" (1879-1965)
Bedford. Entered Royal Engineers, 1898; p.s.c.; Assistant
Instructor, School of Military Engineering, 1908-12;
Instructor, R.M.A., 1913-14; G.S.O.3, 6th Division, 1915;
G.S.O.2, Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 17th Division,
1916; G.S.O.1, 4th Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, 41st Division,
1917; G.S.O.1, 6th Division, 1917-19; retired, 1933. His
brother was killed in action during the war.
Guggisberg, Brigadier-General Sir (Frederick) Gordon (1869-
1930)
Canadian. Burney's, Hampshire, and R.M.A. Entered Royal
Engineers, 1889; Singapore, 1893-96; Instructor, R.M.A.,
1897-1902; Gold Coast, 1902-08; Nigeria, 1910-14; O.C. 94th
Field Company, R.E., 1914; C.R.E., 8th Division, 1915;
C.R.E., 66th Division, U.K., 1916; G.O.C. 170th Brigade,
1917-18; Assistant Inspector-General of Training, 1918-19;
Governor and C.-in-C., Gold Coast, 1919-27; Governor and C.-
in-C., British Guiana, 1928-30. Author of The Shop: The
Story of the Royal Military Academy (1902) and (with
Reverend A.G. Fraser) The Future of the Negro (1929).
Guy, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Francis (1878-1927)
New Zealander. Monkton Combe, near Bath, and Militia.
Joined Wiltshire Regiment, 1900; South Africa, 1901-02;
Captain, 1908; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.2, IX Corps, 1917-18;
G.S.O.1, 42nd Division, 1918-19.
Gwynn, Major-General Sir Charles William (1870-1963)
Third son of Rev. J. Gwynn, Regius Professor of Divinity,
Dublin University. St. Columba's College, Dublin, and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1889; p.s.c.; West Africa,
1893-94 (wounded thrice, despatches, D.S.O.); Staff Captain
(Intelligence), War Office, 1897-1901; Egyptian Army, 1901-
04; Director, R.M.C., Duntroon, Australia, 1911-14; G.S.O.1,
57th Division, U.K., 1915; G.S.O.1, 2nd Australian Division,
M.E.F., 1915; G.O.C. 6th Australian Brigade, M.E.F., 1915-
16; B.G.G.S., I ANZAC Corps, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1916-19;
Commandant, Staff, College, 1926-30; retired, 1931. Author
of Imperial Policing (1934).
Haig, Douglas (Field-Marshal Earl Haig) "D.H." (1861-1928)
His father owned the whiskey distillers. Clifton; Brasenose
College, Oxford; and R.M.C. Joined 7th Hussars, 1885;
p.s.c., 1897; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C.
17th Lancers, 1901-03; Inspector-General Cavalry, India,
1903-06; D.M.T., War Office, 1905-07; D.S.D., War Office,
1907-09; C.G.S., India, 1909-12; G.O.C. Aldershot Command,
1912-14; I Corps, 1914; First Army, 1914-15; C.-in-C., 1915-
19; C.-in-C., Forces in G.B., 1919-20; Field-Marshal, 1917;
created Earl, 1919. Founded British Legion. Author of
Cavalry Studies (1907). Cousin of Major-General H.D. de
Pree (q.v.). Married, 1905, a Maid of Honour to Queen
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Alexandra in the private chapel of Buckingham Palace. His
brother-in-law, Lord Worsley, was killed in October 1914.
Haking, General Sir Richard Cyril Byrne "Dicky" (1862-1945)
Joined Hampshire Regiment, 1881; p.s.c., 1897; Burma, 1885-
87 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches);
Professor, Staff College, 1901-06; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division,
1906-08; B.G.G.S., Southern Command, 1908-11; G.O.C. 5th
Brigade, 1911-14; 1st Division, 1914-15 (wounded); XI Corps,
1915-18; British Troops in Egypt, 1923-27; retired, 1927.
Author of Staff Rides and Regimental Tours and Company
Training.
Haldane, General Sir (James) Aylmer Lowthrop (1862-1950)
Cousin of Lord Haldane of Cloan (Liberal M.P., 1885-1911).
Edinburgh Academy, Wimbledon, and R.M.C. Joined Gordon
Highianders, 1882; p.s.c., 1893; Chitral, 1895; Tirah, 1897-
98; South Africa, 1899-1900 (severely wounded, despatches);
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05; Assistant D.M.O., War Office,
1906-09; B.G.G.S., Eastern Command, 1909-12; G.O.C. 10th
Brigade, 1912-14; 3rd Division, 1914-16; VI Corps, 1916-19;
Mesopotamia, 1920-22; retired, 1925. Author of How We
Escaped from Pretoria (1900), A Brigade of the Old Army
(1920), Insurrection in Mesopotamia (1922), The Haldanes of
Gleneagles (1929), and A Soldier's Saga (1944)
Halliday, General Sir Lewis Stratford Tollemache (1870-1966)
Elizabeth College, Guernsey. Joined Royal Marine Light
Infantry, 1889; China, 1900 (dangerously wounded,
despatches, V.C., 1901); p.s.c., 1906; Instructor (G.S.O.2),
R.M.C., 1908-12; Staff of Royal Naval War college, 1912-14;
G.S.O.2, Malta, 1914; G.S.O.1, Third Army, U.K., 1914-15;
G.S.O.1, 39th Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.1,
Canadian Training Centre, U.K., 1916-17; A.G., Royal
Marines, 1927-30; retired, 1930. Affected by the wound he
received in China in 1900, his health broke down in the
summer of 1916 and he served the rest of the war at home.
Hambro, Percival Otway (Major-General Sir Percy) (1870-1931)
Eton. Joined 15th Hussars, 1892; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-1900; G.S.O.2, India, 1908-10; Instructor, Cavalry
School, India, 1910-12; Special Employment, 1913 and 1914;
D.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Cavalry Division, 1914; G.S.O.2, 1st
Cavalry Division, 1914-15; A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Cavalry
Division, 1915; D.A. & Q.M.G., III Corps, 1915-17; D.A. &
Q.M.G., Fifth Army, 1917-19; G.O.C. 46th Division, 1927-31;
retired, 1931.
Hamilton, Major-General Hubert Ion Wethera].l (1861-1914)
Third son of Lieutenant-General H.M. Hamilton. United
Services College. Joined 2nd Foot, 1880; p.s.c.; Burma,
1886-88; Soudan, 1897-99 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa,
1899-1902; Military Secretary to Lord Kitchener in South
Africa, 1900-02, and India, 1902-05; G.O.C. 7th Brigade,
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1906-08; M.G.G.S., Mediterrenean Command, 1908-09; 11th
Division, 1911-14; 3rd Division, 1914; killed in action, 14
October 1914. Brother of General Sir Bruce Hamilton and
Colonel G.H.C. Hamilton.
Hanbury-Williams, Major-General Sir John (1859-1946)
Wellington. Joined 35 Foot, 1878; transferred to 43 Foot,
1878; Egypt, 1882 (despatches); Burma, 1886; South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches); Private Secretary to the Secretary-
of-State for War, 1901-04; Military Secretary to Governor-
General, Canada, 1904-09; Brigadier-General i/c
administration, Scottish Command, 1909-12; Major-General,
1912; Chief of British Military Mission to French Army,
1914-15, and to Russian Army, 1915-17; retired, 1919.
Father of Sir John Hanbury-Williams, Chairman of Courtauld
Ltd., 1946-62, and Director of the Bank of England, 1936-63,
who served at G.H.Q. during the war.
Hankey, Brigadier-General Edward Barnard (1875-1959)
Eton. Joined Worcestershire Regiment, 1895; South Africa,
1899-1902; Soudan, 1904; O.C. 2/Worcesters, 1914-15;
Lieutenant-Colonel, Machine Gun Corps, 1916-17, O.C. 'G'
Battalion, Tank Corps, 1917-18; 4th Brigade, Tank Corps,
1918; No.3 Group H.Q., Tank Corps, 1918-19 (wounded);
retired, 1929.
Hare, Brigadier-General Robert Hugh (1867-1950)
Hermitage School, Bath, and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers,
1886; Chitral, 1895; p.s.c., 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902
(D.S.O.); G.S.O.2, Highland Division, 1908-12; Instructor,
R.M.C., 1913-14; G.S.O.2, V Corps, 1915; G.S.O.1, 28th
Division, B.E.F. and M.E.F., 1915-16; G.O.C. 83th Brigade,
Salonika, 1916-19; retired, 1924.
Hare, Brigadier-General Robert William (1872-1953)
Harrow. Joined Norfolk Regiment, 1892; p.s.c.; Mashonaland,
1896; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.2,
War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, O.b., G.H.Q., 1914-15;
G.S.O.1, 26th Division, B.E.F. and M.E.F., 1915-16
(wounded); G.S.O.1, Staff College, Cambridge, 1916-17;
B.G.G.S. (Commandant), Staff School, Cambridge, 1918-19;
retired, 1923.
Harington, General Sir Charles Harington "Tim" (1872-1940)
Cheltenham and R.M.C. Joined Liverpool Regiment, 1892;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1900; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1909-
11; special employment, War Office, 1914; G.S.O.2, III
Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 49th Division, 1915; B.G.G.S.,
Canadian Corps, 1915-16; M.G.G.S., Second Army, 1916-17,
British Forces in Italy, 1917-18, and Second Army, 1918;
D.C. I .G. S., War Office, 1918-20; G.O. C. Northern Command,
1923-27; Western Command, India, 1927-31; Aldershot Command,
1931-33; Governor, Gibraltar, 1933-38; retired, 1938. A
very keen games player; playing member of the M.C.C.;
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reserve for Irish hockey team. Author of Plumer of Messines
(1935) and Tim Harington Looks Back (1940).
Harman, Lieutenant-General Sir (Anthony Ernest) Wentworth
"Jake" (1872-1961)
Educated privately and Militia. Joined 3rd Dragoon Guards,
1894; transferred to 2nd Dragoon Guards, 1911; O.C. 18th
Hussars, 1915-16; 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1916-17; 3rd Cavalry
Brigade, 1917; 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1917-18; 3rd Cavalry
Division, 1918-19 (despatches; D.S.O., 1916); 1st Division,
1930-34; retired, 1934.
Harper, Lieutenant-General Sir George Montague uunclen or
"Daddy" (1865-1922)
Bath College and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1884;
South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches, D.S.O.) ; p.s.c., 1902;
Mobilisation Branch, War Office, 1902-06; Instructor, Staff
College, 1907-11; G.S.O.1, D.M.O., War Office, 1911-14;
G.S.O.1, Operations, G.H.Q., 1914; B.G.G.S., Operations,
G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.O.C. 17th Brigade, 1915; 51st Division,
1915-18; IV Corps, 1918-19; Southern Command, 1919-22; died
in car accident, 15 December 1922. Son-in-law of 1st Baron
Allerton, Conservative M.P., and brother-in-law of Sir (F.)
Stanley Jackson, cricketer and Conservative M..P., 1915-27.
Friend and protege of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson.
Harrison, Brigadier Eric Fairweather (born 1880)
Australian. Sydney Church of England Grammar School;
Bedford; and Trinity College, Cambridge. Royal Australian
Garrison Artillery, 1903; p.s.c.; Major, 1914; D.M.T.,
Australia, 1914-15; Instructor, Duntroon, Australia, 1915-
17; G.S.O.1, 3rd Australian Division, 1918-19; D.M.O. & I.,
Australia, 1920-25.
Harrison, Major-General James Murray Robert (1880-1957)
Shrewsbury and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900;
G.S.O.2, 11th Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, XIV Corps, France,
and G.H.Q., Italy, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, V Corps, France, 1918;
G.S.O.1, Inspector-General of Training, 1918; G.S.O.1, 32
Division, 1918-19; G.O.C. 2nd A.A. Division, 1936-39;
Lieutenant-Governor, Jersey, 1939-40; retired, 1942.
Harvey, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Henry (1878-1960)
St. Paul's; Clifton, and R.M.C. Joined Border Regiment,
1898; transferred to the Indian Army, 1903, and East
Yorkshire Regiment, 1908; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902;
G.S.O.3, 58th Division, U.K., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 30th
Divsion, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 18th Division,
1916; G.S.O.2, Fifth Army, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Fifth Army,
1917-18; Fourth Army, 1918; Reserve Army, 1918; Fifth Army,
1918; Viadivostock, 1918-20; retired, 1925.
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Harvey, Major-General Robert Napier (1868-1937)
His father owned Messrs. John Harvey & Sons, Bristol.
Marlborough and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1888; South
Africa, 1900-01; Instructor, School of Military Engineering,
1913-14; G.S.O.2, B.E.F., 1914; Assistant to the Engineer-
in-Chief, 1915-16; Inspector of Mines, G.H.Q., 1916-18;
Chief Engineer, VI Corps, 1918-19; Engineer-in-Chief, India,
1924-28; retired, 1928.
Haskard, Brigadier-General John McDougall (1876-1967)
Blairlodge, Stirlingshire. Joined Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
1897; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded, despatches); Aden,
1903; Egyptian Army, 1908-11; p.s.c., 1914; G.S.O.2, IX
Corps, M.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 19th Division, 1916-17;
G.S.O.1, 20th Division, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., Tactical School,
Caniberley, 1918-19; G.S.O.1, Staff College, Camberley, 1919-
20; retired, 1931.
Hay, Major-General Charles John Bruce (1877-1940)
Wellington and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1897; joined Indian
Army (Corps of Guides), 1898; p.s.c., 1906; Tirah, 1897-98;
Waziristan, 1901-02; G.S.O.2, 12th Division, 1916-17;
G.S.O.1, 12th Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., Mesopotamia,
1917-19; Head of British Military Mission to Iraq, 1934-37;
retired, 1937.
Hayter, Brigadier Ross John Finnis (1875-1929)
Canadian. Grandson of John Hayter, Court Painter to Queen
Victoria. Dover College; Upper Canada College, Toronto; and
R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Joined Cheshire Regiment, 1895;
p.s.c.; G.S.O.2, Canadian Forces, 1911-14; Brigade Major,
1st Canadian Brigade, U.K. and B.E.F., 1914-15; G.S.O.2,
Canadian Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 3rd Canadian Division,
1916-17; G.O.C. 10th Canadian Brigade, 1917-18; B.G.G.S.,
Canadian Corps, 1918-19.
Headlam, Lieutenant-Colonel Rt. Hon. Sir Cuthbert Headlam
(1876-19 64)
King's School, Canterbury, and Magdalen College, Oxford.
Clerk in the House of Lords, 1897-1924; Barrister, Inner
Temple, 1906; Bedford Yeomanry, 1910-26; G.S.O.3, Second
Army, 1916; G.S.O.3, VIII Corps, 1916-18; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q.,
1918; D.S.O., 1918; G.S.O.1, Training, G.H.Q., 1918-19;
O.B.E., 1919. Editor of the Army Quarterley, 1920-42, owned
by Major-General G.P. Dawnay (q.v.). Conservative M.P.,
1924-29, 1931-35, and 1940-52. Created Baronet, 1935.
Author of The History of the Guards Division and a novel,
Knight Reluctant (1934) . Created 1st Baronet, 1935.
Brother of Brigadier-General H.R. Headlam and cousin of
Major-General Sir John Headlam (q.v.).
Headlain, Major-General Sir John Emerson Wharton (1864-1946)
King's College School, London, and R.M.A. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1883; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches);
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Assistant Director of Artillery, War Office, 1904-06; D.S.D.
and D.M.T, India, 1908-13; C.R.A., 5th Division, 1913-15;
M.G.R.A., Second Army, 1915; M.G.R.A., G.H.Q., 1915-16;
employed with Ministry of Munitions, 1916-19; retired, 1921.
Author of History of the Royal Artillery from the Indian
Mutiny to the Great War, 3 volumes (1931-40). Cousin of
Lieutenant-Colonel Rt. Hon. Sir Cuthbert Headlam (q.v.) and
Brigadier-General H.R. Headlam. Brother-in-law of Major-
General Sir Percival Wilkinson (q.v.).
Heard, Colonel Edward Severin "Teddy" (born 1863)
Harrow. Joined South Yorkshire Regiment, 1883; transferred
to Northumberland Fusiliers, 1883; p.s.c.; Instructor, Staff
College, 1897-1900; South Africa, 1900-01; Professor, Staff
College, 1901-04; G.S.O.2 (D.S.D. and D.M.T.) New Zealand
Forces, 1910-12; G.S.O.1 (C.G.S.), New Zealand Forces, 1912-
14; G.S.O.1, H.Q., Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-15;
G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1915 (sacked); G.S.O.1, 61st
Division, U.K., 1915; G.O.C. 67th Brigade, 1915; A.A.G.
(Special Appointment), 1916-18; retired, 1919.
Heath, Major-General Sir Gerald Moore (1863-1929)
Fifth son of Admiral Sir Leopold Heath. Wimbledon and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1882; p.s.c.; Bechuanaland,
1884-85; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches,
D.S.O.); Instructor, School of Military Engineering, 1902-
06; G.S.O.1, India, 1910-11; C.S.O., Burma Division, 1911-
12; B.G.G.S., South Africa, 1912-14; Inspector of Royal
Engineers, 1915; Chief Engineer, First Army, 1915-17;
Engineer-in-Chief, 1917-19; retired, 1919. Brother of
Admiral Sir Herbert Heath and father of Major-General G.W.E.
Heath.
Heath, Major-General Henry Newport Charles (1860-1915)
Son of Major-General A.H. Heath. Clifton, and R.M.C.
Joined South Staffordshire Regiment, 1881; transferred to
Cheshire Regiment, 1889, and Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1889;
p.s.c., 1897; Egypt, 1882; Soudan 1884-85; South Africa,
1899-1902; O.C. Battalion Y.L.I., 1901-02; G.S.O.1, War
Office, 1908-10; G.O.C. 11th Brigade, 1910-14; 48th
Division, 1914-15 (sick May 1915); died 29 July 1915.
Brother of Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Heath.
Henderson, Lieutenant-General Sir David (1862-1921)
Glasgow University and R.M.C. Joined Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, 1883; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-
1900 (wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); D.M.I., South Africa,
1901-02; G.S.O.1, Aldershot, 1907; B.G.G.S., Inspector-
General, Home Forces, 1907-12; learnt to fly at the age of,
1911; D.M.T., War Office, 1912-13; Director-General of
Military Aeronautics, 1913-18; G.O.C. 1st Division, 1914;
R.F.C., B.E.F., 1914-15; Military Attache, Paris, 1918-19;
Director-General, League of Red Cross Societies, Geneva,
1920-21. His only son was killed commanding a Squadron in
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1918. As the author of Field Intelligence: its Principles
and Practice (1904) and The Art of Reconaissance (1907),
Henderson was recognized as the British Armyts leading
authority on tactical intelligence. A thoughtful and far-
sighted officer, Henderson went on to become an important
and innovative figure before and during the war as the
father of both the Intelligence Corps and the R.A.F.
Heneker, General Sir William Charles Giffard (1867-1939)
Canadian. Bishop's College School, Lennoxville, Canada, and
R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Joined Connaught Rangers, 1888;
Benin, 1899; Nigeria, 1901-03; South Africa, 1906-10; O.C.
2nd Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment, India, 1912; 1st
Peshawar Brigade, 1912; Rawalpindi Brigade, 1913-14; 1st
Brigade, Quetta, 1914-15; 54th Brigade, 1915 (severely
wounded in left thigh by German machine-gun bullet while
walking in the open, 10 December 1915); 190th Brigade, 1916;
8th Division, 1916-19; 3rd Division, 1922-26; Southern
Command, India, 1928-32; retired, 1932. Author of Bush
Warfare (1906).	 —ee--wrot-e—the---screenplay for the f-lm,
Henley, Hon. Anthony Morton "Chunkie" (1873-1925)
Third son of 3rd Baron Henley. Eton; Balliol College,
Oxford; called to Bar, 1897; Barrister, Inner Temple, 1899.
In ranks of the Imperial Yeomanry, South Africa, 1899-1900;
commissioned 2nd Dragoons, 1900; transferred to 5th Lancers,
1907; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-13; Private
Secretary to the Secretary-of-State for War, 1914; G.S.O.2,
Cavalry Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 49th Division, 1915-17;
G.O.C. 127th Brigade, 1917-19; retired, 1919. Son-in-law of
4th Baron Sheffield (Liberal M.P., 1880-85) . His wife,
Sylvia, like her sister, Venetia Stanley (later Hon. Mrs
Edwin Montagu), belonged to the Asquith circle.
Hewitt, Brigadier Charles Caulfield (1883-1949)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers, 1902; Captain, 1914; Assistant Instructor, School
of Musketry, 1913-14; Instructor, Machine Gun Training
Centre, 1915-16; Chief Instructor (G.S.O.2), Machine Gun
Training Centre, 1916; O.C. 11th Machine Gun Company, 1916-
17; Machine Gun Officer, VI Corps, 1917; O.C. 46th Machine
Gun Battalion, 1917-18; Army Machine Gun Officer (G.S.O.1),
Third Army, 1918; Deputy Inspector, Machine Gun Units, Fifth
Army, 1918-19 (wounded twice, D.S.O., M.C.); retired, 1938;
re-employed, 1940-41; retired, 1941. Commandant, National
Fire Service College, 1941-45.
Hewlett, Brigadier-General Ernest (1879-1965)
Clifton and R.M.C. Joined Lancashire Fusiliers, 1899;
transferred to Devon Regiment, 1908; p.s.c., 1913; G.S.O.3,
R.F.C., 1914-15; G.S.O.3, III Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 49th
Division, 1916; G.S.O.2, VII Corps, 1916-17; G.S.O..1, 19th
Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1917-18; retired, 1933.
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Heywood, Major-General Cecil Percival "Guf fin" (1880-1936)
Second son of Sir A.P. Heywood, 3rd Baronet. Eton. Joined
Coldstream Guards, 1899; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1900-02
(wounded); Egyptian Army, 1907-09; Soudan, 1908; G.S.O.2,
3rd Division, 1915; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.S.O.1,
G.H.Q., 1916; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.l, Guards Division, 1916-
17; G.S.O.1, Staff Course, Cambridge, 1917-18; G.O.C. 150th
Brigade, 1918; 3rd Guards Brigade, 1918 (wounded); D.M.T.,
India, 1930-32; D.S.D., War Office, 1934-36; G.O.C. 3rd
Division, 1936. Died of a heart-attack, 1936.
Hickie, Major-General Sir William Bernard (1865-1950)
Oscott College and R.M.C. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1885;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1900-02; A.Q.M.G., Irish Command,
1912-14; G.O.C. 13th Brigade, 1914; 53rd Brigade, 1915; 16th
(Irish) Division, December 1915-18 (sick) ; retired, 1921.
Senator, Irish Free State, 1925. Elder brother of
Brigadier-General C.J. Hickie.
Higgins, Air Marshal Sir John Frederick Andrews ' t Josh" or
"Burn and Eyeglass" (1875-1948)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895;
transferred to R.F.C., 1912, and R.A.F., 1918; South Africa,
1900-02 (severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); G.O.C. 3rd
Brigade R.F.C., 1915-18 (wounded); A.O.C., Iraq, 1924-26;
Air Member for Supply and Research, Air Council, 1926-30;
retired, 1930; A.O.C.-in-C., India, 1939-40.
Higgins, Air Commodore Thomas Charles Reginald (1880-1953)
H.M.S. Britannia. Served in all three Services: entered
Royal Navy, 1897; joined to Royal Lancashire Regiment, 1900,
transferred to R.F.C., 1915, and R.A.F., 1918; South Africa,
1900-02; employed with the West African Frontier Force
(Nigeria), 1904-09; Pilot's Licence (No.88), 1911; G.O.C.
6th Brigade R.F.C., 1917-18; D.M.T, Air Ministry, 1922-26;
Chief of Staff, Iraq, 1926-28; A.O.C., No.10 Group, 1928;
retired, 1929.
Higginson, Major-General Harold Whitla (1873-1954)
St. Lawrence College, Ramsgate, and R.M.C. Joined Royal
Dublin Fusiliers, 1894; West Africa, 1897-98; South Africa,
1900-02; Aden, 1903; Soudan, 1908; Brigade-Major, 143rd
Brigade, 1914-15; O.C. 2/Dublin Fusiliers, 1915-16; 53rd
Brigade, 1916-18; 12th Division, 1918-19; O.C. Troops,
Ceylon, 1924-27; 55th Division, 1928-32; retired, 1932.
Hill, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh (1875-1916)
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1895; South
Africa, 1900-00; p.s.c., 1909; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.1, 8th
Division, 1915-16; killed in action 10 September 1916. He
did not know what fear was.
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Hill, Major-General John (1866-1935)
Eldest son of Major-General W. Hill. Bedford and R.M.C.
Joined Oxford Light Infantry, 1887; transferred to Indian
Army (15th Sikhs), 1888; Lushai campaign, 1889; Miranzai
Expedition, 1891; Chitral Relief Force, 1895; Tirah Relief
Force, 1897 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.O.C. 34th Brigade,
M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1915-17; 180th Brigade, E.E.F., 1917;
52nd Division, E.E.F. and France, 1917-18; retired, 1920.
Hi].l-Whitson, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Ernest Lynedocl
(1877-1925)
Harrow and Militia. Joined 14th Hussars, 1896; South
Africa, 1900-02; Adjutant, Imperial Yeomanry, 1902-05;
Brigade-Major, 1st S.W. Mounted Brigade, 1911-14; G.S.O.1,
14th Division, 1918; retired, 1919.
Hoare-Nairne, Brigadier-General Edward Spencer "The Long
'Un" (1869-1958)
Grandson of 2nd Baron Curriehill and second son of Reverend
S. Nairne. Haileybury and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery,
1888; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa, 1900-02;
p.s.c., 1904; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1905-06; G.S.O.2, 1st
London Division, 1908-09; Chief Instructor, R.M.A., 1912-14;
G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1915; B.G.R.A., Lahore Division,
France and Mesopotamia, 1915-17; B.G.R.A., 24th Division,
1917-18; B.G.R.A., XIV Corps, 1918-19; Military Attache,
Athens, 1919-23; retired, 1924. Assumed his wife's name,
Hoare, as additional surname by deed-poll, 1910. Joint
Master, Essex and Suffolk Hounds, 1924-27, and Master,
Southdown Hounds, 1927-29. Owed his nickname to his
tallness.
Hobbs, Lieutenant-General Sir (Joseph John) Talbot (1864-
1938)
Born and educated in England. Emigrated to Australia, 1887.
Architect. Volunteers, England; Australian Militia, 1887;
C.R.A., 1st Australian Division, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1915-17;
G.O.C. 5th Australian Division, 1917-18; Australian Corps,
1918-19; retired, 1927. Regarded with affection by his men
and respect by his superiors.
Hobbs, Major-General Percy Eyre Francis (1865-1939)
Fettes. Entered Royal Marines Light Infantry, 1883;
transferred to A.S.C., 1889; South Africa, 1899-1900
(despatches, C.M.G.); Assistant Director of Supplies and
Transport, Eastern Command, 1910-13; D.A. & Q.M.G., I Corps,
1914; D.A. & Q.M.G., First Army, 1914-17 (resigned).
Hodgson, Brigadier Walter Thornton (1880-1957)
Eton and local Militia Forces, Ceylon. Joined Middlesex
Regiment, 1900; transferred to 1st Dragoons, 1902; South
Africa, 1900-02; G.S.O.2, 1st Cavalry Division, 1916-17;
G.S.O.2, O.a., G.H.Q., 1917; G.S.O.1, SthCavalryDivision,
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1917-18; G.S.O.1, 2nd Mounted Division, E.E.F., 1918-19;
retired, 1934.
Hogg, Brigadier-General Rudolph Edward Trower (1877-1955)
R.M.C.; entered Royal Artillery, 1896; transferred to Indian
Army (38th Central India Horse), 1901; Royal Humane Society
Certificate for Life Saving, 1907; G.O.C. 9th Brigade,
R.A.F., 1918; 2nd Brigade, R.A.F., 1918-19; retired, 1919.
Brother-in-law of Lieutenant-General Sir Bertram Kirwan
(q.v.).
Holdich, Lieutenant-Colonel Godfrey William Vanrenen (1882-
1921)
Wellington and R.M.A.. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900;
p.s.c.; G.S.O.2, Egypt, 1914-15; D.A.A.G., G.H.Q., M.E.F.,
1915; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q.,
E.E.F., 1916-17; G.S.O.1, S2th Division, E.E.F. and France,
1917-18. Brother of Brigadier-General H.A. Holdich.
Holland, Lieutenant-General Arthur Edward Aveling (1862-
1927)
Youngest son of Major-General A. Butcher. Educated
privately. Entered Royal Artillery, 1880; Burma, 1885-89;
South Africa, 1900-1901; Assistant Military Secretary, War
Office, 1910-12; Commandant, R.M.A., 1912-14; B.G.R.A.,
1914-15; B.G.R.A., VII Corps, 1915; G.O.C. 1st Division,
1915-16; M.G.R.A., Third Army, 1916-17; G.O.C. I Corps,
1917-19.	 Conservative M.P., 1924-27. Assumed name of
Holland in lieu of Butcher, 1910.
Holland, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry William (born 1875)
Westminster. Joined Inns of Court O.T.C., 1898;
commissioned, 1912; volunteered for censoring work with
B.E.F. and attached General Staff, B.E.F., 1914; D.S.O.,
1917; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1918-19; O.B.E., 1919.
Hollond, Major-General Spencer Edmund "Tom" (1874-1950)
Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. Joined Rifle
Brigade, 1895; p.s.c., South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches);
G.S.O.3, War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914;
G.S.O.2 (Liaison), B.E.F., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, I Corps, 1915;
G.S.O.1, 9th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Third Army, 1916-
17; B.G.G.S., XVIII Corps, 1917-18; B.G.G.S. to Inspector-
General of Training, 1918-18; Commandant, Senior Officers'
School, Sheerness, 1925-27; retired, 1928. An old friend of
Sir Winston Churchill.
Holman, Lieutenant-General Herbert Campbell (1869-1949)
Dulwich and R.M.C. Joined Devonshire Regiment, 1889;
transferred to Indian Army (16th Bengal Cavalry), 1892;
p.s.c., 1898; Burma, 1891-92 (wounded); China, 1900-01;
attached Russian Army, Manchuria, 1905; G.S.O.2, War Office,
1904-06; G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1910; and 1913-14; A.Q.M.Q.,
First Army, 1915; D.A. & Q.M.G., XI Corps, 1915-16; D.A. &
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Q.M.G., 1916-19; retired, 1928. Royal Humane Society's
Medal, 1907. Treasurer to The Bible Speaks to Britain and
Bible Monthly. Superb, original-minded Administrative
Officer.
Holmes, Major-General William (1862-1917)
Australian. Public Schools in New South Wales. Employed
with the New South Wales Public Service. Citizen soldier,
joining 1st New South Wales Infantry Regiment, 1886;
Colonel, 1912; South Africa, 1899-1900 (wounded, D.S.O.);
A.]J.C. to Governor-General of Australia, 1904-11; G.O.C. 6th
Australian Brigade, which occupied German New Guinea, 1914-
15; 5th Australian Brigade, Gallipoli, 1915; 2nd Australian
Division, M.E.F., 1915-16; 5th Australian Brigade, M.E.F.
and France, 1916-17; 4th Australian Division, 1917; killed
by a shell, 2 July 1917. Keen sportsman.
Ho].t, Air Vice-Marshal Fe].ton Vesey "Tony" (1886-1931)
Third son of Sir Vesey Holt, Senior Partner of Holt & Co.,
Bankers and Army Agents. Eton and R.M.C. Joined
Oxfordshire Light Infantry, 1905; transferred to R.F.C.,
1913; Captain, 1914; served with 4th Squadron, 1914-15; O.C.
16th Squadron, 1915-16; D.S.O., 1915; 18th Wing, U.K., 1916;
Home Defence Wing, U.K., 1916-17; 22nd (Army) Wing, 1917-18;
3rd Brigade, R.F.C., 1918-19; C.M.G., 1919; Commandant,
Central Flying School, 1923; Director, Technical
Development, Air Ministry, 1928; Air Vice-Marshal, 1931;
killed in a flying accident, 23 April 1931. A red-faced and
choleric individual, credited with shooting down an enemy
aircraft with a rifle early in the war, he nonetheless had
good ideas and continued to fly operationally. Brother of
Lieutenant-Colonel A.V. Holt and Vice-Admiral R.V. Holt.
Home, Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Fraser "Sally" (1874-
1953)
Great-grandson of Robert Home, the painter; grandson of
Major-General R. Home; and son of Colonel F.J. Home.
Educated Italy, France, Germany, Aldenham, and R.M.C.
Joined 11th Hussars, 1895; p.s.c.; G.S.O.2, Staff College,
1913-14; G.S.O.2, 1st Cavalry Division, 1914; G.S.O.l, 1st
Cavalry Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps, 1915-16;
G.S.O.l, 46th Division, 1916; B.G.G.S., IX Corps, 1916;
B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps, 1916-19; retired, 1919. Spoke
French and German. From an old Army family with long
associations with India.
Hopwood, Brigadier-General Herbert Reginald (1871-1938)
Son of J.T. Hopwood, M.P., J.P. Cheam and Winchester.
Entered Royal Marines, 1891; transferred to the Indian Army,
1894; China, 1900-01; p.s.c., 1907; G.S.O.l, I.E.F.,
Mesopotamia, 1915-16, B.G.G.S., I.E.F., Mesopotamia, 1916-
17; C.G.S., M.E.F., 1917; G.S.O.1, II Corps, France, 1918;
invalided and retired, 1920. Brother of Admiral R.A.
Hopwood.
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Hordern, Brigadier-General Gwyn Venables (1870-1945)
Wellington. Joined K.R.R.C., 1891; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1899;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches) ; G.S.O.3, War Office,
1907; Brigade-Major, 7th Brigade, 1907-11; G.S.O.2, Canadian
Forces, 1911-14; G.S.O.2, 8th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1,
50th Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., I Corps, 1916-19; retired,
1923.
Hore-Ruthven, Brigadier-General Hon. Alexander Gore
Arkwright (later 1st Earl of Gowrie) "Sandy" (1872-1955)
Second son of 8th Baron Ruthven and grandson of 4th Earl of
Arran. Eton and Militia. Won V.C. while serving as Captain
in 3rd (Militia) Battalion H.L.I. while attached to Egyptian
Army in Soudan, 1898-99; joined Cameron Highianders, 1899;
transferred to 1st Dragoon Guards, 1908, and Welsh Guards,
1915; Somaliland, 1903-04; p.s.c., 1913; Military Secretary
to Governor of Australia, 1908-10; G.S.O.2, VIII Corps,
M.E.F., 1915 (severely wounded); G.S.O.1, 62nd Division,
U.K. and France, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Guards Division, 1917;
B.G.G.S., VII Corps, 1917-18; G.O.C. 26th Brigade, 1918-19;
retired, 1928. Governor of South Australia, 1928-34, and
New South Wales, 1934-36. Governor-General of Australia,
1936-44, and created Earl of Gowrie, 1944. President of
M.C.C., 1948. Brother of Major-General Lord Ruthven and
Colonel Hon. C.M. Hore-Ruthven (q.q.v.).
Hore-Ruthven, Colonel Hon. Christian Malise (1880-1969)
Third son of 8th Baron Ruthven and grandson of 4th Earl of
Arran. Wellington. Joined Royal Highlanders, 1899; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-1902; Egyptian Army, 1906-08; G.S.O.2,
2nd Canadian Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 5th Canadian
Division, U.K., 1917; G.S.O.1, 3rd Canadian Division, 1917-
19; retired, 1933. Brother of Brigadier-General Hon. A.G.A.
Hore-Ruthven (later Earl of Gowrie) and Hon. W.P. Hore-
Ruthven (later Major-General Lord Ruthven) (q.q.v.).
Hore-Rutliven, Hon. Walter Patrick (Major-General Lord
Ruthven) "Jerry" (1870-1956)
Eldest son of 8th Baron Ruthven and grandson of 4th Earl of
Arran. Eton and Militia. Joined Scots Guards, 1891;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches); D.A.A. &
Q.M.G., 2nd London Division, 1908-11; Brigade Major, Brigade
of Guards, London District, 1912-14; Brigade-Major, 4th
Brigade, 1914; G.S.O.1, 47th Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, Guards
Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., VIII Corps, 1916-17, G.S.O.l,
London District, 1918; G.O.C. 117th Brigade, 1918; 120th
Brigade, 1918-19; London District, 1924-28; Lieutenant-
Governor, Guernsey, 1929-34; retired, 1934. Brother of
Brigadier-General Hon. A.G.A. Hore-Ruthven (later Earl of
Gowrie) and Colonel Hon. C.M. Hore-Ruthven (q.q.v.).
438
Home, General Sir Henry Sinclair (General Lord Home of
Stirkoke) (1861 - 1929)
Harrow and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1880; South
Africa, 1899-1902; Inspector of Royal Horse and Field
Artillery, 1912-14; B.G.R.A., I Corps, 1914; G.O.C. 2nd
Division, 1915; XV Corps, 1915-16; First Army, 1916-19;
Eastern Command, 1919-23; retired, 1926; Master Gunner, St.
James' Park, 1926. Created Baron Home of Stirkoke, 1919.
A fine sportsman. A close friend of his fellow Scot, Sir
Douglas Haig (q.v.).
Hoskins, Major-General Sir (Arthur) Reginald (1871-1942)
Westminster. Joined North Staffordshire Regiment, 1891;
p.s.c.; Dongola, 1896 (despatches); Soudan, 1897-99
(despatches); South Africa, 1899-02 (despatches, D.S.Oj;
East Africa, 1902-03 (despatches) ; G.S.O.2, Staff College,
1913; Inspector-General, King's African Rifles, 1913-14;
A.A. & Q.M.G., 8th Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 7th Division,
1914-15; G.O.C. 8th Brigade, 1915; B.G.G.S., V Corps, 1915-
16; G.O.C. 1st East African Division, East Africa, 1916-17;
3rd Indian Division, Mesopotamia and E.E.F., 1917-18; North
Midlands Division, 1919-23; retired, 1920..
Howard, Lieutenant-General Sir Geoffrey Weston nPompeyR
(1876-1966)
Eton and Militia. Joined Essex Regiment, 1897; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.3, Malta,
1914; G.S.O.2, Second Army, 1916; G.S.O.2, 24th Division,
1916; G.S.O.1, 7th Division, France and Italy, 1916-18;
G.O.C. 145th Brigade, Italy, 1918-19; 5th Division, 1934-37;
retired, 1938; re-employed, 1940.
Howard, Colonel Henry Cecil Lloyd (1882-1950)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 16th Lancers, 1901; South Africa,
1901-02 (wounded, despatches); p.s.c., 1911; G.S.O.3, War
Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.3, 1st Cavalry Division, 1914-15;
G.S.O.3, Cavalry Corps; Brigade-major, 6th Cavalry Brigade,
1915; G.S.O.2, Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q.,
1916-17; G.S.O.l, 48th Division, France and Italy, 1917-19;
retired, 1934; re-employed, 1939-41.
Howard-Vyse, Major-General Sir Richard Glanville Hylton
"Wombat" (1883-1962)
Grandson of 1st Lord Hilton. Eton. Joined Royal Horse
Guards, 1902; p.s.c.; employed with Canadian Forces, 1913;
Brigade-major, 5th Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 1st
Cavalry Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, Cavalry Corps, 1916;
G.S.O.2, Reserve Corps, 1916; G.S.O.l, 3rd Cavalry Division,
1916; G.S.O.l, 2nd Indian (later 5th) Cavalry Division,
1916-17; B.G.G.S., E.E.F., 1917-18; G.O.C. 10th Cavalry
Brigade, E.E.F., 1918; retired, 1935; re-employed, 1939-46;
Head of Mission with French High Command, 1939-40. First
officer of the Household Cavalry to graduate at the Staff
College.
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Howell, Brigadier-General Philip (1877-1916)
Lancing. Entered Army, 1897; transferred to Indian Army
(Corps of Guides), 1898, and 4th Hussars, 1913; p.s.c.,
1907; North-West Frontier, 1908; Brigade-Major to Inspector-
General of Cavalry, India, 1908; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1909-
11; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1912-13; O.C. 4th Hussars, 1914;
B.G.G.S., Cavalry Corps, 1915; B.G.G.S, X Corps, 1915;
B.G.G.S., XII Corps, 1915; C.G.S., G.H.Q., Salonika, 1915-
16; B.G.G.S., II Corps, 1916; killed in action 7 October
1916. Protege of Sir Douglas Haig (q.v.). Author of The
Campaign in Thrace 1912 (Rees, 1913). Special Correspondent
of The Times during the Macedonian Rebellions of 1903 and
the Turkish revolution of 1908.
Hudson, General Sir Havelock "Huddie" (1862-1944)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir John Hudson. Reading School
and R.M.C. Joined Northampton Regiment, 1881; transferred
to Indian Army, (19th Bengal Lancers), 1885; Miranzai
Expedition, 1891; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; China, 1900;
Commandant, Cavalry School, Sangor, 1912; B.G.G.S., Northern
Army, India, 1912-14; B.G.G.S., Indian Corps, 1914-15;
G.O.C. 8th Division, 1915-16; Adjutant-General, India, 1917-
20; G.O.C., Eastern Command, India, 1920-24; retired, 1924.
Hudson, Brigadier-General Thomas Roe Christopher (1866-1940)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1885;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1909-10;
G.S.O.2, War Office, 1910-13; G.S.O.l, attached to French
Army, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 17th Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, Third
Army, 1915-16; A.A.G., L. of C., 1916; B.G.R.A., Heavy
Artillery, V Corps, 1917; B.G.R.A., Heavy Artillery, XIV
Corps, 1917-19; retired, 1923.
Hull, Major-General Sir (Charles Patrick) znyatt (1865-1920)
Charterhouse; Trinity College, Cambridge; and Militia.
Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1887; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-02 (severely wounded) ; G.S.O.1, Staff College, 1909-12;
G.O.C. 10th Brigade, 1914-16; 56th Division, 1916-17 (sick);
16th Division, 1918; 56th Division, 1918-19; died, 24 July
1920. Father of Field-Marshal Sir Richard Hull.
Hume-Spry, Lieutenant-Colonel Leighton (1871-1934)
Repton and Militia. Joined West Yorkshire Regiment, 1892;
p.s.c., 1904; Ashanti, 1895-96; South Africa, 1899-02
(severely wounded twice, despatches, D.S.O., 1900); G.S.O.2,
Northumbrian Division, 1912-14; G.S.O.l, 50th (Northumbrian)
Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1914-15 (sacked); A.A. & Q.M.G.,
30th Division, 1915-16.
Humphreys, Lieutenant-General Sir (Edward) Thomas (1878-
1955)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Lancashire Fusiliers, 1898;
p.S.c.; South Africa, 1899-02 (despatches); G.S.O.3, 4th
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Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 17th Division, 1915; G.S.O.1,
60th Division, U.K., B.E.F., Salonika, and E.E.F., 1916-17;
D.S.O., 1916; B.G.G.S., XXI Corps, E.E.F., 1917-18; G.O.C.
179th Brigade, E.E.F., 1918-19; Commandant, Staff College,
Quetta, 1928-31; G.O.C. 5th Division, 1931-34; retired,
1937.
Hunter-Weston, Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer Gould "Hunter-
Bunter" (1864-1940)
Eldest son of Lieutenant-Colonel G. Hunter-Weston, 26th
Laird of Hunterston. Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal
Engineers, 1884; Miranzai Expedition, 1891; Waziristan,
1894-95 (wounded, despatches); Dongola Expedition, 1896;
p.s.c., 1899 (Master of Staff College Hounds, 1898-99);
South Africa, 1899-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O., Eastern
Command, 1904-08; C.G.S.O., Scottish Command, 1908-11;
Assistant D.M.T., War Office, 1911-14; G.O.C. 11th Brigade,
1914-15; 29th Division, Gallipoli, 1915; VIII Corps, M.E.F.
and B.E.F., 1915-19; Unionist M.P., 1916-35.
Huskisson, Major-General William (1859-1946)
Compton House, Brighton, and R.M.A. Entered Royal
Engineers, 1878; Professor, R.M.C., Kingston, Canada, 1890-
95, and R.M.C., Sandhurst, 1898-1903; Assistant Director of
Works, 1915; Chief Engineer, 1915; Chief Engineer, Third
Army, 1915-16; retired, 1917.
Hutchison, Robert (Major-General Lord Hutchison) "Hutch"
(1873-1950)
Militia; joined 7th Dragoon Guards, 1900; transferred to
11th Hussars, 1905, and 4th Dragoon Guards, 1913; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1912-14;
Brigade-Major, 1st Cavalry brigade, 1914; G.S.O.2, Cavalry
Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1915; G.S.O.1, O.b.,
G.H.Q., 1915-16; Director of Organisation, War Office, 1917-
19; retired, 1923. Liberal M.P. 1922-32; Liberal Whip,
1924-26; Chief Liberal Whip, 1926-30; created Baron
Hutchison of Montrose, 1932; Paymaster-General, 1935-38.
Ingouvi].].e-Wi].liams, Major-General Edward Charles "Inky-
Bill" (1861-1916)
Son of General Sir J.W.C. Williams. Militia; joined 3 Foot,
1881; transferred to Worcestershire Regiment, 1903; Soudan,
1884-85 and 1898-99; South Africa, 1899-1902 (D.S.O.); O.C.
2/Worcestershire, 1904-08; C.B., 1910; Commandant, Mounted
Infantry School, Longmore, 1910-12; G.O.C. 16th Brigade,
1912-15; 34th Division, 1915-16; killed by shell-fire on the
Somme, 22 July 1916. Fearless and a stern disciplinarian.
Ironside, William Edmund (Field-Marshal Lord Ironside)
"Tiny" (1880-1959)
Tonbridge and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1899; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.3, 6th Division, 1914-15;
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G.S.O.2, 6th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 4th Canadian Division,
1916-17; Commandant, Machine Gun Corps School, 1918; G.O.C.
99th Brigade, 1918; G.O.C. Allied Troops, Archangel, 1918-
19; Commandant, Staff College, 1922-26; G.O.C. 2nd Division,
1926-28; Meerut District, 1928-31; Lieutenant of the Tower
of London, 1931-33; Q.M.G., 1933-36; G.O.C. Eastern Command,
1936-38; Governor, Gibraltar, 1938-39; Inspector-General,
Overseas Forces, 1939; C.I.G.S., 1939-40; C.-in-C., Home
Forces, 1940; Field-Marshal, 1940; created Baron, 1941.
Played rugby for Scotland. He spoke seven languages and was
the model for John Buchan's Richard Hannay. Author of
Tannenberg: The First Thirty Days in East Prussia (1925);
Archangel, 1918-19 (1953); and High Road to Command (1972,
posthumously). Accompanied everywhere by his bulldog.
Irwin, Major-General Sir Janes Murray (1858-1938)
Trinity College, Dublin. Entered Army, 1882; Major,
R.A.M.C., 1894; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); Assistant Director-General, A.M.S., 1906-10;
D.D.M.S., Southern China, 1911; ]J.D.M.S., 1915-16; D.D.M.S.,
VIII Corps, 1916; D.M.S., Third Army, 1916-19; retired,
1919.
Isacke, Major-General Hubert (1872-1943)
King's School, Canterbury, and R.M.C. Joined Royal West
Kent Regiment, 1892; p.s.c.; Malakand Field Force, 1897-98
(severely wounded); South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.3, War
Office, 1908-10; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1910-12; G.S.O.2,
Staff College (Quetta), 1913-14; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., Meerut
Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.l, 14th Division, 1915-16; D.S.D.
and D.M.T., India, 1916-17; D.M.T., India, 1917-20; G.O.C.
56th Division, 1927-31; retired, 1931.
Jack, Brigadier Evan Maclean (1873-1951)
Crediton and Hastings Grammar Schools and R.M.A. Entered
Royal Engineers, 1893; South Africa, 1899-02; Uganda, 1907-
13; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1913; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1913-14;
G.S.O.3, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1915-17; G.S.O.1,
G.H.Q., 1917-19; Director-General of the Ordnance Survey,
1922-30; retired, 1930. Author of On the Congo Frontier.
Jackson, Colonel Claud Hugh Irving (born 1877)
Militia; joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1896; South Africa,
1899-1902; Instructor, School of Musketry, Hythe, 1913-15;
Assistant Commander, Machine Gun Corps Training Centre,
1915-16; G.S.O.2 (Machine Gun Officer), II Corps, 1918;
G.S.O.1, Army Machine Gun Officer, Second Army, 1918-19;
retired, 1933.
Jackson, Major-General George Hanhury Noble (1876-1958)
Neuenheim College, Heidelberg, and R.M.C. Joined Border
Regiment, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.3, 13th
Division, U.K. and M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.2, 2nd Australian
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Division, M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.1, 2nd Australian Division,
M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 3rd Australian
Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1916-18; G.O.C. 87th Brigade,
1918-19; G.O.C. 49th Division, 1931-35; retired, 1935; re-
employed, 1941-44.
Jackson, General Sir Henry Cholmondeley "Jacko" (1879-1972)
Haileybury and Trinity College, Cambridge. Joined
Bedfordshire Regiment, 1899; p.s.c.; Adjutant, Mounted
Infantry School, Longmoor, 1908-12; G.S.O.3, War Office,
1914; Brigade-Major, 53rd Brigade, U.K. and B.E.F., 1915;
G.S.O.2, VI Corps, 1915-16; O.C. 8/Bedford, 1916; D.S.O.,
1916; 175th Brigade, 1916-18; 50th Division, 1918-19
(wounded twice, D.S.O.); Commandant M.G. School, 1924-2 6;
D.M.T., India, 1926-30; G.O.C. 2nd Division, 1931-35;
Western Command, 1936-39; retired, 1939.
Jackson, Colonel Lainbert Cameron (1875-1953)
Clifton and R.M.A. (Pollock Prize). Entered Royal
Engineers, 1895; p.s.c., 1913; survey duty in Egypt, 1899-
1900; South Africa, 1900-02; Anglo-German Commission, Yola
and Lake Chad, 1903-04; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1909-11;
G.S.O.3, 7th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 16th Division, U.K.
and B.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.1, 16th Division, 1916-19; Chief
Engineer, Western Command, 1930-32; retired, 1932. Brother
of Lieutenant-Colonel M.A. Jackson.
Jacob, Field-Marshal Sir C].aud William (1863-1948)
Son of Major-General W.M. Jacob. Sherborne and R.M.C.
Joined Worcestershire Regiment, 1882; transferred to Indian
Army (30th Bombay Infantry known as 'Jacob's Rifles'), 1884;
Zhob Valley, 1890; North-West Frontier, 1901-02; G.S.O.1,
India, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, Meerut Division, 1914-15; G.O.C.
Dehra Dun Brigade, 1915; Meerut Division, 1915; 21st
Division, 1915-16 (wounded by the shell which killed his
G.S.O.1, Daniell (q.v.), March 1916); II Corps, 1916-19;
C.G.S., India, 1920-24; C.-in-C., India, 1925; Secretary of
Military Department, India Office, 1926-30; Field-Marshal,
1926. Brother of Major-General A. le G. Jacob and father of
Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Jacob who married the daughter of
Major-General Sir Francis Treherne (q.v.). His family had a
long tradition of military service in India.
James, Wing Commander Sir Archibald William Henry (1894-
1980)
Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. Joined 3rd Hussars,
January 1914; transferred to R.F.C., 1915, and R.A.F., 1918;
active service with 16th, 5th and 2nd Squadrons, 1915-17;
O.C. 6th Squadron, 1917-18; Deputy Assistant Inspector-
General of Training (G.S.O.1 and R.A.F. representative on
I.G.T. Staff), 1918-19; retired, 1925. Conservative M.P.,
1931-45. Nephew of Colonel B.R. James (q.v.). Rose from
Subaltern in 1914 to Lieutenant-Colonel and youngest G.S.O.l
on the staff of G.H.Q. in 1918.
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James, Colonel Bernard Ramsden (1864-1938)
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined East Surrey regiment, 1882;
transferred to Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1903; p.s.c.,
1893; Instructor, R.M.C., 1894-99; D.A.A.G. and Staff
Captain, Intelligence Branch, War Office, 1899-1904;
Military Attache, Washington and Mexico, 1907-11; Brevet
Lieutenant-Colonel and retired, 1911; re-employed, 1914; i/c
Mi.litary Attaches, G.H.Q., 1915-18. Uncle of Wing Commander
Sir Archibald James (q.v.).
James, Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Ernest Haweis (1875-1964)
Eton and Militia. Joined North Lancashire Regiment, 1895;
p.s.c.; China, 1900; Instructor, R.M.C., 1902-06; D.A.A.G.,
War Office, 1909-12; G.S.O.1, War Office, and G.H.Q.,
Central Force, Home Defence, 1914-16; G.S.O.1, 8th Division,
1916; Assistant Director-General of Transport (A.Q.M.G.),
1916-18; retired, 1919.
James, Major-General Sir (William) Bernard (1865-1940)
United Services College and R.M.C. Joined Derbyshire
Regiment, 1886; transferred to Indian Army (2nd Lancers),
1887; S.O., Intelligence Branch, War Office, 1900-01; South
Africa, 1902; O.C. 2lth Cavalry, 1913-14; D.A. & Q.M.G.,
Indian cavalry Corps, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., Indian Cavalry
Corps, 1915-16; Q.M.G., India, 1916-17; retired, 1926.
President of the Delhi Horse Show for many years and founder
and president of the national horse breeding and show
secretary of India.
Jeffreys, George Darell (General Lord Jeffreys) "Ma" (1878-
1960)
Only son of Rt. Hon. A.F. Jeffreys, Bt., P.C., M.P., D.L.,
J.P. Eton and R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1897;
Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1900-02; Commandant, Guards
depot, 1911-14; O.C. 2/Grenadier Guards, 1915-16; G.O.C.
58th Brigade, 1916 (severely wounded); 57th Brigade, 1916;
1st Guards Brigade, 1916-17; 19th Division, 1917-19; London
District, 1920-24; 43rd (Wessex) Division, 1926-30; Southern
Command, India, 1932-36; retired, 1938. Conservative M.P.,
1941-51; created Baron, 1952. Ardent disciplinarian who
took over a pet lion with the appointment of commanding 19th
Division from General Sir Tom Bridges (q.v.) who had been
wounded. His only son was killed in 1940.
Jerram, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Frederick (1882-1969)
Educated privately. Entered Royal Marines Light Infantry,
1901; Captain, 1912; G.S.O.2, 31st Division, 1917; G.S.O.2,
XIII Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.l, 46th Division, 1918-19;
retired, 1929. Brother of Rear-Admiral Sir Rowland Jerram
and Sir Bertrand Jerram (Foriegn Office).
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Jess, Lieutenant-General Sir Carl Herman (1884-1948)
Australian. Bendigo. Entered Australian and Imperial
Staff, 1909; O.C. 7th Australian Battalion, 1916; 2nd
Australian Brigade, 1916-17; Instructor, Senior Officers
School, Aldershot, 1917; G.S.O.2, Australian Corps, 1917-18;
G.S.O.l, 3rd Australian Division, 1918; G.O.C. 10th
Australian Brigade, 1918-19; Adjutant-General, Australian
Military Forces, 1934-39.
Jeudwine, Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Sandham "Judy" (1862-
1942)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1882; South
Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O., War Office, 1904-09; G.S.O.2, Staff
College, 1912-13; G.S.O.1, Staff College, 1913-14; G.S.O.1,
I Corps, 1914; G.S.O.1, 1st Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., V
Corps, 1915; G.O.C. 41st Brigade, 1915-16; 55th Division,
1916-19; 5th Division, Ireland, 1919-22; Director-General,
Territorial Army, 1923-27; retired, 1927. Fellow of the
Huguenot Society of London.
Johnson, Major-General Frank-dward (1861-1945)
	
/ Wru..P/r
Entered Royal Artillery, 1880; North-West Frontier, 1897-98;
China, 1900 (despatches, D.S.O.); A.Q.M.G., 2nd Division,
India, 1911; B.G.R.A., Lahore Division, 1911-15; M.G.R.A.,
Third Army, 1915-16; Inspector, Royal Artillery, India,
1916-18; retired, 1918.
Johnson, Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond Henry (born 1882)
Eastbourne College. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; p.s.c.;
Brigade Major, R.A., 8th Division, 1914-15; D.S.O., 1915;
D.A.A.G., (S.O. to G.O.C. R.A.), II Corps, 1915-16; G.S.O.2
(S.O. to M.G.R.A.), Third Army, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Third
Army, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 62nd Division, 1918.
Johnson, Brigadier-General Ronald Marr (1873-1925)
Radley and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1893; China,
1900; p.s.c., 1909; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-14; G.S.O.2,
War Office, 1914; G.S.O.1, 19th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.l,
71st Division, U.K., 1917; B.G.R.A., 29th Division, 1917-19;
retired, 1923. Author of the 29th Divisional Artillery
(1921)
Jones, Major-General Leslie Cockburn (1870-1960)
Clifton and R.M.C. Joined Bedfordshire Regiment, 1890;
transferred to Indian Army (5th Cavalry; 7th Lancers), 1901;
p.s.c.; Isazai Expedition, 1892; South Africa, 1900-02
(despatches); G.S.O.2, India, 1909-10; D.A.A.G., H.Q.,
India, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 2nd Indian Cavalry Division, 1914-
16; G.O.C. Meerut Cavalry Brigade, B.E.F. and Mesopotamia,
1916-17; Cavalry Division, Mesopotamia, 1917-19; retired,
1923. Brother of Lieutenant-Colonel A.N.G. Jones.
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Jury, Colonel Edward Cotton (1881-1966)
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined 18th Hussars, 1900; South Africa,
1901-02; p.s.c.; G.S.O.2 (Liaison), G.H.Q., 1915; G.S.O.2,
O.b., G.H.Q., 1915-17; G.S.O.2, Cavalry Corps, 1917-18;
G.S.O.1, British Mission attached to American Expeditionary
Force, 1918-19; retired, 1927.
Karsiake, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry (1879-1942)
Harrow and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1898; p.s.c.,
1913; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, D.S.O.);
Instructor, R.M.C., 1907-11; G.S.O.2, Third Army, 1915-16;
G.S.O.1, 50th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 4th Division,
1917-18; G.S.O.1, Tanks Corps, 1918; B.G.G.S., Tank Corps,
1918-19; G.O.C. Baluchistan District, 1933-35; retired,
1938; re-employed, France, 1939-40.
Kavanagh, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Toler McMurragh
"Black Jack" (1864-1950)
Son of Rt. Hon. A.M. Kavanagh, P.C., M.P., J.P. Harrow.
Joined 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1884; transferred, 10th Hussars,
1884; South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); O.C. 10th
Hussars, 1904-09; 1st Cavalry Brigade, 1909-13; a Brigade,
India, 1914; 7th Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15; 2nd Cavalry
Division, 1915; 5th Division, 1915-16; I Corps, 1916;
Cavalry Corps, 1916-19 (wounded); retired, 1920.
Kay, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Algernon Ireland (1876-
1918)
Succeeded his father, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir William Kay,
5th Baronet, 1914. Harrow and R.M.C. Joined K.R.R.C.,
1896; p.s.c.; Sierre Leone, 1998-99; South Africa, 1900-02
(despatches); G.S.O.3, G.H.Q. (severely wounded and awarded
one of first D.S.O.s gazetted during the Great War), 1914;
G.S.O.2, 24th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 24th Division,
1916-17; Commandant, Small Arms School, 1917-18; G.O.C. 2nd
Brigade, 1918 (wounded); 3rd Brigade, 1918; killed in
action, 4 October 1918.
Kay, Major-General William Heape (1871-1929)
Rossall and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891; Adjutant,
R.H.A., 1901-04; Staff Captain, R.A., 1906-09; B.G.R.A.,
49th Division, 1916-17; B.G.R.A., 68th Division, U.K., 1917-
18; B.G.R.A., 30th Division, 1918; B.G.R.A., XIV Corps,
1918; M.G.R.A., Italy, 1918-19; M.G.R.A., India, 1925-29.
Kearsley, Brigadier-General (Robert) Harvey (1880-1956)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined 5th Dragoon Guards, 1899; p.s.c.,
1913; South Africa, 1899-02; G.S.O.2, Indian Cavalry Corps,
1915; G.S.O.l, 1st Canadian Division, 1915-17; B.G.G.S., VI
Corps, 1917-19; retired, 1922. His younger brother was
killed in action, 1915.
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Keary, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry D'Urban (1857-1937)
Marlborough. Entered Army, 1875; joined 12 Foot, 1876;
transferred to Indian Army (1st Madras Infantry), 1876;
Afghan War, 1879-80; Burma, 1887-93; China, 1900-02; O.C.
91st Punjabs, 1892-1909; 2nd (Secunderabad) Brigade, India,
1909-10; Garhwal Brigade, India and B.E.F., 1910-15; Lahore
Division, B.E.F. and Mesopotamia, 1915-17; Burmah Division,
1918-19; retired, 1920.
Keir, Lieutenant-General Sir John Lindesay (1856-1937)
Wimbledon School. Entered Royal Artillery, 1876; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-02 (despatches); Royal Artillery Gold
Medal for Prize Essay, 1903; G.O.C. Allahabad Brigade,
India, 1907-11; South Midland Division, 1912-14; 6th
Division, 1914-15; VI Corps, 1915-16; retired, 1918. Author
of A Soldier's Eye-view of our Armies.
Kelly, Brigadier Edward Henry (1883-1963)
Son of Major-General F.H. Kelly. R.M.A. (Sword of Honour).
Entered Royal Engineers, 1902; Mohmand Expedition, 1908;
severely wounded, November 1914; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.l, Vii
Corps, 1918; G.S.O.l, Fifth Army, 1918-19; retired, 1936.
Kennedy, Major-General Alfred Alexander (1870-1926)
Harrow. Joined 3rd Hussars, 1891; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1902; G.S.O.1, 2nd Cavalry Division, 1915; G.O.C. 7th
Cavalry Brigade, 1915-16; 1st Indian (later 4th) Cavalry
Division, 1916-18; 75th Brigade, 1918; 230th Brigade, 1918-
19.
Kenyon, Major-General Edward Randuiph (1854-1937)
Winchester and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1874; Civil
Employ, Cyprus, 1880-86; Assistant Instructor, School of
Military Engineering, Chatham, 1888-94; employed under
Admiralty, 1896-1901; Chief Engineer, Gibraltar, 1906-11;
retired, 1911; re-employed as Deputy Chief Engineer,
Southern Command, 1914; C.R.E., 20th Division, 1914-16;
C.R.E., IV Corps, February - July 1916; Chief Engineer,
Third Army, 1916-17 (wounded, 1917); Deputy Controller
Chemical Warfare, 1918; retired, 1918. Author of Notes on
Land and Coast Fortifications (1902), Gibraltar under Moor,
Spaniard and Briton (1911), and articles in military
journals. Elder brother of Major-General L.R. Kenyon.
Ker, Major-General Charles Arthur (1875-1962)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895; p.s.c.,
1911; Nigeria, 1898-99 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa,
1899-01 (despatches); Instructor, R.M.C., 1906-10; G.S.O.2,
R.M.C., Kingston, Canada, 1914; G.S.O.1, 2nd Canadian
Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 63rd Division, 1916; G.S.O.1
(attached Portuguese Division, 1916-18; B.G.G.S., British
Mission to Portuguese E.F., 1918-19; retired, 1934.
Mon[mouthshire] XI, 1897-99; Devon Hockey XI, 1903-05.
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Kerr, Colonel Frederic Walter (1867-1914)
Grandson of General Sir Peregrine Maitland and third son of
Admiral Lord F.H. Kerr. Page of Honour to Queen Victoria,
1879-83. Charterhouse. Joined Gordon Highianders, 1886;
p.s.c.; Chitral Relief Force, 1896-97; Tirah Expedition,
1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1901; D.A. & Q.M.G., 1st
Division, 1904-05; G.S.O.2, Aldershot, 1905-08; Deputy
Assistant Director of Movements, War Office, 1908-12;
G.S.O.l, Scottish Command, 1913-14; G.S.O.1 to Inspector-
General of Communications, 1914; G.S.O.l, 1st Division,
1914; killed in action, 31 October 1914. Married daughter
of 9th Marquess of Lothian, 1902.
Kiggell, Lieutenant-General Sir Launcelot Edward "Kigge"
(1862-1954)
Educated privately in Ireland and at the R.M.C. Joined
Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1882; p.s.c., 1894; Instructor,
R.M.C., 1897-99; South Africa, 1899-04; D.A.A.G., Staff
College, 1904-07; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1907-09; Brigadier-
General i/c Administration, Scottish Command, 1909; D.S.D.,
War Office, 1909-13; Commandant, Staff College, Camberley,
1913-14; D.M.T., War Office, 1914; Director of Home Defence,
War Office, 1914-15; Assistant to C.I.G.S., 1915; C.G.S.,
G.H.Q., 1915-18; Lieutenant-Governor and Commanding Troops,
Guernsey and Alderney, 1918; Lieutenant-Governor, Guernsey,
1918-20; retired, 1920. He revised the 6th edition of
General Sir Edward Hamley's Operations of War (1866) in 1907
by replacing Hamley's outdated tactical section with three
chapters on the Russo-Japanese War. An educated and erudite
soldier, he suffered from poor health and lacked a dominant
personality. Father of Colonel A.W. Kiggell, O.B.E.
Kirke, General Sir Walter Mervyn St. George (1877-1949)
Son of Colonel St.G.M Kirke. Haileybury and R.M.A. Won
Light-Weight Boxing for Woolwich against Sandhurst, 1896.
Entered Royal Artillery, 1896; p.s.c.; Waziristan, 1901-02;
Burma, 1905-06; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1915-17; G.S.O.1, 4th
Division, 1917; G.S.O.1, War office, 1917-18; Deputy D.M.O.,
War Office, 1918-21; D.C.G.S., India, 1926-29, G.O.C. 5th
Division, 1929-31; Western Command, 1933-36; Director-
General of Territorial Army, 1936-39; Inspector-General of
Home Defences, 1939; C.-in-C., Home Forces 1939-40; retired,
1940. Brother of Colonel E.St.G Kirke and Lieutenant-
Colonel K.St.G. Kirke and father of Lieutenant-Colonel R.
Kirke. A keen boxer.
Kirwan, Lieutenant-General Sir Bertram Kirwan (1871-1960)
Felsted and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1890; Staff
Captain, War Office, 1908-12; Instructor, School of Gunnery,
1913-14; Brigade-Major (S.0. to M.G.R.A.), G.H.Q., 1914-15;
G.S.O.l (S.O. to M.G.R.A.), G.H.Q., 1915-16; B.G.R.A., 25th
Division, 1916; B.G.R.A., XV Corps, 1917-19; retired, 1934.
Brother-in-law of Brigadier-General R.E.T. Hogg.
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Knox, General Sir Harry Hugh Sidney (1873-1971)
St. Columba's College, Dublin, and Militia. Joined
Northamptonshire Regiment, 1893; p.s.c., 1909; Tirah, 1897-
98; Uganda Rifles, 1900-02; G.S.O.3, School of Musketry,
India, 1910-11; G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1911-14; G.S.O.l, 15th
Division, 1915-17; B.G.G.S., XV Corps, 1917-19; Adjutant
General to the Forces, 1935-37; retired, 1938. Brother of
Major-General Sir Alfred (W.F.) Knox and E.F.V. Knox, M.P.
(National Liberal), 1890-99. His daughter married
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Nye.
La.mbe, Air-Vice Marshal Charles Laverock (1875-1953)
H.M.S. Britannia.	 Entered Royal Navy, 1889; Benin
Expedition, 1897; Commander, 1908; Captain, Royal Navy,
1916; transferred, R.N.A.S., 1916; D.S.O., 1917; O.C.
R.N.A.S. units on the Belgian Coast, 1917; 7th Brigade,
R.A.F., 1918; 5th (Operations) Group, Independent Air Force,
1918; C.M.G., 1918; Director of Equipment, Air Ministry,
1919-22; A.O.C. R.A.F. Halton, 1924-28; A.O.C. Coastal Area,
1928-31; retired, 1931.
Lambert, Colonel Thomas Stanton (1871-1921)
Charterhouse. Joined East Lancashire Regiment, 1891;
p.s.c., 1907; South Africa, 1907-09; G.S.O., War Office,
1910-14; O.C. 2/East Lancashire, 1915; A.A.G., G.H.Q., 1915;
G.O.C. 69th Brigade, 1916-18; 32nd Division, 1918-19; killed
while commanding 13th Brigade in Ireland, 20 June 1921.
Keen sportsman.
La.mbton, Major-General Hon. Sir William "Billy" (1863-1936)
Sixth son of 2nd Earl of Durham. Eton and R.M.C. Joined
Coldstream Guards, 1884; p.s.c., 1898; Soudan, 1898; South
Africa, 1899-02 (wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); Military
Secretary to Lord Milner, 1900-04; O.C. 1/Coldstream Guards,
1909-12; Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.O.C. 4th
Division, 1915-17 (incapacitated in a riding accident);
retired, 1920. Brother of Brigadier-General Hon. C. Lambton
and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Hedworth Meux. A brother and a
nephew were killed in action, 1914. He was Groom-in-Waiting
to King George V, to whom he sent long, weekly letters
assessing the progress of the war.
Landon, Major-General Herman James Shelley (1859-1948)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1879;
Soudan, 1898 (despatches); South Africa, 1900 (despatches);
Inspector of Gymnasia, India, 1906-10; G.O.C. 3rd Brigade,
1910-14; Inspector of Infantry, U.K., 1914-15; G.O.C. 9th
Division, 1915; 33rd Division, 1915-16; 35th Division, 1916-
17; 64th Division, U.K., 1917-18; retired, 1919.
Laskey, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Seward (1886-1972)
Merchant Taylor's School; Oriel College, Oxford. Called to
the Bar, 1913; barrister. Captain (S.R.) 4th Manchesters,
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1914; Major, Tank Corps, 1916; Deputy Assistant Inspector-
General, 1918-19. Recorder of Poole, 1939-41, and
Salisbury, 1941-61.
Lavarack, Lieutenant-General Sir John Dudley (1885-1957)
Australian. Brisbane Grammer School. Entered Royal
Australian Artillery, 1905; attended Staff College,
Camberley, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914-15; G.S.O.2,
1st Australian Division, 1917; G.S.O.l, 4th Australian
Division, 1917-19; D.M.I., Australia, 1925-27; D.M.O. and
I., Australia, 1929-32; C.G.S., Australia, 1935-39; G.O.C.
Southern Command, Australia, 1939-40; 7th Australian
Division, 1940-41; I Australian Corps, 1941-42; First
Australian Army, 1942-44; Head of Australian Military
Mission to Washington, U.S.A., 1944-46; retired, 1946.
Governor of Queensland, 1946-57.
Lawford Lieutenant-General Sir Sidney Turing Barlow (1865-
1953)
Wellington and R.M.C. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1885; South
Africa, 1901-02; Commandant, School of Mounted Infantry,
Longmore, 1912-13; G.O.C. Essex Brigade, 1913-14; 22nd
Brigade, 1914-15; 41st Division, 1915-19; retired, 1926.
Lawrence, Gen. Hon. Sir Herbert Alexander "Bertie" or
"Lorenzo" (1861-1943)
4th son of the 1st Baron Lawrence. Harrow and R.M.C.
Joined 17th Lancers, 1882; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); retired to the City; 1903; O.C. King Edward's
Horse, 1904-09; re-employed, 1914; G.O.C. 127th Brigade,
1915; 52nd Division, Gallipoli and Egypt, 1915-16; 71st
Division, U.K., 1916-17; 66th Division, 1917; B.G.G.S.
(Intelligence), G.H.Q., 1917-18; C.G.S., G.H.Q., 1918-19;
retired to the City, 1922. A keen sportsman, he combined
the thrust of a lancer with the circumspection of a banker.
Both of his sons were killed in the War.
Lawrie, Major-General Charles Edward (1864-1953)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1884; Bechuanaland
Border Police Force, 1889-92; Jebu Expedition, Nigeria, 1892
(severely wounded); Dongola Expedition, 1896; Soudan, 1897-
98; South Africa, 1899-1900; B.G.R.A., 19th Division, 1915;
B.G.R.A., II Corps, 1915-17; G.O.C. 63rd Division, 1917-18
(sacked); retired, 1920.
Lawson, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Merrick (1859-1933)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1877; Suakin
Expedition, 1884; Soudan, 1884-85 and 1898 (dangerously
wounded); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); D.A.A.G.,
Dublin District, 1889-92; D.A. & Q.M.G., War Office, 1893-
98; Egyptian Army, 1898-99; A.A.G. and D.A.A.G., South
Africa, 1899-1902; Brigadier General and Chief Staff
Officer, South Africa, 1902-03; Director of Works, War
Office, 1904; Director of Movements and Quarterings, War
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Office, 1904-06; G.O.C. 13th Brigade, 1906-07; Major-General
i/c Administration, Aldershot, 1907-10; G.O.C. 2nd Division,
1910-14; Lieutenant-Governor, Guernsey and Alderney, 1914;
Assistant to C.I.G.S., War Office, 1914; G.O.C. Northern
Command, 1915-16; Inspector-General of Communications,
Italy, 1917-18; retired, 1921. Step-father to the wife of
Major-General H.W. Newcome (q.v.).
Leader, Major-General Henry Peregrine (1865-1934)
Canadian. Trinity College School, Port Hope, Kingston,
Canada. Joined Suffolk Regiment, 1885; transferred to 6th
Dragoon Guards, 1896; South Africa, 1899-05; O.C.
Carabiniers, 1905-09; G.S.O., Rawal Pindi Division, 1909-11;
G.O.C. Sialkot Cavalry Brigade, India and B.E.F., 1911-15;
1st Indian Cavalry Division, 1915-16; Inspector of Cavalry,
India, 1916-20; retired, 1920. Drowned in a boating
accident at sea.
Lecky, Major-General Robert St. Clair (1863-1940)
Tonbridge. Entered Royal Artillery, 1882; A.Q.M.G., India,
1913-14; B.G.R.A., Indian Cavalry Corps, 1914-15; B.G.R.A.,
Meerut Division, 1915; B.G.R.A, Indian Corps, 1915;
B.G.R.A., XIII Corps, 1915-17; M.G.R.A., Third Army, 1917-
18; retired, 1920.
Lee, Colonel Sir Arthur Hainiliton (Viscount Lee of Fareham)
(1868-1947)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1888;
Professor, R.M.C., Kingston, Canada, 1893-98; Military
Attache, Washington, 1898-1900; Spanish-American War, Cuba,
1898; retired as Brevet Major, 1900; re-employed as Liaison
Officer (Colonel), G.H.Q., 1915-16. Conservative M.P.,
1900-18; Director-General of Food Production, 1917-18; First
Lord of the Admiralty, 1921-22; created Baron, 1918, and
Viscount, 1922.
Lee, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Neale (1877-1954)
Uppingham and Trinity College, Cambridge. Solicitor,
Nottingham, until 1914. Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire
Regiment (T.F.), 1899; Officer with 7th Sherwood Foresters,
1914-16; Brigade-Major, 139th Brigade, Dublin, 1916; D.S.O.,
1917; G.S.O.2 (Censorship & Publicity), G.H.Q., 1918;
G.S.O.]. (Censorship & Publicity), G.H.Q., 1918-19; O.B.E.,
1919. Director of Walker & Hall Ltd., Sheffield, from 1920.
Lee, Major-General Sir Richard Philipps (1865-1953)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1885; China,
1900 (despatches) ; Staff Captain, War Office, 1902-04;
C.R.E., 7th Division, 1915; Chief Engineer, I Corps, 1915-
16; Chief Engineer, Fifth Army, 1916-17; G.O.C. 18th
Division, 1917-19 (wounded); retired, 1923.
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Lee, Colonel Reginald Tilson (1878-1940)
Rugby and Oriel College, Oxford. Joined Royal West Surrey
Regiment, 1901; South Africa, 1902; p.s.c.; Captain, 1913;
G.S.O.1, 25th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.l, 55th Division,
1918-19; retired, 1933.
Legard, Brigadier-General D'Arcy (1873-1953)
Winchester and New College, Oxford. Joined 17th Lancers,
1895; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded, despatches);
G.S.O.3, War Office, 1907; Brigade-Major, 9th Cavalry
Brigade, 1907-11; G.S.O.1, Indian Cavalry Corps, 1914-15;
O.C. 17th Lancers, 1915-16; 6th Cavalry Brigade, 1916-19;
retired, 1924. Translated from the German General von
Pelet-Narbonne' s Cavalry on Service.
Legge, Lieutenant-General James Gordon (1863-1947)
Australian. Born London. Cranleigh School, Sydney Grammar
School, and University of Sidney. Barrister. Entered New
South Wales Militia, 1885; South Africa, 1899-1902; Q.M.G.,
Australia, 1909-12; Australian Representative, War Office,
1912-14; G.O.C. 1st Australian Division, M.E.F., 1915; 2nd
Australian Division, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1915-16; C.G.S.,
Australia, 1917-20; Commandant, R.M.C., Duntroon, 1920-22;
retired, 1922. His youngest son was killed during the war.
Levey, Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph H. (born 1881)
His father was a Pole, his mother from Aberdeen.	 In the
ranks of the Scots Guards, 15 years 103 days; Warrant
Officer, 66 days; Sergeant-Major of the Chelsea training
school on the outbreak of war; commissioned into Gordon
Highianders, October 1914; training Royal Naval Division's
recruits as Adjutant of the Crystal Palace Depot, 1914-15;
Second i/c 2/Anson Battalion, 1916; D.S.O., 1917;
Commandant, XVIII Corps School, 1917-18; Deputy Assistant
Inspector-General of Training, 1918-19; Lieutenant-Colonel,
1918; retired, 1920. An expert in training infantry, a
teacher of genius, and a brilliant lecturer.
Lewin, Major-General Ernest Ord (1879-1950)
Winchester and King's College, Cambridge. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1900; S.O. to Inspector of R.A., India, 1912-14;
G.S.O.2, R.A., First Army, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, R.A., First
Army, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, North Russian Force, 1918-19;
retired, 1938.
Liddell, Major-General Sir William Andrew (1865-1949)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1884; Zhob
Field Force, 1890; Assistant Secretary, Military Department,
Government of India, 1900-06; Deputy Director of Works,
B.E.F., 1915-16; Deputy Engineer-in-Chief, B.E.F., 1916-17;
Chief Engineer, Third Army, 1917-19; retired, 1924.
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Lindsay, Major-General George MacKintosh (1880-1956)
Radley and Militia. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1900; South
Africa, 1900-1902 (despatches); Instructor, School of
Musketry, Hythe, 1913-15; Instructor, G.H.Q. Machine Gun
School, Wisque, 1915; G.S.O.2, Machine Gun Training Centre,
Grantham, 1915-16; Brigade Major, 99th Brigade, 1916-17;
Chief Instructor, G.H.Q. Machine Gun School, 1917-18;
Machine Gun Officer, First Army, 1918-19; Inspector of
R.T.C., 1925-29; B.G.S., Egypt, 1929-32; G.O.C. 7th Brigade,
1932-34; Presidency and Assam District, India, 1935-39;
retired, 1939; re-employed, 1939-41. Navy and Army
Middleweight Boxing Champion, 1909. A keen advocate of
mechanisation after the war.
Lindsay, Major-General Sir Walter Fullarton Lodovic (1855-
1930)
St. Andrews and Wimbledon School. Entered Royal Artillery,
1875; Egypt, 1882; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches,
D.S.O.); C.R.A., Southern Division, 1906-08; Inspector of
Royal Horse and Field Artillery, 1908-12; G.O.C. West
Lancashire Division, T.F., 1912-14; M.G.R.A., B.E.F., 1914-
15; G.O.C. 50th Division, 1915; retired, 1917.
Lipsett, Major-General Louis James (1874-1918)
Bedford and R.M.C. Joined Royal Irish Regiment, 1894;
p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., South
Africa, 1904-07; A.D.C., 6th and 2nd Divisions, 1907-08;
Major, 1913; G.S.O.2, Canadian Forces, 1911-14; O.C. 8th
Canadian Battalion (Winnipeg Rifles), 1915; G.O.C. 2nd
Canadian Brigade, 1915-16; 3rd Canadian Division, 1916-18;
4th Division, 1918; mortally wounded while on a
reconnaissance beyond his own line, 14 October 1918,
becoming the last British General to be killed in the Great
War.
Lister, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Hamilton (1880-1971)
Grandson of 9th Lord Belhaven and Stenton and son of Sir
(Thomas) Villiers Lister, K.C.M.G. and Assistant Under
Secretary, Foreign Office. Radley College and R.M.A.
(Silver Medal for French). Entered Royal Artillery, 1900;
seconded to Punjab Frontier Force, 1902-11; p.s.c., 1914;
G.S.O.l, British Mission to Belgian Army, 1917; G.S.O.1,
G.H.Q., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Liaison with French Army, 1918;
G.S.O.l, Supreme War Council, Versailles, 1918-19; G.S.O.l,
British Military Mission to South Russia, 1919-20; retired,
1931. Gentleman-at-Arms, 1932-50.
Livesay, Brigadier-General Robert O'Hara (1876-1946)
Wellington and R.M.C. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment,
1896; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); p.s.c.;
Instructor, R.M.C., 1904-08; retired, February 1914; re-
employed, August 1914, and re-gazetted as Captain, October
1915; G.S.O.1, New Zealand Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.l,
American Staff School, 1917-18; G.S.O.l, 61st Division,
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1918; G.O.C. 24th Brigade, 1918-19; retired, 1920. Played
cricket for Kent and rugby for Blackheath and England.
Lloyd, Brigadier-General John Hardress (1874-1952)
Wellington and R.M.C. Joined 4th Dragoon Guards, 1894;
transferred to 21st Lancers, 1901; Tirah, 1897; South
Africa, 1901-02; retired, 1902; O.C. 1/Inniskilling
Fusiliers, 1916-17; 3rd Tank Battalion, 1917; 3rd Tank
Brigade, 1917-18; D.S.O., 1917, and Bar, 1918; No.1 Group
H.Q., Tank Corps, 1918-19. Captained English Polo Team,
U.S.A., 1911. Married daughter of Sir Samuel Wilson, M.P.,
1903.
Loch, Edward Douglas (Major-General Lord Loch) (1873-1942)
Son of 1st Baron Loch. Winchester and Militia. Joined
Grenadier Guards, 1893; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898 (despatches,
D.S.O.); South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches); G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1911-14; G.S.O.2, Liaison, G.H.Q., 1914; G.S.O.1,
28th Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., VI Corps; G.O.C. 110th
Brigade, 1917-18; retired, 1922.
Lomax, Lieutenant-General Samuel Holt (1855-1915)
Rugby. Joined 90 Foot, 1874; p.s.c.; Kafir and Zulu Wars,
1877-79; G.O.C. 10th Brigade, 1904-08; 1st Division, 1910-
14; mortally wounded at Ypres, 31 October 1914, and died of
wounds, 10 April 1915. Just prior to the outbreak of war,
Lomax has been informed that he had not been selected for
further employment but proved to be perhaps the best
Divisional General of the early days of the war.
Longcroft, Air Vice Marshal Sir Charles Alexander Holcombe
(1883-1958)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Welsh Regiment, 1903;
transferred to R.F.C., 1912, and R.A.F., 1918; Pilotts
Licence (No.192), 1912; flying with No.2 Squadron, R.F.C.,
1912-14; O.C. No.4 Squadron, R.F.C., 1915; No.2 Wing,
R.F.C., 1915-16; 5th Brigade, R.F.C., 1916-17; Training
Directorate, R.F.C., U.K., 1917-18; 3rd Brigade, R.A.F.,
1918; retired, 1929. Popular with his subordinates because
he himself flew almost daily over the lines.
Longmore, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Moorsom (1882-1933)
Son of Surgeon-General Sir Thomas Longmore. Wellington and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1901; D.S.O., 1917;
G.S.O.2, Training, G.H.Q., 1918; G.S.O.1, 24th Division,
1918-19. Brother of Brigadier-General J.C.G. Longmore.
Lorigridge, Lieutenant-Colonel James Atkinson (1875-1916)
Malvern and R.M.C. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment;
transferred to Indian Army (43rd Infantry), 1897; p.s.c.;
China, 1900 (despatches); Somaliland, 1903-04 (despatches);
Assistant Secretary (G.S.O.2), C.I.D., 1912-14; Major, 1913;
G.S.O.1, 1st Division, 1915-16; killed in action, 18 August
1916.
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Loomis, Major-General Sir Frederick Oscar Warren (1870-1937)
Canadian. Sherbrooke Public School and Bishops College
University, Lennoxville, Canada. Entered Canadian Military
Forces, 1886; commissioned, 1897; O.C. 13th Canadian
Battalion, 1914-16; 7th Canadian Brigade, 1916; 11th
Canadian Brigade, 1916; 2nd Canadian Brigade, 1916-18; 3rd
Canadian Division, 1918-19.
Lowther, Major-General Sir (Henry) Cecil "Meat" (1869-1940)
Grandson of Baron Wensleydale and fourth son of Hon. W.
Lowther. Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Scots Guards,
1888; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Staff Captain,
War Office, 1903-05; Military Attache, Paris, Madrid, and
Lisbon, 1905-09; Private Secretary to Field-Marshal Duke of
Connaught, South Africa, 1910; Military Secretary to
Governor-General, Canada, 1911-13; O.C. 1/Scots Guards,
1913-14 (wounded); 1st Guards Brigade, 1914-15; Military
Secretary, G.H.Q., 1915; B.G.G.S., Home Forces, 1915-19;
retired, 1919. Conservative M.P., 1915-18 and 1921-22.
Author of From Pillar to Post (1912), which describes his
pre-war career and big-game shooting.
Lucas, Major-General Cuthbert Henry Tindall (1879-1958)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Royal Berkshire Regiment,
1898; p.s.c., 1913; South Africa, 1899-1900; West African
Frontier Force, 1900-01; Egyptian Army, 1905-09; G.O.C. 87th
Brigade, 1915-16 and 1917-18; B.G.G.S., Machine Guns,
G.H.Q., 1918; G.O.C. 4th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1932.
Luckock, Major-General Russell Mortimer "Buckock" (1877-
1950)
Son of the Dean of Lichfield, an influential high churchman.
Harrow and Trinity College, Cambridge. Joined Royal
Lancashire Regiment, 1900; South Africa, 1899-1902;
Assistant Instructor, School of Musketry, Hythe, 1907-11;
p.s.c., 1914; G.S.O.1, Fourth and Second Armies, 1917-19;
retired, 1938.
Ludlow-Hewitt, Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Rainey (1886-
1973)
Radley and R.M.C. Joined Royal Irish Rifles, 1905;
transferred to R.F.C., 1914, and R.A.F., 1918; O.C. No.3
Squadron, R.F.C., 1915-16; M.C., 1916; 3rd (Corps) Wing,
1916-17; Inspector of Training, Training Division, R.F.C.,
U.K., 1917-18; G.O.C. 10th Brigade, R.A.F., 1918; 9th
Brigade, R.A.F., 1918-19; C.-in-C., Bomber Command, 1937-40;
Inspector-General, R.A.F., 1940-45; retired, 1945.
Lukin, Major-General Sir Henry Timson "Tim" (1860-1925)
Nephew of Major-General W.W.A. Lukin and Colonel F.W. Lukin.
Merchant Taylor's School. Emigrated to South Africa.
Entered Native Cavalry, 1879; transferred to Cape Mounted
Rifles, 1881; Zulu War, 1879 (severely wounded); Basutoland,
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1880-81; Bechuanaland, 1896-97; South Africa, 1899-1901;
retired as Lieutenant-Colonel, 1902; O.C. Cape Mounted
Rifles, 1903-12; Inspector-General South African Forces,
1912-14; G.O.C. South African Mounted Rifles Brigade, South-
West Africa, 1914-15; South African Brigade, 1915-16; 9th
Division, 1916-18; 64th Division, UK, 1918.
Lyall Grant, Colonel Henry Frederick (1879-1964)
Aberdeen Grammar School, Aberdeen University, and Militia.
Entered Royal Garrison Artillery, 1899; North-West Frontier,
1901-08; Aden, 1908-09; p.s.c., 1912; Special employment,
War Office, 1913-14; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1914-15; G.S.O.3,
G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., East African Force,
1915-16; A.A.G., East Africa Force, 1917; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q.,
East African Force, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 36th Division, 1918-
19. Father of Major-General I.H. Lyall Grant, Brigadier C.
Lyall Grant, and Brigadier D.H. Lyall Grant.
Lynden-Bell, Major-General Sir Arthur Lynden "Bellinda"
(1867-1943)
Third son of Major-General T.L. Lynden-Bell. Clifton and
R.M.C. Joined East Kent Regimenmt, 1885; Chitral, 1895;
p.s.c., 1899; South Africa, 1899-1900 (severely wounded);
Staff, War Office, 1900-05; G.S.O., Southern Command, 1907-
11; G.S.O., Lowland Division, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, War Office,
1914; A.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., 1914-15; B.G.G.S., III Corps, 1915;
M.G.G.S., Third Army, 1915; C.G.S., M.E.F. and E.E.F., 1915-
17; D.S.D., War Office, 1918-21; retired, 1924.
Lyon, Brigadier-General Francis (1867-1953)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1887;
p.s.c.; Malakand, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1901; Ashanti,
1900-01; West African Frontier Force, Nigeria, 1902-05
(despatches); Assistant Secretary (G.S.O.2), C.I.D., 1906-
10; special employment, War Office, 1911; Military Attache,
Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, and Athens, 1911-13; attached to
Bulgarian Army, 1912, and Roumanian Army, 1913, during the
Balkan Wars; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 46th
Division, 1915; B.G.G.S., VII Corps, 1915-17; B.G.G.S., XIX
Corps, 1917; employed Ministry of Munitions, 1918; retired,
1922.
Macandrew, Major-General Henry John Milnes (1866-1919)
Inverness College and Militia. Joined Lincolnshire
Regiment, 1886; transferred to Indian Army (5th Cavalry),
1888; Tirah expedition, 1897; Khyber Force, 1898; South
Africa, 1900-02; Brigade-Major to Inspector-General of
Cavalry, India, 1903-05; B.G.G.S., Indian Cavalry Corps,
1914-15; G.O.C. Sirhind Brigade, 1915; 53rd Brigade, 1915-
16; 2nd Indian (later 5th) Cavalry Division, France, 1916-
17, and Palestine, 1917-19. Died from heart failure,
resulting from burns, in Syria on 16 July 1919.
456
McCay, Lieutenant-General Sir James Whiteside (1864-1930)
Australian. Born in Ireland and educated at Scotch College,
Melbourne, and Melbourne University. Barrister. Entered
Australian Militia, 1886; Lieutenant-Colonel, 1903; Member
of the Federal parliament and held many ministerial posts
including that of Minister of State for Defence, 1904-05;
O.C. Australian Intelligence Corps and Director of
Intelligence, Commonwealth Section, Imperial General Staff,
1907-13; G.O.C. 2nd Australian Brigade, 1914-15 (wounded,
May 1915; injured, July 1915); 5th Australian Division,
1916-17; G.0.C. A.I.F., U.K., 1917-18; retired, 1926.
McClintock, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Singleton (1876-1968)
Third son of Admiral Sir Francis McClintock. Charterhouse
and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1895; p.s.c., 1895;
West Africa Frontier Force, 1898-1901; Ashanti, 1900;
Northern Nigeria, 1900; South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1915-16; Instructor (G.S.O.2) , Staff School,
Cambridge, 1917; G.S.O.1, Guards Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1,
L.of C., 1918; G.S.O.1, 51st Division, 1918-19 (Legion of
Honour, D.S.O., and despatches); retired, 1931. Author of
Napoleon and the Campaign of 1814.
McColl, Lieutenant-Colonel John Thomas (born 1877)
Australian. Captain, Australian Military Forces, 1913;
G.S.O.2, Australian Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 5th Australian
Division, 1918-19.
McCracken, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick William Nicholas
(1859-1949)
Educated abroad and R.M.C. Joined Royal Berkshire Regiment,
1880; p.s.c.; Egypt, 1882; Suakin, 1885 (despatches); South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); O.C. 2/Berkshire,
1901-02; G.S.O.1, India, 1907-11; B.G.G.S., Irish Command,
1911-12; G.O.C. 7th Brigade, 1912-14 (wounded, probably the
first General Officer casualty of the war); Inspector of
Infantry, U.K., 1914-15; G.O.C. 15th Division, 1915-17; XIII
Corps, 1917-18; C.-in-C., Scottish Command, 1918-19;
retired, 1922.
Macdonell, Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Cameron (1864-
1941)
Canadian. Trinity College School, Port Hope, Ontario, and
R.M.C, Kingston, Canada. Commissioned into the Royal
Artillery but resigned without actually joining for family
reasons; joined Canadian Mounted Infantry, 1888; transferred
to North West Mounted Police, 1889; South Africa, 1899-1900
(dangerously wounded, despatches, D.S.O.) ; Second in
Command, 1907-12, and O.C. Canadian Mounted Rifles (Lord
Strathcona's Horse), 1912-15; 7th Canadian Brigade, 1915-18
(wounded); 1st Canadian Division, 1918-19; retired, 1925.
Played cricket for Canada. One of his sons was killed in
action on the Somme with the R.F.C., July 1916.
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Macdonogh, General Sir George Mark Watson (1865-1942)
Beaumont College and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1884;
p.s.c., 1897; Barrister, Lincoln's Inn, 1897; G.S.O.l, War
Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, Intelligence, G.H.Q., 1914;
B.G.G.S., Intelligence, G.H.Q., 1914-16; D.M.I., War Office,
1916-18, A.G. to the Forces, 1918-22; retired, 1925. His
only son died in 1915. He spoke Finnish and Swedish.
McDouall, Brigadier-General Robert (1871-1941)
Feisted and R.M.C. Joined East Kent Regiment, 1892;
Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.) ;
O.C. Battalion of the East Kent Regiment, 1915; G.S.O.2, L.
of C., 1915-16; G.S.O.1, L. of C., 1915-16; G.O.C. 141st
Brigade, 1916-17; 142nd Brigade, 1918; retired, 1924.
Macmixes, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan Sayre (1870-1918)
Canadian. Son of Hon. D. Maclnnes. H.M.S. Britannia and
R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Entered Royal Engineers, 1891;
p.s.c.; Ashanti, 1895-96; South Africa, 1899-1900
(despatches, D.S.O.); Secretary (G.S.O.3), Committee setting
up the R.F.C., 1910-12; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1913-14;
wounded, November 1914; G.S.O., War Office, 1915; Director
of Aeronautical Equipment, War Office, 1915-17; C.R.E., 42nd
Division, 1917-18; Inspector of Mines, G.H.Q., 1918; died on
service, 25 May 1918.
Macintyre, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan Eberts (born 1885)
Canadian. Montreal High School. Furniture Manufacturer.
Joined 60th Saskatchewan Rifles, 1913; 28th Canadian
Battalion, 1914-16; D.S.O. and M.C., 1916; G.S.O.1, 2nd
Canadian Division, 1917-18 (wounded); O.C. 28th Canadian
Battalion, 1918-19. Author of Virny Ridge.
Mackenzie, Major-General Sir Cohn John (1861-1956)
Son of Major-General Cohn MacKenzie. Edinburgh Academy and
R.M.C. Joined 16 Foot, 1881, transferred to 78 Foot, 1881;
p.s.c.; Egypt, 1882; Burma, 1885-89; Hazara Expedition,
1888; operations against the Hunza Nazars, 1891-92;
Waziristan, 1894-95; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902;
Staff Officer, 5th Division, 1902-05; O.C., 4th and 6th
Brigades, 1905-10; C.G.S., Canada, 1910-13; G.O.C. Highland
Division, 1914; 4th and 3rd Divisions, 1914 (wounded); 15th
Division, U.K., 1914-15; D.S.D., War Office, 1915-16; G.O.C.
61st Division, 1916-18 (wounded); Inspector of Infantry,
U.K., 1918; retired, 1924. At one time held the record for
the highest score for the first wicket in India.
MacKenzie, Colonel John Hugh (1876-1963)
Merchiston Castle School, Edinburgh, and R.M.C. Joined
Royal Scots, 1896; p.s.c., 1909; Brigade-Major, India, 1911-
14; G.S.O.1, First Army, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 24th Division,
1918; G.S.O.1, 63rd Division, 1918-19; retired, 1932.
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MacKenzie-Kennedy, Major-General Sir Edward Charles Willia.m
(1860-1932)
Canterbury and R.M.C. Joined 19 Foot, 1879; transferred to
Indian Army (1st Madras Infantry), 1882; Burma, 1885-87;
Black Mountain, 1891; China, 1900-01; G.O.C. 2nd Brigade,
Secunderabad, 1907-09; Belgaum Brigade, 1909-il; Bangalore
Brigade, 1911-12; 26th Division, U.K., B.E.F. and Salonika,
1914-17.
Macmullen, General Sir (Cyril) Norman (1877-1944)
Entered Army, 1897; transferred to Indian Army (15th Sikhs),
1899; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Tibet, 1903-04; G.S.O.3
and 2, H.Q., India, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, 2nd Mounted Division,
M.E.F., 1915-16; B.G.G.S., XV Corps, M.E.F., 1916; G.S.O.1,
Fifth Army, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Operations, G.H.Q., 1917;
B.G.G.S., XIX Corps, 1917-18; retired, 1937.
McNamara, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Edward (1877-1949)
Oratory School, Birmingham. Joined Royal West Surrey
Regiment, 1897; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded,
despatches); G.S.O.1, 32nd Division, 1916-18; G.O.C. 99th
Brigade, 1918-19 (wounded, D.S.O.); retired, 1938.
Macpherson, Major-General Sir William Grant (1858-1927)
Fettes College; Töbingen and Leipzig Universities. Entered
Army, 1883; Major, R.A.M.C., 1895; South Africa, 1902-03;
Panama and Cuba, 1908; S.M.O., North China Command and
attached Japanese Army, 1904-05; D.A.D.G., A.M.S. attached
D.M.O., War Office, 1905-09; British Plenipotentiaries,
Geneva Convention, 1906; P.M.O., Malta, 1910; A.D.M.S., 4th
(Quetta) Division and lecturer, Staff College, Quetta, 1911-
14; D.D.G., A.M.S., 1914; D.M.S., First Army, 1914-15;
D.M.S., Salonika, 1915-16; D.D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1916-18;
retired, 1918. Editor-in-Chief, Official Medical History of
the War, and author of articles on military and medical
subjects. Brother-in-law of Major-General B.J.C. Doran
(q.v.) and Brigadier-General W.R.B. Doran.
Macready, General Rt. Hon. Sir (Cecil Frederick) Nevil
(1862 -1946)
Son of William Charles Macready, actor and friend of Charles
Dickens. Marborough and Cheltenham. Joined Gordon
Highlanders, 1881; p.s.c.; Egypt, 1882; South Africa, 1899-
1902 (despatches); A.A.G., War Office, 1907-09; G.O.C. 2nd
Brigade, 1909-10; Director of Personal Services, War Office,
1910-14; A.G., B.E.F., 1914-16; A.G. to the Forces, 1916-18;
retired, 1923. Author of Annals of an Active Life (1924).
Father of Major-General Sir Gordon Macready.
Madocks, Brigadier-General William Robarts Napier (1870-
1946)
Grandson of 1st Baron Napier of Magdala. R.M.A. Entered
Royal Artillery, 1890; p.s.c., 1906; New Zealand Forces,
1896-01; South Africa, 1900-1901; G.S.O.2, Coast Defences,
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Southern Command, 1907-10; Assistant Military Secretary to
G.O.C. Mediterrean and Inspector-General of Overseas Forces,
1910-13; G.S.O.l, 20th Division, 1915-17; B.G.R.A., 35th
Division, 1917-19 (wounded, C.B., D.S.O.); retired, 1927.
His brother, Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. Madocks, was killed in
action, 1915.
Maitland-Makgil].-Crichton, Brigadier Henry Coventry
"Scraggy" (1880-1953)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1899;
p.s.c., 1913; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded);
severely wounded, Second Ypres, 1915; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 24th Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1,
G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1937.
Makin, Major Ernest Llewellyn (born 1877)
Australian. Adelaide and Caius College, Cambridge. Joined
Manchester Regiment, 1900; transferred to Wiltshire
Regiment, 1906; G.S.O.l, 37th Division, 1917-18; retired,
1922.
Malcolm, Major-General Sir Neill (1869-1953)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Argyll and Sutherland Highianders,
1889; Tochi Field Force, 1897; Uganda, 1897-99 (despatches,
D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1900 (severely wounded);
Somaliland, 1903-04; S.O., War Office, 1904-08; Secretary
(G.S.O.2), Historical Section, C.I.D., 1908-10; G.S.O.2,
Staff College, 1912-14; G.S.O.l, I Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.1,
11th Division, M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.l, Salonika Army, 1915;
B.G.G.S., M.E.F. andE.E.F., 1915-16; B.G.G.S. and M.G.G.S.,
Reserve Army, 1916; M.G.G.S., Fifth Army, 1916-17; G.O.C.
66th Division, 1917-18 (severely wounded) ; 39th Division,
1918-19; retired, 1924. Editor (1906) of The Science of
War: A Collection of Essays & Lectures 1891 - 1903 by
Colonel G.F.R. Henderson. Brother of Sir Ian Z. Malcolm,
Diplomat and Conservative M.P., 1895-1906 and 1910-19.
Mangles, Brigadier-General Roland Henry (1874-1948)
Son of R.L. Mangles, V.C. Marlborough and Militia. Joined
Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1894; p.s.c.; West Africa, 1897-
98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded, D.S.O.);
G.S.O.3, War Office, 1910-12; Brigade-Major, 16th Brigade,
1912-15; G.S.O.l, 34th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.l, War
Office, 1917; G.S.O.1, 58th Division, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., V
Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1927. Played rugby for Richmond
and England.
Marden, Major-General Sir Thomas Owen (1866-1951)
Berkhamsted School and R.M.C. Joined Cheshire Regiment,
1886; transferred to Northumberland Fusiliers, 1905, and
Welsh Regiment, 1908; p.s.c.; Burma, 1887-89; South Africa,
1899-1900; Staff, India, 1903-04, War Office, 1904-09, and
South Africa, 1910-11; G.S.O.l, India, 1912-14; O.C. 1st
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Welsh Regiment, 1914-15; 114th Brigade, 1915-17; 6th
Division, 1917-19; retired, 1927.
Marindin, Major-General Arthur Henry (1868-1947)
Eton; New College, Oxford, and R.M.C. Joined Royal
Highianders, 1891; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1900-02
(despatches) ; Instructor, Staff College, 1903-04; Staff
Captain, War Office, 1904-05; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1905-07;
G.S.O.2, Southern Command, 1908-09; Brigade-Major, 9th
Brigade, 1909-12; G.S.O.2, Coastal Defence, Scottish
Command, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, 17th Division, 1915-16; G.O.C.
105th Brigade, 1916-18; 35th Division, 1918-19; retired,
1925. Author of Staff Rides with hints on writing
Appreciations and Reconnaissance Reports (1905).
Marshall, Major-General Francis James (1876-1942)
Rugby and R.M.C. Joined Seaforth Highianders, 1895; p.s.c.,
1907; Crete, 1897; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1901-02;
D.A.A.G., G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.O.C. 44th Brigade, 1916-17;
Commandant, Officers School, Aldershot, 1917-18; G.O.C.
150th Brigade, 1918; Assistant Inspector-General of
Training, 1918; 52nd Division, 1918-19; retired, 1934.
Matheson, General Sir Torquhii. George (1871-1963)
Fifth son of Sir Alexander Matheson, M.P., 3rd Baronet,
succeeding his brother as 5th Baronet, 1944. Eton and
Militia. Joined Coldstream Guards, 1894; South Africa,
1899-1902; O.C. 3/Coldstream Guards, 1915; 46th Brigade,
1915-17; 20th Division, 1917 (gassed) ; 4th Division, 1917-
18; Guards Division, 1918-19; retired, 1935.
Mathew, Major-General Sir Charles Massy (186-1932)
Educated privately and at Portsmouth Grammar School. Joined
Durham Light Infantry, 1884; transferred to Army Ordnance
Department, 1891; Soudan, 1885-86; Ashanti, 1895-96;
Dongola, 1896 (despatches); Soudan, 1898 (despatches,
D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1901; Deputy Assistant Director
of Equipment and Ordnance Stores, War Office, 1904-06;
Assistant Director, 1906-08; A.D.O.S., Southern Command,
1910-14; D.D.O.S, G.H.Q., 1914-15; D.O.S., Salonika, 1916-
17; D.O.S., Mesopotamia, 1917-18; D.O.S., G.H.Q., 1918-19;
retired, 1924.
Maude, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stanley "Joe" (1864-
1917)
Second son of General Sir F. Maude, V.C. Eton and R.M.C.
Joined Coldstream Guards, 1884; p.s.c., 1896; Soudan, 1885;
Brigade-Major, Guards Brigade, 1897-1901; South Africa,
1899-1901 (despatches, D.S.O.; severe accident); Military
Secretary to Governor-General, Canada, 1901-04; Private
Secretary to the Secretary-of-State for War, 1904-05;
G.S.O.2, 2nd London Division, 1908-09; Assistant, D.M.T, War
Office, 1909-12; G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1912-14; G.S.O.1,
D.M.T., War Office, 1914; G.S.O.1, III Corps, 1914; G.O.C.
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14th Brigade, 1914-15 (severely wounded); 13th Division,
1915-16; Tigris Corps, 1916; C.-in-C., Mesopotamia, 1916-17;
died of virulent cholera on active service, 18 November
1917. Cousin of Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-
Massingberd (q.v.) and Major-General H.M. de F. Montgomery
(q.v).
Maunsell, Brigadier-General Frederick Guy (1864-1929)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1883;
Lieutenant-Colonel, 1912; G.S.O.2, attached French Army,
1916; B.G.R.A., Heavy Artillery, XIV Corps, 1916-17;
B.G.R.A.., Heavy Artillery, I Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1919.
Maurice, Major-General Sir Frederick Barton "Freddy" (1871-
1951)
Son of Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice and grandson of
Frederick Denison Maurice. St. Paul's and R.M.C. Joined
Derbyshire Regiment, 1892; p.s.c., 1902; Tirah, 1897-98;
South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); G.S.O.2, War Office,
1908-12; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1913-14; G.S.O.2, 3rd
Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S.
Operations, G.H.Q., 1915; D.M.O, War Office, 1915-18;
retired for criticising the Government in a letter to The
Times, 1918. Professor of Military Studies, London
University, 1927; President, British Legion, 1932-47.
Prolific author, including: The Russo-Turkish War 1877
(1905); Forty Days in 1914 (1919); The Last Four Months
(1919); and The Life of General Lord Rawlinson of Trent
(1928). Brother-in-law of Sir Edward Marsh, civil servant.
Maxse, General Sir (Frederick) Ivor (1862-1958)
Son of Rear-Admiral F.A. Maxse (grandson of the 5th Earl of
Berkeley, a Radical candidate in 1868 and 1874, founder of
the Electoral Reform Association, and a prototype for George
Meredith's novel Beaucharnp's Career, 1876). Rugby and
R.M.C. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1882; transferred to
Coldstream Guards, 1891; p.s.c.; Egyptian Army, Soudan,
1897-99 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1902
(C.B.); elected F.R.G.S. for original exploration on the
River Sobat, Upper Nile, Soudan, 1899; O.C. 2/Coldstream
Guards, 1907-10; 1st Brigade, 1910-14; 18th Division, 1914-
17; XVIII Corps, 1917-18; Inspector-General of Training,
1918-19; retired, 1923. Author of Our Military Problem For
Civilian Readers (1896) and Seymour Vandeleur (1906).
Brother of L.J. "Leo" Maxse, editor of the National Review,
1893-1932, and brother-in-law of Colonel Lord Edward Cecil
(soldier and statesman) and Viscount Milner (statesman)
Maxwell, General Rt. Hon. Sir John Grenfell Maxwell "Conky"
(1859-1929)
Grandson of Vice-Admiral J.P. Grenfell. Cheltenham and
R.M.C. Joined 42 Foot, 1879; Egypt, 1882; Soudan, 1884-86;
Dongola, 1896; G.O.C. 2nd Egyptian Brigade, Soudan, 1898;
G.O.C. 14th Brigade, South Africa, 1900-01; C.S.O. to
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Inspector-General of the Forces, 1904-07; C.S.O. to C.-in-C.
of Mediterrean Forces, 1907-08; G.O.C. British Troops in
Egypt, 1908-12; Head of British Mission to the French Army,
1914; G.O.C. Egypt, 1914-16; C.-in-C., Ireland, 1916, and
Northern Command, 1916-19; retired, 1922. Protege of his
cousin, Field-Marshal Lord Grenfell, and a close friend of
Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener. An Egyptologist of
considerable repute.
Maxwell, Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles (1852-1924)
Entered Royal Engineers, 1872; Afghanistan, 1879-80; South
Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, C.B.); A.A.G., War Office,
1902-06; Brigadier-General i/c Administration, Western
Command, 1906-09; Major-General i/c Administration, Southern
Command, 1909-11; G.O.C., Coast Defence, Eastern Command,
1911-14; Inspector-General of Communications, B.E.F., 1914-
15; Q.M.G., B.E.F., 1915-17; retired, 1919.
Maxwell-Scott see Constable-Maxwell-Scott
May, General Sir Reginald Seaburne (1879-1958)
Eldest son of Admiral of the Fleet Sir William May.
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1898; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Instructor, R.M.C.,
1907-09; A.M.S., to G.O.C. Southern Command, 1909-11;
G.S.O.2, West Riding Division, 1912-13; G.S.O.2, War Office,
1913-14; G.S.O.3, L. of C., B.E.F., 1914; G.S.O.2, Lines of
Communication, 1914-15; A.A. & Q.M.G., 6th Division, 1915-
16; A.Q.M.G., Fourth Army, 1916; D.A. & Q.M.G., II Corps,
1916-17; D.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., 1917-19; Commandant, R.M.C.,
1931-34; Q.M.G. to the Forces, 1935-39; retired, 1939.
Meinertzhagen, Colonel Richard (1879-1967)
Son of a banker of Danish origin. Harrow and Militia.
Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1899; King's African Rifles, 1902-
06; Nandi, 1905-06 (wounded, despatches); student at Staff
College, Quetta, 1913-14; G.S.O.3, East Africa, 1914-16;
G.S.O.2, H.Q., East Africa Force, 1916; Secial Employment,
War Office, 1917; G.S.O.2, E.E.F., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, War
Office, 1918; G.S.O.1 (Intelligence), G.H.Q., 1918-19;
retired, 1920. Author of Kenya Diary, 1902-06 (1957);
Middle East Diary (1959); Army Diary (1960); Diary of A
Black Sheep (1964) and books on ornithology. A brilliant
but controversial intelligence officer.
Mercer, Major-General Malcolm Smith (1859-1916)
Canadian. Barrister; joined Militia and 2nd Regiment
(Queen's Own Rifles of Canada), 1885; O.C. 2nd Canadian
Regiment, 1911; 1st Canadian Brigade, 1914-15; 3rd Canadian
Division, 1915-16; killed in action near Mount Sorrel, 2
June 1916.
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Mercer, Major-General Sir (Harvey) Frederick (1858-1936)
Educated in Jersey and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery,
1877; Afghan War, 1880; Burma, 1886-87 (despatches); Hazara,
1888 (despatches) ; Tirah, 1897 (despatches); South Africa,
1900-1902 (despatches, C.B.); A.A.G., R.A., War Office,
1907-10; Inspector of R.A., India, 1911-14; B.G.R.A., Indian
Corps, 1914-15; M.G.R.A., First Army, 1915-18; retired,
1919.
Micklem, Brigadier-General John (1889-1952)
Winchester and R.M.A. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1910; O.C.
Battalion of Gloucestershire Regiment, 1915-17, and Tank
Corps, 1917-18; Deputy Assistant Inspector-General of
Training, 1918; G.0.C. 4th Brigade, Tank Corps, 1918
(wounded twice, M.C., D.S.O.); retired, 1929. Brother of
Brigadier Ralph Micklem.
Miles, Lieutenant-General Charles George Norman (1884-1958)
Australian. Brisbane Grammar School. Entered Royal
Australian Artillery, 1904; G.S.O.l, 2nd Australian
Division, 1918-19; A.G., Australia, 1939-40; retired, 1941.
Mime, George Francis (Field-Marshal Lord Mime) "Uncle
George" (1866-1948)
Gymnasium, Aberdeen, and Aberdeen University. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1885; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-
1902; D.A. & Q.M.G., War Office, 1903-07; G.S.O.2, North
Midland Division, 1908-09; G.S.O.l, 6th Division, 1919-13;
B.G.R.A., 4th Division, 1913-15; B.G.G.S., III Corps, 1915;
M.G.G.S., Second Army, 1915; G.O.C. 27th Division, B.E.F.
and M.E.F., 1915; XVI Corps, M.E.F., 1915-16; G.O.C.
Salonika, 1916-20; C.I.G.S., 1926-33; Field-Marshal, 1928.
Created Baron, 1933.
Mitchell, Brigadier-General Charles Hamilton (1872-1941)
Canadian. University of Toronto. Civil Engineer. Entered
Canadian Militia, 1899; Canadian Corps of Guides, 1903;
G.S.O., Military District NO.2, Toronto, 1911-14; G.S.O.3,
1st Canadian Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, Canadian Corps,
1915-16; G.S.O.1, Second Army, 1916-18; B.G.I., British
Forces in Italy, 1918-19.
Mitford, Major-General Bertram Reveley (1863-1936)
Wellington and King Edward's School, Birmingham. Joined
East Kent Regiment, 1882; transferred to East Surrey
Regiment, 1891; p.s.c.; Egyptian Army, 1886-1891; Soudan,
1886-89; Dongola, 1896-97; Soudan, 1898-99; South Africa,
1899-1902; G.O.C. 5th Division, 1906-10; retired, 1910;
G.O.C. 72nd Brigade, 1914-17; 42nd Division, 1917; retired,
1918.
Moir, Brigadier-General Alan James Gordon (1873-1940)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Royal Scots, 1893; p.s.c
South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded, despatches);
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G.S.O.2, Highland Division, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 51st)
Division, 1914-15; A.A. & Q.M.G., 51st) Division, 1915-17;
D.A. & Q.M.G., XIX Corps, 1917-19; retired, 1929.
Monash, General Sir John (1865-1931)
Australian of German Jewish origin. Scotch College,
Melbourne, and University of Melbourne. Civil Engineer
specialising in reinforced concrete. Entered Australian
Citizen Forces, 1887; Colonel, 1913; G.O.C. 4th Australian
Brigade, 1914-16; 3rd Australian Division, 1916-18;
Australian Corps, 1918; general and retired, 1930;
Chairman, Victorian Government State Electricity Commission,
1920-31. Author of The Australian Victories in France in
1918 (1920). Able, meticulous and careful, he was one of
the best corps commanders.
Monro, General Sir Charles Carmichael (1860-1929)
Sherborne. Joined 2 Foot, 1879; Malakand, 1879-80; South
Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); Chief Instructor, School of
Musketry, 1901-03; Commandant, School of Musketry, Hythe,
1903-07; G.O.C. 13th Brigade, 1907-12; 2nd Division, 1912-
14; I Corps, 1914-15; Third Army, 1915; C.-in-C., M.E.F.,
1915-16; G.O.C. First Army, 1916; C.-in-C., India, 1916-20;
created Baronet, 1921; retired, 1928. Musketry expert who
pioneered new infantry fire-tactics after the Boer War.
Montague-Stuart-Wortley, Hon. Lieutenant-General Sir (Alan)
Richard (1868-1949)
Grandson of 2nd Baron Wharncliffe and brother of 2nd Earl
Wharncliffe. Wellington. Joined K.R.R.C., 1887; p.s.c.;
Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1900 (wounded, despatches,
D.S.O.); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1904-07; G.S.O.2, War office,
1907-08; G.O.C. 5th Division, 1912-14; Assistant Director of
Movements, War Office, 1914-15; Director of Movements, 1915-
17; G.O.C. 19th and 32nd Divisions, 1917; D.Q.M.G.,
Mesopotamia, 1917-19; retired, 1927. Brother of Major-
General Hon. E . J. Montague-Stuart-Wortley (q.v.).
Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, Major-General Hon. Edward James
"Eddie" (1857-1934)
Grandson of 2nd Baron Wharncliffe and brother of 2nd Earl
Wharncliffe. Eton and Militia. Joined K.R.R.C., 1877;
Afghanistan, 1879-80; South Africa, 1881; Egypt, 1882;
Soudan, 1884-86 and 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1900; O.C.
2/K.R.R.C., 1900-01; Military Attache, Paris, 1901-04;
G.O.C. 10th Brigade, 1908-12; North Midland (later 46th)
Division, 1914-16 (sacked); 65th Division, U.K., 1916-18;
retired, 1919. A friend of George V. Brother of
Lieutenant-General Hon. Sir Richard Montague-Stuart-Wortley
(q.v.).
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Montgomery, Archibald Armar (Field-Marshal Sir Archibald
Montgomery-Mas gingberd) "Archie" (1871-1947)
Second son of Rt. Hon. Hugh de F. Montgomery, PC.
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891;
p.S.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded; despatches);
Special Employment, War Office, 1905-06; G.S.O.3, Aldershot,
1908-li; G.S.O.2, Staff College, Quetta, 1912-14; G.S.O.2,
Staff College, Camberley, 1914; G.S.O.2, 4th Division, 1914;
G.S.O.1, 4th Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1915-16;
M.G.G.S., Fourth Army, 1916-19; Adjutant-General, 1931-33;
C.I.G.S., 1933-36; Field-Marshal, 1935. As Chief Staff
Officer to Sir Henry Rawlinson, 1915-19, he rose from Major
to Major-General in 2 years. Added Massingberd to his name
when his wife inherited the Massingberd estates, 1926.
Brother of Major-General H.M. de F. Montgomery (q.v.) and
Sir Charles Montgomery, Vice-Marshal of the Diplomatic
Corps, 1920-33, and cousin of Lieutenant-General Sir
Frederick Maude (q.v.).
Montgomery, Bernard Law (Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery
of Alainein) "Monty" (1887-1976)
Son of the Bishop of Tasmania. St.Paul's and R.M.C. Joined
Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1908; severely wounded and
D.S.O., 1914; G.S.O.1, 47th Division, 1918-19; G.O.C. Eighth
Army, 1942-43; 21st Army Group. 1944-45; Field-Marshal,
1944; created Viscount, 1946; C.I.G.S., 1946-48. Author of
Memoirs (1958). Brother of Lieutenant-Colonel Brian
Montgomery, author of A Field-Marshal in the Family (1973),
and cousin of Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Ferguson Montgomery
(q.v.). Brother-in-law of Major-General Sir Percy Hobart.
Montgomery, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Ferguson (1880-1920)
Marlborough. Entered Royal Marine Light Infantry, 1898;
Naval Intelligence Department, 1911-12; Operations Division,
Admiralty War Staff, 1912-15; G.S.O.1, 19th Division, 1917-
19; killed by I.R.A. in Dublin in 1920. Played hockey for
England. Cousin of Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of
Alamein (q.v.).
Montgomery, Major-General Hugh Maude de Fellenberg (1870-
1954)
Eldest son of Rt. Hon. Hugh de F. Montgomery, PC. Eton and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-1900 (despatches); Special Employment, War Office,
1902-03; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1903-07; G.S.O.2, Staff
College, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, 7th Division, 1914 (sacked); A.A.
& Q.M.G., 8th Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1915;
B.G.G.S., XI Corps, 1915 (sacked); A.Q.M.G., V Corps, 1915-
16; D.A. & Q.M.G., V Corps, 1916-19; retired, 1925. Brother
of Field-Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd (q.v.)
and Sir Charles Montgomery, Vice-Marshal of the Diplomatic
Corps, 1920-33, and cousin of Lieutenant-General Sir
Frederick Maude (q.v.).
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Montgomery, Major-General Sir Robert Arundel Kerr "Monty"
(1862 -1951)
Entered Royal Artillery, 1881; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-
1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Professor, Staff College, Quetta,
1905-09; G,S.O.1, 1st Division, 1909-11; B.G.G.S., Southern
Command, 1911-14; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1914-15; B.G.R.A., I
Corps, 1915; M.G.R.A., Third Army, 1915; Commander Tyne
Garrison, U.K., from 1915; retired, 1920. His son was lost
with H.M.S. Good Hope in 1914.
Montgomery-Massingberd see Montgomery, Archibald Arinar
Moore, Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Hamilton (1876-1952)
Joined Royal Berkshire Regiment, 1896; South Africa, 1899-
1902; Trinidad Local Forces, 1903-04; Special Employment,
War Office, 1907-13; G.S.O.1, 29th Division, 1917; G.S.O.1,
Tyne Garrison, U.K., 1918-20.
Moores, Samuel Guise (Major-General Sir Guise Guise-Moores)
(1863-1942)
Cheltenham and St. Thomas' Hospital, London. Captain,
R.A.M.C., 1890; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); A.D.M.S., 14th Division, 1915-16; A.D.M.S.,
29th Division, 1916; A.D.M.S., Guards Division, 1916-17;
D.D.M.S., XI Corps, 1917-18; D.M.S., Second Army, 1918-19;
D.M.S., Royal Army Medical College, 1919-20; retired, 1934.
Author of Manual of Hygiene and Sanitation (Red Cross
Society) and articles.
Mor].and, General Sir Thomas Letlibridge Napier (1865-1925)
Charterhouse. Joined K.R.R.C., 1884; p.s.c.; Nigeria, 1897-
98 and 1900; Ashanti, 1900; Nigeria, 1901 and 1903;
Inspector-General, West African Frontier Force, 1905-10;
G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, 1910-13; 14th Division, U.K., 1914; 5th
Division, 1914-15; X Corps, 1915-18; XIII Corps, 1918-19;
retired, 1923.
Mudie, Brigadier Thomas Couper (1880-1948)
Fettes College, Edinburgh. Joined Royal Scots, 1899;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; Barrister, Inner Temple;
G.S.O.2, Operations, G.H.Q., 1917; G.S.O.1, 9th Division,
1917-19; retired, 1932. Secretary, 1932-44, and Director,
1944-47, Scottish Branch, British Red Cross Society.
Muirhead, Lieutenant-Colonel John Arthur (born 1879)
Bedford. Joined Indian Police, 1898; Entered Royal
Artillery, 1900; transferred to Indian Army (1st Lancers),
1902; P.S.C.; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, 3rd Cavalry Division,
1917-18 (wounded).
Mullens, Major-General Richard Lucas "Gobby-Chops (1871-
1952)
Eton and R. .C. Joined 16th Lancers, 1890; transferred to
2nd Dragoon Guards, 1893, and 4th Dragoon Guards, 1911;
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p.s.c., 1905; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded);
Brigade-Major, 4th cavalry Brigade, 1905-09; O.C. 4th
Dragoon Guards, 1911-14; 2nd Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15
(wounded); 1st Cavalry Division, 1915-19; retired, 1920.
Father of Brigadier G J de W Mullens OBE and grandfather of
Lieutenant-General Sir Anthony Mullens KCB OBE.
Munby, Lieutenant-Colonel, Joseph Ernest (1881-1962)
Malvern and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1900;
p.s.c., 1913; G.S.O.1, 38th Division, 1917-19; retired,
1927. Master of Derwent Foxhounds, 1930-34.
Murray, General Sir Archibald James (1860-1945)
Cheltenham and R.M.C. Joined 27 Foot, 1879; p.s.c.;
Zululand, 1888; South Africa, 1899-1901 (dangerously
wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); O.C. Battalion, Royal
Inniskilling Fusilers, 1900-02; A.A.G., Aldershot, 1905-07;
D.M.T., War Office, 1907-12; Inspector of Infantry, 1912-14;
G.O.C. 2nd Division, 1914; C.G.S., G.H.Q., 1914-15; Deputy
C.I.G.S., 1915; C.I.G.S., 1915; C.-in-C. E.E.F., 1916-17;
Aldershot, 1917-19; retired, 1922.
Murray, Colonel Keneim Digby Bold (1879-1947)
Haileybury and R.M.C. Joined Royal Munster Fusiliers, 1899;
transferred to Indian Army (59th Rifles), 1903; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1901-02; North-West frontier, 1908; G.S.O.1,
Second Army. 1917-18 (wounded, D.S.O.); retired, 1933.
Director of Military Studies, Cambridge University, from
1933. Brother of Colonel A.D. Murray, D.S.O.
Muspratt, General Sir Sidney Frederick (1878-1972)
United Service College and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1898;
transferred to Indian Army (12th Cavalry), 1899; p.s.c.;
North-West Frontier, 1908; Staff Captain and G.S.O.3, H.Q.,
India, 1906-10; A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Cavalry Division, 1915-
18; G.S.O.1, 1st Cavalry Division, 1918; retired, 1941.
Napier, Brigadier Vernon Monro Coiquhoun (1881-1957)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; South
Africa, 1902; p.s.c.; G.S.O.1, Fourth Army, 1917-18;
Assistant Director of Staff Duties, G.H.Q., 1918-19;
retired, 1935.
Nash, Major-General Sir Philip Arthur Manley (1875-1936)
Radley. Engineer with Indian Railways, 1899-1914; Director,
Ministry of Munitions, 1915-16; Deputy Director-General of
Transportation, B.E.F., 1916; Director-General of
Transportation, France, 1917; Director-General of
Transportation, Western Front, 1918.
Neame, Lieutenant-General Sir Philip Neame (1888-1978)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1908; V.C.,
1914; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1, 30th Division, 1918;
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D.C.I.G.S., 1939-40; G.O.C. Cyrenaica, 1941; Lieutenant-
General and C.-in-C., Guernsey, 1945-53; retired, 1947.
Gold and Bronze Medals with the British Olympic Sporting
Rifle Team, 1924. Author of German Strategy in the Great
War (1923), Playing With Strife (1946), and articles on big
game shooting.
Neilson, Colonel Walter Gordon (1876-1927)
Merchiston Castle School, Edinburgh, and Militia. Joined
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1897; South Africa, 1899-
1902 (wounded twice, despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.l, 63rd
Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Fourth Army, 1918-19. One of
four brothers who played rugby for Scotland.
Newall, Cyril Louis Norton (Marshal of the Royal Air Force
Lord Newall) (1886-1963)
Bedford and R.M.C. Joined Royal Warwickshire Regiment,
1905; transferred to Indian Army (2nd Gurkha Rifles), 1909,
and R.F.C., 1914; Zakka Khel Expedition, 1908; learned to
fly, 1911; Instructor, Indian Central Flying School, 1913-
14; O.C. No.12 Squadron, R.F.C., 1915-16; 41st (G.H.Q.)
Wing, R.F.C., 1917; 8th Brigade, R.A.F., 1917-19; C.A.S.,
1937-40; Marshal of the Royal Air Force, 1940; Governor-
General, New Zealand, 1941-46; created Baron, 1946.
Newcome, Major-General Henry William (1875-1963)
Marlborough and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895; South
Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); Instructor, School of
Gunnery, 1914; G.S.O.2 (S.O. to M.G.R.A.), First Army, 1915-
16 (wounded twice); G.S.O.1 (5.0. to M.G.R.A.), G.H.Q.,
1916; Instructor, Gunnery School, Salisbury Plain, 1916-17;
B.G.R.A., 21st Division, 1917-18; Commandant, Chapperton
Down Artillery School, 1918-22; retired, 1935. Lieutenant-
General Sir Henry Lawson (q.v.) was his wife's step-father.
Newland, Major-General Sir Foster Reuss (1862-1943)
Shrewsbury and Dublin University. Joined R.A.M.C., 1886;
South Africa, 1900-02; A.M.S., 18th Division, 1915-16;
D.D.M.S., XV Corps, 1916-17; D.D.M.S., XIV Corps, 1917;
D.M.S., Italy, 1917-18; retired, 1922. Married daughter of
Lieutenant-General Count Michele Salazar, Italian Army.
Newman, Major-General Charles Richard (1875-1954)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1895; Tirah,
1897-98; G.S.O.3, Coast Defence, Northern Command, 1912-14;
D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1, 35th Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, 62nd
Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, Second Army, 1918-19; retired,
1934. Brother-in-law of Air Chief Marshal Sir Geoffrey
Salmond and Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Salmond (q.v.).
Nichol, Colonel Charles Edward (1859-1939)
Edinburgh Collegiate School and Edinburgh University.
Entered Army, 1882; Major, R.A.M.C., 1893; Burma, 1885-87;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Commandant,
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R.A.M.C. School of Instruction, 1906-09; P.M.O., India,
1912-15; D.D.M.S., V Corps, 1915-16; D.M.S., Fifth Army,
1916; retired, 1917.
Nicholson, Major-General Sir Cecil Lothian (1865-1933)
Grandson of 1st Baron Romilly and son of General Sir Lothian
Nicholson. Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire
Regiment, 1885; transferred to Worcestershire Regiment,
1905, and East Lancashire Regiment, 1912; p.s.c.; Tirah,
1897-98; G.S.O.2, South Africa, 1911-12; G.O.C. 16th
Brigade, 1915-16; 34th Division, 1916-19; retired, 1925.
Brother of Major-General O.H.L. Nicholson (q.v.), Major-
General F.L. Nicholson, and Admiral Sir Douglas Nicholson;
and cousin of Colonel W.G. Nicholson and Colonel W.N.
Nicholson, author of Behind The Lines (1939). His son was
killed in action, 1917.
Nicholson, Major-General Octavius Henry Lothian (1877-1938)
Grandson of 1st Baron Romilly and son of General Sir Lothian
Nicholson. St. Paul's and R.M.C. Joined West Yorkshire
Regiment, 1897; p.s.c., 1914; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.l, 25th Division, 1917; G.S.O.1,
First Army, 1917-19. Brother of Major-General Sir Cecil
Nicholson (q.v.), Major-General F.L. Nicholson, and Admiral
Sir Douglas Nicholson; and cousin of Colonel W.G. Nicholson
and Colonel W.N. Nicholson, author of Behind The Lines
(1939). His nephew was killed in action, 1917.
None, Major-General Charles Edward de Manley (1866-1929)
Second son of Major-General C.E.M. None. Fettes. Joined
Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1885; transferred to Indian Army
(2nd Gurkha Rifles), 1887; p.s.c.; Manipur Expedition, 1891;
Tirah, 1897-98 (severely wounded, despatches); South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); D.A.A.G., India, 1904-07;
G.S.O.1, Meerut Division, 1915; D.A. & Q.M.G., Indian Corps,
1915; G.O.C. Bareilly (later 21st) Brigade, B.E.F. and
Mesopotamia, 1915-17; Brigade Commander, India, 1917;
retired, 1920.
Nosworthy, Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Poitiers (1887-
1971)
Exeter School and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1907;
Mishmi Abor Expedition, 1912-13; G.S.O.2, II Corps, 1916-18;
G.S.O.1, 66th Division, 1918-19 (wounded twice, D.S.O. and
Bar, M.C. and Bar); C.-in-C., West Africa, 1943-45; retired,
1946.
Nugent, Major-General Sir Oliver Stewart Wood (1860-1926)
Son of Major-General St.G.M. Nugent. Harrow and Militia.
Joined Royal Munster Fusiliers, 1882; transferred to
K.R.R.C., 1883; p.s.c.; Hazara Expedition, 1891; Miranzai
Expedition, 1891; Izazai Expedition, 1892; Chitral Relief
Force, 1895 (slightly wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); South
Africa, 1899-1900 (dangerously wounded, despatches); G.O.C.
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Hampshire Brigade, 1911-14; Humber Defences, U.K., 1914-15;
41st Brigade, 1915; 36th Division, 1915-18; retired, 1920.
Nunn, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Henry Clayton (born 1873)
Militia; joined Royal West Kent Regiment, 1894; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); Adjutant, School
of Mounted Infantry, Egypt, 1902-05; Brigade-Major, Mounted
Infantry Brigade, Southern Command, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, 46th
Division, 1916 (invalided); G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., Home Forces,
1916; G.S.O.l, 58th Division, 1916-17; O.C. Battalion,
Middlesex Regiment, 1917-18; O.C. 14/Warwickshire, 1918;
G.S.O.1, Humber Garrison, U.K., 1918-19.
O'Connor, Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Bernard (born 1879)
Entered Royal Engineers, 1897; p.s.c.; G.S.O.1, 25th
Division, 1917; Special Appointment (G.S.O.l) (Liaison
Officer), G.H.Q., Italy, 1917-18; G.S.O.l, VI Corps, 1918;
G.S.O.l, XXII Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 29th Division, 1918.
O'Donnell, Major-General Sir Thomas Joseph (1858-1947)
St. Stanislaus College, Tullabeg. Entered Army, 1881;
Major, R.A.M.C., 1893; Egypt, 1881-82; Bechuanaland, 1885-
86; Zululand, 1887-88; Tirah, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-
1901 (despatches, D.S.O.); P.M.O., India, 1910-11; A.D.M.S.,
Southern Command, 1911-14; D.D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1915-16;
D.M.S., India, 1916-18; retired, 1918. Fellow, Royal
Institute of Public Health. Rode many winners in South
Africa and India.
O'Keefe, Major-General Sir Menus William (1859-1944)
Queen's University, Ireland. Entered Army, 1884; Major,
R.A.M.C., 1893; Egypt, 1882; Tirah, 1897-98; Mohmand, 1908;
Inspector of Medical Services, War Office, 1910-14;
D.D.M.S., Cavalry Corps, 1915-16; D.M.S., Fourth Army, 1916-
19.
O'Leary, Brigadier-General Tom Evelyn (1862-1924)
Son of Surgeon-General T.C. O'Leary. Beaumont College.
Joined Royal Irish Regiment, 1884; Miranzai Expedition,
1891; Isazai Expedition, 1892; Chitral Relief Force, 1895
(despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); Colonel,
1913; G.S.O.1, 3rd (Lahore) Indian Division, India and
B.E.F., 1913-14; A.A.G., G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915; 	 D.A.G.,
G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915-16; special employment, War Office,
1916-17; Deputy Director of Prisoners of War, War Office,
1917.
011ivant, Brigadier-General Alfred Henry (1971-1919)
Winchester. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891; Somaliland,
1904; p.s.c., 1908; G.S.O.2, Colonial Office, 1909-11;
G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-13; G.S.0.2, Admiralty, 1913-14;
G.S.O.1, Royal Naval (later 63rd) Division, Antwerp,
Gallipoli, and France, 1914-16; B.G.R.A., Heavy Artillery, X
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Corps, 1918-19; G.S.O.1, Supreme War Council, 1919; retired,
1919.
Ons].ow, Richard William Alan, Earl of Onslow (1876-1945)
Succeeded his father, 4th Earl of Onslow, P.C., G.C.M.G., in
1911. Eton and New College, Oxford. Diplomatic Service,
1901-11; Clerk in the Foreign Office, 1911-14; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1916-18; Assistant-Director of Staff Duties
(Censorship and Publicity), G.H.Q., 1918; O.B.E., 1918;
Under Secretary-of-State for War, 1924-28; P.C., 1926;
Paymaster-General, 1928-29. Author of Sixty-Three Years, an
Autobiography (1944).
Osborne, Lieutenant-General Edmund Archibald (1885-1969)
Cheltenham. Entered Royal Engineers, 1904; Lieutenant,
1907; D.S.O., 1914; G.S.O.2, Operations, G.H.Q., 1917-18;
G.S.O.2, 1918; G.S.O.1, 33rd Division, 1918-20; G.O.C. 44th
Division, 1938-40; retired, 1941.
Oxley, Brigadier-General Reginald Stewart (1863-1951)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire and Lancashire
Regiment; 1884; transferred to K.R.R.C., 1884; p.s.c.;
Manipur Expedition, 1891; Brigade-Major, 12th Brigade, South
Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches); O.C. Battalion K.R.R.C.,
1907-11; G.S.O.1, Staff College, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, II Corps,
1914; G.O.C. 24th Brigade, 1915-16 (sacked); D.A. & Q.M.G.,
Southern Army, Home Forces, U.K., 1916-18; D.A. & Q.M.G.,
XXIII Corps, Home Forces, U.K., 1918-19; retired, 1919.
Paget, Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Edward Sidney Louis
(1879-1917)
Eldest son of General Rt. Hon. S.r Arthur Paget, nephew of
Admiral Sir Alfred Paget, and grandson of General Lord
Paget. Eton. Joined 11th Hussars, 1900; G.S.O.1, 3rd
Cavalry Division, 1916-17; went home sick, April 1917, and
died on 2 August 1917.
Pakenham, George de la Poer Beresford (1875-1960)
United Services College and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1895;
transferred to Indian Army (3 9th Garhwal Rifles), 1896, and
Border Regiment, 1904; p.s.c., 1908; G.S.O.1, 56th Division,
1916-19; retired, 1931. His brother died of wounds in 1915.
Paley, Colonel Alan Thomas (1876-1950)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1897; p.s.c.; North-
West Frontier, 1897-98; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-
1900 and 1902 (dangerously wounded, despatches); Instructor,
R.M.C., 1907-11; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1913-14; D.S.O., 1915;
G.S.O.1, 21st Division, 1916-17; Assistant Commandant,
R.M.C., 1917-18; retired, 1925.
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Panet, Brigadier-General Edouard de Bellefeuille (born 1881)
Canadian. Ashbury College, Ottawa University, and R.M.C.,
Kingston, Canada. Entered Royal Canadian Artillery, 1902;
p.s.c., 1913; G.S.O.l, 4th Canadian Division, 1918-19;
retired, 1919. Half-brother of Major-General H.A. Panet and
Brigadier-General A.E. Panet.
Paris, Major-Genera]. Sir Archibald (1861-1937)
Eton and Royal Naval College, Greenwich. Entered Royal
Marine Artillery, 1879; p.s.c.; Naval Intelligence
Department, Admiralty, 1899-1900; Rhodesian Field Force,
1900-02 (despatches); Professor, R.M.A., 1903-06; C.B.,
1907; Inspector of Marine Recruiting, 1913-14; G.O.C. Royal
Naval (later 63rd) Division, U.K., Antwerp, Gallipoli, and
France, 1914-16 (severely wounded, losing his leg); he
retired as a consequence of his wounds in 1917.
Parker, Brigadier-General Arthur (1867-1941)
Wellington and Militia. Joined 5th Lancers, 1887; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); O.C. 5th Lancers, 1913-15;
G.O.C. 92nd Brigade, 1915-16; O.C. Northumberland Hussars,
1917, and a Tank Corps Battalion, 1917-18; G.O.C. 5th, 2nd,
and 3rd Brigades, Tank Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1919.
Parker, Brigadier-General Robert Gabbett (1875-1927)
Clifton and R.M.C. Joined Royal Lancashire Regiment, 1896;
p.s.c., 1908; South Africa, 1900-02 (wounded, despatches);
Instructor, R.M.C., 1911-13; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.1, 41st
Division, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., IV Corps, 1918-19; retired,
1926. His brother was killed in action, 1914.
Parsons, Major-Genera]. Sir Harold Daniel Edmund (1863-1925)
Son of Major-General J.E.B. Parsons.	 Duiwich College.
Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1882; Burma, 1885-89;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, C.M.G.); transferred to
Ordnance Store Department, 1890; A.D.O.S., Scottish Command,
1910; A.D.O.S., South Africa, 1910-14; D.D.O.S., Lines of
Communication, B.E.F., 1914; D.O.S., B.E.F., 1914-18.
Parsons, Brigadier Johnston Lindsey Rowlett (1876-1935)
Canadian. University of Toronto. Land Surveyor from 1903.
Major, Corps of Guides, Canada, 1913; served with 58th
Canadian Battalion; G.S.O.2, Canadian Corps, 1916-17;
G.S.O.1, 1st Canadian Division, 1917-19 (despatches, C.M.G.,
D.S.O.).
Peck, Major-General Arthur Wharton (1869-1948)
Clifton and R.M.C. Joined Border Regiment, 1890;
transferred to Lincolnshire Regiment, 1890, and Indian Army
(Sam Browne's Cavalry), 1892; Waziristan, 1894-95; South
Africa, 1900; North-West Frontier, 1908; G.S.O.2, Northern
Army, India, 1908-11; G.S.O.2, India, 1914; A.Q.M.G., Indian
Corps, 1914-15; D.A. & Q.M.G., Indian Corps, 1915; D.A. &
473
Q.M.G., XV and XVII Corps, 1915-18; IJ.A. & Q.M.G., First
Army, 1918-19; retired, 1921.
Peck, Lieutenant-Colonel John Henry (born 1886)
Australian. Lieutenant, Australian Militia, 1912; D.S.O.,
1917; G.S.O.2, I ANZAC Corps, 1917; G.S.O.l, 5th Australian
Division, 1917-18 (sick); C.M.G., 1918.
Peck, Major-General Sydney Capel (1871-1949)
The Perse School and Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge.
Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; Nigeria, 1902-03; G.S.O.2,
Inspector-General of Training, 1918; G.S.O.]., R.A., Fifth
Army, 1918-19; retired, 1933.
Perceval, Major-General Sir Edward Maxwell "Perks" (1861-
1955)
Son of General J.M. Perceval. Royal Academy, Gosport and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1880; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-1902 (severely wounded, despatches); Professor, R.M.A.,
1903-04; D.A.A.G. (Staff Duties), War Office, 1904-05;
G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1908-09; Assistant Director of
Movements, War Office, 1912-14; C.R.A, 2nd Division, 1914-
15; B.G.G.S. (Sub-Chief), G.H.Q., 1915; G.O.C. 49th
Division, 1915-17; 68th Division, U.K., 1917-19; retired,
1920.
Percival, Lieutenant-Colonel, Arthur Jex-Blake (1870-1914)
Son of the Bishop of Hereford. Marlborough and Rugby.
Joined Northumberland Fusiliers, 1892; p.s.c.,1908; Crete,
1898; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches,
D.S.O.); Soudan, 1905-06 (despatches); G.S.O.3, War Office,
1911-13; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1914; G.S.O.l, 2nd
Division, 1914; killed in action, 31 October 1914.
Percy, Major-General John Samuel Jocelyn (1871-1952)
Born as John Samuael Jocelyn Baumgartner. Queen Elizabeth
School, Sevenoaks, and R.M.C. Joined East Lancashire
Regiment, 1891; p.s.c.; Waziristan Expedition, 1894-95;
Chitral Relief Force, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1902;
D.A.A.G./G.S.O.2, India, 1908-12; Instructor, R.M.C., 1913-
14; G.S.O.2, 27th Division, U.K. and B.E.F., 1914-15;
G.S.O.l, 48th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 3lth Division,
1916; B.G.G.S., IX Corps, 1916-17; M.G.G.S., Fifth Army,
1917-18; M.G.G.S., Second Army, 1918-19; retired, 1920.
Inspector-General Albanian Gendarmerie, 1926-38. Assumed
surname of Percy in 1917.
Pereira, Major-General Sir Cecil Edward Pinto" (1869-1942)
Oratory School, Edgbaston, Birmingham. Joined Coldstream
Guards, 1890; Nigeria, 1896-97; Uganda, 1897-98; South
Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. 2/Coldstream Guards, 1914-15; 85th
Brigade, 1915 (wounded twice); 1st Brigade, 1916; 2nd
Division, 1916-19; retired, 1923. Brother of Brigadier-
General G.E. Pereira.
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Peyton, General Sir William Elliot (1866-1931)
Brighton College. In the ranks, 1 year 361 days;
commissioned 7th Dragoon Guards, 1887; p.s.c.; Dongola, 1896
(despatches); Soudan, 1897 (dangerously wounded); Soudan,
1898 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1900
(despatches); O.C. 15th Hussars, 1903-07; Meerut Cavalry
Brigade, 1908-12; Military Secretary to C.-in-C., E. Indies,
1912-14; G.S.O.l, Mounted Division, U.K., August 1914;
G.O.C. 2nd Mounted Division, Central Force, Home Defence,
U.K. and M.E.F., 1914-16; Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 1916-
18; G.O.C. Reserve Army and X Corps, 1918; 40th Division,
1918-19; retired, 1930. Brother-in-law of Brigadier-General
M.F. Gage (q.v.).
Philippe, Major-General Sir Ivor (1861-1940)
Second son of Canon Sir Erasmus Philipps, 12th Baronet.
Feisted and Militia. Joined Manchester Regiment, 1883;
transferred to Indian Army (5th Gurkha Rifles), 1884;
p.s.c.; Burma, 1887-89; Miranzai Expedition, 1891; Isazai
Expedition, 1892; North-West Frontier, 1896; Tirah, 1896-97;
China, 1900-01 (despatches, D.S.O.); retired as Major, 1903;
Liberal M.P., 1906-22, and man of business; G.O.C. 38th
Division, 1915-16 (sacked); K.C.B., 1917. Author of The
Issue of Orders in the Field. Brother of Sir John Philipps,
13th Baronet (financier and Liberal M.P., 1888-94, created
Baron, 1908, and then Viscount St. Davids, 1918) and O.C.
Philipps, (shipowner, financier, Liberal M.P., 1906-10, and
Conservative M.P., 1916-22, created Baron Kylsant, 1923), he
was a political ally of Lloyd George, who was instrumental
in his being given command of the 38th Division in 1915.
Piggott, Major-General Francis Stewart Gideroy (1883-1966)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1901; Japan,
1904-06 and 1910-13; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1914; G.S.O.1,
Fifth Army, 1918; G.S.O.1, Second Army, 1918-19; p.s.c.,
1919; retired, 1939. Interpreter in Japanese; Senior
Lecturer in Japanese, London University, 1942-46. Author of
The Elements of Sosho (1913) and Broken Thread (memoirs,
1950)
Pigot, Brigadier-General Sir Robert "Bob" (1882-1977)
Succeeded his father as 6th Baronet, 1934. Eton and
Militia. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1901; seconded to R.F.C,
1913-14; D.S.O., 1916; O.C. 3/Rifle Brigade, 1916-17, and
11th Tank Battalion, 1917-18; 6th Brigade, Tank Corps, 1918-
19; retired, 1919. Author of Twenty-Five Years' Big-Game
Hunting (1928). Brother-in-law of Lieutenant B.H.
Barrington-Kennett, killed in action, 1915.
Pike, Major-General Sir William Watson (1860-1941)
Kingstown School. Entered Army, 1882; Major, R.A.M.C.,
1894; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.);
D.D.M.S., Indian Cavalry Corps, 1915; D.D.M.S., Indian
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Corps, 1915; D.M.S., First Army, 1915-17; retired, 1920.
Played Rugby and Hockey for Ireland.
Pilcher, Major-General Thomas David (1858-1928)
Harrow and Militia. Joined 22 Foot, 1879; transferred to 5
Foot, 1879; p.s.c.; West African Frontier Force, 1897-1900;
Nigeria, 1897-98 (despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); G.O.C. 3rd and 5th Brigades, 1902-07; Major-
General, 1907; G.O.C. Burma Division, 1912-14; 17th
Division, 1915-16 (wounded, 1915; sacked on the Somme);
Commander Reserve centre, U.K., 1916-18. Author of Lessons
from the .Boer War; The Writing on the Wall; A General's
Letters to his son; A General's Letters on Minor Tactics;
War According to Clausewitz (1918); and East is East.
Pinney, Major-General Reginald John (1863-1943)
Winchester and R.M.C. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1884; p.s.c.,
1890; South Africa, 1901-02; O.C. 4/Royal Fusiliers, 1903-
07; A.A.G., Egypt, 1909-13; G.O.C. Devon and Cornwall
Brigade, 1913-14; 23rd Brigade, 1914-15; 35th Division,
1915-16; 33rd Division, 1916-19; retired, 1919. Notorious
for refusing to issue rum to his troops.
Pinwill, Lieutenant-Colonel William Richard (born 1873)
Clifton, R.M.C. (Tactics Prize), and L.S.E. Joined
Liverpool Regiment, 1893; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, New Zealand
Military Forces, 1911-14; G.S.O.2, New Zealand Military
Forces, Samoa, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, A.N.Z.A.C. Division,
M.E.F., 1915; G.S.O.l, A.N.Z.A.C. Division, M.E.F., 1915-16;
G.S.O.1, New Zealand Division, 1916; O.C. 16/Liverpool
Regiment, 1916-18; G.S.O.1, XVII Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 12th
Division, 1918; O.C. 7/West Yorkshire, 1918; retired, 1923.
Pitcher, Air Commodore Duncan le Geyt (1877-1944)
Sedburgh, Geneva University, and R.M.C. Joined South Wales
Borderers, 1898; transferred to Indian Army (39th Horse),
1901, and R.F.C., 1914; Tutor to the Maharajah of Holkar,
1908; Assistant Inspector, Imperial Service Troops, Central
India, 1910-11; Pilot's Certificate No.125, 1911; Central
Persia, 1911-13; Assistant Commandant, Central Flying
School, 1915; Commandant, C.F.S., 1915-16; G.O.C. 1st
Brigade, R.F.C., 1916-17 and 1918-19; retired, 1929.
Pitman, Major-General Thomas Tait (1868-1941)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 11th Hussars, 1889; North-West
Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. 11th
Hussars, 1912-15; 4th Cavalry Brigade, 1915-18; 2nd Cavalry
Division, 1918-19; retired, 1930.
Pitt-Taylor, General Sir Walter William (1878-1950)
Eton and Militia. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1899; p.s.c.; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Egypt, 1908-09;
G.S.O.2, 37th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Fourth Army, 1916-
17; G.S.O.1, XIV Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, British Mission with
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Italian Forces, 1917-18; G.O.C. 145th Brigade, Italy, 1918;
B.G.G.S., XIV Corps, Italy, 1918-19; retired, 1939.
Place, Colonel Charles Otley (1875-1955)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1895; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); Instructor,
R.M.A., 1909-10; G.S.O.3, Western Command, 1912-14; G.S.O.2,
19th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 36th Division, 1916-18;
wounded and captured, 26 March 1918; retired, 1923.
Platt, General Sir William (1885-1975)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Northumberland Fusiliers,
1905; p.s.c., 1919; Mohmand Expedition, 1908 (despatches,
D.S.Oj; G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1918-20; G.O.C. East
Africa, 1941-45; retired, 1945. Dynamic personality.
Plumer, Herbert Charles Onslow (Field-Marshal Lord Plumer)
"Plum" (1857-1932)
Eton. Joined 65 Foot, 1876; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1884; Matabele,
1896; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.O.C. 4th Brigade, 1902-03;
10th Division and 19th Brigade, 1903-04; Q.M.G., 1904-05;
G.O.C. 5th Division, 1906-09; Northern Command, 1911-1914;
G.O.C. V Corps, 1915; Second Army, 1915-17; British Forces
in Italy, 1917-18; Second Army, 1918-19; Army of the Rhine,
1918-19; created Field-Marshal and Baron, 1919, and
Viscount, 1929. Although the model for David Low's cartoon
character, Colonel Blimp, because of his walrus moustache,
beefy complexion and rotound figure, he was one of the best
generals of the war.
Pollok-Morris, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Auselan (born 1877)
Harrow. Joined Highland Light Infantry, 1897; p.s.c.;
Crete, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.S.O.1, Third Army,
1917-18; G.S.O.1, 2/2nd Mounted Division, U.K., 1918-19.
Assumed additional name of Morris, 1901.
Ponsonhy, Major-General Sir John (1866-1952)
Eldest son of General Rt. Hon. Sir Henry Ponsonby, P.C.
Eton and Militia. Joined Royal Irish Rifles, 1887;
transferred to Coldstream Guards, 1888; Matabeleland, 1893-
94; Uganda, 1898-99; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C.
Battalion, Coldstream Guards, 1913-15; 2nd Guards Brigade,
1915-16 and 1917; 40th Division, 1917-18; 5th Division,
1918-19; retired, 1925. Brother of Sir Frederick Ponsonby,
Keeper of the Privy Purse, 1914-35, and Treasurer to George
V, 1920-35.
Porter, Major-General Sir Robert (1858-1928)
Foyle College, Londonderry; Glasgow University; and Paris.
Entered Army, 1881; Major, R.A.M.C., 1893; Ashanti, 1895-96;
South Africa, 1899-1902; A.M.O., Irish Command, 1908-10;
P.M.O., Western Command, 1910; D.D.M.S., Malta, 1910-14;
D.D.M.S., II Corps, 1914-15; D.M.S., Second Army, 1915-18;
retired, 1918.
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Price, Brigadier-General Thomas Rose Caradoc (1875-1949)
Melbourne and R.M.C. Joined Royal West Kent Regiment, 1894;
transferred to Indian Army (Probyn's Horse), 1899, and Welsh
Guards, 1915; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; Tibet,
1903-04; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.l, 55th Division, 1917-18;
G.O.C. 114th Brigade, 1918-19; retired, 1941. A tournament
polo player and winner of races in India across country.
Pritchard, Brigadier-General Clive Gordon (1871-1948)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir Gordon Pritchard. Malvern
College and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891; O.C.
Hongkong Volunteers, 1902-07; B.G.R.A., XIX Corps, 1917-18;
B.G.R.A., G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1922.
Pryce, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Edward ap Rhys (1874-
1950)
Glenalmond and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1895; transferred to
Indian Army, 1896; p.s.c.; Tibet, 1903-04; G.S.O.2, H.Q.,
India, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 38th Division, 1915-17; G.O.C.
113th Brigade, 1917-18; retired, 1938. Author of Transport
Training Notes.
Pulteney, Lieutenant-General Sir William "Putty' t (1861-1941)
Eton and Militia. Joined Scots Guards, 1881; Egypt, 1882;
Uganda, 1895-97 (D.S.O.) ; South Africa, 1899-1902; G.O.C.
16th Brigade, 1908-09; 6th Division, 1910-14; III Corps,
1914-18; XXIII Corps, U.K., 1918-19; retired, 1920. Author
of The Immortal Salient (1925). A personal friend of King
George V.
Radcliffe, General Sir Percy Pollexfen de Blaquiere "P. de
B." (1874-1934)
Son of General Sir William Pollexf en Radcliffe. Winchester
and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1893; p.s.c.; South
Africa, 1899-1900; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1906-10; G.S.O.2,
Eastern Command, 1911-13; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1913-14;
G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1915; G.S.O.1,
Third Army, 1915; B.G.G.S., II Corps, 1915-16; B.G.G.S.,
Canadian Corps, 1916-18; D.M.O, War Office, 1918-22. Author
of Tactical Employment of Field Artillery (translated from
the French of Commandant Rouquerol)
Ramsay, Major-General Frank Williams (1875-1954)
Eldest son of Brigadier-General W.A. Ramsay. Militia;
joined Middlesex Regiment, 1897; South Africa, 1901-02; O.C.
Battalion of The Middlesex Regiment, 1915-16; D.S.O., 1916;
G.O.C. 48th Brigade, 1916-18; 58th Division, 1918-19
(wounded twice); retired, 1929. Author of Polo Training,
with Hints on the Game (1928). From a Scots family with a
long tradition of military service. Brother of Admiral Sir
Bertram Ramsay. His other brother was a soldier and his two
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sisters married soldiers. Married the widow of Lieutenant-
Colonel A. St. Leger Glyn (q.v.), 1929.
Rainsay, Major-General Sir John George (1856-1920)
Queen Elizabeth's School, Ipswich, and Stubbington House,
Hampshire. Joined 14 Foot, 1875; transferred to Indian Army
(24th Punjab Infantry), 1877; Afghan War, 1878-80; Hazara
Expedition, 1888; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; China, 1900;
Mohmand Expedition, 1908; G.O.C. 3rd Bangalore Brigade,
India, 1907-11; retired, 1912; G.O.C. 24th Division, 1914-15
(resigned)
Ramsay-Fairf ax, Commander William George Astell (1876-1946)
Second son of Colonel Sir William Ramsay-Fairfax, 2nd
Baronet. Cornwalles, Malmesbury; The Limes, Greenwich; and
H.M.S. Britannia. Entered Royal Navy, 1900; resigned, 1901;
Imperial Yeomanry, South Africa, 1902; exploration of the
Blue Nile, 1903; Abyssinian Army, co-operating with the
British Somaliland Field Force, 1903-04; served with Royal
Naval Division, Gallipoli and France (O.C. Howe Battalion),
and Tank Corps, France, 1915-18; D.S.O., 1916; G.O.C. 3rd
Brigade, Tank Corps, 1918-19.
Rawlins, Colonel Stuart William Hughes (1880-1927)
Eton. Entered Royal Marine Artillery, 1898; transferred
Royal Artillery, 1900; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1902; King's
African Rifles, 1903-08; G.S.O.1 (S.O. to M.G.R.A.), G.H.Q.,
1916-19.
Rawlinson, Henry Seymour (General Lord Rawlinson) "Rawly"
(1864-1925)
Succeeded his father, Major-General Sir Henry Rawlinson, as
2nd Baronet, 1895. Eton. Joined K.R.R.C., 1884;
transferred to Coldstream Guards, 1892; p.s.c.; Burma, 1886-
87; Soudan, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1902; Commandant,
Staff College, Camberley, 1903-06; G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, 1907-
09; 3rd Division, 1910-14; 4th Division, 1914; IV Corps,
1914-15; First Army, 1915-16; Fourth Army, 1916-17; Second
Army, 1917-18; Fifth Army, 1918; Fourth Army, 1918-19;
created Baron, 1919; C.-in-C., India, 1920-25. Author of
The Officers' Note-book.
Reed, Major-General Hamilton Lyster "Paddy" (1869-1931)
Son of Sir Andrew Reed, K.C.B., C.V.O. and nephew of H.H.
Lyster, V.C., C.B. Attended R.M.A.; entered Royal
Artillery, 1888; p.s.c., 1905; South Africa, 1899-1902
(wounded, despatches, V.C.); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1906-10;
G.S.O.2, Inspector-General, Overseas Forces, 1910-11;
Military Attache, Turkish Forces, Balkan War, 1912-13;
G.S.O.2, Eastern Command, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, 27th Division,
1914-15; B.G.G.S., IX Corps, M.E.F., 1915-16; B.G.R.A., 40th
Division, 1916-17; B.G.R.A., X Corps, 1917; G.O.C. 15th
Division, 1917-19 (wounded, despatches); retired, 1928.
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Renny, Colonel Lewis Frederick (1877-1955)
Brighton College and R.M.C. Joined Royal Dublin Fusiliers,
1897; ps.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902; West African Frontier
Force, 1904-08; Brigade-Major, Malta, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 6th
Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.l, Machine Gun Corps Training
Centre, 1917-18; B.G.G.S. (Inspector of Machine Gun Units),
G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1930.
Rice, Major General Sir (Spring) Robert (1858-1929)
Entered Royal Engineers, 1877; Adjutant, School of Military
Engineering, 1892-1905; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); Chief Engineer, Coast Defence, Southern
Command, 1909-11; Chief Engineer, Aldershot, 1911-14; Chief
Engineer, I Corps, 1914-15; First Army, 1915-16; Engineer-
in-Chief, France, 1916-17; Commander, Forth Garrison, U.K.,
1917-18; retired, 1919.
Rizningtoxi, Major-General Sir Michael Frederick "Mike" (1858-
1928)
Highgate School and Keble College, Oxford. Joined 6th
Dragoons, 1881; Bechuanaland, 1884-85; Zululand, 1888; South
Africa, 1899-1902; Inspector of Cavalry, India, 1911-14;
G.O.C. 1st Indian Cavalry Division, 1914; Indian Cavalry
Corps, 1914-16; retired, 1919. Author of Our Cavalry and
Hints on Stable Management. Proponent of the Stokes Mortar.
Ritchie, Major-General Sir Archibald Buchanan (1869-1955)
Son of Major-General John Ritchie. United Services College
and R.M.C. Joined Seaforth Highlanders, 1889; Soudan, 1898;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); O.C. l/Seaforth
Highianders, 1913-15; 26th Brigade, 1915-16; 11th Division,
1916-17 (wounded); 16th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1928.
Robb, Major-General Sir Frederick Spencer (1858-1948)
Harrow; Trinity Hall, Cambridge; and R.M.C. Joined 68 Foot,
1880; p.s.c., 1888-89; Soudan, 1898 (despatches); G.O.C. 6th
Division, 1905-09; Major-General i/c Administration,
Aldershot, 1910-14; Inspector-General of Communications,
B.E.F., 1914; Assistant, C.I.G.S., 1914; Military Secretary
to the Secretary-of-State for War, 1914-16; Major-General
i/c Administration, Eastern Command, 1916-19; retired, 1920.
Robertson, Major-General Sir Philip Rynd (1866-1936)
Son of General J.H.C. Robertson. Charterhouse and R.M.C.
Joined Scottish Rifles, 1886; O.C. 1/Cameronians, 1914-15;
19th Brigade, 1915-16; 17th Division, 1916-19; retired,
1923.
Robertson, Brigadier-General William (born 1872)
Sedburgh and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1892; p.s.c.;
Chitral Relief Force, 1895; Tirah, 1897-98 (despatches);
G.S.O.3, 1908-10; G.S.O.2, Canadian Forces, 1910-13; Chief
Instructor, R.M.A., 1914; G.S.O.2, V Corps, 1915 (severely
wounded); G.S.O.2, War Office and Second Army, 1916;
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G.S.O.l, Second Army, 1916-17; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1,
G.H.Q., Italy, 1917-18; B.G.G.S. (Staff Duties), G.H.Q.,
1918-19.
Robertson, Field-Marshal Sir William Robert "Wully" (1859-
1933)
Educated at a private school. In Ranks, 16th Lancers, 1877-
88; commissioned, 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1888; p.s.c., 1898;
Miranzai and Black Mountain Expeditions, 1891; Chitral
Relief Force, 1895 (severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.);
S.O., Intelligence Branch, Simla, 1892-96, and Intelligence
Department, War Office, 1899-1900; D.A.A.G., Intelligence,
H.Q., South Africa, 1900 (despatches); Assistant D.M.O., War
Office, 1901-07; B.G.G.S., Aldershot, 1907-10; Commandant,
Staff College, Camberley, 1910-13; D.M.T., War Office, 1913-
14; Q.M.G., G.H.Q., 1914-15; C.G.S., G.H.Q., 1915; C.I.G.S.,
1915-18; C.-in-C., Home Forces, U.K., 1918-19; British Army
on the Rhine, 1919-20; created Baronet, 1919; Field-Marshal,
1920. Author of From Private to Field-Marshal ( 1921) and
Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914-18 (1926). He excelled at man-
at-arms and Anglo-Indian sports. Without private means and
renowned for dropping his "aitches", he was forced to
qualify in native languages to supplement his income,
gaining a reputation which led him eventually to be the
first ranker to become C.I.G.S. and a Field-Marshal. Father
of General Lord Robertson of Oakridge, his brother-in-law
was the brother of Field-Marshal Lord Birdwood (q.v.).
Romer, General Sir Cecil Francis "Romeo" (1869-1962)
Fourth son of Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Romer, Lord Justice of
Appeal. Eton. Joined Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1890; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-1902; Staff Captain, War Office, 1903-04;
G.S.O.2, War Office, 1904-07; G.S.O.2, East Anglian
Division, 1908-09; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1909-13; D.A. &
Q.M.G., Irish Command, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, 5th Division, 1914-
15, and 1st Canadian Division, 1915; B.G.G.S., III Corps,
1915-17; G.O.C. 59th Division, 1917-18; C.G.S., Forces in
Great Britain, 1918-20; A.G. to the Forces, 1933-35;
retired, 1935. Author with Major A.E. Mainwaring of The
Second .Bn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers in the South African War,
with a description of the Operations in the Aden Hinterland
(1908). Brother of Sir Mark (Judge Lord) Romer.
Rosenthal, Major-General Sir Charles (1875-1954)
Australian architect. Son of Scandinavian migrants, born
and educated in New South Wales. Entered Australian
Militia, 1892; commissioned, 1903; O.C. 3rd Australian Field
Artillery Brigade, Gallipoli (wounded twice) and France,
1914-16; C.R.A., 4th Australian Division, 1916-17 (wounded);
G.O.C. 9th Australian Brigade, 1917-18 (gassed); D.S.O.,
1918; 2nd Australian Division, May - September 1918
(wounded); A.I.F. Depots, U.K., 1919; 2nd Australian
Division, N.S.W., 1921-1926 and 1932-37; retired, 1937.
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Served in N.S.W. State Parliament, 1922-25 and 1936-37.
Able commander and great character who led from the front.
Ross, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Murray (1879-1933)
Son of Hon. H.T. Ross. Rugby and R.M.C. Joined West
Yorkshire Regiment, 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902;
Instructor, R.M.C., Duntroon, Australia, 1913-14; D.S.O.,
1916; G.S.O.2, I A.N.Z.A.C. Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 1st
Australian Division, 1918-19; retired, 1922.
Ross, Major-General Charles (1864-1930)
Third son of General Sir C.C.G. Ross, K.C.B. Stubbington
House, Hampshire, and Militia. Joined Norfolk Regiment,
1884; p.s.c., 1899; Egyptian Army, 1893-94; South Africa,
1900-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); Instructor, R.M.A., 1904-08;
R.M.C., 1905-08; and Staff College, 1908-12; retired as
Colonel, 1912; G.O.C. 61st Brigade, 1915; 6th Division,
1915-17; 69th Division, 1917-18. Author of Representative
Government and War; The Problem of National Defence (1907);
An Outline of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904 and 1905 and
various works of fiction. Brother-in-law of Brigadier-
General A.L. Schreiber.
Rowan, Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Stewart (1882-1931)
Tonbridge School and Militia. Joined Wiltshire Regiment,
1901; p.s.c., 1919; wounded twice, 1914; D.S.O., 1915;
G.S.O.2, Training, G.H.Q., 1917-18; G.S.O.2, 14th Division,
1918; G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 64th Division,
U.K., 1918-19.
Ruggles-Brise, Major-General Sir Harold Goodeve (1864-1927)
Winchester and Balliol College, Oxford. Joined Grenadier
Guards, 1885; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches);
O.C. Battalion of the Grenadier Guards, 1907-11; Commandant,
School of Musketry, 1911-14; G.O.C. 20th Brigade, 1914
(severely wounded, Ypres); B.G.G.S., Aldershot Training
Centre, 1915; G.O.C. 40th Division, 1915-17; 73rd Division,
U.K., 1917-18; Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 1918-19. Famous
racquets player. Brother-in-law of Brigadier-General Duke
of Atholl.
Russell, Brigadier-General Hon. Alexander Victor Frederick
"Alick" (1874-1965)
Fourth son of lth Baron Ampthill and Godson of Queen
Victoria and Emperor Frederick of Germany. Wellington and
R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1894; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-1901 (despatches); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1908-10;
Military Attache, Berlin and Stockholm, 1910-14; G.S.O.1,
36th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, London District, 1916-18;
G.S.O.1, Censorship and Publicity, G.H.Q., 1918; retired,
1926.
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Russell, Major-General Sir Andrew Russell (1868-1960)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Border Regiment, 1889; retired,
1892, to be a sheep farmer in New Zealand; New Zealand
Territorial Forces; G.O.C. Wellington Mounted Brigade,
M.E.F., 1914-16; New Zealand Division, M.E.F. and France,
1916-19; retired, 1932; Inspector-General of New Zealand
Forces, 1940-41. Related by marriage to Colonel E.F. St.
John (q.v.).
Ryan, Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Sunner (1884-1952)
Only son of Major-General Sir Charles Ryan. Harrow and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1904; G.S.O.1, First Army,
1917-20; D.S.O., 1918; retired, 1929. Married only daughter
of 21st Earl of Erroll, 1924.
Rycroft, Major-General Sir William Henry (1861-1925)
Second son of Sir Nelson Rycroft, 4th Baronet. Eton.
Joined 107 Foot, 1879; transferred to 71 Foot, 1879, 7th
Dragoon Guards, 1888, and 11th Hussars, 1896; p.s.c., 1892;
Soudan, 1884-85; Egyptian Army, Soudan, 1886-87; North-West
Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa, 1899-1900; Somaliland,
1902-03; O.C. 11th Hussars, 1904-08; S.O., South Africa,
1911-12; A.Q.M.G., Southern Command, 1912-14, and II Corps,
1914; D.A. & Q.M.G., Second Army, 1914-15; G.O.C. 32nd
Division, 1915-16 (sacked); D.Q.M.G., G.H.Q., 1916; D.A.G.,
Salonika, 1917-18; D.Q.M.G., Salonika, 1918-19; retired,
1921.
Sackville-West, Lionel Edward, Lieutenant-Colonel Lord
Sackvil].e (1867-1928)
Eldest son of Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. W.E. Sackville-West.
Succeeded his wife's father, his uncle, as 3rd Baron
Sackville, 1908. Wellington and Christ Church College,
Oxford. Joined West Kent Yeomanry, 1906; served Gallipoli,
Egypt, Palestine and France, 1915-18; G.S.O.2, British
Mission, G.A.R., 1918. Elder brother of Major-General Lord
Sackville (q.v.), father of Vita Sackville-West, succeeded
by his brother, Major-General C.J. Sackville-West (q.v.).
Sackville-West, Charles John (Major-General Lord Sackville)
"Tit Willow" (1870-1962)
Second son of Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. W.E. Sackville-West.
Succeeded his brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Sackville
(q.v.), as 4th Baron Sackville, 1928. Winchester and R.M.C.
Joined K.R.R.C., 1889; p.s.c., 1904; Manipur Expedition,
1891; Burma, 1891-92; South Africa, 1899-1900 (A.D.C. to
General Buller); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1905-06; D.A.A.G.,
Staff College, 1906-09; G.S.O.2, London District, 1909-10;
G.S.O.2, D.M.O., War Office, 1910-13; G.S.O.1, Indian Corps,
1914-15; G.S.O.1, 12th Division, 1915; G.O.C. 21st Brigade,
1915-16 (wounded, Somme); 190th Brigade, October 1916
(wounded); 182nd Brigade, 1917; M.G.G.S. (British Military
Representative, Supreme War Council, Versailles), 1917-20;
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Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey and Alderney, 1925-29;
retired, 1929. Uncle of Vita Sackville-West. Friend and
protoge of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson.
St. John, Colonel Edmund Farquhar (1879-1945)
Eldest son of Rev. Hon. E.T. St. John, third son of 14th
Baron St. John of Bletso. Harrow and R.M.A. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); S.O.,
R.A., V Corps, 1915-17; G.S.O.1, R.A., Fourth Army, 1918-19;
retired, 1933. Related by marriage to Major-General Sir
Andrew Russell (q.v.).
Salmond, Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir John Maitland "Jack"
(1881-1968)
Second son of Major-General Sir W. Salmond. Wellington and
R.M.C. Joined Royal Lancashire Regiment, 1901; transferred
to R.F.C., 1912; South Africa, 1901-02; West African
Frontier Force, 1903-05; learned to fly (Certificate
No.272) , 1912; Instructor, Central Flying School, 1912-14;
O.C. 3rd Squadron, R.F.C., 1914-15; 2nd Wing, R.F.C., 1915-
16; D.S.O., 1915; G.O.C. Training Brigade, R.F.C., U.K.,
1916-17; Director-General of Miliary Aeronautics, U.K.,
1917-18; G.O.C. R.F.C., 1918-19; C.A.S., 1930-33; Marshal of
the R.A.F., 1933. Brother of Air-Chief Marshal Sir Geoffrey
Salmond and brother-in-law of Major-General C.R. Newman
(q.v.). Somewhat overshadowed by Marshal of the R.A.F.
Viscount Trenchard (q.v.), he was one of the pioneers of
British military aviation, holding the rank of Major-General
at the age of 36 and becoming C.A.S. at the age of 48.
Sandbach, Major-General Arthur Edward (1859-1928)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1879; p.s.c.;
Egypt, 1882; Soudan, 1885; Burma, 1886-87; Sikkim
Expedition, 1888; Hazara, 1891; Soudan, 1898; South Africa,
1899-1901 (D.S.O.); C.R.E., Aldershot, 1908-10; Chief
Engineer, Ireland, 1910-14; Chief Engineer, Second Army,
1915; Inspector of Royal Engineers, 1915; G.O.C. 68th
Division, U.K., 1915-16; 59th Division, U.K. and France,
1916-17 (sacked). Wounded once.
Sanders, Brigadier-General Arthur Richard Careless (1877-
1918)
Haileybury and R.M.C. Entered Royal Engineers, 1897;
p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1908; G.S.O.3, 3rd Division,
1915; G.S.O.2, Third Army, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, Third Army,
1916-18; D.S.O., 1916, and Bar, 1918; O.C. 1/ Essex, March -
September 1918; 50th Brigade, September 1918; killed in
action, 20 September 1918.
Sandilands, Brigadier Harold Richard (1876-1961)
Harrow; Trinity College, Cambridge; and Militia. Joined
Northumberland Fusiliers, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); North-West Frontier, 1908; G.S.O.1, 23rd
Division, 1918-19 (wounded thrice); retired, 1932. Author
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of The 23rd Division, 1914-19 and The Fifth in the Great
War. Brother of Major-General J.W. Sandilands.
Sargent, Major-General Harry Neptune (1866-1946)
Educated in Ireland. Militia; joined Devonshire Regiment,
1886; transferred to A.S.C., 1890; Soudan, 1898
(despatches); South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches) ;
Assistant Director of Supplies and Transport, Irish Command,
1903-05; Deputy Assistant Director of Supplies and Ransport,
Irish Command, 1905-06; Colonel i/c A.S.C. Records, Woolwich
Dockyard, 1912-13; Assistant Director of Supplies and
Transport, Aldershot, 1913-14; A.Q.M.G., I Corps, 1914; D.A.
& Q.M.G., 1914-16; D.A. & Q.M.G., Fifth Army, 1916-17; D.A.
& Q.M.G., British Mission attached American Expeditionary
Force, 1918-19; retired, 1919. Author of The Servant Nation
(1932); This Blind World (1933); This Changing World (1935);
The Marvels of Bible Prophecy (1938); The Modern World and
its Delusions (1944)
Sceales, Brigadier-General George Adinston McLaren (1878-
1956)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902; O.C. Battalion
of The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, 1915-17; 14th
Battalion, Tank Corps, 1917-18; 1st Brigade, Tank Corps,
1918-19; retired, 1921. Author of The Historical Calendar
of the 91st Highianders (1908).
Scobell, Major-General Sir (Sanford) John Palairet (1879-
1955)
Winchester and R.M.C. Joined Norfolk Regiment, 1899;
p.s.c.; Sonialiland, 1903-04; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q.,
1916-17; G.S.O.2, XI Corps, 1917; G.S.O.1, 49th Division,
1917-19; retired, 1939. Lieutenant of the Tower of London,
1942-45.
Scott, Major-General Sir Arthur Binn 'y (1862-1944)
Cheltenham and R.M.A. Entered Roya]Arti11ery, 1881; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); B.G.R.A., Meerut
Division, 1914-15; B.G.R.A., Indian Corps, 1915; M.G.R.A.,
Third Army, 1915; G.O.C. 12th Division, 1915-18; retired,
1920. Author with P.M. Brumwell of The History of the 12th
(Eastern) Division in the Great War 1914-18 (1923).
Scott, Major-General Charles Walker (1875-1929)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1894;
p.s.c.; West African Frontier Force, 1899-1900; South
Africa, 1900-02; D.S.O., 1915; Member of Ordnance Committee,
Ministry of Munitions, 1915-16; Assistant-Director of
Artillery, G.H.Q., 1916-18 (wounded).
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Scrase-Dickens, Brigadier-General Spencer William (1862-
1919)
Eton. Joined Highland Light Infantry, 1882. Egypt, 1882;
North-West Frontier, 1897-98; G.O.C. 28th Division, 1914-16;
27th Division, 1916; 37th Division, 1916; died 23 October
1919.
Segrave, Brigadier-General William Henry-Erik (1875-1964)
Beaumont College and Militia. Joined Highland Light
Infantry, 1898; p.s.c.; Crete, 1898 (wounded, despatches,
D.S.O.); South Africa, 1901-02; Staff Captain, War Office,
1914; D.A.A.G., G.H.Q., 1914; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q.,, 1916;
G.S.O.2, 48th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 4th Division, 1916-
17; O.C. 15/London Regiment, 1917-18; 152nd Brigade, 1918-
19; retired, 1929. Brother of Vice-Admiral J.R. Segrave.
Shea, General Sir John Stuart MacKenzie "Jinuny' (1869-1966)
Sedburgh and R.M.C. Joined Royal Irish Regiment, 1888;
transferred to Indian Army (15th Bengal Lancers), 1891;
p.s.c.; Chitral, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1901 (D.S.O.);
Professor, Staff College, Quetta, 1906-14; G.S.O.1
(Liaison), G.H.Q., 1914; G.S.O.1, 6th Division, 1914-15;
G.O.C. 151st Brigade, 1915-16; 30th Division, 1916-17
(sacked); 60th Division, E.E.F., 1917-19; retired, 1932.
Brother of Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Shea and brother-in-law
of General Sir Walter Congreve (q.v.).
Shephard, Brigadier-General Gordon Strachey (1885-1918)
Second son of Sir Horatio Shephard. Eton and R.M.C. Joined
Royal Fusiliers, 1905; transferred to R.F.C., 1912; p.s.c.;
Captain, 1913; O.C. 6th Squadron, R.F.C., 1914-15; 12th
(Corps) Wing, R.F.C., 1916-17; 1st Brigade, R.F.C., 1917-18;
M.C., 1915; D.S.O., 1917; killed in an aeroplane accident,
"stunting" a Nieuport which he kept for his own use, 19
January 1918. Interpreter in French and German. Prior to
the war he did a great deal of yatching and is said to have
been a model for Carruthers in Erskine Childers' The Riddle
of the Sands (1903). He was only 31 when he was given
command of 1st Brigade, R.F.C., in 1917.
Sherbrooke, Colonel Nevile Hugh Cairns (1880-1944)
Grandson of 1st Earl Cairns. Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1898; p.s.c., 1914; South Africa, 1900-02;
D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, Australian Depots in England, 1917-
18; G.S.O.1, 35th Division, 1918-19; retired, 1936.
Shoubridge, Major-General (Thomas) Herbert (1871-1923)
Blundell's School, Tiverton. Joined Dorset Regiment;
transferred to Northumberland Fusiliers, 1900; p.s.c.;
Tirah, 1897-98 (despatches, D.S.O.); South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); G.S.O.2, West Lancashire Division, 1912-14;
G.S.O.2, Southern Command, 1914; G.S.O.1, 18th Division,
1915; G.O.C. 54th Brigade, 1915-17; 7th Division, France and
Italy, 1917-19; Commandant, R.M.C., 1923; retired, 1923.
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Shute, General Sir Cameron Deane (1866-1936)
Educated Marlborough and France. Joined Welsh Regiment,
1885; p.s.c.; Soudan, 1898; O.C. 2/Rifle Brigade, 1910-14;
B.G.G.S, Aldershot, 1914-15; G.O.C. 59th Brigade, 1915-16;
63rd Division, 1916-17; 32nd Division, 1917; 19th Division,
1917; 32nd Division, 1917-18; V Corps, 1918-19; retired,
1931. Had the reputation of being a martinet.
Sillem, Major-General Sir Arnold Frederick (1865-1949)
Eastbourne College and Militia. Joined Royal West Surrey
Regiment, 1887; p.s.c., 1907; South Africa, 1899-1902
(severely wounded, despatches); Egyptian Army, 1891-94; O.C.
Battalion of the Worcestershire Regiment, 1912-14; Assistant
Commandant, R.M.C., 1914-15; A.A. & Q.M.G., 3rd Division,
1915; A.Q.M.G., I Corps, 1915-16; D.A. & Q.M.G., Third Army,
1916-19; retired, 1924.
Simpeon-Baikie, Brigadier Sir Hugh Archie Dundas (1871-1924)
United Services College. Entered Royal Artillery, 1889;
p.s.c.; Soudan, 1899 (despatches); South Africa, 1900-1902
(despatches); G.S.O.2, War Office, 1909-10; G.S.O.1, 48th
Division, 1915; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915; C.R.A., 29th
Division and VIII Corps, M.E.F., 1915; B.G.G.S., East Africa
Force, 1915-16; C.R.A., 60th Division, UK., France,
Salonika, and E.E.F., 1916-17; C.R.A.,, XXI Corps, E.E.F.,
1917-18; retired, 1920.
Sinclair-Maclagen, Major-General Ewen George (1868-1948)
United Services College and Militia. Militia; joined Border
Regiment, 1889; transferred to Yorkshire Regiment, 1908;
Waziristan Field Force, 1894-95; South Africa, 1899-1901
(severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); New South Wales
Military Forces, 1902-04; Director of Drill, R.M.C.,
Duntroon, Australia, 1911-14; G.O.C. 3rd Australian Brigade,
1914-17; Director of Training, A.I.F. Depots, U.K., 1917;
G.O.C. 4th Australian Division, 1917-19; 51st (Highland)
Division, 1919-23; retired, 1925. The ideal type of
regimental soldier and one of the very few British officers
to remain with the A.I.F. throughout the war..
Skeffington-Smyth, Lieutenant-Colonel Geoffrey Henry Julian
(1873-1939)
Eton. Joined 9th Lancers, 1895; South Africa, 1899-1900
(severely wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); retired, 1906.
Conservative candidate, 1906 and 1910. re-employed, 1914;
G.S.O.3 and G.S.O.2, War Office, 1914-16; sick leave, 1916;
G.S.O.2, 1917-18, and G.S.O.1, Mission to French Army, 1918-
19; retired, 1923. Assumed the surname FitzPatrick, 1938.
Second prize in the 'Sword v. Lance' competition at the
Royal Military Tournament, 1896.
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Skinner, Major-General Bruce Morland (1858-1932)
All Saints School, Bloxham. Entered Army, 1882; Major,
R.A.M.C., 1894; North-West Frontier, 1897-98; South Africa,
1899-1901 (despatches); P.M.O., 6th Division, South Africa,
1900; Commandant, R.A.M.C. College, 1912-14; D.D.M.S., 1915-
16; D.M.S., Fifth Army, 1916-18.
Skinner, Major-General Sir (Percy) Cyriac Burrel]. (1871-
1955)
Charterhouse and R.M.C. Joined Northampton Regiment, 1891;
p.s.c.; West Africa, 1897-97; South Africa, 1899-1902;
G.S.O.3, South Africa; G.S.O.2, Bermuda, 1912; employed
under Union of South Africa, 1912-15; G.O.C. 41st Brigade,
1916-18; D.S.O., 1917; 14th Division, 1918-19; retired,
1929.
Sloggett, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Thomas (1857-1929)
Son of Inspector-General W.H. Sloggett. Entered Army, 1881;
Lieutenant-Colonel, R.A.M.C., 1896; Indian Frontier, 1884;
Dongola, 1896 (despatches); Soudan, 1897-98 (dangerously
wounded, despatches); South Africa, 1899-1903 (despatches);
P.M.O., Home and London Districts, 1903-08; P.M.O., 14th
Division, India, 1908-11; D.M.S., India, 1911-14; Director-
General, A.M.S., 1914-18; D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1915-18. Father
of Lieutenant-Colonel A.J.H. Sloggett. He had a reputation
as a womaniser.
Sloman, Brigadier-General Henry Stanhope (1861-1945)
Sherborne. Joined East Surrey Regiment, 1882; p.s.c.;
Egyptian Army, 1896-1900; Soudan, 1885 and 1897-98
(despatches); South Africa, 1900-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.2,
War Office, 1911-12; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.1,
III Corps, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 62nd Division, U.K., 1915-16;
G.O.C. 204th Brigade, U.K., 1916-18; retired, 1918. Author
with Colonel C.W. Pearse of The History of the East Surrey
Regiment, Volumes II and III, 1914-1919 (1923-24)
Smith, Major-General Sir William Douglas (1865-1939)
Joined Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1885; Burma, 1886; Tirah,
1897-98; O.C. 1/Royal Scots Fusiliers, 1911-14; 9th Brigade,
1914-16; 20th Division, 1916-17; 56th Division, 1917; 20th
Division, 1917-18; retired, 1920.
Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace Lockward "S.D." (1858-
1930)
Harrow. Joined Derby Regiment, 1876; p.s.c., 1888; Zulu
War, 1879 (one of few survivors of Isandhlwana and was
recommended for the V.C.); Egypt, 1882; Soudan, 1885-86
(D.S.O.); Chitral, 1895; Tirah, 1897-98; Brigade and
Divisional Commander, South Africa, 1899-1901; A.G., India,
1901-03; G.O.C. 48th Division, 1903-07; Aldershot, 1907-12;
Southern Command, 1912-14; II Corps, 1914; Second Army,
1914-1915 (sacked); First Army, Home Defence, U.K., 1915;
Governor, Gibraltar, 1918-23; retired, 1923. Author of
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Memories of Forty-Eight Year's Service (1925). Brother of
Rear-Admiral A.H. Smith-Dorrien.
Smyth, Major-General Sir Nevill Maskelyrie (1868-1941)
Educated privately and at the R.M.C.; joined 2nd Dragoon
Guards, 1888; transferred to 6th Dragoon Guards, 1903; Zhob
Valley, 1890; Dongola, 1896; Soudan, 1897-98 (severely
wounded, despatches, V.C.); Soudan, 1899-1901; Abyssinia,
1901-02; South Africa, 1902-03; Egyptian Army, 1896-1902,
and 1913-15; learnt to fly, 1913; G.O.C. 1st Australian
Brigade, 1915-16; 2nd Australian Division, 1916-18; 58th
Division, 1918 (sick) ; 59th Division, 1918-19; retired,
1924; emigrated to Australia, 1925. As a man of few words
he was known to Australians as "The Sphinx". Highly
regarded.
Smyth-Osbourne, Air Commodore Henry Percy (1879-1969)
H.M.S. Britannia. Entered Royal Navy, 1895; Commander,
1913; R.N.A.S., 1915-18; G.O.C. 9th Brigade, R.F.C., 1918-
19; retired, 1924. Joint Master, Eggesford Hounds. Younger
brother of Brigadier-General G.N.T. Smyth-Osbourne.
Snow, General Sir Thomas D'Oyly "Snowball" (1858-1940)
Eton and Cambridge University. Joined Somerset Light
Infantry, 1879; p.s.c.; Zulu War, 1879; Soudan, 1884-85
(severely wounded); Soudan, 1898 (despatches); G.O.C. 11th
Brigade, 1910-11; 4th Division, 1911-14 (incapacitated);
27th Division, 1914-15; VII Corps, 1915-18; retired, 1920.
Solly-Flood, Major-General Arthur (1871-1940)
Son of Major-General Sir Frederick Sally-Flood. Stubbington
House, Hampshire; Wellington and R.M.C. Joined South
Lancashire Regiment, 1891; transferred to 4th Dragoon
Guards, 1908; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches,
D.S.O.); G.S.O.2, War Office, 1906-08; G.S.O.2, Egypt, 1909-
13; G.O.C. 35th Brigade, 1915-17; B.G.G.S., Training,
G.H.Q., 1917; G.O.C. 42nd Division, 1917-19; retired, 1931.
Innovator in new tactics during the war, whose contribution
has been overshadowed by General Sir Ivor Maxse.
Soutry, Lieutenant-Colonel Trevor Lloyd Blunden (born 1878)
Cheltenham. Joined Royal Irish Rifles, 1899; South Africa,
1899-1902 (despatches); D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O..1, 63rd
Division, 1918 (despatches, wounded); retired, 1920.
Spender, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Wilfred Bliss (1876-1960)
Winchester and Militia. Entered Royal Artillery, 1897;
p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1908-10; retired to join the
Ulster Volunteer Force, 1913; re-employed, 1914; G.S.O.2,
36th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1916; G.S.O.1, 31st
Division, 1916-18; retired, 1919; Head of Civil Service,
Northern Ireland, 1925-44; knighted, 1929.
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Stephens, General Sir Reginald Byng "Stiff'un" (1869-1955)
Winchester. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1890; p.s.c.; Soudan,
1898; South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely wounded,
despatches); Matabele War, 1906; Instructor, R.M.C., 1907-
11; O.C. 2/Rifle Brigade, 1914-15; 25th Brigade, 1915-16;
5th Division, 1916-18; X Corps, 1918-19; Commandant, R.M.C.,
1919-23; Director-General, T.A., 1927-31; retired, 1931. A
good trainer of troops.
Stericker, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur William (born 1879)
Victoria College, Jersey, and Brighton College. Joined
D.C.L.I., 1899; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches);
D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, 20th Division, 1918-19.
Stewart, Brigadier-General Cosmo Gordon (1869-1948)
Educated Victoria College, Jersey; France and Germany.
Entered Royal Artillery, 1888; p.s.c.; Kurram Expedition,
1892-93; Chitral (despatches, D.S.O.); Egyptian Army, 1897-
1900; Soudan, 1897-99; Sudd Expedition, 1900; South Africa,
1901-02; G.S.O.2, Staff College, 1909-13; G.S.O.1, 24th
Division, 1915-16; G.0.C. 183rd Brigade, 1916; B.G.R..A.,
33rd Division, 1917-18; G.O.C. South Midland Reserve
Brigade, 1918-19 (despatches, very severely wounded);
retired, 1925.
Stewart, Brigadier-General Ian (1874-1941)
R.M.C. Joined Scotish Rifles, 1895; p.s.c., 1909; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.3, South Africa, 1911-
12; G.S.O.2, South Africa, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, 7th Division,
1914-15; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.1, 51st Division, 1915-16;
B.G.G.S., XIII Corps, 1916-19; C.M.G., 1919; retired, 1921.
Brother of Lieutenant-Colonel P.D. Stewart, D.S.O.
Stewart, Major-General Sir (John Henry) Keith (1872-1955)
Eldest son of Lieutenant-General J.M. Stewart. Repton and
R.M.C. Entered Army, 1892; joined Indian Army (39th Garhwal
Rifles), 1893; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1897-98;
Brigade-Major, Garhwal Brigade, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, Lahore
Division, 1915-17; B.G.G.S., I and III Indian Corps,
Mesopotamia, 1917-21; retired, 1929. Brother of Colonel
P.A.V. Stewart (q.v.).
Stewart, Colonel Patrick Alexander Vansittart (1875-1960)
Second son of Lieutenant-General J.M. Stewart. Repton and
Militia. Joined K.O.S.B., 1896; p.s.c.; Tirah, 1897-98;
South Africa, 1902; Instructor, R.M.C., 1913-14; G.S.O.1,
9th Division, 1916-17; retired, 1931. Brother of Major-
General Sir Keith Stewart (q.v.).
Stirling, Major Patrick Douglas (1889-1973)
Joined Scottish Yeomanry as Second Lieutenant, 1912;
temporary Lieutenant, 1915; temporary Captain, 1916;
Captain, Duke of Wellington's (West Riding Regiment), 1917;
G.S.O.1, VIII Corps, 1918-19. J.P. for Perthshire.
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Stranack, Lieutenant-Colonel Cyril Edwin (born 1882)
Cheltenham. Entered Royal Artillery, 1901; Instructor,
R.M.C., 1914; D.S.O., 1917; S.O., R.A., II A.N.Z.A.C. Corps,
1917; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.2, R.A., XXII Corps, 1917-18;
G.S.O.1, R.A., Second Army, 1918-19.
Strick, Major-General John Arkwright (1870-1934)
Joined Shropshire Light Infantry, 1890; North-West Frontier,
1897-98; D.S.O., 1915; A.A. & Q.M.G., B.E.F., 1915-17; Base
Commandant, Italy, 1917-18; Inspector-General of
Communications, Italy, 1918-19; G.O.C. British Forces in
Italy, 1919-20; retired, 1926.
Strickland, General Sir Edward Peter "Strick" (1869-1951)
Warwick School and Militia. Joined Norfolk Regiment, 1888;
transferred to Manchester Regiment, 1914; Burma, 1887-88;
Egyptian Army, 1896-1903; Dongola Expedition, 1896
(despatches); Soudan, 1897-99 (despatches, D.S.O.); West
African Frontier Force, 1906-13; Nigeria, 1906; O.C.
Manchester Regiment, 1914-15; Jullundur Brigade, 1915; 98th
Brigade, 1915-16; 1st Division, 1916-19; retired, 1931. Had
a reputation of being a martinet and was known as "Hungry
Face" to his men.
Stuart, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander George (1872-1916)
Shrewsbury. Joined Royal Scots, 1894; transferred Indian
Army (40th Pathans), 1904; p.s.c.; Staff Captain and D.A. &
Q.M.G., H.Q., India, 1905-09; Mohmand Field Force, 1908;
G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-12; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1912-14;
G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1914-16; G.S.O.1, 50th Division, 1916;
killed in action, visiting the front-line, 4 June 1916.
Stuart, Major-General Sir Andrew Mitchell (1861-1936)
Son of General J.R. Stuart. Dulwich. Entered Royal
Engineers, 1879; Soudan, 1884-86 (despatches); Colonel,
1910; Assistant Director of Fortifications and Works, War
Office, 1910-14; Director of Works, B.E.F., 1914-19;
retired, 1920.
Stuart-Wortley see Montague-Stuart-Wortley
Studd, Brigadier-General Herbert William (1870-1947)
Eton; Trinity College, Cambridge; and Militia. Joined
Coldstream Guards, 1891; p.s.c., 1905; South Africa, 1899-
1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.2, London District, 1905-
09; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, I Corps, 1914;
O.C. 1/Coldstream Guards, 1914 (dangerously wounded); 19th
Reserve Brigade, U.K., 1915-16; 180th Brigade, 1916;
B.G.G.S., XI Corps, 1916-17; B.G.G.S., Supreme War Council,
Versailles, 1917-19; retired, 1923.
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Sutton, Major-General Hugh Clement "Dickie" (1867-1928)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Coldstream Guards, 1887; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); O.C. 1/Coldstream Guards,
1910-13; A.A.G., War Office, 1913-16; D.A. & Q.M.G., Fourth
Army, 1916; Assistant to Major-General i/c Administration
(Brigadier-General), Home Forces, 1916-17; Inspector-General
of Communications, Home Forces, 1917; Deputy Inspector-
General of Communications, Mesopotamia, 1917-19.
Sutton Nelthorpe, Colonel Oliver (1888-1963)
Eton and R.M.A. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1906; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1917-18; G.S.O.l, G.H.Q., 1918-19; D.S.O., 1919;
retired, 1920.
Swinton, Major-General Sir Ernest Dunlop (1868-1951)
Rugby; Cheltenham; University College School, London; and
Blackheath Propriety School. Entered Royal Engineers, 1888;
G.S.O.2, Press Work, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.l, Secretary,
C.I.D., 1915-16; Commander, Heavy Section, Machine Gun
Corps, 1916; G.S.O.1, Assistant Secretary, C.I.D., 1916-18;
retired, 1919. Chichele Professor of Military History,
Oxford University, 1925-39. Author of The Defence of
Duffer's Drift (1904), The Green Curve (1909), The Great Tab
Dope (1915), A Year Ago (1916), The Study of War (1926);
Eye-Witness ( 1932), and Over My Shoulder (1951).
Sykes, Major-General Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Hugh "Bill"
(1877-1954)
Educated privately and abroad. In the Ranks, Imperial
Yeomanry Scouts, South Africa, 1900-01 (dangerously
wounded); joined 15th Hussars, 1901; transferred R.F.C.,
1912; p.s.c., 1909; West African Regiment, 1903-04;
Ballooning Certificate, 1904; Intelligence Branch, India,
1905-06; Attache, German manoeuvres, 1907; Pilot's
Certificate No.95, 1910; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-12;
Commander, R.F.C., 1912-14; G.S.O.1, R.F.C., 1914-15;
C.A.S., 1918-19; retired, 1922. Unionist M.P., 1922-28 and
1940-45. Author of Aviation in Peace and War (1922); From
Many Angles ( 1942), and Roads to Recovery (1944). Son-in-
law of A. Bonar Law (Unionist M.P., Chancellor of the
Exchequor, 1916-18; Prime Minister, 1922-23) . Of
considerable ability, he had a knack of making himself
disliked, notably through his intrigues to have General Sir
David Henderson replaced as commander of the R.F.C. in
France by himself.
Symons, Brigadier-General Adolphe (1872-1954)
Clifton and R.M.C. Joined 13th Hussars, 1892; p.s.c.; South
Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); S.0., War Office, 1902-06;
G.S.O.2, Irish Command, 1908-12; G.S.O.1, 33rd Division,
1915-16; G.S.O.1, War Office, 1916-17; Deputy D.S.D., War
Office, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, IV Corps, 1918; G.S.O.1, 51st
Division, 1918; G.O.C. 94th Brigade, 1918 (sick); retired,
1919.
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Tagart, Major-General Sir Harold Arthur Lewis (1870-1930)
Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge. Joined 15th Hussars,
1890; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1900 (invalided home,
despatches, D.S.O.); O.C. 15th Hussars, 1911-14; D.A. &
Q.M.G., Third Army, 1915-16; D.A. & Q.M.G., G.H.Q., Home
Forces, 1916-18; retired, 1919.
Tandy, Brigadier-General Ernest Napier "Napper" (1879-1953)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1898;
p.s.c., 1913; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.3,
G.H.Q., 1915; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1915-17; G.S.O.l, 1st
Division, 1918; retired, 1921. Brother of Brigadier Sir
Edward Tandy.
Tanner, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Courtney (1879-1965)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined Lancashire Fusiliers, 1899;
transferred to Royal Scots, 1908; p.s.c., 1912; D.S.O.,
1914; Instructor, R.M.C., 1915; G.S.O.2, Staff Course,
Cambridge, 1917; G.S.O.l, G.H.Q., British Forces in Italy,
1917-18; G.S.O.1, Second Army, 1918-19; retired, 1930.
Taylor, Brigadier-General Reginald O'Bryan (1872-1949)
Marlborough. Joined Wiltshire Regiment, 1892; transferred
to Indian Army (19th Lancers), 1896; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1900; G.S.O.2, Staff College, Quetta, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 1st
Indian Cavalry Division, 1914-15; B.G.G.S., M.E.F., 1915;
G.O.C. 159th Brigade, M.E.F., 1915-16; 187th Brigade, U.K.
and France, 1916-18; West Lancashire Reserve Brigade, 1918;
retired, 1921.
Teck, H.H. Duke of (later Marquess of Cambridge) "Dolly"
(1868-1927)
Eldest son of the Duke of Teck and the daughter of the 1st
Duke of Cambridge. Married daughter of the 1st Duke of
Westminster. Wellington and R.M.C. Joined 17th Lancers,
1888; transferred to 1st Life Guards, 1895; South Africa,
1899-1900; Military Attache, Vienna, 1904-09; Assistant
Military Secretary, War Office, 1915; Military Secretary,
G.H.Q., 1915-16; created Marquess of Cambridge, 1917;
retired, 1919. Brother of Prince Alexander of Teck (later
Earl of Athlone) (q.v.).
Teck, H.S.H. Prince Alexander of Duke of (later Earl of
Ath.lone) (1874-1957)
Third son of the Duke of Teck and the daughter of the 1st
Duke of Cambridge. Married H.R.H. Princess Mary Adelaide,
daughter of the 1st Duke of Albany. Eton and R.M.C. Joined
7th Hussars, 1894; transferred to Royal Horse Guards, 1904,
and 2nd Life Guards, 1911; Matabele, 1896-97; South Africa,
1899-1900; G.S.O.2, British Mission, Belgian H.Q., 1914-15;
Assistant Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 1915; G.S.O.1, British
Mission, Belgian H.Q., 1915-18; created Earl of Athlone,
1917; B.G.G.S., British Mission, H.Q., 1918-19; retired,
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1919. Governor-General of South Africa, 1923-31, and
Canada, 1940-46. Brother of the Duke of Teck (later
Marquess of Cambridge) (q.v.).
Temperley, Major-General Arthur Cecil (1877-1940)
Sherborne and Queen's College, Cambridge. Joined
Northumberland Fusiliers, 1900; transferred Norfolk
Regiment, 1908; South Africa, 1901-02; Mohmand Expedition,
1908; G.S.O., New Zealand Military Forces, 1913-14; Brigade-
Major, New Zealand Brigade, M.E.F., 1914-15; G.S.O.2,
A.N.Z.A.C. Division, E.E.F. andB.E.F., 1916-17; G.S.O.2,
Desert Mounted Corps, E.E.F., 1917; G.S.O.1, 60th Division,
E.E.F., 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 74th Division, 1918; retired,
1935. Military Correspondent, Daily Telegraph, 1935-39.
Thesiger, Major-General George Handcock (1868-1915)
Grandson of 1st Baron Chelmsford, eldest son of Lieutenant-
General Hon. C.W. Thesiger, and nephew of General Lord
Chelmsford. Educated Eton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade,
1890; p.s.c., 1901-02; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1900
(severely wounded); D.A.A.G. for Musketry at Salisbury
Plain, 1902-06; A.M.S., to the G.O.C. in Ireland, 1908-09;
Inspector-General, King's African Rifles, 1909-13; O.C.
4/Rifle Brigade, India and B.E.F., 1913-15; 2nd Brigade, May
- August 1915; 33 Division, U.K., August - September 1915;
9th Division, September 1915; killed in action during the
Battle of Loos, 27 September 1915.
Thompson, Major-General Sir Harry Neville (1861-1925)
Royal Armagh School and Trinity College, Dublin. Entered
Army, 1884; Major, R.A.M.C., 1896; Soudan, 1898; South
Africa, 1900-02 (despatches, D.S.O.); D.D.M.S., Scottish
Command, 1913-14; A.D.M.S., 2nd Division, 1914; A.D.M.S.,
48th Division, 1915; D.D.M.S., VI Corps, 1915-17; D.M.S.,
First Army, 1917-19; D.M.S., British Army of the Rhine,
1919-20; retired, 1920.
Thomson, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Guthrie (1873-1953)
Fettes and R.M.C. Joined Northumberland Fusiliers, 1893;
transferred to Indian Army (38th Rifles), 1897; North-West
Frontier, 1902; G.S.O.3, H.Q., India, 1910-11; G.S.O.2,
H.Q., India, 1911-13; G.S.O.2, American Staff College,
France, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, 36th Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, 52nd
Division, 1918-19; retired, 1920.
Thomson, Major-General James (1862-1953)
Aberdeen University. Entered Army, 1884; Major, R.A.M.C.,
1896; Soudan, 1898; O.C. i/c R.A.M.C. Records, 1913-16;
A.D.M.S., 5th Division, 1916; D.D.M.S., VIII Corps, 1918;
D.D.M.S., Eastern Command, 1918; D.D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1918-
19; retired, 1920.
494
Thorp, Colonel Herbert Walter Beck (1879-1934)
Harrow and R.M.C. Joined Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1898;
p.s.c.; Somaliland, 1901-04 (despatches); South Africa,
1901-02; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1, 35th Division, 1917-18;
G.S.O.l, G.S.O.1, Tank Corps, 1918-19; retired, 1933.
Thorpe, Major-General Gervase (1877-1962)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Argyll and Sutherland Highianders,
1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1915-16; G.S.O.2, 46th Division, 1916; G.S.O.l, 46th
Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.l, Third Army, 1917-18; G.O.C. 17th
Brigade, 1918-19; retired, 1939.
Thuillier, Major-General Sir Henry Fleetwood (1868-1953)
Wimbledon School and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1887;
Chitral, 1895; G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, 1915-16; Director of Gas
Services, B.E.F., 1916-17; G.O.C. 15th Division, 1917;
Controller, Chemical Warfare, Ministry of Munitions, 1917-
18; G.O.C. 23rd Division, Italy, 1918-19; Commandant, School
of Military Engineering, 1919-23; Director of Fortifications
and Works, War Office, 1924-27; retired, 1930.
Thwaites, General Sir William (1865-1947)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1887;
p.s.c., 1904; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches) ; G.S.O.3,
War Office, 1905-06; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1906-10; G.S.O.2,
nd London Division, 1912-14; G.S.O.1, 47th Division, 1914-
15; G.O.C. 141st Brigade, 1915-16 (wounded); 46th Division,
1916-18; D.M.I., War Office, 1918-22; Director-General,
T.A., 1931-33; retired, 1933.
Traill. Lieutenant-Colonel William Henry (1871-1951)
Educated privately and R.M.C. Joined East Lancashire
Regiment, 1892; p.s.c.; Tirah, 1897-98; G.S.O.1, 3rd
Division, 1916-19; D.S.O., 1917; retired, 1921.
Treherne, Major-General Sir Francis Harper (1858-1955)
Godolphin School and St. Bartholomews t s Hospital. Entered
Army, 1882; Major, R.A.M.C., 1894; Egypt, 1882; Soudan,
1884-5; South Africa, 1899-1901 (Surgeon on the personal
staff of General Sir George White during the siege of
Ladysmith, 1899-1900); North-West Frontier, 1908; A.D.M.S.,
India, 1911-14; D.D.M.S., Meerut Division, 1914-15; D.M.S.,
Third Army, 1915-16; D.M.S., Mesopotamia, 1916-17; D.D.M.S.,
London District, 1917-18; retired, 1918. His daughter
married the son of Field-Marshal Sir Claud Jacob (q.v.).
Trenchard, Hugh Montague (Marshal of the R.A.F. Viscount
Trenchard) "Boom" (1873-1958)
Educated privately and Militia. Joined Royal Scots
Fusiliers, 1893; transferred to R.F.C., 1912; South Africa,
1899-1902 (dangerouly wounded); Nigeria, 1904-06
(despatches, D.S.O.); West African Frontier Force, 1903-10;
Instructor, Central Flying School, 1912-13; Assistant
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Commandant, C.F.S., 1913-14; O.C. R.F.C., U.K., 1914-15; 1st
Wing, R.F.C., B.E.F., 1915; G.O.C. R.F.C., B.E.F., 1915-18;
C.A.S., 1918; G.O.C., Independent Air Force, 1918-19;
C.A.S., 1919-29; created Marshal of the R.A.F., 1927; Baron,
1930; Chief Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, 1931-35;
created Viscount, 1936. Regarded as the artitect of the
Royal Air Force's survival and development after the war.
Tudor, Major-General Sir (Henry) Hugh (1871-1965)
Newton Abbott and abroad. Entered Royal Artillery, 1890;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (wounded, despatches); BG.R.A., 9th
Division, 1916-18; G.O.C. 9th Division, 1918-19; Chief of
Police, Ireland, 1920; Inspector-General of Police and
Prisons, Palestine, 1922; retired, 1925. He was an
innovator in the employment of gas and smoke shells. A
friend of Winston Churchill.
Tulluch, Brigadier-General James Bruce Gregorie (1870-1946)
Son of Major-General Sir Alexander Tulluch. Dover College.
Joined Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1890; p.s.c.; Tirah, 1897-
98; South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.2, South China, 1911-13;
G.S.O.3, Lines of Communication, B.E.F., 1914-15; G.S.O.l,
49th Division, 1915; D.A.A. & Q.M.G., 5th Division, 1915;
A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Division, 1915-17; D.A. & Q.M.G., VI
Corps, 1917-19; retired, 1927.
Turner, Brigadier-General Arthur Jervois (1878-1952)
Bedford and R.M.A. (Sword of Honour). Entered Royal
Artillery, 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1900 and 1902
(severely wounded, despatches); West Africa, 1904;
Cameroons, 1914-15; Instructor, R.M.A., 1901-02; West
African Frontier Force, 1903-04; G.S.O.3, Aldershot Command,
1911-13; S.O. to Inspector-General King's African Rifles
(G.S.O.2), 1913-15; G.S.O.2, 24th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1,
Second Army, 1916; G.S.O.1, 47th Division, 1916-18; G.S.O.1,
American Staff School, France, 1918; G.O.C. 105th Brigade,
1918-19; retired, 1930.
Turner, Colonel John Earner (1880-1955)
Cheltenham and R.M.C. Joined Scottish Rifles, 1900; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-1902; Adjutant, T.F., 1910-12; G.S.O.1,
58th Division, 1917; D.S.O., 1917; G.S.O.1, Fourth Army,
1917-18; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., Italy, 1918-19; retired, 1925.
Turner, Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Ernest William (1871-
1961)
Canadian. Quebec High School and University of Bishop's
College, Lennoxville. Wholesale merchant in Quebec. Joined
10th Queen's Own Canadian Hussars, 1892; South Africa, 1899-
1900 (wounded, despatches, D.S.O., V.C.); O.C. 10th Queen's
Own Canadian Hussars, 1905-07; 3rd Canadian Cavalry Brigade,
1907-12; retired, 1912; 3rd Canadian Brigade, 1914-15; 2nd
Canadian Division, 1915-16; Canadian Overseas Military
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Forces, U.K., 1916-18; C.G.S., Canadian Forces, U.K., 1918-
19. Freemason, Conservative and Anglican.
Twining, Major-General Sir Philip Geoffrey (1862-1920)
Canadian. R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Entered Royal
Engineers, 1886; A.A. & Q.M.G., Meerut Division, 1915; D.A.
& Q.M.G., XIII Corps, 1915-16; Director of Light Railways
and Roads, G.H.Q., 1916-17; Deputy Director-General of
Transportation, 1917; D.A. & Q.M.G., First Army, 1917-18;
Director of Fortifications and Works, War Office, 1918-20.
Author of contributions to reviews and periodicals upon
military and general subjects.
Twi gs, Major-General Sir William Louis Oberkirch (1879-1962)
Son of Baroness Marie d'Oberkirch of Moisheim, Alsace.
Bedford and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1898; transferred Indian
Army (9th Gurkhas Rifles), 1899; p.s.c., 1907; China, 1900-
01 (despatches); Tibet, 1903-04; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1908-
12; G.S.0.2, Indian Corps, 1914-16; G.S.O.2, First Army,
1916; G.S.O.1, First Army, 1916-17; Deputy D.M.I. (G.S.O.l),
India, 1917-19; retired, 1939. Founder member of Royal
Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, and
Himalayan Club. Author of Some of My Memories (privately
printed, 1960)
Uniacke, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Crofton Campbell
(1866-1934)
R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1885; South Africa, 1899-
1902; Nigeria, 1903; Chief Instructor, School of Gunnery,
1913-14; Commandant, School of instruction for Royal
Artillery, Shoeburyness, 1914; B.G.R.A., Heavy Artillery
Reserve, B.E.F., 1915; B.G.R.A., V Corps, 1915-16; B.G.R.A.,
III Corps, 1916; M.G.R.A., Fifth Army, 1916-18; Deputy
Inspector-General of Training, 1918-19; retired, 1932.
Van Straubenzee, Major-General Sir Casimir Cartwright
"Straw" (1867-1956)
Canadian. R.M.C., Kingston, Canada. Entered Royal
Artillery, 1886; Ashanti, 1895-96; Professor, R.M.C.,
Kingston, Canada, 1898-1903; Instructor, School of Gunnery,
1909-12; Chief Instructor, School of Instruction for R.H. &
R.F.A., 1914-15; B.G.R.A., 18th Division, 1915-16; B.G.R.A.,
X Corps, 1916-17; Inspector-General of R.A., Home Forces,
1917-18; M.G.R.A., Fifth Army, 1918-19; retired, 1929.
Vaughan, Major-General John (1871-1956)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined 7th Hussars, 1891; transferred to
10th Hussars, 1904; p.s.c.; Matabeleland, 1896; Mashonaland,
1897; Soudan, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1901 (severely
wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); Commandant Cavalry School,
Netheravon, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, Cavalry Division, 1914; G.O.C.
3rd Cavalry Brigade, 1914-15; 3rd Cavalry Division, 1915-18;
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Inspector-General of Q.M.G.'s Services, France, 1918-19;
retired, 1920. Author of Cavalry and Sporting Memories
(1955)
Vaughan, Lieutenant-General Sir Louis Ridley "Father" (1875-
1942)
Uppingham and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1896; transferred Indian
Army (7th Gurkha Rifles), 1896; p.s.c.; G.S.O.3, H.Q.,
India, 1910-12; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1914; G.S.O.2, 2nd Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.1, 2nd
Division, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., XV Corps, 1916-17; M.G.G.S.,
Third Army, 1917-19; Commandant, Staff College, Quetta,
1919-22; retired, 1928. Like an Oxford Don in his
professional manner, sweetness of speech, gentleness of
voice and gesture.
Vincent, Brigadier-General Sir Berkeley (1871-1963)
Wellington and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1891;
transferred to 6th Dragoon Guards, 1908; p.s.c.; China,
1900; South Africa, 1901-02; attached to Japanese Army in
Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05; G.S.O.2,
Staff College, Quetta, 1910-11; G.S.O.2, India, 1913-14;
G.S.O.2, Indian Corps, 1914; G.S.O.1, 37th Division, 1915-
17; G.O.C. 35th Brigade, 1917-19 (gassed); retired, 1924.
Vivian, Lieutenant-Colonel Valentine (1880-1948)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Grenadier Guards, 1899; p.s.c.;
South Africa, 1899-1902; Brigade-Major, 4th Brigade, 1915;
G.S.O.3, 1st Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.2, Intelligence,
G.H.Q., 1916; G.S.O.l, Intelligence, Fourth Army, 1916-19;
retired, 1922. Married daughter of 5th Earl of
Portarlington, 1904.
Wace, Brigadier-General Edward Gurth (1876-1962)
Son of Major-General R. Wace, C.B., R.A. Marlborough and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1896; p.s.c.; S.O., War
Office, 1907-10; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.2, War
Office, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q., 1915; G.S.O.2, 15th
Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 32nd Division, 1916 (sacked) ;
Deputy Director of Labour Force, France, 1916-18; Controller
of Labour, G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1926.
Wagstaff, Major-General Cyril Mosley (1878-1934)
United Services College and Berkhamsted School. Entered
Royal Engineers, 1897; p.s.c.; North-West Frontier, 1908;
G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1911-14; G.S.O.1, 5th Australian
Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, Liaison Officer, H.Q., American
Expeditionary Force, 1917-18; B.G.G.S., British Mission to
A.E.F., 1918-19; Commandant, R.M.A., 1930-34.
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Wake, Major-General Sir Hereward (1876-1963)
Succeeded his father as 13th Baronet, 1916. Eton and R.M.C.
Joined K.R.R.C., 1897; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902
(wounded, despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.3, War Office, 1910-11;
G.S.O.3, G.H.Q., 1914-15; G.S.O.2, I Corps, 1915, and War
Office, 1916; G.S.O.1, Gist Division, 1916-17; B.G.G.S.,
Supreme War Council, Versailles, 1917-19; retired, 1937.
Author of an article, The Four-Company Battalion in Battle
in the Journal of the RUSI (November 1914) and (with W.F.
Deedes) Swift and Bold (1949). Member of a gentry family
with a long record of military service. Elder brother of
Vice-Admiral Sir St. Aubyn Wake. His daughter married the
son of Major-General G.P. Dawnay (q.v.), 1939.
Walcot, Lieutenant-Colonel Basil (1880-1918)
Charterhouse. Entered Royal Engineers, 1900; p.s.c.; South
Africa, 1902; specialemployment, War Office, 1906-09; Staff
Captain, War Office, 1909-11; G.S.O.3, Eastern Command,
1913-14; G.S.O.3, II Corps, 1914-15; D.S.O., 1915; G.S.O.2,
Second Army, 1915-16; G.S.O.1 (Intelligence), Second Army,
1916; G.S.O.2, 63rd Division, 1916-17; died 14 September
1918.
Walker, Brigadier-General Henry Alexander (1874-1953)
Militia. Joined Royal Fusiliers, 1894; p.s.c.; Somaliland,
1902-04; Nandi, 1906-07 (despatches) ; Somaliland, 1908-10
(despatches); Central African Rifles and King's African
Rifles, 1901-10; Brigade-Major, India, 1914-14; Brigade-
Major, Dehra Dun Brigade, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 8th Division,
1915; G.S.O.1, 40th Division, 1915-17; G.S.O.1, 65th
Division, U.K., 1917; G.O.C. 16th Brigade, 1917-19
(seriously wounded losing his left arm, October 1918);
Inspector-General, King's African Rifles, 1927-31; retired,
1931.
Walker, Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Bridgwood 'Hooky'
(1862-1934)
Shrewsbury; Jesus College, Cambridge; and Militia. Joined
D.C.L.I., 1884; transferred to Border Regiment, 1904;
Soudan, 1884-85; Egypt, 1885-86; North-West Frontier, 1897-
98; South Africa, 1899-1902 (D.S.O.); G.S.O.]., India, 1912-
14; B.G.G.S., A.N.Z.A.C. Corps, M.E.F., 1914-15; G.O.C. New
Zealand and 1st Australian Brigades, Gallipoli, April - May
1915; 1st Australian Division, Gallipoli, Egypt and France,
1915-18 (wounded twice); 48th Division, Italy, 1918-19; C.-
in-C., Italy, 1919; G.O.C. Southern Command, India, 1924-28;
retired, 1928. Excellent trainer and widely respected.
Walker, Major-General William George (1863-1936)
Son of Deputy-Surgeon-General W.M. Walker, I.M.S.
Haileybury, St. John's College, Oxford, and R.M.C. Joined
Suffolk Regiment, 1885; transferred to Indian Army (4th
Gurkha Rifles), 1887; Miranzai Expedition, 1891; Waziristan,
1894-95; Somaliland, 1903-04 (despatches, V.C.); O.C. 4th
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Gurkha Rifles, 1910-15; Sirhind Brigade, 1915; 2nd Division,
1915-16; Assistant Censor, 1917-18; retired, 1919.
Wallace of that Ilk, Colonel Robert Francis Hurter (1880-
1970)
Charterhouse and New College, Oxford. Joined Royal Highland
Regiment, 1902; p.s.c., 1910; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1911-13;
Brigade-Major, 18th Brigade, 1913-14; severely wounded,
November 1914; G.S.O.2, War Office, 1916-17; G.S.O.2,
G.H.Q., 1917; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1917-18; Assistant Director
of Staff Duties, G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1923.
Wanless O'Gowan, Major-General Robert (1864-1947)
Son of E.J. Smith of Dublin, reverted to family name, 1895.
Educated privately. Joined Scottish Rifles, 1886;
transferred to East Lancashire Regiment, 1906; South Africa,
1899-1901 (severely wounded, despatches); District Inspector
of Musketry, Southern District, 1901-03; D.A.A.G. (for
Musketry), North East District, 1903-05; Officer i/c.
Musketry Duties, Northern Command, 1905-06; A.Q.M.G.,
Eastern Command, 1914; A.A.G., L. of C., 1914; A.A. &
Q.M.G., 6th Division, 1914-15; G.O.C. 13th Brigade, 1915;
31st Division, 1915-18; retired, 1920.
Wardrop, General Sir Alexander Ernest (1872-1961)
Son of Major-General A. Wardrop. Haileybury and R.M.A.
Entered Royal Artillery, 1892; B.G.R.A., Guards Dvision,
1915-16; B.G.R.A., XIV Corps, 1916-18; M.G.R.A., Third Army,
1918-19; Q.M.G., Inida, 1930-33; G.O.C. Northern Command,
1933-37; retired, 1937. Author of Modern Pig-sticking
(1914) and Indian Big Game (1923).
Watkis, General Sir Henry Buickley Buriton (1860-1931)
R.M.C. Joined 6 Foot, 1878; transferred to Indian Army
(31st Bengal Infantry), 1881; Tochi Field Force, 1897-98
(despatches); Bazar Valley, 1908; G.O.C. Abbottabad and
Lucknow Brigades, 1907-11; 3rd Lahore Division, 1912-15
(sacked); retired, 1919.
Watson, Brigadier-General Charles Frederic (1877-1948)
Wellington College and Militia. Joined Royal West Surrey
Regiment, 1898; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches,
D.S.O.); G.S.O.3, 2nd Division, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, 23rd
Division, U.K. and France, 1915-16; G.S.O.l, 23rd Division,
1916-17; G.S.O.l, G.H.Q., E.E.F., 1917; G.O.C. 180th
Brigade, E.E.F., 1917-21 (wounded); Rangoon Brigade, Burma,
1927-31; retired, 1931.
Watson, Major-General Sir David (1871-1922)
Canadian. Public School, Quebec. Journalist and managing
director of the Quebec Chronicle from 1901. Commissioned
into the 8th Royal Rifles of Quebec, 1900; O.C. 8th Royal
Rifles, Canada, 1911-14; 2nd Canadian Battalion, 1914-15;
5th Canadian Brigade, 1915-16; 4th Canadian Division,
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1916-19.
Watt, Brigadier-General Donald Munro (1871-1942)
Fettes and R.M.C. Joined Gordon Highianders, 1891;
transferred to Indian Army (2nd Gurkha Rifles), 1896;
p.S.c., 1907; Chitral, 1895; Tirah, 1897-98; Somaliland,
1904; G.S.O.1, 25th Division, 1915-16; O.C. T.F. Battalion
of the West Riding Regiment, 1916; 145th Brigade, 1916-18
(wounded, D.S.O., 1915, and Bar, 1918); retired, 1920.
Watts, Lieutenant-General Sir Herbert Edward (1858-1934)
Militia; joined 20 Foot, 1880; transferred to 14 Foot, 1880;
South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); G.O.C. No. 9 District,
1910-14; retired, 1914; 21st Brigade, 1914-15; 7th Division,
1915-17; XIX Corps, 1917-19.
Weatherby, Lieutenant-Colonel James Thorpe (born 1877)
Winchester and Magdalen College, Oxford. Joined Oxfordshire
and Buckingharnshire Light Infantry, 1899; p.s.c.;
Somaliland, 1903-04; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1912-14; G.S.O.1,
47th Division, 1916 (sick); G.S.O.1, War Office, 1916-17;
G.S.O.1, 61st Division, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1918;
Assistant Military Secretary, G.H.Q., 1918-19.
Webb-Bowen, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Tom Ince (1879-1956)
Militia; joined Bedford Regiment, 1899; transferred to
R.F.C., 1912; North-West Frontier, 1902; Somaliland, 1904;
Instructor, Central Flying School, 1913-14; O.C. 2nd
Squadron R.F.C., B.E.F., 1914-15; Assistant Commandant,
C.F.S., 1915-16; G.O.C. 2nd Brigade, R.F.C., 1916-17; 4th
Brigade, R.F.C., 1917-18; 2nd Brigade, R.F.C., 1918; retired
from R.A.F., 1933. Always immaculately turned out and had a
reputation for being a martinet.
Webber, Brigadier-General Norman William "Squib (1881-1950)
Bradfield College and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1899;
p.s.c., 1914; South Africa, 1901-02; G.S.O.1, 2nd Canadian
Division, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, A.A., G.H.Q., 1917-18; B.G.G.S.,
G.H.Q., 1918; B.G.G.S., Fifth Army, 1918; B.G.G.S., Canadian
Corps, 1918; Deputy Director of Mobilisation, War Office,
1918-19; retired, 1921. His father was killed in action on
the Somme, July 1916!
Weber, Colonel William Hermann Frank (1875-1936)
Charterhouse and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1894;
p.s.c., 1907; South Africa, 1899-1900 (despatches); G.S.O.2,
North Midland Division, 1914; G.S.O.1, 46th Division, 1914-
15; G.S.O.2, Lahore Division, 1915 (wounded); G.S.O.l, 30th
Division, 1915-17 (D.S.O., sacked); retired, 1924. Author
of A Field Artillery Group in Battle and A Novice on the
Nile.
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Western, Major-General Sir William George Balfour (1861-
1936)
Victoria College, Jersey. Joined 50 Foot; Royal West Kent
Regiment, 1880; Soudan, 1884-85; North-West Frontier, 1897-
98 (wounded, despatches); South Africa, 1900-02 (despatches,
C.B.); Instructor, R.M.C., 1893-94; G.S.O.1, 3rd Division,
1908-10; O.C. No.8 District, Southern Command, 1911-15;
Commandant, Lines of Communication, M.E.F., 1915; Base
Commandant, M.E.F., 1915-16; Major-General i/c Southern
Command, 1916-17; D.A.G., Italy, 1917-18; D.A.G., Egypt,
1918-19; retired, 1920.
Wethered, Colonel Joseph Robert (1873-1942)
Radley and R.M.C. Joined Gloucestershire Regiment, 1893;
p.s.c.; South Africa, 1900-02; D.S.O., 1916; G.S.O.1, 57th
Division, 1917-18; retired, 1926. Brother of Brigadier H.L.
Wet he red
Whetherly, Lieutenant-Colonel William Stobart (1879-1955)
Uppingham and R.M.C. Joined 7th Dragoon Guards, 1898;
transferred to 19th Hussars, 1916; p.s.c.; South Africa,
1899-1902; G.S.O.1, 71st Division, U.K., 1917-18; G.S.O.1,
67th Division, U.K., 1918; G.S.O.1, 61st Division, 1918-19;
retired, 1921.
Whighain, General Sir Robert Dundas "Bob" or "Whigwarn" (1865-
1950)
Fettes and R.M.C. Joined Royal Warwickshire Regiment;
p.s.c.; Egyptian Army, Soudan, 1898 (despatches); South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O.1, War Office,
1912-14; G.S.O.1, 2nd Division, 1914 (wounded); B.G.G.S., I
Corps, 1914-15; B.G.G.S. (Sub-Chief), G.H.Q., 1915; Deputy
C.I.G.S., War Office, 1915-18; G.O.C. 59th Division, 1918;
62nd Division, 1918-19; A.G. to the Forces, 1923-27;
retired, 1931.
White, General Sir (Cyril) Brudenell Bingha.m (1876-1940)
Australian. Eton School, Queensland. Militia, 1896;
entered Royal Australian Artillery, 1899; South Africa,
1902; p.s.c., 1906; served on Imperial General Staff, 1908-
11; D.M.O., Australia, 1912-14; G.S.a.]., 1st Australian
Division, M.E.F., 1914-15; B.G.G.S., A.N.Z.A.C. Corps,
M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1915-18; M.G.G.S., Fifth Army, 1918-19;
C.G.S., Australia, 1919-23 and 1940. Chairman, Commonwealth
Public Service Board, 1923-28. Killed in aeroplane crash,
13 August 1940. A highly respected staff officer.
Whitton, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Ernest (1872-1940)
Trinity College, Dublin. Joined Leinster Regiment, 1894;
p.s.c., 1904; South Africa, 1902; Assistant Secretary, 1911-
13, and Secretary, 1913-14, Historical Section, C.I.D.
(Official History of the Russo-Japanese War); dangerously
wounded, Ypres, 1914; half-pay for wounds, 1916; G.S.O.2,
War Office, 1916-18; G.S.O.2, (Censorship and Publicity)
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(War Workers), G.H.Q., 1918-19; G.S.O., War Office, 1919-22;
retired, 1922. Author of The Marne Campaign; History of the
Leinster Regiment; History of the 40th Division.
Wieck, Lieutenant-Colonel George Frederick Gardells (born
1881)
Australian. Entered Australian Army, 1912; G.S.O.1, 1st
Australian Division, 1918; G.S.O.1, A.I.F. Depots, U.K.,
1918.
Wigra.tn, General Sir Kenneth "Kitten (1875-1949)
Winchester and R.M.C. Entered Army, 1896; transferred to
Indian Army (2nd Gurkhas Rifles), 1897; Tirah, 1897-98;
Waziristan, 1901-02; Tibet, 1903-04; G.S.O.3, H.Q., India,
1913-14; G.S.O.2, H.Q., India, 1914-15; G.S.O.2, G.H.Q.,
1915-16; G.S.O.1, G.H.Q., 1916-17; B.G.G.S. (O.b.), G.H.Q.,
1917-18; retired, 1936. Brother of Colonel Rt. Hon. Sir
Clive Wigram, later 1st Baron, and Vice-Admiral E. Wigram.
Wilkins, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry St. Clair (born 1867)
Cheltenham. Joined Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1883;
p.s.c.; attached War Office, 1904-06; G.S.O.3, Coast
defence, Irish Command, 1908-12; G.S.O.2, West Riding
Division, 1913-14; G.S.O.1, West Riding Division, U.K.,
1914-15; G.S.O.1, 34th Division, 1915-16; G.S.O.1, 64th
Division, U.K., 1916; retired, 1919.
Wilkinson, Major-General Sir Percival Spearman (1865-1919)
Uppingham and Militia. Joined Northunibrian Fusiliers, 1886;
the Niger, 1897-98; Ashanti, 1900; Inspector-General, West
African Frontier Force, 1909-13; G.O.C. Secunderabad
Brigade, India, 1913-14; Troops at Shorncliffe, 1915; 50th
Division, 1915-18 (wounded, Arras, 1917) ; Inspector of
Musketry, 1918-19; retired, 1923. Brother-in-law of Major-
General Sir John Headlam (q.v.).
Wilicocks, General Sir James (1857-1926)
Educated by Tutors, at Easton, Sornersetshire, and R.M.C.
Joined Leinster Regiment, 1878; Afghan War, 1879-80; North-
West Frontier, 1881, 1891; 1897-98, and 1908; Soudan, 1885;
Burma, 1886-89; Niger, 1899-1900; Ashanti, 1900; South
Africa, 1902; G.O.C. Nowshera Brigade, 1902-07; Northern
Army, India, 1910-14; Indian Corps, 1914-15 (sacked);
Governor of Bermuda, 1917-22; retired, 1922. Author of From
Cabal to Kurnassi (1904); With the Indians in France (1920);
and The Romance of Soldiering and Sport (1925).
Williams, Colonel Arthur Frederick Carlisle (1876-1934)
Elizabeth College, Guernsey, and R.M.C. Joined 4th Hussars,
1896; transferred to Indian Army (31st Lancers), 1897; South
Africa, 1899-1900 (dangerously wounded, despatches, D.S.O.);
G.S.O.1, 4th Division, 1917 (sacked); G.S.O.1, Liaison
Officer with British Force in Italy, 1918-19; retired, 1928.
503
Williams, Brigadier Ernest Morgan (born 1885)
Joined Permanent Australian Military Forces, 1910; G.S.O.3,
Australia, 1911-14; O.C. 4th Australian Pioneer Battalion,
1916; 13th Light Horse, 1916; G.S.O.l, 1st Australian
Division, 1917; G.S.O.2, 3rd Australian Division, 1917;
G.S.O.1, Australian Mounted Division, E.E.F., 1918;
Commandant, Cavalry Corps, School of Instruction, Jaffa,
1918; Staff College, Quetta, 1920-22; Brigadier, 1936.
Williams, Hugh Bruce (later Major-General Sir Hugh Bruce-
Williams) (1865-1942)
Only son of General Sir E.C.S. Williams. Winchester and
R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1894; p.s.c., 1899; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches, D.S.O.); G.S.O., War Office,
1903-05; G.S.O.2, Southern Command, 1906; Secretary, School
of Military Engineering, 1907-08; G.S.O.2, Eastern Command,
1908-11; G.S.O.2, Irish Command, 1912-14; Commandant, L. of
C., 1914-15; M.G.G.S., Second Army, 1915-16; G.O.C. 137th
Brigade, 1916; 37th Division, 1916-19; retired, 1923.
Assumed by deed poll the additional surname of Bruce, 1920.
Williams, Major-General Weir de Lancey (1871-1961)
Son of Lieutenant-General Sir William Williams. United
Services College and R.M.C. Joined Hampshire Regiment,
1891; p.s.c.; Tirah, 1897 (severely wounded); West Africa,
1898 (severely wounded); South Africa, 1899-1902 (severely
wounded, despatches) ; G.S.O.2, Welsh Division, 1913-14;
G.S.O.1, 1/1st Welsh Division, U.K., 1914-18; G.S.O.l,
G.H.Q., M.E.F., 1915; G.O.C. 88th Brigade, M.E.F., 1915;
86th Brigade, M.E.F. and B.E.F., 1915-17; 30th Division,
1917-19; retired, 1923. Brother of Brigadier-General 0. de
L. Williams.
Wilson, Brigadier-General Charles Stuart (1867-1933)
Clifton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers, 1886; South
Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches); employed with the Anglo-
Portugese Boundary Commission, East Africa, 1892-93 and
1898-99; Chief Engineer, XIV Corps, B.E.F. and Italy, 1916-
18; Engineer-in-Chief, Italy, 1918-19; retired, 1923. Elder
brother of Colonel C.E. Wilson.
Wilson, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Fuller Maitland "Fatty"
(1859-1941)
Eton. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1878; Afghanistan, 1878-79;
Mahsud Waziri Expedition, 1881; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); G.S.a., India, 1907-11; G.O.C. 12th Brigade,
1912-14; 4th Division, 1914-15; XII Corps, B.E.F. and
Salonika, 1915-19; retired, 1921. The uncle of Field-
Marshal Lord Wilson of Libya (q.v.) and married in 1884 the
cousin of General Sir Hubert Gough (q.v.) and Major-General
J.E. Gough (q.v.).
504
Wilson, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Hughes (1864-1922)
Marlborough and Militia. Joined Royal Irish Regiment, 1884;
transferred to the Rifle Brigade, 1884; p.s.c.; Burma, 1885-
87 (wounded) and 1887-89; South Africa, 1899-1901; Assistant
D.S.D., War Office, 1904-06; Commandant, Staff College,
1907-10; D.M.O., War Office, 1910-14; M.G.G.S. (Sub-Chief),
G.H.Q., 1914-15; Chief Liaison Officer with the French Army,
1915; G.O.C. IV Corps, 1915-17; Chief Liaison Officer with
the French Army, 1917; G.O.C. Eastern Command, 1917;
C.I.G.S., 1918-22; created Field-Marshal and Baronet, 1919.
Shot dead by Sinn Feiners on the steps of his London house,
22 June 1922. An ebullient and able character whose
reputation was sullied by a notoriety amongst his critics
for political intrigue and his defence of Ulster against the
"papists".
Wilson, Henry Maitland (Field-Marshal Lord Wilson) "Jumbo"
(1873-1950)
Eton and R.M.C. Joined Rifle Brigade, 1900; South Africa,
1900-02; Adjutant, O.T.C., 1911-14; G.S.O.l, New Zealand
Division, 1917-19; C.-in-C., Middle East, 1943; Supreme
Allied Commander, Mediterranean, 1944; Head of British Joint
Staff Mission, Washington, 1945-47; created Field-Marshal,
1944, and Baron, 1946. The nephew of Lieutenant-General Sir
Henry Maitland Wilson (q.v.). An outstanding trainer of
troops and a giant in stature at 6'7".
Wilson, Brigadier-General Sir Samuel Herbert (1873-1950)
Educated privately and R.M.A. Entered Royal Engineers,
1893; p.s.c.; South Africa, 1899-1900; G.S.O.3, War Office,
1906-09; G.S.O.2, War Office; G.S.O.3, R.M.C., 1911;
Secretary (G.S.O.2), Overseas Defence Committee, 1911-14;
G.S.O.1, First Army, 1915-16; B.G.G.S., II Corps, 1916-18;
B.G.G.S. (Secretary, Overseas Defence Committee), 1918-21;
retired, 1923. Permanent-Under-Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 1925-33; retired, 1933.
Wing, Major-General Frederick Drummond Vincent (1860-1915)
R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1880; South Africa, 1899-
1902 (wounded, despatches, C.B.); S.O., R.A., 1907-10;
A.A.G., War Office, 1910-13; C.R.A., 3rd Division, 1913-15
(wounded); G.O.C. 12th Division, 1915; killed with his
A.D.C. by a shell at Loos, 2 October 1915. Very religious.
Wintour, Major-General FitzGerald (1860-1949)
Rossall and R.M.C. Joined 50 Foot, 1880; Egypt, 1882;
Soudan, 18 84-85 (despatches); North-West Frontier, 1897
(despatches); South Africa, 1899-1901 (despatches); G.S.O.l,
Northern Command, 1909-12; Brigadier-General i/c
Administration, Scottish Command, 1912-14; Brigade
Commander, 1914-15; D.A. & Q.M.G., Second Army, 1915-16
(sick); retired, 1918.
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Wood, Brigadier-General Philip Richard (1868-1945)
Joined Royal Irish Fusiliers, 1887; Soudan, 1899 and 1901;
Egyptian Army, 1899-1906; G.O.C. 43rd Brigade, 1915-17; 33rd
Division, 1917 (sacked) ; 139th Brigade, 1918; retired, 1919.
Woodhouse, Major-General Sir (Tom) Percy (1857-1931)
St. Paul's College, Stony Stratford. Entered Army, 1881;
Major, R.A.M.C., 1893; South Africa, 1899-1902 (despatches);
D.D.M.S., Scottish Command, 1909-13; D.D.M.S., Aldershot,
1914; D.G.M.S., G.H.Q., 1914-15.
Woods, Brigadier-General Hugh Kennedy (1877-1864)
Portsmouth Grammar School and R.M.C. Joined South
Lancashire Regiment, 1898; South Africa, 1899-1902
(despatches); O.C. 6/South Lancashire, 1915-16; a Battalion
of the Machine Gun Corps, 1916-17; a Battalion of the Tank
Corps, 1917-18; 2nd Brigade, Tank Corps, 1918-19; retired,
1925. Brother of Rear-Admiral A.R.W. Woods.
Woolicombe, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Louis (1857-1934)
Marlborough and R.M.C. Joined 46 Foot, 1876; transferred 25
Foot, 1877; Afghan War, 1878-80; Burma, 1899-90; Chitral,
1895; North-West Frontier, 1897-98 (despatches); G.O.C.
Allahabad Brigade, 1906-07; Garhwal Brigade, 1907-10;
Highland Division, 1911-14; Eastern Command, 1914-15; Second
Army, U.K., 1915-16; 11th Division, 1916; IV Corps, 1916-18;
Eastern Command, 1918-19; retired, 1920. A son was killed
in action, October 1914.
Wright, Brigadier-General Wallace Duf field (1875-1953)
Militia; joined Royal West Surrey Regiment, 1896; p.s.c.;
North-West Frontier, 1897-98 (severely wounded); Nigeria,
1902-03 (wounded, V.C.); Cameroons, 1914-15; West African
Frontier Force, 1901-04; G.S.O.3, War Office, 1909-11;
Brigade-Major, 3rd Brigade, 1911-13; West African Frontier
Force, 1914-16; G.S.O.2, 55th Division, 1916; G.S.O.1, 18th
Division, 1916-18; B.G.G.S., XVII Corps, 1918-19; retired,
1927. Conservative M.P., 1928-31. Awarded the V.C. for
beating off a Fulani attack by 1,000 horsemen and 2,000 foot
at Kotorkwashi with little more than a platoon of Mounted
Infantry in February 1903.
Wynter, Brigadier Henry Walter (1882-1959)
Eton and R.M.A. Entered Royal Artillery, 1900; p.s.c.;
Brigade-Major, R.A., 7th Division, 1915-16; S.O., R.A., X
Corps, 1916-17; G.S.O.1, X Corps, 1917-18; G.S.O.1, R.A.,
G.H.Q., 1918-19; retired, 1936.
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Yarde-Buller, Brigadier-General Hon. Sir Henry (1862-1928)
Fourth son of 1st Baron Churston. Radley and Militia.
Joined Leicestershire Regiment, 1884; transferred to Rifle
Brigade, 1884; p.s.c.; Waziristan, 1894-95; Soudan, 1898;
Crete, 1898-99; South Africa, 1899-1902 (D.S.O.); S.0., War
Office, 1903-05; Military Attache, Scandinavia, 1906-10;
Assistant Military Secretary to C.-in-C., Ireland, 1910-12;
Military Attache, Paris, Madrid, and Lisbon, 1912-14;
B.G.G.S., British Mission to the French Army, 1914-16;
Military Attache, Scandinavia, 1917-19; retired, 1919.
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APPENDIX 2
BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE BY OCCUPATION















Serving British Army Officer
Serving Indian Army Officer
Retired British Army Officer
Serving Commonwealth Officer
Serving Commonwealth Militia Officer
Serving British Territorial Officer
Serving Royal Marine Officer
British Civilian
Serving Royal Naval Officer
Retired Indian Army Officer
	



































SERVICE OF BRITISH OFFICERS


























9 Royal Flying Corps
10 Army Service Corps
11 Household Cavalry
12 Royal Marines Light Infy.
13 Royal Marines Artillery
14 Army Ordnance Department
































MOST POPULAR CORPS/REGIMENT OF BRITISH REGULAR OFFICERS





































School	 Number	 % of
of	 Sample
Officers	 (700)
1 Eton College	 93
2 Wellington College	 44
3 Harrow School	 38
4 Marlborough College	 35
5 Charterhouse	 33
6 Winchester	 33
7 Clifton College 	 30
8 Cheltenham College 	 26
9 Haileybury	 19
10 Rugby	 19
11 Bedford School	 14
12 United Services College 	 12
13 St Paul's School	 9
14 Fettes	 8
15 Radley	 8
16 Wimbledon School	 8
17 H.M.S. Britannia 	 7
18 Malvern	 7
19 Upp ± ngham	 7
20 Feisted	 6
21 King' s, Canterbury	 6
22 Shrewsbury	 6
23 Brighton College 	 5
24 Sherborne	 5
25 Stubbington House	 5
26 Beaumont	 4
27 Bishop's College, Canada 	 4
28 Duiwich	 4
29 Eastbourne College	 4
30 Merchiston Castle School	 4
31 Repton	 4
32 St Columba's College	 4
33 Sedburgh	 4
34 Victoria College, Jersey 4
35 Edinburgh Academy	 3
36 Newtown College 	 3
37 Ross all	 3


















































Leading school (Eton)	 93	 13
5 leading schools	 244	 35
10 leading schools	 37].	 53
15 leading schools	 42].	 60
20 leading schools	 456	 65
25 leading schools	 483	 69
30 leading schools	 503	 71
35 leading schools	 522	 74
40 leading schools	 537	 77
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APPENDIX 6
UNIVERSITIES ATTENDED BY OFFICERS
University	 Number	 % of
of	 Sample
Officers	 (700)
Oxford University	 25	 3.5
Cambridge University 	 19	 2.5
Trinity College, Dublin 	 7	 1.0
Canadian Universities	 4	 0.5
Australian Universities 	 3	 0.5
Dublin University	 3	 0.5
European Universities	 3	 0.5
London University	 3	 0.5
Aberdeen University	 3	 0.5
Glasgow University	 2	 0.3

















































































































































Occupation	 Number	 % of
of	 Sle
Officers	 (700)






































GRADUATES FROM STAFF COLLEGE












AGE GROUPS OF GRADUATES FROM STAFF COLLEGE
Birth Number	 % of	 Non	 % of	 psc	 % of
of	 Sample	 psc	 age	 age
Officers	 (700)	 group	 group


































































STAFF EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE B.E.F., 1914
Post














Junior General Staff Post





BATTLE EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE B.E.F. IN 1914



































ANALYSIS OF SENIOR OFFICERS
Corps! Number of % of	 psc	 % of	 non	 % of
Regt.	 Officers Total	 group	 psc	 group
COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE B.E.F.

























CORPS COMMANDERS OF THE B.E.F.
Infantry	 19	 40%	 14	 74%
Guards	 6	 12%	 3	 50%
Cavalry	 10	 21%	 6	 60%
Artillery	 7	 15%	 2	 29%




Dominion	 2	 4%	 0	 0%
Total:	 48	 100%	 27	 56%
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Corps! Number	 of % of	 psc	 % of	 non	 % of
Regt.	 Officers Total	 group	 psc	 group
DIVISIONAL COANDERS OF THE B.E.F.
Infantry	 9].	 47.0%	 57	 63%	 34	 37%
Guards	 15	 8.0%	 7	 47%	 8	 53%
Cavalry	 27	 14.0%	 15	 56%	 12	 44%
Artillery	 22	 11.0%	 10	 45%	 12	 55%
Engineers	 9	 4.5%	 5	 56%	 4	 44%
Indian Army 14	 7.0%	 3	 21%	 11	 79%
Marines	 1	 0.5%	 1	 100%	 0	 0%
Dominion	 16	 8.0%	 1	 6%	 15	 94%











ANALYSIS OF STAFF OFFICERS
Corps! Number of %of 	 psc	 %of	 non	 % of
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ANALYSIS OF STAFF AT G.H.Q.
Corps! Number of % of	 psc	 % of	 non	 % of
Regt.	 Officers Total	 group	 psc	 group
C.G.S., G.H.Q.
Cavalry	 2	 100%	 2	 100%	 0	 0%
Infantry	 2	 100%	 2	 100%	 0	 0%
Total:	 4	 100%	 4	 100%	 0	 0%
M.G.G.S., G.H.Q.
Infantry	 3	 75%	 3	 100%	 0	 0%
Guards	 1	 25%	 1	 100%	 0	 0%
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AVERAGE AGES OF ARMY COANDERS
Corps! Number of % of	 psc	 non	 average
Regt.	 Officers Total	 psc	 age
5 August 1914
Cavalry	 1	 100%	 0	 1	 62
10 March 1915
Infantry	 1	 50%	 1	 0	 57
Cavalry	 1	 50%	 1	 0	 54
Total:	 2	 100%	 2	 0	 55
25 September 1915
Infantry	 2	 67%	 2	 0	 57
Cavalry	 1	 33%	 1	 0	 54
Total:	 3	 100%	 3	 0	 56
1 July 1916
Infantry	 2	 50%	 2	 0	 58
Guards	 1	 25%	 1	 0	 52
Cavalry	 1	 46%	 1	 0	 55
Total:	 4	 100%	 4	 0	 54
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Corps! Number of % of	 psc	 non	 average
















































AVERAGE AGES OF CORPS COMMANDERS
Corps! Number of % of	 psc	 non	 average
Regt.	 Officers Total	 psc	 age
5 August 1914
Infantry	 1	 50%	 1	 0	 56
Cavalry	 1	 50%	 1	 0	 53


























































Corps! Number of %of	 psc	 non	 average
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5 August 1914

























































































Corps! Number of %of	 psc	 non	 average
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SCHOOLING OF SENIOR CO?ffANDERS
Corps! Total	 % of	 Public % of	 Non-	 % of
Regt.	 of	 Total	 School group	 Public group
Officers	 School
COZ'ThANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE B.E.F.
Cavalry	 2	 100%	 1	 50%	 1	 50%



































Corps! Total	 % of	 Public	 % of	 Non-	 % of
Regt.	 of	 Total	 School group	 Public group
Officers	 School
DIVISIONAL COANDERS OF THE B.E.F.
Infantry	 90	 46.0%	 65	 72%	 25	 28%
Guards	 15	 8.0%	 14	 93%	 1	 7%
Cavalry	 27	 14.0%	 19	 70%	 8	 30%
Artillery	 22	 11.0%	 14	 64%	 8	 36%
Engineers	 9	 4.5%	 7	 78%	 2	 22%
Indian Army 15	 8.0%	 9	 60%	 6	 40%
Marines	 1	 0.5%	 1	 100%	 0	 0%
Dominion	 16	 8.0%	 2	 13%	 14	 88%











SCHOOLING OF SENIOR STAFF OFFICERS
Corps! Total	 % of	 Public	 % of	 Non-	 % of
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CHANGES IN SENIOR CO(ANDS DURING THE WAR
Year	 Division % of	 Corps	 % of	 Army	 % of
Cozndrs Total	 Comdrs Total	 Comdrs Total
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APPENDIX 19
PROMOTION OF SENIOR COANDERS IN 1914
Of the thirty Divisional commanders in the B.E.F. in 1914 no
less than nineteen (63%) became Corps commanders:
1914: Field-Marshal Lord Allenby, Generals Sir Charles
Fergusson, Sir Charles Monro, Sir Henry Rawlinson, Major-
General Sir Michael Rimington
1915: Lieutenant-Generals Sir Edwin Alderson, Sir Charles
Anderson, General Sir Francis Davies (Gallipoli),
Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Fanshawe, Generals Sir Gough, Sir
Richard Haking, Lieutenant-General Sir John Keir, Generals
Sir Thomas Morland, Sir Thomas Snow, Lieutenant-General Sir
Henry Maitland Wilson (Salonika)
1916: Field-Marshal Lord Byng and General Sir Aylmer Haldane
1917: General Sir Edward Bulf in (Egypt)
1918: General Sir Beauvoir de Lisle in 1918.
No less than six (20%) were killed or invalided:
Major-Generals T.S. Baldock, Sir Thompson Capper, H.I.W.
Hamilton, H.N.C. Heath, S.H. Lomax and Sir Cohn Mackenzie.
Only five (17%) failed to become corps commanders, all of
whom were rather elderly:
Major-Generals Sir Richard Bannatine-Allason, Lieutenant-
General Sir Charles Barter, Major-Generals H.J.S. Landon,
Hon. E.J. Montague-Stuart-Wortley, and General Sir Henry
Watkis.
Furthermore, five (17%) became Army commanders:
Allenby and Monro in 1915; Rawhinson and Gough in 1916; and
Byng in 1917.
Of the twenty-five Brigade commanders in August 1914, only
four (16%), did not become divisional commanders:
Brigadier-Generals W.R.B. Doran, L.G. Drummond, S.P. Rolt
and R. Scott-Kerr.
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while twenty-one (84%) did so in the rapid expansion of
1914, 1915 and 1916.
Of the remaining 165 British and Dominion officers who
obtained command of a Division on the Western Front between
1915 and 1918 only a very few, 20 (or 12%), became Corps
commanders:
1915: Major-General Hon. Sir Cecil Bingham, and General Sir
Walter Congreve
1916: Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Briggs (Salonika),
Field-Marshals Lord Cavan, Lord Home, Sir Claud Jacob and
General Sir Charles Kavanagh
1917: General Sir Arthur Currie, Lieutenant-Generals Sir
Edward Fanshawe, Sir Arthur Holland, Sir Frederick
McCracken, General Sir Ivor Maxse, Lieutenant-Generals Sir
Herbert Watts, and Sir Charles Woolicombe
1918: Generals Sir George Barrow (Palestine), Sir Walter
Braithwaite, Sir George Harper, Sir John Monash, Sir
Reginald Stephens and Sir Cameron Shute
In other words, 145 (88%) failed to progress to Corps level..
Five (56%) of the nine corps commanders in 1914 were
promoted to command of armies:
Field-Marshals Lord Allenby and Earl Haig, Generals Sir
Charles Monro, Sir Henry Rawlinson, and Sir Horace Smith-
Dorri en
Of the 34 corps commanders who served between 1915 and 1918
only five (17%) rose subsequently to army command:
1915: Field-Marshal Lord Plumer
1916: General Lord Home
1917: Field-Marshal Lord Byng
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